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Report on European Competitiveness since the
1994 Industry Council Resolution that established
the basis for the Competitiveness Report. As in
recent editions, competitiveness in this Report is
understood to mean a sustained rise in the stan-
dards of living of a nation and as low a level of
involuntary unemployment possible.
The special theme of this Report concerns the
impact of public policies on economic performance.
Both because of its size and of its involvement in
economic life the public sector exerts an important
influence on economic performance. The first three
Chapters of the Report review the impact of the
public sector on productivity growth, the role of
public sector funding in research and development
and the performance of the health sector, a key
component of the public sector. The following,
Chapter 4, reviews recent developments in the
European automotive sector, a key sector in
Europe’s industrial structure, where government
regulation is significant and where competitiveness
improvements have been realized in recent years.
The final, Chapter 5, discusses the growing integra-
tion of China in the world economy and its implica-
tions for the European economy. These implications
are most pronounced in the case of the new
Member States which are increasingly competing
with Chinese exports.
Productivity Growth 
and the Public Sector
Public policies play a key role in shaping competi-
tiveness and growth in an economy. The effects of
public policies on productivity come about both via
productivity growth in the public sector and via the
effects of public policies – taxation, public spending
and regulations – on the private sector. Chapter 1
discusses the effects of public policies on produc-
tivity mainly by means of a literature review.
Public sector activities carry a large weight in the
overall output of an economy: public employment
accounts for between 10 % (Germany) and 30 %
(Sweden) of all jobs in EU-15 Member States.
Labour productivity within the public sector is thus
a major determinant of average labour productivity
at the national level.
Difficulties in the measurement if public sector
output as well as the lack of internationally
harmonised data often inhibit comparisons of
public sector productivity across countries. Available
studies suggest that there is scope for further
improvements in public sector efficiency in the EU,
and that the current public sector output could be
achieved at a significantly smaller cost. There is also
some evidence suggesting that smaller govern-
ments are more efficient, pointing to the existence
of declining marginal products of public spending
beyond a given size of government.
Reforms in the public sector are often a response to
pressures to curb public spending, seek to raise
economic growth or aim at introducing innovations
which are already in use in the private sector, such
as information technology. Chapter 1 identifies
three types of reforms that have been applied by
many EU countries in order to enhance the effi-
ciency in the public sector: (i) management
reforms; (ii) introduction of information technology;
and (iii) privatisation and outsourcing. Empirical
research suggests that privatisation is usually associ-
ated with increased efficiency, profitability and
capital investment spending.
Taxation is necessary in order to finance govern-
ments. Empirical research on the relationship
between the overall tax ratio (total taxes to GDP)
Executive Summary
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and GDP growth has not yielded conclusive results.
However, there is plenty of empirical evidence on
the distortive effects of specific taxes. High taxes on
labour are found to affect labour market participa-
tion as well the willingness to acquire skills and
human capital. High taxation also acts as a brake on
entrepreneurship, although some authors argue
that the incentive effects may not be very large.
International differences in taxation affect foreign
direct investment flows and may affect productivity
growth in catch-up countries which rely on foreign
investors to acquire new technologies and modern
management methods.
Government spending on areas such as education,
research and development or infrastructure, affects
the production possibilities and costs of private enter-
prises. Government spending is thus a determinant of
competitiveness and affects the location decisions of
international enterprises. Available empirical evidence
suggests that government spending has generally a
positive impact on economic performance; however,
evidence on the net effect of government spending
on the economy remains inconclusive suggesting that
there may be cases where the resources would have
been in a more productive use in the private sector.
Cross-country studies investigating the role of
public capital in explaining productivity growth
differentials provide no clear conclusions: while
many studies find a positive impact, the effect is
often not significant. Recent studies on the impact
of public infrastructures on productivity find either
no significant impact or a small positive impact for
the US, while the estimated impact is higher and
mostly significant for European countries. Moreover,
some studies point to decreasing marginal returns
of public infrastructures, but no such evidence is
found for European countries.
Research has established a link between human
capital and productivity. However, the results are
more ambiguous as to the extent to which govern-
ments should subsidise the educational system. For
both education and research and development
(R&D), the case for government involvement is
often based on the existence of externalities: such
investments have larger benefits to society than an
individual or enterprise can appropriate, thus
leaving private investments at a sub-optimal level.
There is econometric evidence suggesting that
research performed by governments and universi-
ties could have a stronger impact on productivity
growth than business R&D, but by far the largest
productivity effect comes from the absorption of
the results of foreign R&D. The extent to which
public research can strengthen productivity growth
depends also on the exploitation of the results in
the business sector. Finally, some studies conclude
that public R&D has to some extent taken the place
of private research rather than adding to it;
however, most available studies do not find such
substitution effects.
Regulations may promote objectives such as social
goals, consumer protection or the quality of envi-
ronment. At the same time, regulations limit the
choices which individuals and enterprises can make;
and compliance with regulations usually involves
costs. The productivity effects of regulations come
as a by-product and are often hard to measure in
quantitative terms.
A significant part of research focuses on the role of
product market regulation, market entry and
competition policies. Regulations which inhibit
competition are found to have a negative effect on
productivity mainly because they slow down the
technological catch-up. On the other hand, regula-
tions adopted at EU level can have the beneficial
effect of creating a level playing field for all partici-
pants in the market. The largest productivity effects
of liberalisation measures have been found in serv-
ices which have traditionally been most heavily
regulated, in particular network industries such as
telecommunications, postal services, electricity, gas,
railways and air transport. The EU, in particular in
comparison to the US, is seen to place a relatively
heavy regulatory burden on enterprises. It has been
suggested that an increase in competition in
product and labour markets to US levels could raise
euro area GDP by even as much as 12 %.
A large number of studies have identified negative
productivity effects linked to environmental regula-
tions. The results are however disputed by others who
argue that adjustment to environmental regulations
can lead enterprises to discover more cost-effective
production methods, with the cost savings offsetting
the initial compliance cost of the regulations. Finally,
sector- or industry-specific regulations may play an
important role in influencing productivity growth in
individual industries, but a closer analysis of their
impacts falls outside the scope of this Report.
European Productivity,
Innovation and Public Sector
R&D
This chapter analyses empirically the influence of
public support of R&D on output and industrial
European competitiveness report 2004
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innovations in the EU. It investigates two sets of
questions: a) whether publicly financed R&D acts as
complement to industry financed R&D and b)
whether R&D performed in the public sector has a
positive impact on growth and on innovation
output as measured by patents or other proxies for
scientific output. Under the first set of questions -
dealing with the relation between publicly- and
industry-financed R&D - the impact of direct R&D
funding in the form of subsidies and of R&D tax
credits on R&D conducted by the business sector is
analysed as is the relationship between R&D
performed in the public sector – both in public
research institutions and in the higher education
sector – and R&D performed in the business sector.
Using industry-level data for EU countries for the
period 1987-1999, estimation results suggest that
government-financed R&D expenditures comple-
ment domestic industry-financed expenditures on
R&D. Furthermore, using economy-wide data for a
panel of OECD/EU countries for the period 1981-
2002, the results suggest that both direct funding
of business R&D and tax incentives for R&D have a
significant and positive impact on business R&D
spending in OECD and EU countries. However, the
majority of the increase in the average R&D inten-
sity cannot be explained by tax credits or direct
funding. Other factors such as the shift to R&D
intensive industries seem to be more important
than direct support for R&D in explaining the
change in the R&D intensity in the business sector
across EU countries. To the extent that reallocation
of production factors towards high-technology
industries is being hampered by lack of flexibility in
product or factor markets, structural reforms aimed
at rendering markets more flexible will play an
important role in increasing the level of business
R&D across the EU. Another result is the importance
of R&D performed in the public sector for produc-
tivity and spillover effects in the private R&D sector.
Expenditures on R&D performed by universities and
public research organisations are significantly posi-
tively related to business enterprise sector expendi-
tures on R&D, indicating that public sector R&D
and private sector R&D are complements. Further-
more, econometric results using data on OECD/EU
countries suggest that expenditures on R&D in the
higher education sector significantly stimulate
growth of GDP per capita. Finally, public sector
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP has a posi-
tive and significant impact on EPO patent applica-
tions per capita, even after private R&D spending
and country specificities have been controlled for.
The effectiveness of public support to R&D and
innovation is also analysed using firm-level data
from the latest Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Firms from three Member States are studied:
Germany, Finland and Austria. The first country case
study compares the propensity to patent in German
and in Finnish firms and how this propensity
depends on receiving government support and on
participation in innovation cooperation. The second
country case estimates the effect of government
funding for innovation on R&D and on the share of
innovative sales among Austrian firms.
Both studies conclude that the public sector has an
important role to play in innovation by giving finan-
cial support and/or by stimulating R&D coopera-
tion. The largest impact is achieved when collabora-
tion among firms and public funding are present
simultaneously. In Germany, public funding has no
additional impact once firms cooperate already, but
it does have an impact in Finland. In Austria, central
government support increases the companies’ share
in total sales of both products new to the firm and
of products new to the market. The relevance of
collaboration in fostering innovative performance
reflects the importance of the interconnections
between public and private agents in driving inno-
vation. It is precisely in this area that the EU tends
to score low relative to the US where public and
higher education research institutions have devel-
oped a far more effective system of linkages with
the world of innovation.
These results have some implications for public
policy. Given the significant and positive impact of
tax incentives on R&D spending, increasing the
generosity of R&D subsidies may become instru-
mental in increasing business R&D to levels closer
to those of other main world leaders in this area.
This is likely to be particularly true for countries with
little or no tax-based support schemes (e.g. the new
EU Member States and some large EU countries,
notably Germany and Italy for large firms). Firm-
level results suggest that collaboration in R&D activ-
ities accelerate technological diffusion via patents.
Policies should improve the collaboration of public
research organisations with firms and foster tech-
nology transfer through funding and specific
programs. There is also a need to improve the infra-
structure for commercialisation of research findings
such as technology transfer offices and providers of
risk capital.
The analysis also suggests that governments should
provide appropriate funding for R&D conducted by
public institutions, in particular research and devel-
opment in the higher education sector. The role of
higher education research in fostering R&D output
and economic growth reinforces the need to inte-
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grate education policy reforms in the EU efforts to
foster research and innovation throughout the
economy. Government research institutions should
demonstrate the relevance of their work by making
more evident their contribution to economic
performance. However, the decline in funding for
government research organisations in the EU
implies that restructuring will have to be accom-
plished through reallocation of existing resources.
This creates increasing pressure on public sector
organisations to engage in the systematic evalua-
tion of their programs and, clearly, such evaluation
should include researchers and programs as well as
institutions.
Performance 
in the EU Health Sector
Governments intervene both directly through the
provision of funding and indirectly through regula-
tion, in the health sector. Moreover, policies must
balance efficiency concerns with equity a conflict
that can have serious implications for the health
sector’s performance. Chapter 3 discusses issues
related to the performance of the EU health sector.
The health sector accounts for a significant share in
national income and has potentially important
implications for the economy’s competitiveness.
These implications relate not just to the health
sector’s contribution to the well-being of the citi-
zens but also to its more direct contribution to
measured national productivity. An inefficient health
sector using resources wastefully can be a serious
burden to the public sector and to an economy.
The performance of the health sector has implica-
tions for labour mobility and labour market flexi-
bility as, for example, in occupational insurance
schemes.
In general, the health sector is characterized by a
number of market imperfections, including moral
hazard, adverse selection and the presence of exter-
nalities. The literature on health economics empha-
sises the unique nature of this sector so that, unlike
other service industries, it is necessary to analyse its
performance in a wider than otherwise contextual
framework. Its unique features range from its histor-
ical development, with its original concentration on
equity rather than efficiency goals, to a high degree
of government intervention and regulation and to
the important role played by technological change
in determining both expenditure developments and
input use. Information asymmetries make it difficult
to distinguish between activities and outputs,
whereas final outcomes are highly influenced by
extraneous influences such as lifestyle. Thus,
performance is difficult to measure as is drawing
conclusions about the relative efficiency of systems
of health services provision and their impact on
competitiveness.
There are considerable differences in the structure
of the health care system in the EU. Current health
care systems are characterized by diversity in both
the funding and delivery of health care. Efficiency
and equity considerations, but also in order to
promote productivity growth, have led recently
many Member States to embark upon reforms of
their systems of health care provision. Although
rapid advances in technology have been responsible
for much of the increase in health expenditure, this
must be weighed against the considerable benefits
that they produce in terms of improvements in
health outcomes.
Both aggregate and micro studies reveal some weak
evidence linking increased expenditure on health
care to better outcomes, with the evidence some-
what stronger in the case of microeconomic studies.
There is mixed evidence on the relationship
between health expenditure and outcomes based
on macro aggregate indicators. Health sector
productivity may well be affected by changes to the
system of health care provision, with supply-side
incentives influencing the use of treatments and
technology diffusion. However, it is important to
note that much of the observed improvements in
health outcomes appear not to be a result of the
health care system itself but other outside factors
which exert a much greater influence. The evidence
to date, even from microeconomic studies, reveals a
considerable diversity across countries in outcomes,
resource use and adoption of technological
changes. Thus, it is difficult to draw concrete
conclusions. Demand-side incentives, such as cost-
sharing, may also influence health system efficiency,
although there is little by way of concrete evidence
on the impact of such policies.
Currently many EU countries are engaged in a
process of reform with emphasis on efficiency objec-
tives. Despite the paucity of evidence at the country
level, there is general agreement that the rise in
expenditures in health care provision world-wide
requires more consideration of efficiency than has
hitherto been the case. But the pace of reform will be
determined by the historical evolution of systems of
provision and preferences regarding equity. It is
unlikely that there are easy solutions to these issues.
In private market services, for example, a commonly
employed argument is that less competition and
excess regulation in the EU may hinder productivity
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growth. To date there is little hard evidence to
support this thesis but proponents at least can point
to considerably higher productivity in the past
decade in the US, probably the most competitive and
least regulated industrial economy. In the health care
sector, in contrast, the US experience is not
supportive of unfettered competition and deregula-
tion. Although there is a general recognition that
providing greater incentives may enhance efficiency,
there are few academics and certainly fewer policy
makers who would advocate that EU economies
should imitate the US system of health provision. In
particular when equity considerations are given a
significant weight the weaknesses of the US health
care sector become more apparent.
On the input side, there appears to be some scope for
better use of resources, in particular labour. Thus
oversupply of physicians in some EU countries coin-
cide with shortages in others and in many there is
also scope to improve the mix between general and
specialist physicians and nurses. Better and more co-
ordinated training programs may be a policy change
that is worth exploring. Expenditure on pharmaceu-
ticals has been rising and therefore subject to
numerous cost containment reforms. At the same
time, pharmaceuticals contribute enormously to
improvements in health outcomes. A balance there-
fore ought to be achieved between cost containment
and ensuring sufficient incentives for continued inno-
vation. However, far less systematic evidence is avail-
able to compare the role of capital across countries,
in both quantity and quality terms.
Organisational changes play an important role in
economic performance. Recent literature suggests
that productivity improvements can arise from the
use of organizational capital complementing other
investments in traditional capital and in ICT. Many
organizational changes in the health sector reflect
reforms by which Member States seek to find the
appropriate mix of decentralisation and centralisa-
tion in delivery matching individual choice with effi-
ciency. The extent of patient choice varies among EU
countries. Many have chosen to increase choice in
order to improve health outcomes, as well as the
quality of care and patient satisfaction. However, the
literature suggests that the success of such reforms is
dependent on the information available to individ-
uals. Improving the efficiency of the health sector,
securing benefits from advanced technology at
reasonable cost and ensuring equity are major chal-
lenges facing the EU.
Reforms of the health sector are likely to improve the
efficiency of the public sector and to ultimately
contribute to the productivity performance of the
Member States. A principal challenge facing the EU
in coming years concerns a reconciliation of real-
ising efficiency improvements, securing benefits
from advanced technology at reasonable cost and
ensuring fair access to quality health services for all
citizens.
The European Automotive
Sector
This chapter presents a broad picture of the European
automotive industry and seeks to determine how
competitive it is internationally and which are the
sources of its competitiveness. Competitiveness is
defined as the ability of an industrial sector to defend
and/or gain market share in open, international
markets by relying on price and/or quality of goods.
This ability is affected by a wide range of factors,
including framework conditions ranging from
production costs to technological and organisational
innovation, from the regulatory framework to macro-
economic conditions. Given this variety, drawing a
definitive conclusion about the future of the sector is
not possible. Instead, a systematic analysis of
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
(SWOT) draws together the possible implications of
the various elements identified in the Report as rele-
vant to the competitiveness of the industry.
The automotive industry is one of Europe’s major
industries. It contributes about 6 % to total Euro-
pean manufacturing employment and 7 % to total
manufacturing output. Almost 20 % of all R&D in
manufacturing is undertaken by car manufacturers.
The importance of the automotive industry derives
to a large degree from linkages within the domestic
and international economy. There is evidence for
upstream inputs of about up to two times the
volume of value added that the industry produces.
The EU automotive industry is highly concentrated,
with Germany alone accounting for close to half of
total value added. Besides Sweden, Germany and
France, a specialisation in auto manufacturing is
clear in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.
The EU automotive industry has been able to main-
tain its international position both in terms of
exports (where its share has increased considerably)
and in terms of global sales, i.e. worldwide sales,
including the home market, exports and sales to
foreign markets through subsidiaries. This could
only be done by establishing and maintaining a
substantial presence in foreign markets through
which European companies can gather customer
feedback and market information.
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A large and sophisticated home market, in which
European brands dominate, constitutes a first and
decisive competitive advantage for the European
automotive industry. This market presents a wide
variety of consumer demands; it permits the early
commercialisation of innovations as well as strate-
gies of product differentiation. However, this market
is to a large extent mature, most sales are for
replacement of existing cars. Therefore, perspec-
tives for further growth are rather limited.
The EU automotive industry still lags behind the US
and Japan in terms of productivity. The catching-up
process of the EU automotive industry has slowed
down in the last decade despite steep increases in
some Member States. Another increasingly serious
problem is the level of labour costs in some
Member States. Relatively high labour costs and
their negative impact on price competitiveness are a
special threat in light of structural overcapacity in
the global automotive industry.
Enlargement has been a very important development
to the European automotive industry. First, the new
Member States are developing a very dynamic manu-
facturing cluster with high output and export poten-
tial. Second, investment there reinforces the Euro-
pean value chain by adding to it lower cost locations
and permitting more options in combining existing
components and intermediary parts. Third, the Euro-
pean home market is extended too to include a high-
growth potential customer base which displays a
variety of preferences in comparison to the EU-15
Member States. On the other hand, increased
capacity in the new Member States - be it from Euro-
pean or overseas owned plants - will exacerbate
competition and price pressures for existing locations.
The combination of mass production with the
complexity of specific goods such as cars and other
transport equipment makes the risks of failure related
to radical innovations very high. Therefore, processes
and products are developed incrementally. In-house
R&D activities and product engineering are the main
sources of technical progress. Additionally, the work
of specialised suppliers – sometimes research facilities
– is integrated into the value chain.
EU firms have increased their investments in new
products, new processes and new technologies
considerably in the 1990s. Compared to the US and
Japan, the EU has improved its position in terms of
R&D investment. The technological competitiveness
of the European automotive industry rests not only
on the presence of leading car makers but also on
widespread innovation activities within the supplier
part of the industry.
The impact of a new regulation on the automotive
industry is complex. It can vary with the time
horizon and introduce dynamic effects that are diffi-
cult to assess accurately. Measures like new pollu-
tion standards can have a negative effect on the
performance and cost structure of carmakers, chal-
lenging the competitive strength of the industry. At
the same time, dealing with the measures can be
the first step towards new markets and achieving
technology or quality leadership.
World-wide demands to make vehicles safer and more
environment-friendly will continue. These demands
will drive research and innovation; it is of crucial
importance to identify and implement innovative
technical solutions that will become global, thus
giving European industry a first mover advantage.
The key technological problem facing the automo-
bile industry today is the complexity of demands
emanating from society. The need to address
several issues at the same time can make the devel-
opment of technical solutions more demanding as
the underlying physical and technical characteristics
can give rise to trade-offs.
On the other hand, measures that manage to reduce
the wide differences in tax systems should have a
positive impact on the ability of the car industry - and
European consumers - to reap the benefits of oper-
ating within a Single Market. Car market fragmenta-
tion prevents industry from exploiting economies of
scale, or to produce motor vehicles for the entire
Internal Market, applying the same specifications and
contributes to significant variations of pre-tax prices
within the internal market.
Clearly, the competitiveness of the automotive
industry depends on a coherent and cost-effective
regulatory framework. To achieve this, the Commis-
sion is using increasingly the tools of ‘Better regula-
tion’ such as Impact Assessment techniques. Progress
is still to be made, however, in reducing regulatory
complexity and in designing regulations so as to
meet their goals while taking into account possible
conflicts between regulations, their cumulative
impact and their external aspects. These concerns are
of particular importance to the automobile industry.
The Challenge to the EU 
by a Rising Chinese Economy
China’s economic transformation during the last 25
years has been dramatic. Industry has been growing
at an annual rate of 10.9 % between 1979 and
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2002 while GDP by an annual average of 9.0 %
during the same period. These economic trends
were triggered off primarily by the reforms intro-
duced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. Since then,
China has moved from isolation to a gradual inte-
gration in the world economy.
In recent years China has emerged as an important
supplier of goods in international trade following a
path which will undoubtedly lead it to greater
prominence. China is competing with other nations
on the basis of labour abundance but also on the
basis of goods embodying skills and technology.
Chinese exports to the EU include technology-
intensive and knowledge-based products as well as
capital intensive manufactured products and labour
intensive manufactured products. The vast, inex-
pensive work force, combined with the develop-
ment of a knowledge economy provides an excel-
lent basis for the establishment of offshore centres
for the manufacture of a broad range of products
and services. Western direct investment intended
primarily to serve a large and expanding domestic
market but also to supply products internationally,
has led to concerns that jobs in the industrial world
but also in other nations competing with China are
being delocalized and lost. Thus, the opening up of
China poses an important competitiveness chal-
lenge to the advanced industrial nations including
the EU. Among those most vulnerable to this
competitiveness challenge are the new Member
States.
Competition from lower-wage locations is nothing
new for EU industries which have been adapting to
a changing world trade environment, exploiting
‘soft factors’ such as time, customisation, service
and reliability to improve productivity and make up
for labour costs disadvantages. But although the
challenge of China may not be entirely unfamiliar,
the combination of low labour costs and rapidly
developing high technical and research capacities is
less familiar. For EU firms to remain profitable and
compete in segments of the value chain, it is neces-
sary to continue exploiting advantages other than
labour costs. It is necessary to maintain the produc-
tivity advantage by opening up to new areas and
products. Concentrating on products in which old
comparative advantage was held is not sustainable.
But creating high value added jobs requires a
dynamic framework where innovation can spur
productivity and job growth. This will require,
among others, to strengthen R&D efforts and stim-
ulate innovation as well as exploit advantages in
organization, coordination, marketing, logistics, etc.
Currently, institutional conditions for implementing
innovations are better in the EU-15, and also in the
new Member States, compared to China. Yet, the
emergence of China will inevitably lead to a change
in the international division of labour and the place
of the EU in it.
The greatest challenge of the emergence of China
as a prominent trading partner concerns the new
Member States. The new Member States and the
candidate countries have so far offered more attrac-
tive nearshore centres and have provided opportu-
nities for specialization across segments of the value
chain, reflecting their integration into the European
economy since the early 1990s. The metal indus-
tries in particular have entered in a mutually benefi-
cial division of labour between the EU-15 and new
Member States. Despite the promise that enlarge-
ment offers for the division of labour and the loca-
tion of production across the wider Europe, it is not
certain that these will be adequate to respond effec-
tively to China’s challenge. Chinese exports to the
new Member States have been growing at rates
much higher than to the EU-15 for all of the indus-
tries reviewed in the Report - total exports to new
Member States have also grown at a higher rate –
reflecting the fact that their integration into the
global division of labour has progressed significantly
since the mid-1990s. Some employment losses have
also occurred from relocation of activities to China,
notably in the Hungarian electronics industry, indi-
cating that even manufacturing of high-tech, imita-
tion-based, products has been challenged by
China’s low-cost locations.
China’s emergence as a supplier of high-tech prod-
ucts is a reflection of a more general concept under-
taken to upgrade the Chinese economy through a
clear industrial policy the basis of which is to trans-
form knowledge into economic success for
domestic companies. The transition to a market
economy has been accompanied by a regulatory
system and administrative guidance to ensure the
development of internationally viable national
companies with the potential to compete with the
top global players in their markets. Chinese compa-
nies are already playing a crucial role as original
equipment manufacturers (OEM) for the world’s
leading brands and retail labels. However, the
greatest challenge to established Western multina-
tionals and brand owners will ultimately arise from
Chinese brand name producers whose growth
established patterns of international trade have so
far concealed. Europe’s advanced industrial
economies – France, Germany, Italy, and the UK –
will likely be those to experience most notably this
challenge especially as Chinese brands become
entrenched in European markets and outbound
Chinese foreign direct investment rises. In this
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context, European corporations will see a decline in
their competitive edge in new global economic
structures.
The opening up of China provides many opportuni-
ties for European companies and certainly more
than those which emerged with the integration of
Japan or Korea into the world economy. China has
already dismantled many of the barriers to market
access during to process of market reforms and with
China’s access to the WTO new steps towards
market opening will be undertaken. China has
clearly a fundamental interest in developing frame-
work conditions that are supportive of strength-
ening inward foreign direct investment.
Clearly, the Chinese market offers strong long-term
growth opportunities especially for those industries
that are dominated by global multinationals.
Foreign enterprises are establishing themselves in
China to take advantage of growth opportunities
and the prospects for rising real incomes. All the
international brands of the automotive industry and
OEM manufacturers have established local produc-
tion facilities and are in strong competition with
each other to sustain and improve market shares.
Indigenous Chinese enterprises are virtually absent
from these markets and play no independent role.
Success in this market will not only contribute to
raising economic growth but will also make possible
the exploitation of economies of scale that will
confer a strategic advantage to large players to
protect their position against their competitors.
Similar remarks apply to the chemical industry and
also other industries characterized by large-batch
production or the processing of commodities;
production facilities in China will be necessary in
order to protect market shares against competitors
and to sustain their competitive edge.
Some years ago concerns that Japan would become
an economic superpower to sweep away older
industrial economies simply did not materialize. In
retrospect, Japan’s rise and integration in the world
economy contributed, through the exchange of
goods and services and through international
capital flows, not only to economic growth in the
developing world but also to enriching consumers
and producers in the industrial economies. China
offers similar possibilities today. Europe should
design a strategy based on strengthening its
productivity, innovation and competitiveness to
meet China’s challenge and take advantage of the
emerging growth opportunities.
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European Competitiveness Report since the 1994
Industry Council Resolution that established its
basis. Competitiveness in this Report is understood
to mean a sustained rise in the standards of living of
a nation and as low a level of involuntary unem-
ployment as possible.
Recent Competitiveness Reports have reviewed
the diverging growth patterns within Europe and
between Europe and the United States. In the
1990s, the EU and OECD countries have seen
widening disparities in output and productivity
growth. Economic growth patterns in the second
half of the 1990s have diverged from earlier
trends in both Europe and the United States. In
the period since the World War II, Europe regis-
tered higher productivity growth than the US
reflecting a catching up process. Since 1995 this
has been reversed: US productivity growth has
been 1 percentage point higher than Europe’s
while unemployment has been at a historical low
in the US and stagnating at a high level in
Europe.
A theme of this year’s Report concerns the role of
the public sector in the competitiveness of the
European economies. Measuring productivity
growth in the service sector is notoriously difficult
and, especially so, in the public sector. Since the
presence (however measured) of the public sector
is quite substantial not just in the EU but in other
industrialized nations, it is possible that public
sector inefficiencies will ultimately show up in
such measures of economic performance as
productivity growth. Although direct measures of
the importance of the public sector, such as the
share of government expenditure or of revenues
in GDP are indicative of the extent of its involve-
ment in economic activity, another crucial area
that might have a direct impact on incentives to
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engage in economic activity is the web of rules
and regulations that delineate the framework
conditions within which economic activity is
taking place. Despite indirect and conjectural
evidence, especially the effect of these is not easy
to identify empirically. The hypothesis is that the
public sector matters in productivity growth and,
therefore, it is important to consider the influence
of its structure, size, strategy, quality and the effi-
ciency of its activities that impinge upon decision
to produce, work, modernize and innovate in the
EU. A large part of this edition of the Competi-
tiveness Report is concerned with these issues.
The Report comprises five chapters. Chapter 1
reviews the general issues related the role of the
public sector in economic activity. The material
considers issues of taxation, spending and incen-
tives. Measured by the share of public expendi-
ture in GDP, the EU stands out as having the
largest public sector among the triad nations.
Notwithstanding the fact that the size of the
public sector varies considerably across the
Member States, the EU has a significantly larger
share of expenditures for social protection and
general public services than its international
competitors. The evidence on the influence of
public sector activities in aggregate productivity
growth is fragmentary, inconclusive and incom-
plete. With the advent of monetary unification in
Europe, the need for fiscal consolidation but, also
importantly, recognition that the involvement of
the pubic sector in many aspects of economic life
may be harmful to performance, has led to a
reform process undertaken across the Member
States. Clearly, public sector reforms are central
issues in the Lisbon agenda.
Chapter 2 examines issues related to the impact of
public support of R&D on innovation output and
growth. Spending on R&D has drawn significant
Introduction
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attention in recent years. The chapter takes an empir-
ical view, examining the influence of public sector
R&D on output and industrial innovations in the EU
at the firm, industry and country level. The results
confirm that both tax incentives for R&D and direct
funding of business R&D have a significant and posi-
tive impact on business R&D spending. However, the
majority of the increase in the average R&D intensity
cannot be explained by tax credits or direct funding.
Other factors, such as the shift towards R&D inten-
sive industries, appear to be more important than
direct support in explaining the change in R&D
intensity in the business sector across EU countries.
Expenditures on R&D performed by universities and
public research organisations are also found to be
significantly positively related to business sector
expenditures on R&D, indicating that public sector
R&D and private sector R&D are complements and
suggesting the presence of spillover effects from
academic research. Results also suggest that expendi-
ture on R&D in the higher education sector
contributes significantly to growth of GDP per capita,
and that the ratio of public sector R&D to GDP is an
important predictor of EPO patent applications per
capita. Community Innovation Survey (CIS) evidence
at firm level for Austria, Germany and Finland confirm
that the public sector contributes importantly to
innovation through financial support and/or through
stimulating cooperation. The largest impact on inno-
vation occurs when R&D collaboration and public
funding are conducted simultaneously.
Chapter 3 reviews the performance of the health
sector. The efficiency of this large sector undoubt-
edly has implications for measured productivity
growth essentially because it affects resource alloca-
tion in the face of idiosyncratic circumstances –
market imperfections including moral hazard,
adverse selection and the presence of externalities,
are notorious in this sector. Rapid advances in tech-
nology are one reason for increase in health expen-
diture but they also produce improvements in
health outcomes. The evidence that increased
expenditure on health care leads to better
outcomes is generally weak but stronger in the case
of specific disease-based studies.
Efficiency considerations are receiving greater atten-
tion than has hitherto been the case and reforms
are under way in many Member States. On the
input side, there appears to be some scope for
better use of resources, in particular labour – physi-
cians and nurses. Furthermore, as pharmaceuticals
contribute enormously to improvements in health
outcomes, it is necessary to find a balance between
cost containment and incentives provision for
continued innovation. Finally, the role of organisa-
tional change is also important. Realising efficiency
gains, securing benefits from advanced technology
at reasonable cost and ensuring fair access for all
citizens is one of the major challenges facing the EU
in the coming decades.
Chapter 4 examines the competitive position and
recent developments in the European automotive
sector as well as regulation issues impinging on the
sector’s performance. Europe has a strong position
in automotive production and trade and European
companies have established leading international
positions both as exporters and as investors. This
success rests on the large and sophisticated Euro-
pean market which is dominated by local brands.
The industry is under permanent change as globali-
sation, consolidation and restructuring of the value
chain occurs; one such development was the
upgrading of the role of the supplier industry. At
the same time, the European automotive industry
seems to have fully grasped the opportunities of the
recent enlargement of the EU.
The importance of the car in the economy and in
everyday life places it necessarily at the centre of
many, sometimes divergent, regulatory require-
ments. The industry has an interest in the continua-
tion and fruition of the efforts to better regulate. Of
crucial importance will be to identify and implement
innovative solutions that will become global, thus
giving European industry a competitive advantage.
Chapter 5 mainly discusses the challenges the rising
economy of China is posing for the competitiveness
of the EU. The specific economic structures and
factor endowments of the new Member States and
of the candidate countries make them more suscep-
tible to competitive pressure arising from China that
is rapidly integrating in the global economy; the
EU-15 economies, which are significantly more
industrialized, are les vulnerable.
The chapter discusses, first, the driving forces of
China’s recent advance in the global economy as
well as the downside risks inherent in China’s recent
economic and social development; secondly,
China’s role in the global division of labour and
Chinese-European economic relations including
trade patterns and foreign direct investment flows;
and, third, the impact a rising Chinese economy
might have on various industries in the EU and
especially those in the new Member States.
China’s economic transformation during the last 25
years has been dramatic. Industry has been growing
at an annual rate of 10.9 % between 1979 and 2002
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and GDP by 9.0 % during the same period. China’s
exports to Europe include a surprisingly high share of
technology-intensive and knowledge-based prod-
ucts as well as capital intensive manufactured goods.
China’s growing importance as producer of high-
tech products is a reflection of a clear industrial
policy. The opening up of China, given its market
potential and appetite for strategic-sector and
government-driven foreign companies engagement,
provides substantial trading and investment oppor-
tunities for European companies; however, the
greatest challenge to established multinationals and
to brand owners in the industrial world will arise from
Chinese brand name producers whose growth has
been concealed in the traditional patterns of the
international labour division.
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Public policies play an essential role in shaping
competitiveness and growth in an economy. This
Chapter discusses the effects of public policies on
productivity. The public sector affects overall labour
productivity in an economy in two ways:
First, the public sector itself has a large weight in the
overall economy. In Sweden, which has the highest
share of government employment in EU-15, one out
of three jobs is in the government sector (Table 1.1).
The Netherlands has the smallest share of govern-
ment employment, one tenth of all jobs. Due to the
size of government activity, labour productivity in the
21
public sector is an important determinant of average
labour productivity at the national level.
Secondly, the organisation and functioning of govern-
ments affects productivity in the private sector. This
Chapter considers three main channels through which
government action can have an impact on productivity:
• Taxation is needed in order to finance govern-
ments. However, taxes distort relative prices in
the economy and thus influence economic
incentives such as the willingness to work, to
invest or to engage in entrepreneurial activities;
• Government spending on areas such as educa-
tion, research and development or infrastructure
Chapter 1:
Productivity and the Public Sector
Table 1.1: Government employment in EU Member States,US and Japan in 2003, % of total employment
Country Government employment % of total
Sweden 31.7
Denmark 30.4
Finland 25.6
France 23.0
Hungary 17.8
Slovak Republic 21.1
United Kingdom 18.8
Belgium 18.3
Portugal 17.9
Poland 17.4
Czech Republic 16.2
Italy 16.0
Luxembourg 15.4
Spain 15.0
Austria 12.9
Greece 12.5
Ireland 12.0
Germany 11.1
Netherlands 11.0
EU-15 16.7
United States 15.7
Japan 8.7
Source: OECD (2003a).
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influences the development of economic
activity. For example, the development of high-
tech production is often linked to research
activity and depends on the availability of high-
skilled labour;
• Regulations exist in order to correct distortions,
guarantee the basic economic rights and to
promote objectives such as consumer protec-
tion or the quality of environment. At the same
time, regulations limit the choices which indi-
viduals and enterprises can make, and compli-
ance with regulations usually involves costs.
This Chapter starts with a discussion of productivity
within the public sector in Section 1.2. Some recent
studies on public sector efficiency are reviewed,
followed by a brief description of recent reforms.
The remainder of the Chapter is devoted to the
effects of public sector involvement on productivity
in the private sector. Sections 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5
respectively discuss the effects of taxation, public
spending and regulations on private sector produc-
tivity. Section 1.6 concludes. Significant omissions
from the analysis include institutional factors;
industry- or sector-specific regulations; and regula-
tions on labour markets.
1.2 Productivity in the
provision of public services
1.2.1 International comparisons of public
sector efficiency
Most empirical studies on public sector perform-
ance assess either the relative performance of
specific producing units (e.g. hospitals) against each
other, frequently using frontier analysis, or broad
sector aggregates (e.g. health, education, or admin-
istration), assessing performance over time or across
countries. Measurement of public sector output is
more difficult than the valuation of private sector
output, as public services are often provided at a
subsidised price to the customer and no market
prices are available to valuate them. Box 1.1
discusses methodological issues in the measurement
of productivity in the public sector.
Lack of internationally harmonised data often
prevents cross-country comparisons of public sector
productivity across countries. Cross-country studies
on public sector efficiency frequently rely on indica-
tors such as the educational achievement of school
pupils at a given age; infant mortality or life
expectancy; survey results on how managers
perceive the functioning of justice and the extent of
corruption in a given country;1 or macroeconomic
indicators such as GDP per head, economic growth,
or income distribution. Two recent studies which
use such indicators are discussed next.
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) compute
indicators of public sector performance (which
describes the outcomes of public sector activity)
and public sector efficiency (which relates the
outcomes to resource use i.e. public spending) for
a sample of 23 OECD countries in 2000. To estab-
lish indicators of overall public sector perform-
ance, they use selected socioeconomic indicators
for public administration, education, health, infra-
structure, income distribution, economic stability
and economic performance.
In general, the performance differences across
countries are rather small. Countries with small
public sectors (government spending less than
40 % of GDP) on average report the highest
scores in particular for administrative and
economic performance. Countries with large
public sectors show more equal income distribu-
tion.2 Of the individual countries, the highest
performance scores were reported for Luxem-
bourg, Japan, Norway, Austria and the Nether-
lands; the lowest for Greece, Portugal and Italy. It
is worth noting that within the group of 23 OECD
countries, the overall performance score for EU-
153 is clearly below the average (0.94 against a
normalised average of 1.00) and below the scores
of the US and Japan (1.02 and 1.14 respectively).
Afonso et al. (op cit.) subsequently compute indica-
tors of public sector efficiency which relate the
above mentioned performance measures to inputs.
Inputs are proxied by government spending on
each type of activity. While cross-country differences
were rather limited in terms of the performance
indicators, the efficiency scores suggest rather large
differences between individual countries. Countries
with small public sectors report significantly higher
efficiency indicators than countries with medium-
sized or large public sectors. Overall efficiency is
highest in Japan, Luxembourg, Australia, US and
Switzerland. At the other end of the range, Italy,
Sweden, France and Belgium report the weakest
scores. EU-15 ranks below the sample average of
1.04 with a score of 0.94; this compares to 1.26 in
the US and 1.38 for Japan.
1 Examples of data sources include the OECD Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA), World Economic Forum (2003), or IMD (2004).
2 On the link between government size and productivity, see also Section 1.4
below.
3 Weighted average using GDP weights.
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Box 1.1: Measurement of public sector productivity
The most important issues in the measurement of the efficiency in the production of public services are:
• how to define output (output vs. outcome, gross output vs. value added, number of activities vs. deflated expen-
ditures);
• how to define aggregate output over a range of different products;
• how to incorporate exogenous conditions (such as the general health condition of a patient) in the valuation of
efficiency.
Conventional productivity measurement relates outputs to inputs. The intrinsic problem in the measurement of
public sector productivity is the lack of information on the market value of the output. As public services are often
provided to the user at no cost or at a subsidised price, there are no market prices that reflect the value of the serv-
ices.
When market prices are not available for the output of public sector activity, the value of output is usually derived
from input data.4 Inputs are to a large extent provided through the market, and it is therefore easier to value them.
As with private sector activities, inputs can be approximated (a) for labour inputs: by the number of employees
involved or by hours worked, and (b) for capital inputs: by investment outlays.
The construction of an output measure for a particular field of government activity would involve a number of steps
(Baxter 2000): (i) set up a list of all relevant activities in that field; (ii) find a volume measure to describe how the
amount of work in that field is changing over time; and (iii) use weights that are proportional to nominal expendi-
ture on the activities in a base year to produce an aggregate measure for the whole field.
Efforts are being made at national and international level to improve the measurement of public sector output. The
current version of the European System of National Accounts (ESA95) recommends the use of output indicator
methods. Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, attempts to improve price and volume measures of non-market
output, concentrating on the health, education and general administration branches of public services.5 At the
OECD, the Statistics Directorate and the Public Management Directorate (PUMA) consider ways to advance on
public sector output and productivity measurement (OECD, 1999).
National measurement methods have been developed in individual countries. In the UK, the Office for National
Statistics (ONS) has developed genuine output measures for education, health and social security and more recently
for courts, prisons, agricultural intervention, fire, social services and the probation service (Pritchard, 2002).
Since 1994, the productivity of all general government agencies except Ministries in Finland has been measured by
the output indicator method. A questionnaire, sent annually to those units that provide services to external
customers, collects information on the quantities of final products, their shares in terms of cost, income or working
time, as well as on the quantity of labour input and gross expenditures (Lehtoranta and Niemi, 1997).
The Dutch authorities implemented the ‘modified deflator method’ in 1992 to quantify the volume of government
output in the national accounts. This method avoids the estimation of output. Alternative methods, such as the
output indicator approach and the structural determinants method, though they yielded similar results, were
rejected.
4 The value of non-market output is traditionally approximated by summing up the production costs at current prices. To arrive at non-market output in real
terms, the current year cost components (such as labour inputs) are deflated using the relevant inflation rate (e.g. wage inflation).
5 See also the Eurostat Handbook on Price and Volume Measures.
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Graph 1.1 compares public sector performance
with the efficiency at which the results are achieved
in the 23 OECD countries:
• Luxembourg, Japan, Switzerland, Australia and
the US report high performance at a low cost in
terms of public spending;
• The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and
Iceland report above-average performance in
the public sector, but this is achieved at a
disproportionately high cost in terms of public
expenditure;
• The countries close to the average efficiency
line combine low public spending with low
performance (Greece, Portugal, Spain and the
UK), or higher performance with above-average
spending levels (Norway, Austria, Ireland,
Canada and Finland);
• Italy, France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent
New Zealand and Germany, appear as relatively
inefficient in their use of public resources, while
they also score badly in terms of performance.
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) conclude that
the higher performance and efficiency scores of
small governments may suggest that the size of
government could be too large in many industri-
alised countries, leading to the prevalence of
declining marginal products. In interpreting the
results, it is important to keep in mind that the
rankings depend on choices such as the selection of
indicators to measure performance.6
Afonso et al. (2003) also conduct a Free Disposable
Hull (FDH) analysis7 to measure the efficiency of
public spending across the sample of 23 OECD
Graph 1.1: Indicators of public sector performance and efficiency
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Notes: The performance indicator is an unweighted average of performance scores in seven areas of government activity: public administration,
education, health, infrastructure, income distribution, economic stability and economic performance. Indicator values have been normalised with the
average set as 1.00.
The efficiency indicator is computed as the ratio of the performance indicator to public spending on the relevant items (the spending indicator is
expressed as % of GDP, and normalised with the average set as 1.00).
Source: Afonso et al. (2003).
6 Other methodological choices include the decision to give equal weights to
all indicators in the computation of performance scores by area and the
overall performance score (the authors maintain that the results are relatively
robust to moderate changes in weighting), and the choice of spending rela-
tive to GDP as a measure of inputs (the latter assumes that production costs
of public services are proportional to GDP per capita – this may be a good
approximation for labour intensive services such as education, but less so for
items such as infrastructure).
7 FDH is a deterministic production frontier technique to estimate the extent
of slack in government expenditure. In contrast to the related Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA), it does not require a convex production frontier. Input
efficiency scores indicate how much less input a country could use to achieve
the same level of output. Output efficiency scores show how much more
output a country would be able to produce with the same inputs as currently
employed.
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countries. Public sector outputs are approximated
by the performance indicators which were
described above, and inputs are measured by public
spending as a percentage of GDP in 2000. The US,
Japan and Luxembourg are identified as the most
efficient countries in the sample, followed by
Australia, Ireland and Switzerland.
Most of the EU countries lie well inside the produc-
tion possibility frontier, suggesting that the same
results could be achieved with fewer inputs. For EU-
15, the average input efficiency is estimated at
0.73, meaning that the same level of output could
be attained by using 73 % of the inputs which are
currently used.
In a sectoral analysis of education and health activi-
ties of the public sector in selected OECD countries,
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) estimate efficiency
frontiers and compare the results of Free Disposable
Hull (FDH) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).8
In their analysis of education, they use (i) financial
inputs: annual expenditure on secondary education
per student in 1999 (in purchasing power parities),
and (ii) physical inputs, such as hours of instruction
per year and per school in 2000, or the number of
teachers per 100 students in 2000. PISA (the OECD
Programme for International Student Assessment)
survey data on the performance of 15-year-olds are
used as output indicators.
For education, Afonso and St. Aubyn (op cit.) esti-
mate average input efficiencies in terms of output
for all countries considered as ranging between
0.52 and 0.89, depending on the estimation
method used. This means that on average the same
output could be achieved by using 11 % to 48 %
fewer inputs than are currently employed. The
country by country results differ considerably
according to whether inputs are measured in terms
of financial resources or in physical terms. Sweden
and Finland appear as efficient when inputs are
measured in physical terms, but not in terms of
expenditure, which may reflect the relatively high
price of inputs in these two countries. Hungary,
where inputs are rather inexpensive, appears effi-
cient when inputs are measured in financial terms,
but no longer qualifies as efficient when inputs are
measured in physical terms. Mexico, Japan and
Korea are efficient no matter which method is used.
Similar results are obtained for the provision of
health care services. Using as inputs alternatively (i)
per capita health expenditures in purchasing power
parities and (ii) the number of doctors, nurses and
beds; and as output indicator either the infant
survival rate or life expectancy, the estimated input
efficiency in terms of output varies between 0.74
and 0.96 across countries. Sweden is positioned on
the efficiency frontier only when inputs are physi-
cally measured, reflecting comparatively high input
prices. In contrast, owing to their relatively inexpen-
sive inputs, the Czech Republic and Poland are effi-
cient in financial terms, but not efficient in physical
terms. As was the case for education, Mexico, Japan
and Korea are identified as efficient independently
of the method employed. The authors note that the
estimated efficiency scores in both education and
health care may be partly attributable to cross-
country differences in population density, the
composition of population as well as the mix of
public and private funding.
1.2.2 Recent reforms in the public sector
Comprehensive reforms of public administration in
many countries during the 1970s and 1980s have
given way to more targeted reforms. Recent reforms
in the public sector have often been carried out as a
response to pressures to limit public spending, to
strengthen economic performance or to keep up
with the innovations introduced in the private sector,
such as the introduction of information technologies.
Country-specific forces are usually at the root of
public sector reforms (Knox, 2002).
This section will briefly discuss three types of
reforms to enhance efficiency in the public sector:
• Management reforms;
• Introduction of information technology; and
• Privatisation and outsourcing.
Human resources management – wage differentia-
tion, hiring and firing practices, promotion – in the
public sector often differs substantially from that in
the private sector. Improvements in the incentive
structure are seen as a central device to enhance
the performance of the public sector. Measures
such as explicitly defined objectives, incentive
mechanisms to encourage results-oriented manage-
ment, and evaluations of the outcomes have been
introduced in many OECD countries. Reliable
output and performance indicators are a critical
factor for the success of such mechanisms.
Public administration has traditionally operated in a
non-profit environment, and reforms in public 8 See footnote 7.
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management have frequently involved the introduc-
tion of commercial management practices, aiming at
enhanced performance and customer orientation of
public administration. Prominent examples are New
Public Management and Total Quality Management.
The term New Public Management originated in
New Zealand in the 1980s and aims at creating a
management culture that focuses on citizens and
involves accountability for results. It promotes well-
defined targets, contract-like arrangements to
provide performance incentives, and decentralised
budget control through cost centres.
Total Quality Management was first developed for
application in business enterprises, but was later on
introduced also in the production of public services.
It is a ‘person-focused management system with the
main target of continuously increasing customer
satisfaction at the lowest possible cost’ (Lindsay and
Petrick 1997, 20).
Since the 1990s, the introduction of information and
communication technologies has been a major tool to
improve the performance of the public sector. The
introduction of information and communication
technologies, together with the associated changes
in working methods (‘e-Government’) offers the
potential for improvements in the quality of infor-
mation, time savings, and increased speed of
response in interaction with citizens and businesses;
it promotes the establishment of common stan-
dards across public agencies, and encourages the
elimination of redundant systems.
eEurope 2005 Action Plan and the subsequent e-
Government policy9 put forward measures to speed
up the development of e-Government in the EU.
One of the aims is to connect the public adminis-
trations of Member States to broadband by 2005.
The Action Plan proposes i.a. the following: (a)
access to public services for all via multiple plat-
forms (PC, TV, and mobile terminals); (b) new serv-
ices via broadband development; (c) three-year
action plan on electronic public procurement by
2004; (d) development of pan-European services;
(e) one-stop shop for e-Government related activi-
ties of the EU. European Commission (2003a) iden-
tifies Sweden and Ireland as leading countries in the
introduction of e-Government, while Germany and
Belgium are found to lag behind.
The US Government launched a large-scale
programme in 2002 to facilitate the use of informa-
tion technology in the public sector. It includes facili-
ties for disaster management, access to federal and
state level benefit programmes, participation in the
rulemaking processes concerning small business, e-
training courses, a job search engine, and electronic
tax filing services.
Privatisation and outsourcing to private service
providers have been seen as solutions to the incentive
problems in public sector production. Mukherjee and
Wilkins (1999) report on outsourcing via the exten-
sive creation of arms-length agencies and on some of
the problems in achieving the desired goals. Batley
(1999) concludes that the effects of outsourcing have
not been exclusively positive. Particularly in devel-
oping countries, radical outsourcing of service
delivery agencies has resulted in transaction costs
that outweigh the efficiency gains of unbundling. In
general, reforms that attempt to separate purchasers
from providers may reduce accountability.
Empirical research on the effects of privatisation10
suggests that privatisation is usually associated with
increased efficiency, profitability and capital invest-
ment spending. On the other hand, in the short run
privatisation often leads to employment reductions,
which are linked with increased labour productivity
(see Meggison and Netter, 2001, for a survey). Nico-
letti and Scarpetta (2003) find that a gradual move
over some ten years towards the OECD average share
of state-owned enterprises in total value added
boosts annual multi-factor productivity growth by
0.7 percentage points in those EU countries where
government ownership of industries is high, notably
in Austria, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal.
Public-private partnerships are an alternative to
outright privatisations. The involvement of the
private sector can yield benefits by bringing the
projects closer to the market in terms of risk-
sharing, management skills and the quality of public
services.
The remainder of the Chapter discusses the effects
of government policies on productivity in the private
sector. Three channels of influence are considered:
Section 1.3 examines questions of taxation, Section
1.4 deals with government spending and, finally,
Section 1.5 provides a brief overview of the effects
of regulations.
10 See Bennett et al. (2004), Claessens and Djankov (2002), Djankov and
Murrell (2002), Frydman et al. (1999), Gonenc et al. (2000), La Porta and
López-de-Silanes (1999), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Van den Noord
(2002), and Vickers and Yarrow (1988). 9 See European Commission (2003a).
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1.3 Taxation
1.3.1 Introduction
Graph 1.2 shows the evolution of the ratio of total
taxes to GDP in EU-15, the US and Japan. The
average tax ratio in EU-15 increased trendwise until
the mid-1990 and has declined slightly in the
recent years. In 2002, total taxes in EU-15
amounted to 40.5 % of GDP. In the US and Japan,
the tax ratios remain below 30 % of GDP.
Graph 1.3 illustrates the large differences in the tax
burden across the EU-25 member states. In Sweden
and Denmark, the sum of taxes and social security
contributions equals half the value of GDP. At the
lower end of the range, Ireland and Lithuania have
tax ratios just below 30 per cent. The average tax
ratio in EU-25 is 40 per cent, the same level as in
the mid-1990s.
Empirical research on the relationship between the
overall tax ratio (total taxes to GDP) and GDP
growth has not yielded conclusive results. Barro
(1991) analyses the relation between the growth
rate of GDP per capita and the tax ratio. His find-
ings suggest that the tax burden has a negative
impact on a country’s growth performance. This
result has been contested by subsequent studies
that show a slightly positive or insignificant correla-
tion (e.g. Easterly and Rebelo, 1993).
Not only the overall tax burden, but also the
composition of the tax mix is considered as relevant
for the growth performance, as the size of the
incentive effects varies from one type of tax to
another. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) suggest that
there is a relationship between the level of national
income and the composition of overall taxes.
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) find a
growth-reducing impact of distortionary taxes. In
contrast, Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997)
show that the growth effects of changes in the tax
structure (implicit tax rates on capital, labour and
consumption) are negligible.
In the following, two types of taxes are discussed:
(i) taxes on labour; and (ii) taxes which affect entre-
preneurship and innovation.
1.3.2 Labour taxation
The taxation of labour exerts an influence on overall
labour productivity in the economy via two main
channels:
• First, taxes affect the incentives to work;
• Secondly, taxes on labour have an impact on
the incentives for human capital formation.
High taxation can induce more individuals to stay
outside the labour market, or make them work
Graph 1.2: Total taxes in EU-15, the US and Japan in 1980-2002, % of GDP
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
41
43
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
EU 15 USA Japan
Notes: Data for the US and Japan only available until 2001; taxes include social security contributions.
Source: OECD (2003b).
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:16  Pagina 27European competitiveness report 2004
28
shorter hours in exchange for more leisure time.11
Empirical studies suggest that labour taxation influ-
ences the decision to participate in the labour
market, in particular for low-income earners,
married women and single parents. In contrast,
labour supply of males and those in the high-wage
segment of the labour market appears to be quite
insensitive to labour taxation.
Prescott (2004) observes that the lower labour
supply in Europe, and not so much the lower hourly
productivity of labour, accounts for the difference in
living standards against the US. In studying the G-7
countries, he finds that tax rates alone account for
most of the cross-country differences in labour
supply.12 In the early 1970s, Europeans worked
more than Americans, while the opposite is true at
present. Prescott argues that changes in tax rates
since the early 1970s account for most of the
changes in labour supply; significant increases in
taxation in the EU G-7 members after the early
1970s coincide with a relatively large decline in
labour supply.
Within the neoclassical framework, lower employ-
ment should lead to higher average labour produc-
tivity, as the workers with below-average produc-
tivity are the first to exit from the labour market.
However, there are other factors that may work in
the opposite direction. Spill-over effects from
increased employment can enhance the produc-
tivity of skilled workers and of capital, as suggested
in some models of endogenous growth (e.g. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2003). Moreover, when individ-
uals are outside the labour market, their skills dete-
riorate which reduces the potential for future
productivity growth.
Several empirical studies have found significant
positive correlation between measures of human
capital and a country’s growth performance (e.g.
Romer, 1990, Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992),
although the magnitude of this effect is disputed
(Barro and Lee, 1992). Human capital affects
productivity both directly and indirectly:
• First, an increase in human capital directly
improves the quality of labour and therefore its
productivity (Harberger 1996);
Graph 1.3: Tax ratios by EU-25 Member State in 2002
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11 In the standard neoclassical textbook labour-leisure model (see Zagler and
Duernecker, 2003), at a given gross wage, labour taxes affect individual
labour supply decisions through an income effect (higher taxes reduce the
net incomes, and an individual has to work more to maintain the same
income level) and a substitution effect (an increase in taxation reduces the
net income from an hour worked and, at the margin, makes leisure time
more attractive). As these effects work in opposite directions, the total effect
on labour supply is indeterminate.
12 Labour supply is measured as hours worked per person aged 15 to 64. The
study abstracts from a number of other possible factors that may explain
labour supply, such as the number of wage earners in a household.
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• Secondly, as the literature on economic growth
suggests, additional human capital is associated
with  positive spill-overs which affect indirectly
the productivity of labour and capital. In the
activities of high-skilled workers (production,
research), individual productivity also depends
on co-workers’ productivity (Lucas, 1988).
Therefore a higher level of individual human
capital should not only enhance individual
earning capacities but also promote overall
productivity growth in the economy (Caucutt,
Imrohoroglu and Kumar, 2003).
Tax rates and the design of income tax systems
have been found to affect human capital formation.
The primary economic incentive for individuals to
invest in human capital is the expectation of higher
lifetime earnings and future wages (Zagler and
Duernecker, 2003). As higher tax wedges on labour
are associated with lower future net earnings, they
reduce the incentives to acquire skills.
Moreover, a more progressive tax schedule is associ-
ated with higher disincentive effects, as the future
returns on investments in human capital are taxed at
a higher tax rate than the lower earnings without
additional schooling that would be foregone when
engaging in the acquisition of additional knowledge
(Poterba, 2002; Gentry and Hubbard, 2002).
However, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) show
that replacing the progressive U.S. income tax by a
proportional tax can be expected to have only small
effects on skill formation. On the basis of a simulation
study, Trostel (1993) shows that a one percentage
point decrease in the marginal tax rate induces a
long-term increase in human capital of 0.97 %.
1.3.3 Taxation of enterprises
Productivity-enhancing innovations are often intro-
duced to the market by new enterprises. OECD
(2003c), on the basis of data from a firm-level data-
base, shows that new firms in general contribute
positively to industry productivity growth in Euro-
pean countries, and their contribution is higher
than in the US. However, most of the observed
productivity growth at the aggregate industry level
is due to incumbent firms. Moreover, cross-country
differences with regard to the contribution of new
firms to productivity growth are considerable.
This section focuses on the enterprise sector and
discusses two potential channels via which taxation
can influence productivity growth:
• First, taxation affects the incentives to start an
enterprise;
• Secondly, taxation influences enterprises’
investment behaviour and, at the international
level, may influence foreign direct investment
flows.
Robson, Wren (1999) show that higher marginal tax
rates lead to a decline in self-employment rates as
they reduce the return to effort and therefore
discourage entrepreneurial activity. Gentry, Hubbard
(2000) point at the role of the progression of the
tax schedule: a more progressive taxation of busi-
ness incomes disproportionately reduces the after-
tax return of successful entrepreneurs and thus
lowers average returns, hence reducing the incen-
tives for entrepreneurial activity. For the US, they
show that the probability of entry into self-employ-
ment is negatively correlated with the progression
of the tax schedule.
On the other hand, Long (1982) and Blau (1987),
using time series regressions to explore the relation-
ship between marginal federal tax rates and the
rates of self-employment in the U.S., find a positive
correlation. The explanation offered for this result is
that high tax rates induce workers to shift from paid
employment to self-employment where taxes can
be evaded more easily. A number of more recent
studies (e.g. Fairlie and Meyer, 2000; Briscoe,
Dainty and Millett, 2000) conclude that the correla-
tion between tax rates and self-employment is in
general weak and of a limited size. Gordon (1998)
and Cullen and Gordon (2003) point to the impor-
tance of the tax treatment of losses in influencing
the incentives for entrepreneurship.
Several authors stress the importance of capital
gains taxation under imperfect capital markets
(Gordon, 1998; Fuest and Huber, 2003). They
argue that taxes on capital gains realised by venture
capitalists who provide capital to start-ups can lead
to a sub-optimal supply of venture capital and
therefore dampen innovation and entrepreneurship.
Anand (1996) shows that the taxation of capital
gains has a significant influence on the supply of
venture capital in the telecommunication industry.
In contrast, Poterba (1989) argues that cuts in
capital gains taxes are not an effective instrument to
spur innovative activities, as venture capital only
accounts for a small share in investors’ total capital
income.
International tax differentials may distort the inter-
national allocation of capital, impeding the equaliza-
tion of the marginal productivity of capital across
countries. This implies that overall (global) produc-
tivity could be increased by a re-allocation of capital
from low-tax to high-tax Member States. Foreign
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direct investment (FDI) is also an important channel
for the transfer of productivity-enhancing technolo-
gies and management methods. Several empirical
contributions focusing on the US and the UK find
that foreign-owned firms show higher labour
productivity than domestically-owned firms (e.g.
Doms and Jensen, 1998; Griffith, 2003).13
Empirical studies show that FDI displays some sensi-
tivity to international tax differentials, although the
magnitude of the correlation is disputed (for a
review of empirical contributions see Hines, 1999
and de Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). In an empirical
analysis of the sensitivity of the operations of multi-
national corporations to host country taxation,
Mutti and Grubert (2004) show that the location
decisions of US majority-owned foreign affiliates
oriented to export markets are considerably and
increasingly influenced by host country taxation.
In a recent study including the EU Member States,
Gorter and Parikh (2003) find that a one
percentage point reduction in the effective corpo-
rate income tax rate relative to the European mean
in an EU Member State induces investors from the
other Member States to increase their FDI position
by about 4 %. In their meta analysis, covering 25
empirical studies on the impact of corporate taxes
on the allocation of FDI, de Mooij and Ederveen
(2003) find that the median value of the tax rate
elasticity of FDI is about -3.3, i.e. a one percentage
point reduction in the host-country tax rate
increases FDI in that country by 3.3 %.
The case for international harmonisation or co-ordi-
nation of corporate taxation remains disputed.14
The evidence for the past quarter of century in the
EU points to a downward convergence of statutory
corporate income tax rates and effective corporate
tax rates.15
1.4 Public spending
1.4.1 Introduction
Pressures to increase the efficiency of public
spending come from many directions: in many
countries, there is a need to reduce the high levels
of public debt or to cut taxation; simultaneously,
population ageing is leading to an increase in
pension and health expenditures. EU Member
States outline their medium-term budgetary disci-
pline strategies in their Stability or Convergence
Programmes. These often target also the procedural
side of government spending by the use of fiscal
rules (tax, expenditure, budget balance or debt ceil-
ings); extension of the planning horizon; reduction
in the fragmentation of the budget (into extra-
budgetary funds and contingent liabilities).16 In
general, there is an increasing emphasis on the
outcomes of public spending.
In 2003, overall government spending amounted to
49 % of GDP in EU-15. Differences in expenditure
levels across the Member States are large, with the
Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark and France
displaying the highest public expenditures and the
Baltic States and Ireland the lowest (Graph 1.4). In
most EU-15 Member States, the share of public
spending in GDP has declined since the early
1990s.
Over the last 40 years, economists have profoundly
changed the way they seek to quantify the impact of
public expenditures on economic performance. They
have abandoned the traditional Keynesian and
neoclassical macroeconomic frameworks in favour of
an empirically-oriented approach. Current economic
analysis, instead of considering the multiplier effects
of the overall size of government spending, distin-
guishes between the impacts of different types of
government spending. While the available empirical
studies suggest that government spending has some
positive effects on economic performance, the net
effect of the government activities on the economy
often remains ambiguous.
At an aggregated level, Afonso, Schuknecht and
Tanzi (2003; see also section 1.2) analyse the
performance of public sectors in 23 OECD coun-
tries. They find that countries with small govern-
ments (public spending below 40 % of GDP in
2000) in general performed better than countries
with medium-sized or large governments. The
higher public sector efficiency in countries with
small governments points to diminishing marginal
products in public spending.
The results of Afonso et al. (op cit.) stand in contrast
to those of La Porta et al. (1999). The latter carry
out a correlation analysis and report that (a) high
taxes are not necessarily a sign of an inferior
16 See also Joumard et al. (2004).
13 Chapter 4 in European Commission (2003b) discusses the role of foreign
direct investment in boosting productivity growth in the Central and East
European new Member States and candidate countries.
14 For a discussion of the initiatives on company tax harmonisation currently
contemplated on the EU level see e.g. Cnossen (2003), Devereux (2004),
Sorensen (2004) or Zodrow (2003).
15 For the development of nominal corporate income tax rates in the OECD,
see KPMG (2004); for a survey of a number of recent studies on effective tax
rates based on different methodologies, see Schratzenstaller (2003).
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government; (b) the quality of public goods is high
in countries with efficient governments; (c) coun-
tries with larger governments are less corrupt, have
fewer bureaucratic delays, better provision of public
goods, but also higher tax rates; and (d) freer
governments are larger, more efficient, they inter-
vene less and provide better public goods. In the
study by La Porta et al., larger governments on
average perform better with respect to performance
indicators such as the quality of business regulation,
bureaucratic delays and infrastructure quality. The
conflicting results of Afonso et al. and La Porta et al.
may partly be explained by the differences in the
country samples: Afonso et al. consider OECD coun-
tries only, while La Porta et al. include many devel-
oping countries in their sample.
Graph 1.5 compares the size of government and
labour productivity in the total economy across the
Member States. At such an aggregated level, it is
difficult to detect any link between productivity and
government size. Ireland stands out with its high
productivity and low level of government spending.
Also Luxembourg combines a very high level of
productivity with below-average government size.
The three Member States with the highest level of
government spending – Czech Republic, Sweden
and Denmark – display productivity levels below or
close to the EU average. The three Baltic States are
characterised by very low levels of both productivity
and government spending.
The structure of public expenditures in EU-15 is
illustrated in Graph 1.6. By far the largest part of
overall public spending goes to social protection
which amounts to almost 19 % of GDP and is a
major instrument of redistribution. The next two
largest spending items in EU-15 are health and
general public services.17 The high spending on
social protection is the most important single
feature which distinguishes the EU from the US and
Japan (where public spending on social protection
accounts for 7 % and 10 % of GDP respectively).
On health, EU-15 governments spend slightly more
than the US, while the GDP share of education
spending in EU-15 is slightly below that of the US.
17 General public services are composed of expenditures for executive and
legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs; foreign
economic aid; general services; basic research; R&D, general public services;
public debt transactions; and transfers of a general character between
different levels of government. A detailed classification is provided at:
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=4&Lg=1.
Graph 1.4: General government expenditure in EU Member States in 2003, % of GDP
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Graph 1.5: Government expenditures and labour productivity in EU Member States in 2003
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Graph 1.6: Public expenditures by category in EU-15 in 2001, % of GDP
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On defence, EU-15 Member States spend on
average 1.7 % of GDP, less than half of the US
defence spending.
The remainder of this section reviews recent litera-
ture on the productivity effects of government
outlays by type of spending. Outlays on public
infrastructure, education, research and develop-
ment are reviewed in turn.
1.4.2 Physical infrastructure
Physical infrastructure can be seen as a public good,
which should be provided collectively – consumers
and firms can usually not be excluded from
consumption, and one person’s consumption does
not reduce the amount available to others. In empir-
ical studies, infrastructures provided by the public
sector are usually defined as comprising roads and
motorways, water and sewer system, dwellings and
sometimes public research and development capital.
Most studies show that public infrastructures (i)
decrease the costs of firms and contribute to their
production possibilities, and (ii) are an important
factor for attracting firms and start-ups.
European Commission (2003c) provides a survey of
recent studies on the effect of investments in public
capital. The majority of existing work suggests that
public capital has a positive impact on output,
productivity or growth. However, in most studies
the positive impact is not strong, and there are
cases where the impact is insignificant or even
negative. The weak results may reflect the fact that
a large part of public investments only have an indi-
rect influence on productivity (for example, provi-
sion of public housing, or water and sewers).
There is considerably more empirical work available
for the USA than for other economic regions (see
Table 1.2). A number of contributions estimate the
impact of public capital on production and rely on
panel data for the 48 states of continental USA over
the period from 1970 to the end of the 1980s.
Stephan (1997) provides a survey of 15 studies
using such data. Early investigations concluded that
public capital had a positive impact on production,
with an estimated output elasticity with respect to
public capital included between 0.05 and 0.30.
However, more recent studies have not been able to
confirm these findings. Holtz-Eakin (1994), for
instance, argues that an apparent impact of public
capital on value added could be due to neglecting
individual heterogeneity in panel data analysis.
Zegeye (2000) uses very detailed data for a sample
of 1,514 U.S. counties covering the years 1982,
1987 and 1992 and concludes that public capital
significantly increases productivity. The elasticity of
output to capital he finds is relatively small
(between 0.022 and 0.133), but statistically signifi-
cant. Fernald (1999) considers a longer time period
(1953-1989) for 29 U.S. sectors and finds that roads
had an important impact on productivity in the
sub-period 1953-1973; thereafter, the productivity
impact gradually declined to a very low level. The
detailed data Fernald uses, containing information
on vehicles used for production, allow him to
conclude that ‘correlation between productivity and
public capital primarily reflects causation from
public capital to productivity’.
Most contributions for European and Japanese
regions report a positive impact of public infrastruc-
ture on production. Regional data are available for
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan, yielding
estimates for the output elasticity with respect to
public capital which lie between 0.08 and 0.65 (see
Stephan 1997, 2003). Also national-level data have
Table 1.2: Estimates of the impact of infrastructure on production
Surveys Data Results
15 contributions reviewed by
Stephan (1997)
9 studies reviewed by Stephan
(1997)
Time series for economy wide or
sector level, different countries
ε(y;g)=0.30 on average and often 
significant
7 studies reviewed by Stephan
(1997)
Panel of OECD or G7 countries ε(y;g) is only significant in 3 out of 7
studies, in which case ε(y;g)=0.30 on
average
9 papers reviewed by Stephan (1997
and 2003) and Picci (1999)
Panel of regions for different Euro-
pean countries
ε(y;g)=0.20 on average and almost
always significantly different from zero
Panel of 48 U.S. states for the period
1970 to end of the1980s
ε(y;g)=0.15 on average in studies
prior to 1994. This elasticity is not
significant in post 1994 studies
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been used to investigate the impact of variations in
the level of public capital on productivity growth
differentials between countries. However, no clear
conclusions arise from such cross-country compar-
isons; in four of the seven studies, the impact is
insignificant.
Instead of relying on data for different geographic
areas, time series data for a country or for different
industries within a country have been used to relate
temporal variations in the level of the public capital
stock to variations in the level of production (see
Stephan, 1997). Empirical studies using such data
find a positive impact of public capital on produc-
tivity growth. The mean value of the production
elasticity with respect to public capital is about 0.30
and mostly significant. However, two caveats are
worth mentioning: (i) time series variables are often
non-stationary, and (ii) in this framework, it is diffi-
cult to deal with reverse causation from productivity
to public investment.
Finally, instead of estimating the impact of public
capital on the level of output, many studies assess
the effects of public capital on the (private) cost of
production. It can be shown that any production-
enhancing public infrastructure also decreases the
private costs of production. Since cost and input
demand functions are related, this framework
allows one to derive directly the impact of public
infrastructure on private input demands. Musolesi
(2002) reviews 22 papers, published during the last
15 years, using the cost function approach. The
empirical estimates of the cost saving impact of
public infrastructure are in line with those obtained
from the production function approach: on
average, one percent additional public capital
reduces private costs of production by 0.16 percent.
The empirical findings lead to two concluding
observations. First, the outcomes are different for
the US and Europe. Whereas recent studies for the
US find either no significant, or a small positive,
impact of public infrastructure on productivity, the
estimated impact is higher and mostly significant
for European countries. Secondly, some studies
point to decreasing marginal returns in public infra-
structure. This could explain the variety of empirical
results for US regions. Decreasing returns in public
infrastructure may be relevant also for European
countries, but there is no evidence of them yet.
1.4.3 Education
The economic rationale for government involve-
ment in education rests on the existence of exter-
nalities, economies of scale and other market fail-
ures, as well as distributional motives (Hanushek,
2002). If the social rate of return on human capital
is, due to externalities, higher than the private rate
of return, individuals’ investment in human capital
may be sub-optimal. Also capital market imperfec-
tions (difficulty to finance studies) may impede a
socially optimal investment in human capital. Public
expenditures, such as the costless provision of
education, or subsidies to higher education, can be
justified on these grounds.
A vast theoretical literature stresses the importance
of education and human capital for economic
growth: a skilled workforce is more likely to develop
and adopt new technologies, thereby shifting
potential output and productivity upwards.
However, there is no consensual evidence as to
whether the education system is under- or over-
financed by the public sector.
Following Barro (1991), many empirical contribu-
tions report positive correlation between schooling
and growth. This literature, however, is subject to
three important qualifications:
• The strong correlation between schooling and
growth may be a consequence of the omission
of other relevant variables from the analysis;
• Anticipated economic growth may induce
more people to stay longer at schools. Bils and
Klenow (2000) provide empirical evidence of
this. As a consequence, a part of the observed
correlation between schooling and growth is
explained by the fact that expected growth
implies more schooling, not by the fact that
schooling leads to economic growth.
• Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) are unable to find
significant evidence for the presence of external-
ities in schooling. This is in line with Hanushek
(2002, p. 2066) who concludes that: ‘little
evidence exists that distinguishes externalities in
economic growth from simply the impact of
better workers and more human capital’.
The thrust of empirical work that fails to establish a
firm positive relationship between the level of
education and income growth is based on endoge-
nous growth models which treat human capital not
as an input of the production function, but as a
determinant of innovation. In such a setting,
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) were not able to find
a positive contribution of changes in years of
schooling in their growth regressions. In another
strand of the literature, based on an extended
version of the neoclassical growth model in the
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tradition of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992),
human capital is regarded as a factor of production.
Soto (2002) applies this model to empirical estima-
tion and concludes that years of schooling fit well in
a neoclassical production function.
While most contributions consider the relationship
between the quantity of schooling (such as the
number of years spent in education) and growth,
Hanushek and Kimko (2000) analyse the quality of
schooling. To measure quality, they use the cogni-
tive performance of students in various international
tests. They find that differences in the quality of
schooling contribute significantly to explaining
differences in economic performance. Although
Barro (2001) reports similar results, the robustness
of his findings has not yet been confirmed.
Coulombe et al. (2004) analyse panel data of cross-
country growth in 14 OECD countries. Their results
suggest that human capital indicators based on
literacy scores have a positive and significant effect
on the long run levels of GDP per capita and labour
productivity. Neri (2003) includes life expectancy as
an indicator for health in the model, which not only
has a significant impact on growth, but also lowers
the impact of schooling quality.
1.4.4 Research and development18
When the commercial exploitation of an innova-
tion cannot be confined to the firm which
conducted the relevant research, also competitors
will share in the benefits of the research activity.
As a consequence, each individual firm will inno-
vate less than would be optimal from a social
point of view. This has frequently been used as a
justification of government spending on research
and development (R&D) for sustaining an innova-
tive economy.
Whereas the lack of incentives for carrying out R&D
projects was identified by Arrow (1962), first empir-
ical studies trying to measure the rate of return of
R&D appeared soon afterwards. Estimations of the
difference between private and the social rate of
return of R&D were surveyed by Griliches (1992)
and by Griffith (2000). The empirical framework
used to evaluate the impact of public infrastructures
on private productivity is easily extended to analyse
the effects of R&D on productivity. The result that
the social rate of return to R&D is about twice as
high as the private rate of return appears to be a
robust – but not always significant – finding.
Public involvement in research and development
activity can take two forms: (i) government research
at universities or in government laboratories; and
(ii) indirect involvement through financing or subsi-
dising R&D in the business sector. Some studies
have sought to find out whether public spending
on R&D simply replaces private research (substitu-
tion) or whether the public funds lead to an
increase in overall R&D (additionality). David, Hall
and Toole (2000) review the available econometric
evidence accumulated over more than 35 years on
possible crowding out of private R&D. They
conclude that one third of the 33 studies consid-
ered, conducted on all levels of aggregation, report
some kind of substitution, while two thirds do not.
A number of empirical studies attempt to distin-
guish the growth effects of (i) business R&D, (ii)
government R&D and (iii) foreign R&D. Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe (2001) estimate regressions
for 16 OECD countries covering the period 1980-
1998, explaining total factor productivity by the
various R&D aggregates. They find a long-term
elasticity of government and university performed
research on productivity of 0.17, which compares
to 0.13 for business R&D and 0.45 to 0.50 for
foreign R&D.
Part of the impact of public research on overall
productivity is indirect and depends on the
exploitation of the results in the business sector.
Established strong links between public and private
research should enhance this effect. The provision
of high quality scientific, technical and managerial
education is essential to the successful dissemina-
tion of innovation. The result of foreign R&D having
a higher impact on productivity growth than
domestic R&D points to the importance of the
capacity to absorb foreign technology.
1.5 Regulatory framework
1.5.1 Introduction
A basic function of government is to safeguard public
order and safety. In industrialised economies, the
regulatory system seeks to promote many other goals
as well, including public health and safety, social
objectives or the protection of the environment. The
quality of the regulatory system, as well as the effi-
ciency of public administration, affect the production
costs of firms and the ways in which production is
organised. An efficient regulatory system promotes
efficiency and innovation while excessively bureau-
cratic procedures or outdated technical regulations
can harm productivity and competitiveness. 18 See also Chapter 2 of the present Report.
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Since productivity growth is usually not the primary
objective of regulations, the effects on productivity
come as a by-product and are often hard to
measure in quantitative terms. A significant part of
research on regulations and productivity growth
focuses on the role of product market regulation,
market entry and competition policies. These will be
discussed briefly below. A short review of recent
analysis on the role of environmental regulations
closes the section. In many cases, sector- or
industry-specific regulations are particularly impor-
tant for firm productivity but a discussion of sector-
specific rules is outside the scope of this Chapter.
1.5.2 Competition
Competition can be expected to provide incentives
for improved efficiency via three channels (see
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994):
• First, allocative efficiency. Competition leads to an
efficient allocation of resources across markets,
equalizing the marginal rate of transformation to
the marginal rate of substitution. A large body of
literature highlights the importance of market
entry for productivity performance (see for
example Caves, 1998; Geroski, 1995);
• Secondly,  efficient organisation of production
within firms. Competition provides managerial
incentives for the reduction of organisational
slack and X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). A
series of studies in the tradition of principal-
agent theory show that competition induces
firms to be more efficient by reducing their
agency problems (Hart, 1983; Nalebuff and
Stiglitz, 1983; Mookherjee, 1984; Willig, 1987;
Hermalin, 1992);
• Thirdly, competition may lead to increased inno-
vative activity. Empirical support for the
assumption that competition forces firms to
innovate is quite broad (e.g. Nickell, 1996;
Blundell et al., 1995; Geroski, 1990; 1995;
Porter, 2000). A number of economists believe
that the relationship between competition and
innovation has the shape of an inverted U:
introduction of competition into monopolistic
markets enhances innovation until a given level
of market de-concentration. Beyond that point,
higher intensity of competition would reduce
the rents on innovation: atomistic competition
would not necessarily spur innovation.19
Bayoumi et al. (2004) note that the US has a lower
regulatory burden than other countries, which is
reflected in more competitive markets and lower
markups. They use a general equilibrium model to
assess the macroeconomic effects of increased
competition in Europe. Bayoumi et al. (op cit.) esti-
mate that an increase in competition in labour and
product markets to US levels could boost GDP in
the euro area by more than 12 %, as both invest-
ment and hours worked would rise markedly (over
20 % and 10 %, respectively). This is an important
empirical finding and suggests that incompletely
competitive markets in the EU are leading to sub-
optimal economic performance.
Scarpetta et al. (2002) find firm-level evidence
suggesting that a stringent regulatory setting in
product markets has a negative effect on productivity
and on market access by (mainly small- and medium-
sized) firms.
Djankov et al. (2000) note that entry regulation
may be acceptable if it leads to higher consumer
welfare in terms of factors such as product quality,
water pollution, death from accidental poisoning or
the size of the unofficial economy. However, the
authors conclude that the opposite seems to hold:
their empirical ‘results are broadly consistent with
the public choice theory that sees regulation as a
mechanism to create rents for politicians and the
firms they support’.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) estimate the impact of
regulations on multi-factor productivity using indica-
tors of regulation as developed in Nicoletti et al.
(1999). They note that overall regulations have been
substantially reduced since the 1970s. In manufac-
turing, regulatory reforms mostly concerned admin-
istrative simplification and trade liberalisation.
However, reform has been deepest in non-manufac-
turing where, partly due to strong economies of scale
and pervasive market failure, markets were most
restricted by regulations on entry, prices and supply.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (op cit.) conclude that
economy-wide product market regulations that
curb competition and private governance have a
negative effect on productivity, mainly by slowing
down technological catch-up. This effect is
strongest for countries which are further behind the
technological frontier. They estimate that entry
liberalisation in services should boost annual multi-
factor productivity growth in the overall business
sector by about 0.1–0.2 percentage points in coun-
tries like Portugal, Greece and Italy.
Within the services sector, major efforts of market
liberalisation have been made in particular in
19 Empirical evidence for the ‘inverted-U’ is quite strong (e.g. Scherer, 1967;
Scott, 1984; Levin et al., 1985; Caves and Barton, 1990; Green and Mayes,
1991; Caves et al., 1992; Aghion et al., 2002).
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network industries: telecommunications, postal
services, electricity, gas, railways and air transport.
In telecommunications, EU legislation imposed full
competition as from January 1998: although market
concentration remains high, prices declined by
about 23 % between 1996 and 2000 (ECB,
2001).20 Liberalisation in the energy sector procee-
ded at a slower pace.
Bains, Dierx, Pichelmann and Roeger (2002) estimate
that the liberalisation of energy and telecommunica-
tions markets resulted in a reduction of some 1/2
percentage point in the aggregate economy-wide
mark-up. Evidence for individual countries suggests
generally positive effects of liberalisation (see Gagne-
pain and Marin, 2004, for aviation; Friebel et al.,
2004, for the railroad sector; Arocena and Price,
2002, for electricity generators in Spain).
1.5.3 Environmental regulations
Environmental regulations set standards or incen-
tives which induce enterprises to behave in environ-
mentally responsible ways. They may require enter-
prises to change their production methods and
hence involve compliance costs. The effects on
competitiveness and productivity depend on issues
such as the degree of competition on the market
and the method of financing the compliance costs
(productivity may be affected if environmental
improvements are financed e.g. by cutting research
expenditures). In a survey of several empirical
studies on the impact of environmental regulation
on productivity growth, Jaffe et al. (1995) conclude
that ‘empirical analyses of these productivity effects
have found modest adverse impacts of environ-
mental regulation’.
Gollop and Roberts (1983) report that regulating
the emission of electric utilities lowered total factor
productivity by 0.59 percentage points. Gray
(1987) finds that health, safety and environmental
regulations caused total factor productivity in US
manufacturing industries to decrease by 0.44
percentage points on average (that is, 30 % of the
productivity growth). Conrad and Wastl (1995) find
a smaller but growing negative impact of environ-
mental regulations on total factor productivity in
German manufacturing industries. Gray and Shad-
begian (1998) show that regulation crowds out
more productive investments in other areas.
Porter (1990) and Porter and van der Linden (1995)
challenge the conventional view of the exclusively
negative productivity impact of environmental
regulations. Porter and van der Linden (op cit.)
maintain that strict regulations, if properly
designed, can stimulate firms to discover cost-effec-
tive ways of complying with environmental regula-
tion. The revenues from such innovations can
outweigh the compliance costs. Furthermore, firms
may gain first-mover advantages through the devel-
opment of environmental technology which can be
beneficial later on when also other countries intro-
duce stricter environmental legislation. Porter and
van der Linden (op cit.) present case study evidence
in support of their hypothesis.
Porter and van Linden’s (op cit.) work has triggered
a huge body of literature (see for example Haq et al.
2001; Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999; Köppl and
Pichl, 1997; and Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995).
Critiques of the ’Porter hypothesis’ – regulations
stimulate firms to become more innovative – argue
that within rational economic modelling, it cannot
be explained why firms would not see the opportu-
nities for cost-reducing innovations by themselves
in the absence of regulation. Palmer, Oates and
Portney (1995) point out that the message of cost-
less regulation in Porter and van der Linden (op cit.)
distracts attention from the cost-benefit-analysis
which should be at the core of policy decisions.
An increasing number of contributions lend support
to the ‘Porter Hypothesis’. OECD (2001, 9), in
reviewing the environmental achievements of its
member countries, notes that ‘environmental poli-
cies have often provided positive incentives for
economic restructuring and technological innova-
tion.’ According to Lanoie, Patry and Lajeunesse
(2001), while current environmental regulation
lowers total factor productivity growth, past regula-
tions have a positive impact on productivity. Esty
and Porter (2001) find a relationship between envi-
ronmental regulation and competitiveness at
country level. Using an international database on
environmental performance, environmental regula-
tory regimes, economic and legal framework and
economic competitiveness, they find ‘no evidence
that improving environmental quality compromises
economic progress’. On the contrary, strong envi-
ronmental performance appears to be positively
correlated with competitiveness.
1.6 Concluding remarks
This Chapter has discussed various ways in which
government interventions affect productivity and
economic growth. The importance of a high-quality
public service for national competitiveness is widely 20 See also European Commission (2003d).
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recognised: it reaches from the role of the public sector
as an efficient producer of public services to the effects
of modern infrastructure, education and public
research, to taxation and the regulatory system.
In many cases, the productivity effects of govern-
ment action come as a by-product of policies which
primarily target other goals. Productivity effects
may be positive or negative; where trade-offs are
unavoidable, awareness of the costs and benefits
helps policy makers in making their choices.
Over the last ten years, most EU Member States
have been under pressure to curb public spending.
Monetary Union and the Stability and Growth Pact
have set norms on public debt and deficits; interna-
tional tax competition makes it difficult to maintain
tax rates significantly above those of other coun-
tries; and the persistently high unemployment rate
has created pressures to reduce taxes on labour
which are likely adversely to affect work incentives.
Moreover, population ageing has forced govern-
ments to take measures to consolidate public
finances in anticipation of the increasing financing
burden of public pensions.
The pressures on financing the public sector call for a
careful assessment of the justification for each type of
public spending. Two conclusions from the review of
empirical studies in this Chapter are worth recalling.
First, there is some cross-country evidence
suggesting that, despite the reforms which have
been carried out in the public sector in recent years,
many countries should be able to provide the same
public services as today at a significantly lower budg-
etary cost by enhancing the efficiency in their provi-
sion. Productivity improvements in the provision of
public services would free resources for other uses.
Secondly, many types of public spending – such as
education, infrastructure, or research – are identi-
fied as having positive effects on the productivity of
private enterprises. However, there is much more
ambiguity surrounding the estimates of the optimal
extent of government spending on each item: while
an increase in government spending may have a
further favourable effect on growth, in some cases
the additional resources might have been in a more
productive use in the private sector. There is some
evidence suggesting that smaller governments are
more efficient than larger ones, which points to the
existence of diminishing marginal products of
public spending.
Governments that wish to increase public spending
are faced with the need to increase taxes or to raise
debt. As a regulator, governments are less directly
confronted with the economic costs of the regula-
tions, as these tend to fall on producers or
consumers. Nevertheless, regulatory reforms are
high on the agenda in many countries as well as the
EU where the European Commission has adopted
an action plan for Better Regulation.
This Chapter has omitted the discussion of the links
between productivity and the general institutional
and legal framework. Institutions may have a role in
determining productivity performance, but are
outside the scope of the present Report, as are
industry-specific regulations and the regulation of
labour markets.
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Public scientific research plays a key role in techno-
logical change and consequently in economic
growth. Industrial innovation increasingly draws on
scientific research, in particular in information tech-
nology and biotechnology (OECD, 2001).21
In recent years, a number of trends have emerged,
heightening interest in the economic effects of
public research both in policy and academic circles.
Firstly, budget constraints are leading policymakers
to re-evaluate public spending for R&D. Secondly,
public academic research is being asked to
contribute directly to industrial innovations and
economic performance. However, economic returns
are not the primary purpose of scientific research
(OTA, 1986); specific mission goals such as national
security, public health and the exploration of space
are essential parts of public research spending.22
Faced with slower growth in overall public funding
and pressure to generate more economic benefits,
some universities have become more entrepre-
neurial in seeking new sources of funding (Mowery
and Sampat, 2002; OECD, 2002). In addition, a
number of EU countries have implemented or
consider implementing policies to strengthen the
linkages between universities and industry in order
to enhance the contributions of university-based
research to innovation and economic performance.
These policies include encouraging the formation of
science parks located nearby universities, spin-offs
based on university research in science and tech-
45
nology, as well as policies which attempt to stimu-
late university patenting and licensing activities
(OECD, 2002, Mowery, Sampat, 2002).
Furthermore, the public sector is not only a
performer of R&D, but also an important source of
R&D funding in the business sector. In the
Barcelona European Council 2002, the Member
States decided to intensify their efforts to increase
investment in research and technology develop-
ment and close the growing gap between Europe
and its main competitors. Expenditures on business
sector R&D as a percentage of GDP in the European
Union (EU-15: 1.30 % in 2002) lag significantly
behind the US (1.86 % in 2002) and Japan (2.26 %
in 2001) whereas there is virtually no gap in public
sector expenditures on R&D (including the govern-
ment and higher education sector). The gap in
private research investment between the EU and
the US has alarming consequences for the long-
term potential for innovation, growth and the
creation of employment in Europe. For this reason,
the European Council decided to strive to increase
gross expenditures on R&D from 1.9 % to 3.0 % of
GDP in the European Union by 2010 with industry
contributing two-thirds of the total amount of R&D
expenditures (European Commission, 2003a;
2003d).
A significant range of public goods is necessary in a
knowledge-driven economy to create the competi-
tive advantage European countries need to
compete successfully with the most dynamic indus-
trial economies in the world. These public goods
include an effective science and technology base,
incentives for knowledge transfer and business
R&D, the support of conditions fostering innova-
tion, and improvements in human capital endow-
ments both through formal education and long-life
training. To achieve these aims European govern-
ments use different mixes of indirect and direct
Chapter 2:
European Productivity, Innovation 
and Public Sector R&D
21 University researchers have significantly contributed to the development of
ATM switches, digital subscriber lines (DSL) technology, search engines,
medical devices such as magnetic resonance imaging machines and lasers for
a broad medical applications, financial services and logistic services (e.g.
portfolio theory, linear programming and derivative pricing theory). Often,
spin-off companies have commercialized much of these developments
(National Academy of Engineering, 2003).
22 For instance, the outcomes and social benefits of public research in health
include longer lives, better health and lower costs of illness.
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measures to stimulate technological activity. Direct
policies include the funding of government R&D
labs, universities or businesses, the investment in
human capital formation as well as the extension of
patent protection and fiscal incentives for R&D (EC
2003a; Griffith, 2000). Other policies not directly
targeted at R&D may also have a positive impact on
the level of R&D expenditure. These measures
include competition policy and regulation in several
sectors, including pharmaceuticals and telecommu-
nications (Griffith, 2000).
The aim of this chapter is to empirically analyse the
influence that public support in the area of research
and innovation might exert on growth and research
output. There are two important features of public
R&D support. Firstly, the public sector is a
performer of R&D conducted in public institutions
such as universities and government laboratories.
Secondly, the public sector is a source of funding for
research activities performed in the private sector.
The first step in the analysis is to test whether R&D
performed in public institutions such as universities
and government laboratories acts as stimulus to
private investment in R&D or whether it crowds
out, or substitutes for, private activity. Another aim
of this chapter is to investigate whether both direct
subsidies and tax incentives are an effective means
of stimulating private investment in R&D. This will
be investigated econometrically using panel data on
EU/OECD countries and industries.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2001) suggest that
considerable caution is needed in drawing policy
conclusions from empirical analysis at the aggregate
level. Therefore, the study will also analyse the impact
of public support for R&D using firm level data.
The Chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2
presents a brief overview of the literature on the
impact of public sector research and government
support for R&D on private R&D spending, on
industrial innovation and on overall productivity
growth. Section 3 describes some recent trends in
government support for R&D and in public sector
R&D spending in the European Union. This section
also provides a detailed empirical analysis of the
impact of public sector research and government
support for R&D. This section’s starting point is the
relationship between industry and government
funding of R&D at the industry and country level
followed by an investigation of the impact of R&D
performed in public institutions on growth and
research output. Section 4 contains two case
studies; the first investigates to what extent public
subsidies and R&D collaboration are effective in
leading to patent applications based on firm level
data for Finland and Germany. The second case
study concentrates on the experience of Austria and
compares various measures of public support for
innovation. It analyses to what extent the sources of
public support account for higher shares in the sales
of innovative products. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical background
and literature review
2.2.1 Justification for public intervention
in R&D and instruments
Innovative activities of private companies are a key
contributor to wealth creation in economies. The
social benefits of R&D are larger than the private
benefits because some of the generated knowledge
can be used not only by the inventing company but
also by its competitors. Therefore, R&D activity
creates  externalities  which give rise to spill-over
effects. One can speak of externalities when the
action of one party affects the welfare of another
party in ways that do not require payment
according to the existing definition of property
rights. In the case of R&D, the companies bene-
fiting from the general increase in the knowledge
stock do not need to pay for it. While the costs are
fully borne by the inventing company, others can
build on this additional knowledge. Since externali-
ties of R&D activities are positive, firms tend to
under-invest in R&D – they spend less than the
social optimum (cf. Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962).
Companies have some leeway to exclude competi-
tors from research results, for example through
patents or secrecy. However, in these cases research
efforts may be wastefully duplicated.
The market failure manifest in the under-provision
of R&D provides a rationale for government inter-
vention whose aim is to raise R&D expenditure
closer to the socially optimal level by making use of
appropriate instruments. Other than R&D directly
performed by the government sector there are two
instruments commonly employed in order to
achieve this social optimum: tax incentives and
grants. Both of these instruments are market-
compatible in the sense that they aim to induce a
change in behaviour rather than trying to
command it. This aim is achieved by altering rela-
tive prices. The input for production that should be
used more heavily, in our case R&D, is made
cheaper. Tax incentives reduce the cost of the R&D
activity and therefore encourage companies to
invest more in R&D. More specifically, it is possible
to allow an immediate write-off of R&D-related
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expenses, to give R&D tax credits or to allow an
accelerated depreciation of R&D-related invest-
ment. Tax incentives do not discriminate between
R&D projects – they are available for any R&D
activity. This is in contrast with the other important
instrument,  grants. Grants usually match private
R&D expenditures at a certain percentage with
public money (matching grants). The government
can select specific projects, for example those from
which it expects large spill-over effects. Grants allow
the government to influence the investment behav-
iour of companies in a more specific way. It can
therefore be an efficient instrument to achieve
specific objectives.
There are important questions that need be asked
about the efficacy of any government intervention.
Since the aim of government intervention when
using these instruments is the increase of private
R&D expenditure, it is necessary to investigate
whether the public money is really spent on addi-
tional R&D activities (also referred to as input addi-
tionality): does this funding motivate companies to
undertake R&D projects that would otherwise not
be pursued? The danger is that instead of under-
taking additional R&D, companies reduce their own
contribution to R&D as they receive the subsidy.
Government intervention can only be deemed
successful if companies previously not engaged in
R&D activities start to innovate or if existing inno-
vators increase their R&D budget.
Even if R&D subsidies are successful in increasing
R&D activity, it is still not certain whether it is actually
socially beneficial to intervene. In addition to input
additionality, it is of importance that public money
leads to an increase in R&D output (output addition-
ality). It is not sufficient that the money is being
spent, there also needs to be a ‘return’ on this money.
The ‘return’ on R&D subsidies could, for example, be
the development of an improved or cheaper product.
In other words, public funding should stimulate inno-
vations that are valued by society.
A first task is therefore to investigate whether public
subsidies increase private R&D spending; or, in other
words, whether public subsidies are a complement or
a substitute for private R&D expenditure. It is useful
to differentiate between total and net R&D spending
at the company level. Total R&D spending is the sum
of private R&D spending (financed exclusively by the
company) and public R&D subsidies. Net R&D
spending concerns only the privately financed part of
total R&D spending. Thus, if a public subsidy
increases net R&D spending, then a relationship of
complementarity is found, indicating that new R&D
projects have been undertaken or that existing R&D
projects have been enlarged. On the contrary, if a
public subsidy reduces net R&D spending, then a
relationship of substitutability is established (see
David et al., 2000). This indicates that companies
reduce their own contribution to R&D as a response
to the subsidy.23
Economic policy analysis needs to go a step further.
To foster economic growth it is not enough that
resources be spent on innovative activities, it is also
crucial that the innovative activities be successful.
Only in the case of successful innovation activities
will there be a welfare-enhancing effect. An impor-
tant task is therefore the measurement of R&D
output achieved by public subsidies. The research
area of testing the efficacy of public subsidies by
measuring R&D output at the company level is
quite unexplored. Yet it is a necessity if govern-
ments wish to be accountable to taxpayers in the
way they spend their money.
2.2.2 Measuring public intervention 
in R&D activity and its impact
Public activity in the area of R&D can be discussed
from two angles. First, it is possible to describe the
actions of the public sector, i.e. to measure the
degree of public intervention. This includes a
discussion of direct R&D expenditures by the public
sector (for example expenditures for higher educa-
tion or civilian and non-civilian R&D) as well as
government instruments aimed at raising the
economy-wide degree of R&D activity (for example
tax subsidies, tax credits and matching grants).
Secondly, it is equally important to assess the
impact (or effects) of public R&D. These impacts
concern both the additional R&D activity induced
in the private sector and the impact of public R&D
efforts on outcomes such as patents, new products
and labour productivity.24
23 It is not always possible to differentiate between complementarity and substi-
tutability in empirical studies due to lack of information on the size of the
subsidy. Often the available information concerns only total R&D spending
and whether a company receives a subsidy or not. If it is found that public
money increases total R&D spending, it can only be concluded that there is
no total crowding out: a direct (one for one) substitution of public for
private money. When the size of the subsidy is available, complementarity at
the company level can be tested in two ways. In a regression with total R&D
spending as the dependent variable (total R&D = α + β R&D subsidy + ε) one
tests for β>1 whereas in a regression with net R&D spending as the
dependent variable (net R&D = α + β R&D subsidy + ε) one tests for β>0.
24 A main challenge in microeconomic studies measuring the impact of public
innovation intervention is the endogeneity of a company’s decision to
participate in government support programmes. Neither the decision to
apply for a grant nor the probability of receiving a grant is independent of
company characteristics. For example, it is more likely that companies with
outstanding research ideas apply for funding or that the government selects
companies undertaking R&D projects with limited risk and a high success
probability. Another important problem lies in the heterogeneity of compa-
nies. One would expect that companies differ in their reaction to R&D subsi-
dies. For example, the size of the company can be influential. Also, the tech-
nological possibilities differ according to the sector of the company. The
impact of government intervention can also differ according to the general
economic situation: private R&D activity may depend on the economic cycle.
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(A) Measurement of public/government research
and innovation interventions
(a) Government research organisations
The two main public sector R&D performers
comprise higher education and government research
organisations. Government-owned R&D centres are
usually involved in missions in areas such as nuclear
power, agriculture, construction, health and defence
(European Commission 2003b). In recent years, the
environment of government-owned laboratory cen-
tres has changed considerably. These changes can be
seen in the increasing pressure to generate commer-
cial income and technology transfer (Bozeman,
1994; OECD, 2002), in the privatisation or the shift to
private management schemes (Boden et al, 2001), in
the introduction of new business practices and in
reactions to budget constraints imposed by govern-
ments (European Commission, 2003b). In this chap-
ter, the level of R&D activity performed in the
government sector as a proportion of GDP is used as
an indicator of government R&D (GOVERD).
(b) R&D performed by the higher education
sector
Universities and other higher education institutions
are key elements in the science system in all EU
countries. They perform research and train
researchers and other skilled personnel. The role of
universities and scientific research in the innovation
system has broadened in recent years. For example,
according to the OECD, there is a ‘growing
demand for economic relevance’ of research, and
‘universities are under pressure to contribute more
directly to the innovation systems of their national
economies’ (OECD, 1998). In particular, universities
are becoming more dependent on output and
performance criteria and academic research is
increasingly mission-oriented as well as contract-
based (European Commission 2003c; OECD, 1998).
At the same time, universities have established
closer links with business through cooperative
research, networks and exchange of information
(European Commission, 2003c). The other principal
indicator of public sector R&D used in this chapter
is expenditures on R&D in the higher education
sector (or HERD).
When measuring R&D performance in the higher
education and government sector and their evolu-
tion, it should be noted that a large part of the data
for this sector is estimates by national authorities
and that evaluation methods are periodically revised
(see Box 2.2 in section 2.3.1). Furthermore, certain
national characteristics may strongly influence the
performance of R&D by government and higher
education. For example in France, CRNS (Centre
National de la Recherche Scientifique) is classified as
part of the higher education sector, whereas in Italy,
similar research organisations are treated as part of
the government sector (see OECD 2003, Annex 2).
(c) Civilian and non-civilian R&D
The benefits of defence R&D spending have been
the subject of an ongoing controversy (Adams,
2004). Supporters of defence R&D have tradition-
ally argued that defence R&D has produced impor-
tant technology spin-offs to the civilian economy.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is claimed as a
direct result of defence funding. Generations of jet
engines and transport aircraft have been the
product of the concurrent development of military
and civilian applications of common, defence-
funded technologies (Adams, 2004). In this chapter,
a distinction will be made between civilian and non-
civilian R&D government outlays for R&D.
(d) Tax Incentives for R&D
Tax incentives are typically used to provide support
to a broad range of sectors. With tax incentives,
firms decide which R&D projects will be under-
taken. Tax incentives can be more effective in
encouraging long-term expenditures in R&D than
other measures such as R&D subsidies. Further-
more, tax incentives can be less costly and less
burdensome than direct R&D subsidies. Fiscal
incentives for R&D may take various forms. Some
EU countries provide R&D tax credits (European
Commission, 2003a). These are deducted from the
corporate income tax and are applicable either to
the level of R&D expenditures or to the increase in
these expenditures with respect to a given base. In
addition, some countries allow for the accelerated
depreciation of investment in machinery, equip-
ment, and buildings devoted to R&D activities. The
generosity of R&D tax incentives can be measured
by the B-index (Warda, 1996, 2002).25 This is a
composite index computed as the present value of
income before taxes necessary to cover the initial
cost of R&D investment and to pay the corporate
income tax so that it becomes profitable to perform
research activities. Alternatively, the generosity of
R&D tax incentives can be measured by annual
R&D tax credits.
25 The B-index is computed as the after-tax cost of a one Euro expenditure on R&D
divided by one less the corporate income tax rate. The after-tax cost is the net
cost of investing in R&D, taking account of all available tax incentives (corporate
income tax rates, R&D tax credits and allowances, depreciation rates).
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(e) R&D and innovation subsidies
Government-funded R&D performed by business
firms primarily consists of contracts and non-
repayable grants. Other forms of support are guar-
antees for bank loans, conditional loans and
training grants. Government programs allocating
direct subsidies are based on specific selection
criteria. Firms applying for R&D projects must fulfil
some predefined criteria in order to be funded. The
indicators used in this study include government-
funded BERD (Business Expenditure in R&D) as a
percentage of total BERD and as a percentage of
GDP and, alternatively, the level of R&D subsidies at
the micro-level.
(B) Impact measures for public/government
research and innovation intervention
(a) Private sector R&D expenditure
R&D expenditure is an indication of the level of
R&D activity in an economy. It shows the amount
of resources spent to increase the knowledge base.
It is generally safe to assume that higher expendi-
ture levels lead to higher gains in knowledge. R&D
expenditure is widely used in empirical analyses to
measure the magnitude of R&D activity on the
company or the country level.
(b) Private sector innovation expenditure
Innovation expenditure is a broader concept than
R&D expenditure. It recognises that successful
product improvements require more activities than
comprised under the heading of R&D expenditure.
Innovation26 expenditure also includes the purchase
of patents and licenses, trial production and
tooling-up, training of personnel, the acquisition of
embodied technology, industrial design and market
research.
(c) Patents
The number of patent applications is an indicator
for the success of the innovative activities of a
company, since patents relate directly to technolog-
ical enhancements. As such, they are an indication
of the increase in the knowledge stock of an
economy. Additional knowledge is an important
contributor to economic growth. As governments
are interested in bringing the generation of knowl-
edge to a socially optimal level, patents are a useful
indicator to judge the success of these endeavours.
The short time-lag between R&D activity and
patent application adds to its attractiveness as indi-
cator for policy evaluations. National patent offices
and the European patent office publish data on the
number of patent applications that they receive.
Because the data includes the name of the appli-
cant, it is possible to relate the patent applications
to specific companies for a deeper analysis. An
important advantage for empirical research is the
widespread availability of this indicator – patent
office data is available for all developed countries.
Furthermore, since this measure is a by-product of
an administrative process, it is of high accuracy.
Because of these advantages, ‘raw patent counts are
generally accepted as one of the most appropriate
indicators that enable researchers to compare the
inventive or innovative performance of companies’
(Hagedoorn, Cloodt, 2003, p. 1368). A possible
drawback of this indicator is that patents are also
used for strategic purposes that go beyond mere
protection against appropriability by others. There-
fore, firm may patent useless inventions merely to
signal their presence to competitors, to discourage
new entrants, or to enter into cross-licensing agree-
ments. Some firms prefer not to patent, keep their
inventions secret and exploit the time lead on
competitors to reap profits from their inventions.
(d) Products new to the firm
The Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) provide
the share in total sales due to new or improved prod-
ucts as a measure of innovation output. The term
‘new products’ describes a product with new charac-
teristics derived from the combination of existing
technologies or from entirely new technologies.
Cellular telephones with internet access are consid-
ered new products while cellular telephones that
differ from old ones only by their shape or colour are
not considered new. An improved product is a
product with enhanced or upgraded performances,
like ABS braking systems or cordless telephones. Most
economists would agree that consumer utility
increases as the number of products to choose from
increases. Likewise, the productivity of firms is likely
to increase with the range of intermediate inputs, as
modelled in endogenous growth models. In the end,
innovation outputs are a better innovation perform-
ance indicator than innovation inputs like R&D or
innovation expenditures.
The share in sales due to new products can be
considered as a sales weighted average of the
26 The Oslo Manual (Eurostat/OECD, 1997) defines the term ‘innovation’ as
follows: ‘Technological product and process (TPP) innovations comprise
implemented technologically new products and processes and significant
technological improvements in products and processes. A TPP innovation has
been implemented if it has been introduced on the market (product innova-
tion) or used within a production process (process innovation). TPP innova-
tions involve a series of scientific, technological, organisational, financial and
commercial activities’ (p. 47).
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number of new products. New products are not
collected on a systematic basis, whereas sales values
on new products are easier to measure. Moreover,
the simple count of new products does not account
for differences in their value. In the share of innova-
tive sales, a product innovation receives more
weight if it is successful in the market, just like cita-
tion-based patents put more weight in the patents
that receive more forward citations. However, the
measurement of product innovation by the share of
innovative sales has one major drawback: it may
favour smaller firms, especially start-up firms, whose
total sales is mainly composed of new products
even though the absolute sales due to new prod-
ucts is much lower than for some larger firms
producing predominantly unchanged products.27
(e) Products new to the market
The Community Innovation Surveys distinguish
between products new to the firm and products
new to the market. The former correspond to prod-
ucts that the firm introduces for the first time in the
market, but that are not new to the market. The
latter correspond to entirely new products that do
not yet existed on the market. This distinction is
important because it separates true innovation from
imitation. The reasoning behind this distinction is
that the impact on the economy is different
depending on whether the first product of its kind is
introduced (e.g. the mobile phone) or whether
merely a different brand of an existing product is
being produced. Products new to the market
express radical innovations offering opportunities
for further imitation. Products new to the firm, but
not new to the market, instead signal diffusion of
new products in the economy. While both notions
are interesting to analyse, true innovations measure
more fundamental innovation output with poten-
tially more long-lasting effects.
(f) GDP per capita/labour productivity growth
and other output measures of public sector
research
At least some part of the increase in labour produc-
tivity or in GDP per capita can be assumed to reflect
the impact of both public and private sector R&D. It
is clear that government and university R&D have a
direct effect on scientific and basic knowledge.
However, modelling and measuring the productivity
effects of public sector R&D is a difficult task. There
are a number of reasons why it is difficult to
measure rates of return on public sector R&D. It is
well known that public research takes a long time to
affect production. Furthermore, public sector
research may be undertaken for non-economic
reasons and often produces public goods (Smith,
1991). In some cases the productivity effects of
public research cannot be measured because the
results are not accounted for in GDP (Guellec, van
Pottelsberghe, 2003b). For example, health-related
research improves the length and quality of life
which is not taken into account in GDP measures.
Overall, the expected effect of public sector R&D is
positive, yet it remains unclear whether the impact
is similar to private R&D. There are reasons to
suppose that public R&D expenditures might be
less productive at the margin if misdirected
according to political, rent-seeking objectives.
However, there are also reasons for a higher
productivity of public R&D expenditures because
the higher education sector concentrates more on
basic research known to generate more externalities
(Guellec, van Pottelsberghe, 2003b).
The principal output of university and government
research is new knowledge - an output that is diffi-
cult to measure. The economically important
outputs of university research include, among
others, scientific and technological information,
equipment and instrumentation, skills and human
capital, networks of scientific and technological
capabilities and prototypes for new products and
processes (Sampat, 2003). Several useful indicators
and proxies of the outputs of public research exist
(see Box 2.1). One such indicator is publication
counts. This indicator is frequently used to measure
stocks and flows in the world knowledge base. Most
27 For a discussion of various measures of product innovation, see Kleinknecht
(1999).
Box 2.1: Outputs of university research
The outputs of academic research can be classified into two
major categories (National Science Foundation, 1998):
(i) Published outputs of academic research in referred
journals
(a) the output volume of research using article
counts
(b) patterns of research collaboration using multi-
author articles
(c) the use of research outputs in subsequent
scientific research using citation counts
(d) the potential practical utility of these research
outputs using citation to these articles on
patents;
(ii) Patents issued to universities and colleges, i.e. the
number and types of patents and revenue generated
by patents and licenses.
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publications result from research carried out by the
academic sector. Besides the direct outcome of
public sector research – publications and patents -
the other outcomes occur through licensing and by
creating spin-offs. However, it is important to keep
in mind that patents are one of many channels
through which university research contributes to
innovation output. In a survey of R&D managers of
firms in the U.S. manufacturing sector, Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh (2002) asked respondents to
rank different channels through which they learn
from university research. The authors found that in
most industries, the channels reported to be most
important were publications, conferences, and
informal information exchange. Patents and licenses
ranked near the bottom of the list.
In this chapter, scientific/research productivity is
measured as outputs and outcomes related to
inputs. The average number of papers produced by
the researchers (or alternatively, number of papers
in relation to public sector R&D as a percentage of
GDP) is used as an indicator. The relevance and
‘impact’ of those publications can be measured by
looking at the (relative) quantity of citations these
publications receive from other, later, publications.
Here we rely on citations relative to higher educa-
tion sector expenditures on R&D and citations rela-
tive to the sum of HERD and government sector
expenditures on R&D.
(g) Overview on further impact measures
Some other impact measures for public innovation
intervention are available. First, innovation output
can take the shape of new processes instead of new
products. New processes allow existing products to
be produced in a cheaper way, or more efficiently in
terms of work safety or environmental protection.
Second, the Community Innovation Surveys also
contain information on ongoing innovation activi-
ties that have not yet lead to new products and
processes, or that have failed to produce new prod-
ucts or processes. This is an indirect measure of
innovation inputs. Third, CIS 3 asks firms explicitly
about organisational innovations, i.e. changes in the
way to do business. Fourth, another outcome of
R&D activity is cost reduction. If cost reduction
leads to lower prices, then the consumer surplus
increases, whereas the producer surplus increases if
prices are kept constant. This output of R&D is
especially hard to measure because many additional
factors influence cost reductions. Fifth, the count of
patent applications gives equal weight to every
innovation. By using patent counts that are
weighted by the number of citations that the patent
later received, it is possible to give more weight to
more significant innovations. Sixth, by econometric
methods, one can estimate the capacity that a firm
has to innovate and its intensity of innovation once
it has reached the minimum capacity to innovate. It
is then possible to construct from the estimates of
both these two facets of innovation an expected
innovation intensity for any firm given its character-
istics (see Mohnen and Dagenais, 2002 and
Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002).
2.2.3 Overview of the literature 
on the impact of public intervention
2.2.3.1 Impact of public sector research 
on industrial innovation, scientific output 
and overall productivity
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of
public R&D spending investigates either its impact
on output/productivity growth or its stimulative
effect on business R&D. However, few studies inves-
tigate in detail the effects of research performed in
the public sector. Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002)
have reported cross-country regressions that
suggest a negative return on public sector R&D.
Subsequent research showed that the results of this
study may be misleading because it fails to account
for the time delay between public R&D and produc-
tivity outcomes. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe
(2003a) explicitly examine the productivity effects
of public sector R&D using panel data across 16
OECD countries. In particular, the authors analyse
the relationship between national total factor
productivity (TFP) levels and three distinct stocks of
R&D capital based on (i) domestic business-
performed R&D; ii) foreign business-performed
R&D; and iii) public R&D performed in the higher
education sector and in the government sector
(public laboratories). They find evidence for lagged
effects with a three-year time lag for the initial
impact of public sector R&D capital. The long-run
elasticities of total factor productivity with respect to
public sector R&D and business sector R&D capital are
on average 0.17 and 0.13, respectively. Thus, the
long run impact of R&D seems to be higher when it
is performed by the public sector than when it is
performed by the private sector. Furthermore, the
elasticity is higher for countries with a relatively
large share of university-performed research
compared to government laboratory research. The
authors interpret this finding as evidence ‘that
much government performed R&D is aimed at
public missions that do not impact directly on
productivity (health, environment), whereas univer-
sities are providing the basic knowledge that is used
in later stages by industry to perform technological
innovation’. The elasticity of public research is also
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higher where the business R&D intensity is relatively
high, indicating that the spillover benefits of public
research are complementary with corporate re-
search activities.
Another strand of the literature in this field investi-
gates what proportion of firm’s products could not
have been developed without academic research.
Mansfield (1991) illustrates the importance of
academic research to the advance in industrial inno-
vation using U.S firm data in seven manufacturing
industries: information processing, electrical equip-
ment, chemicals, instruments, drugs, metals, and
oil. The author finds that about 11 % of the firms’
new products and about 9 % of their new processes
could not have been developed without substantial
delay in the absence of recent academic research.
Mansfield (1991) also identified inter-industry differ-
ences: the percentages of new products and
processes steaming from recent academic research
are highest in the drug industry. The average time
lag between the conclusion of the relevant
academic research and the first commercial intro-
duction of the innovations based on this research
was about 7 years. Finally, Mansfield (1991) esti-
mated that the social rate of return from academic
research in 1975–78 was 28 %. Using a large
sample of German firms, Beise and Stahl (1999) find
that about 5 % of new product sales could not have
developed without academic research. Overall, one
can conclude that academic research (e.g. scientific
and engineering research) has a direct and signifi-
cant impact on new products and processes and
thus indirectly contributes to economic growth and
productivity. Using time-series data for the US,
Adams (1990) finds that there is a 20-year lag
between the appearance of research in the
academic community and its effect on productivity
as measured by industry-absorbed knowledge.
Another strand of the literature addresses the
spillover effect of academic research performed by
universities and government research organisations
(see Salter and Martin, 2001). The importance of
universities in promoting technical change and
innovation is widely recognized. Studies by Acz,
Audretsch and Feldman (1992), Jaffe (1989) and
Nelson (1986) have found a significant role for
academic research in the innovation process. Jaffe
(1989) has shown at a state level in the US that
university research causes industry R&D and not
vice versa. Another line of previous research of this
type has utilised patent citations to identify positive
knowledge spillovers. Studies, carried out in the US
in particular, show that patents now rely more on
academic scientific publications than they did in the
past. Exploring the relationship among patent text
and the published research literature the authors
find that only 27 % of the papers cited by US
industry patents are authored by industrial scientists
against 73 % written at institutions such as universi-
ties, government labs and other public agencies,
both in the US and abroad (Narin et al., 1997).
However, little work on this topic has been done for
the EU.
The relationship between academic research and
industrial innovation also depends on the structure
of industry. A summary table developed by Marsili
(1999) illustrates the patterns across industries. The
author classified industries in terms of the contribu-
tion of academic research to innovation in each
sector from very high to low (see Table 2.1). Not
surprisingly, examples of industries that have been
closely related to academic knowledge include
computer hardware and software, biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals.
2.2.3.2 Review of studies/reports on the impact
of public/government innovation intervention
on private R&D expenditures and innovation
output
Macroeconomic studies
Macroeconomic studies typically exploit the time
variation in the data. They use private R&D
spending at the country or industry level and
regress it on public R&D spending at the same level
of aggregation. To avoid a spurious relationship
between both variables, it is important to control
for macroeconomic influences that can affect both
private and public R&D (David et al., 2000).
The effect of public basic research on private basic
research has been analysed for the US by Robson
(1993) and Diamond (1998). Both authors find an
effect of complementarity. There are also studies at
country level for panels of OECD countries (Levy,
1990; von Tunzelmann and Martin, 1998) and at
the industry level for Spanish data (Callejon and
Garcia-Quevedo, 2003). For the majority of cases,
complementary effects are found.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2003b) examine the
effect of government funding on business R&D
across 17 OECD countries for the period 1981-
1996. The authors report that government funding
stimulates business R&D expenditure (BERD) if the
government research is contracted to the business
sector, but tends to partially crowd out BERD when
performed in government laboratories. BERD is not
affected by university research. They also find that
tax incentives are effective in stimulating BERD.
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Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2003b) quantify the
average stimulatory effect of direct government
funding of private R&D as a 0.70 marginal increase
in business funded R&D for each dollar of direct
non-defence government funding. This effect is
found to be higher for those OECD countries with
medium levels of subsidisation than for countries,
such as Australia, with lower levels of public
funding. Defence research carried out in the public
sector does crowd out private R&D. They also
report that the positive impact of government
support on corporate research – through both
direct funding and R&D tax incentives – is substan-
tially enhanced when the levels of support are
stable over time.
A related strand of literature investigates the impact
of tax incentives for R&D on private expenditures.
For instance, Bloom, Griffith and van Reenen (2002)
examined the impact of taxes on R&D in eight
countries over a 15 year period. They find that the
considerable variation in the user cost of R&D
within and across countries is induced by the very
different tax systems. The econometric analysis
suggest a quite substantial long-run elasticity of
R&D with respect to user costs of about -1.0 after
controlling for demand, country-specific fixed
effects and world macroeconomic shocks. This
suggests that a 1 % decrease in the user cost of
R&D will lead to a 1 % increase in R&D expendi-
ture. In a review of the literature, Hall and van
Reenen (2000) conclude that the most plausible
estimate of the long-run elasticity of R&D with
respect to user costs of R&D is about -1.0.
Microeconomic studies
A crucial advantage of microeconomic studies is
their ability to control for differences at the industry
and company level. The industries can differ in the
technological opportunities and in the appropri-
ability of returns from innovation. Depending on
the company size, one can expect important differ-
ences in innovative activities across companies.
Studies in this area typically concentrate on one
country and sometimes on a specific industry within
a country.
Microeconomic studies using private R&D activity
as an impact measure of public innovation interven-
tion pose strong requirements on data availability.
They require information on company characteris-
tics  and on public R&D subsidies. These studies
have mostly been conducted for European countries
and the US. The dependent variable of interest is
usually the private R&D expenditure, and the ques-
tion studied is whether public R&D subsidies
succeed in raising private R&D expenditure. Some
studies also use the R&D or innovation intensity as
dependent variable.
Analyses of Spanish firms find a positive effect of
subsidies on private R&D expenditures (Busom,
2000; González et al., 2004). These results are also
confirmed by analyses of the German grant system
(e.g. Licht and Stadler, 2003). The effect of R&D
subsidies has also been tested for Israeli and French
companies, again with a positive result. Toivanen and
Niininen (2000) concentrate on the relationship
Table 2.1: The role of academic research in different industries
Contribution of
Academic Research
High Aerospace
Motor vehicles
Telecommunications and electronics
Electrical equipment
Petroleum
Chemicals
Food
Medium Instruments
Non electrical machinery
Basic metals
Building materials
Low Metal products
Rubber and plastic products
Textiles
Paper
Relevant scientific fields Mathematics, Computer Science,
Mechanical and Electrical Engineering
Biology, Chemistry, 
Chemical Engineering
Very high Computers Pharmaceuticals
Development Activities
Engineering Disciplines (mainly tacit)
Research-based Activities
Basic and Applied Science
Source: Adapted from Marisili (1999) cited in Salter and Martin (2001).
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between credit constraints and the effectiveness of
R&D subsidies. Their empirical study of Finnish firms
suggests that R&D subsidies are most effective when
directed at firms affected by modest credit
constraints. For the US, the Small Business Innovation
Research Programme has been evaluated (Wallsten,
2000) and the author comes to the opposite conclu-
sion: R&D grants are found to crowd out private R&D
expenditure dollar for dollar.
Summing up, the majority of studies on the rela-
tionship between public and private funding of
R&D finds that no complete crowding out takes
place. Due to data restrictions, some analyses
cannot differentiate between ‘no complete
crowding out’ and ‘complementarity’. But among
the studies that are able to do so, many find indeed
that public R&D and private R&D are in a comple-
mentary relationship. This is an important result in
favour of government activities aiming to raise the
economy-wide level of innovative activities.
2.3 The impact of public
sector R&D and government
support for R&D in the EU
2.3.1 General trends in public R&D
This section starts with a brief overview of the major
trends in public sector R&D and publicly funded
business enterprise sector R&D (for an extensive
overview see European Commission, 2003b).
Research and development activities in all EU coun-
tries are performed primarily by three sectors: busi-
ness, institutions of higher education (primarily
universities) and government institutions (see Box
2.2 for definitions of measures). While the EU-15
(1.30 %) lags significantly behind the US (1.86 %)
and Japan (2.26 %) in terms of business sector R&D
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, there is virtu-
ally no gap in public sector expenditures on R&D
(including the government and higher education
sector) which range between 0.68 % of GDP in the
EU-15 and 0.65 % in the US in 2002 (see Table
2.2). However, both public sector and private sector
expenditures on R&D are significantly lower in the
new EU Member States than in the EU-15 at about
0.44 % and 0.39 % in 2000, respectively (see Table
2.2). In the new EU Member States the lower ratio
of public sector R&D expenditures to GDP is mainly
due to the low ratio of R&D performed by the
higher education sector (HERD) to GDP. Further-
more, in the EU-15, HERD increased steadily relative
to GDP over the 1980s and 1990s with a slowdown
in the mid-1990s (see Graph 2.1). The ratio of
HERD to GDP reached 0.42 % in 2002 compared to
0.30 % in 1981. There seems to be a similar trend
in the US, although the level is underestimated (see
Box 2.2).
Box 2.2: Measuring public R&D expenditures
The public sector is a source of R&D funding and also
a performer of R&D activity. When measuring public
sector R&D by performing sector, it is useful to distin-
guish between the higher education sector and the
government sector expenditures on R&D, HERD and
GOVERD, respectively. It should be noted that values
for the US and Sweden are seriously underestimated
(OECD, 2003; European Commission, 2003b).
Data on GBAORD (government appropriations or
outlay for R&D) concerns all appropriations by central
government allocated to R&D in federal/central
government budgets to be carried out in one of the
four sector of performance – business enterprise,
higher education, government and private non-profit
sector. Data on government R&D appropriations there-
fore refers to budget provisions, not to actual expendi-
ture, i.e. GBAORD measures government support for
R&D using data collected from budgets. Data on
GBAORD provides an indicator of the relative impor-
tance of various socio-economic objectives such as
defence R&D, health R&D and environmental R&D in
total public R&D spending (OECD, 2003; European
Commission, 2003b).
Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) are the key
component of all R&D activities. Funding for business
R&D can come from any one of four sources: domestic
business, government, other national institutions (for
example charities funding medical research) and
abroad; ‘abroad’ includes foreign businesses and
foreign subsidiaries of domestic businesses.
In the EU-15, government sector expenditures on
R&D as a percentage of GDP dropped from 0.32 % to
0.20 % during the same period, with the majority of
this fall occurring during the 1990s - see Graph 2.1.
The decline in funding for government labs in the EU-
15 is largely due to drastic reductions in funding for
government research organisations in countries such
as France and the UK (OECD, 2002). It may also
reflect restructuring of some government labs.
There is indication that the gap between the EU-15
and the US in terms of the ratio of BERD to GDP has
increased significantly between 1995 and 2000 but
decreased afterwards - see Graph 2.1. It should be
noted that in EU countries the R&D expenditures of
the higher education sector are primarily financed
through public funding. However, the share of
industry funding in the higher education sector
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more than doubled between 1981 and 2001
(OECD, 2002). At the beginning of the 1990s, the
EU-15 average for the share of HERD financed by
the government was around 89 %. At the end of
1990s, the share of HERD financed by the govern-
ment decreased slightly to 81 % (European
Commission, 2003b). In the US, the share of HERD
financed by the government decreased from 74 %
to 71 % in the same period.
Measured as a percentage of GDP, public sector R&D
spending (including the government and higher
education sector) is highest in Finland, Sweden,
France and the Netherlands. It is lowest in Portugal,
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and in the new
EU Member States - see Graph 2.2. Expenditures on
R&D in the higher education sector are highest in
Sweden, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands with a
share in GDP of 0.5 % and more. Public sector and
private sector R&D expenditures are positively
related across countries.28 Countries with a higher
ratio of expenditures on R&D in the higher education
sector to GDP tend to have a higher ratio of business
sector R&D expenditures to GDP but the correlation
coefficient between the government expenditures on
R&D and business sector R&D is not statistically
significant at the 5 % level. Countries with a low
initial level of public sector R&D (e.g. Portugal,
Greece, Spain and Ireland) recorded the highest
Table 2.2: R&D expenditures by performing sector (in percent of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EU-15
Government sector 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26
Higher education sector 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42
Public sector 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.68
Business enterprise sector 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.30 1.30
New EU Member States
Government sector 0.25 0.25 0.24
Higher education sector 0.18 0.18 0.20
Public sector 0.43 0.43 0.44
Business enterprise sector 0.40 0.40 0.39
US
Government sector 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.23
Higher education sector 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.42
Public sector 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.65
Business enterprise sector 1.93 1.97 2.03 1.99 1.86
Japan
Government sector 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29
Higher education sector 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.44
Public sector 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73
Business enterprise sector 2.10 2.10 2.12 2.26
Table 2.3: Trends in civilian and non-civilian GBAORD (in percent of GDP)
total GBAORD, % GDP Civil GBAORD, % GDP non Civil GBAORD, % GDP
1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001
EU 15 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.11 0.13
EU 25 0.80 0.74
United States 0.93 0.86 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.45
Japan 0.50 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.03 0.03
Notes:  The new EU Members States include CY, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, MT, PL, SK and SI.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos and OECD, MSTI.
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos.
28 HERD and business R&D have a correlation coefficient of 0.72 and a p-value
of 0.01 based on 25 EU countries, US and Japan.
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Graph 2.1: Evolution of R&D expenditure by performing sector
HERD as a percentage of GDP
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Graph 2.2: R&D by performing sector, 2001
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growth during the period 1995-2001. Some smaller
EU countries (e.g. Finland and Denmark) also experi-
enced an increase in public sector R&D (see Euro-
pean Commission, 2003b).
In 2001, the government budget appropriations or
outlays for R&D (GBAORD) in EU-15, Japan and US
amounted to 0.75 %, 0.68 % and 0.86 % of their
GDP, respectively. It is well known that the EU has a
smaller share of GBAORD devoted to defence
compared to the US. In contrast, in the US, defence
objective represents a substantial part of the total
GBAORD and amounted to 0.45 % of GDP in 2001
compared to 0.13 % in the EU-15 - see Table 2.3 
Given the significance of business R&D (BERD) as a
component of all R&D activities, it is worth looking at
the trends in government support for business R&D.
Government support for business R&D includes direct
R&D subsidies and fiscal incentives for R&D. In terms
of direct subsidies, funding from government is a
small component of total business R&D expenditures.
Rates of government funding of business R&D range
from 8 % in the EU-15 to 10 % in the US. The
majority of business R&D expenditures are financed
by domestic business. In 2001, funding from govern-
ment sources accounted only for 0.1 % of GDP in the
EU-15 and 0.19 % in the US – see Table 2.4. Both in
the EU-15 and in the US, the ratio of government-
funded BERD to GDP has constantly decreased during
the period 1981-2001, especially during the first half
of the 1990s. This decline has been more
pronounced in the US – see Table 2.4.
Graph 2.3 shows the change in the intensity of
business performed R&D by source of funds across
individual EU Member States. It is clear that the
increases in the intensity of business sector R&D in
some smaller Member States are largely driven by
domestic industry funding, followed by foreign
sources. The contribution of financing from govern-
ment seems to be negligible. The US also saw large
increases in business R&D, despite significant reduc-
tions in government financing. In several other
large EU Member Sates, including Italy and the UK,
both industry and government financed R&D
declined as share of GDP.
Policies that directly target R&D include tax incen-
tives for R&D. The generosity of R&D tax incentives
can be measured by the B-index (Warda 1996,
2002, see also section 2.2.2). The relative
generosity of R&D tax incentives differs significantly
across the EU. According to this indicator, Spain
and Portugal, have the most generous fiscal incen-
tives for R&D - see Table 2.5. The least favourable
tax environment can be found in Germany,
Sweden, Belgium and Finland. Overall, there has
been a significant increase in generosity of R&D tax
incentives in the large company category in
Portugal, Spain and the UK between 1995 and
2001. Furthermore, the UK, France and Japan signif-
icantly improved the attractiveness of their R&D tax
systems in the period 2000-2004.29
Graph 2.4 shows the relative importance of direct
and indirect financing (tax incentives) of business
R&D as well as the costs associated with changes in
Table 2.4: BERD by source of funds, 1981-2001 (as percent of GDP)
1981 1990 1995 2001
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD)
EU-15 1.11 1.30 1.19 1.30
US 1.66 1.89 1.66 1.99
Japan 1.40 2.11 1.89 2.26
Government financed BERD
EU-15 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.10
US 0.52 0.48 0.30 0.19
Japan 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
BERD financed by industry, abroad and other sources
EU-15 0.90 1.11 1.06 1.20
US 1.14 1.41 1.36 1.80
Japan 1.37 2.08 1.86 2.24
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos and OECD, MSTI.
29 France introduced the new Research Tax Credit 2004 (Crédit d’Impôt
Recherche – CIR 2004). More information can be downloaded from the
website of the Ministère délégué à la Recherche, http://www.recherche.
gouv.fr/.
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Table 2.5: Rate of tax incentives for ￿ 1 of R&D in 2001
Large firms SMEs
2001 change between 2001
1995-2001
Belgium -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Denmark 0.11 -0.02 0.11
Germany -0.02 0.03 -0.02
Spain 0.44 0.16 0.44
Greece -0.01 -0.01
France 0.06 -0.02 0.06
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy -0.03 0.03 0.44
Netherlands 0.10 0.00 0.35
Austria 0.12 0.05 0.12
Portugal 0.34 0.36 0.34
Finland -0.01 0.00 -0.01
Sweden -0.01 0.00 -0.01
UK 0.10 0.10 0.11
EU (unweighted average) 0.08 0.05 0.14
US 0.07 0.09 0.07
Japan 0.01 0.02 0.12
Graph 2.3: Change in BERD in % of GDP by source of funds, EU, US and Japan, 1990-2001
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R&D tax credit regimes since 2002 for a group of
selected countries. Estimates indicate that in France
the costs of R&D tax credits will increase from 2.7
to 4.7 % of total industry R&D expenditures due to
the reform of the R&D tax system. In the UK the
costs of the introduction of the new R&D tax credit
regime in 2000 and 2002 were equivalent to 4 % of
total industry R&D expenditures. In Japan a new
volume-based R&D tax credit was introduced as an
alternative to the existing incremental R&D tax
credit starting from fiscal year 2003. This raises the
costs to government of the R&D tax credit from
0.3 % to 4 % of total industry R&D expenditures. In
the US, in contrast, R&D tax incentives represent
1.6 % of total industry spending. The costs will
slightly increase from 1.6 % to 1.9 % as a result of
the introduction of the alternative incremental
credit regime.
In the new Member States tax incentives for R&D
receive a low priority (European Commission,
2001). However, in those countries overall corpo-
rate tax ratios are already very low compared to the
EU-15 countries.
The mix of direct financing and tax incentives for
business R&D varies considerably across EU coun-
tries (see OECD, 2002; European Commission,
2003a). For example, with regard to large manufac-
turing firms, France and the UK have a relatively
high share of R&D subsidies and offer a favourable
tax treatment. Other countries, such as Finland,
Italy and Sweden, focus more on direct subsidies. In
contrast, Spain and Portugal have generous fiscal
incentives combined with a relatively low subsidy
rate. It is interesting to note that Sweden and
Finland have neither substantial direct nor indirect
funding although these countries have high levels
of private business enterprise expenditures. In
Finland, the substantial private R&D spending can
be partly explained by an industrial structure
focusing on ICT intensive, highly skilled, human-
capital intensive production (Rouvinen and Ylä-
Anttila, 2003). It is doubtful that tax incentives for
Graph 2.4: Direct and indirect financing of business R&D and additional costs of changes in R&D tax
credit regimes since 2002 (as percentage of business R&D)
0 2 4 6 8 1 01 21 41 6
Notes: *Vertically striped: direct financing from regional funding agencies as a percentage of total business R&D spending. ** diagonally striped: esti-
mated additional costs resulting from the introduction of the ‘Alternative Incremental Credit’ since the budget year 2002/03. *** diagonally striped:
estimated additional costs resulting from the reform of the R&D tax system in 2000 (for SMEs) and 2002 (large firms). **** diagonally striped: esti-
mated additional costs resulting from the by the change from the switch of incremental to a volume based R&D tax credit regime. ***** diagonally
striped: estimated additional costs French NEW caused by the introduction of the new R&D Tax Credit regime (Crédit d’Impôt Recherche) in 2004.
Source: OECD, MSTI, Rammer et al. (2003).
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R&D can compensate for a lack of ‘enabling condi-
tions’ in countries with low levels of R&D spending
(OECD, 2002). Furthermore, tax incentives and
direct subsidies may be either complements or
substitutes. Data on R&D subsidy ratios and tax
incentives for the 15 pre-accession Member States,
the US and Japan for the period 1981-2002 indicate
that countries with an increased level of tax conces-
sions experienced a lower decrease in the R&D
subsidy ratio. Also, econometric results suggest that
both instruments are indeed complements.30
2.3.2 Empirical analysis of the impact of
public support to R&D on business R&D
This section investigates the empirical relation
between public support to R&D and business R&D
by studying separately two channels through which
public money spent on R&D can influence business
R&D spending. The first concerns the relation
between government-financed R&D expenditures
(performed in the business sector) and business
R&D spending; the second concerns the impact of
public funding of R&D performed by universities
and government institutions on business R&D.
Relationship between industry- and government-
financed business R&D at the industry level
The aim here is to investigate whether government-
financed R&D expenditures are complementary and
thus ‘additional’ to private R&D spending, rather
than substitutes for industry-financed R&D expendi-
tures. The analysis, conducted for the business
sector in the EU-15 at the industry level, extends
previous work in two directions. First, the empirical
analysis gives sector-specific estimates of the impact
of government-funded R&D in the business sector;
and, second, the use of industry-/country-level data
allows the estimation of the R&D equation for each
country separately.31 The main hypothesis to be
tested is whether R&D subsidies to a particular
industry stimulate private R&D expenditures in that
particular industry.32 Complementarity between
private and public BERD occurs when the estimated
elasticity of government-funded BERD is signifi-
cantly different from zero and positive. A negative
estimated elasticity would indicate a substitution
effect. A positive elasticity implies that the marginal
effect is also positive.33 More specifically, the
marginal effect measures the degree to which
private R&D is stimulated by government-financed
R&D.
The estimated elasticity of private business R&D
with respect to publicly funded R&D ranges
between 0.20 and 0.13 and is highly significant –
see Table A.2.1 in Appendix 1. When controlling for
output and R&D financed from abroad, in the EU, a
marginal increase of ￿ 1 in government-funded
BERD leads to an increase in domestic business-
funded R&D of ￿ 0.93.34 The funding effect on total
R&D expenditures in the business sector is therefore
￿ 1.93. The results are consistent with Guellec and
van Pottelsberghe (2003b) who find a marginal
effect of 0.70 in business-funded R&D for each
dollar of direct non-defence government funding
(total effect of 1.70). Moreover, the findings
suggest a positive impact of R&D financed from
abroad on domestic business R&D expenditures. A
￿ 1 increase in BERD financed by abroad leads to an
increase in domestic and privately funded R&D
expenditures of about ￿ 0.37.
For 17 out of 18 EU industries, the elasticity of
industry-financed BERD with respect to R&D subsi-
dies shows the expected positive sign.35 Another
result is that the elasticity estimates are generally
higher in high-tech industries than in medium- and
low-tech industries. The corresponding marginal
effects of R&D subsidies show the opposite pattern
as they depend on the R&D subsidy ratio.36 In 10
out of 11 EU countries, private R&D is significantly
positively associated with public R&D.37
The impact of government support and public
sector R&D on business R&D
While most of the literature focuses on the impact
of publicly funded R&D that is performed by private
firms, few studies investigate the impact on private
R&D of R&D performed by universities and govern-
ment institutions. The aim in what follows is to
analyse empirically the influence of both public
sector R&D and government support for R&D on
private R&D spending.
A large number of factors potentially have an
impact on business sector R&D intensity. First and
33 The marginal effect is computed as the product of the estimated elasticity
and the ratio of domestic industry-funded BERD to government-funded BERD
evaluated at sample means.
34 The elasticity estimates have been transformed into marginal effects based
on sample means.
35 For 15 industries, the elasticity is significantly positive at the 5 % level and for
at least one more industry, it is significantly positive at the 10 % level.
36 With a constant elasticity the marginal effect increases when the ratio of
government financed R&D to industry financed R&D decreases.
37 See ‘European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background
study prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report
for estimation results.
30 See ‘European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background
study prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report
for further details.
31 The data used consists of an industry panel data set for 13 EU Member States
in 25 industries for the period 1987-1999.
32 In these regressions, possible (negative) spillover effects between industries
are not addressed. It is well known that R&D subsidies may crowd out busi-
ness R&D investments in other, closely related industries.
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on private sector R&D discussed above, the public
sector can also act as a complement to the private
sector by lowering the cost of research for the
industry. This can be achieved by conducting basic
research and making its results publicly available.
University research has historically been an impor-
tant source of external knowledge, equipment and
methodologies for industrial researchers in the
development of new products and production
processes. Graph 2.5 illustrates various types of
public intervention and their potential impact on
business R&D. Whether the positive stimulation and
spillover effects dominate the negative effects
discussed above is ultimately an empirical question
and will be examined below.
The aim of this section is to estimate the impact of
public sector intervention measures as outlined in
Graph 2.5 on business expenditure on R&D. The
econometric model used estimates the elasticities of
BERD intensity (BERD/GDP) relative to the following
variables:
- Government-financed R&D expenditures in the
business sector as a percentage of GDP which
captures direct financial support in the form of
grants, loans, etc.
- B-index, measuring the generosity of the tax
system38, captures fiscal incentives. Decreases
in the B-index mean that fiscal incentives for
R&D have been increased, or, equivalently, that
the cost of R&D-activities at the enterprise level
has fallen. Accordingly, if fiscal incentives are
effective in raising expenditures on R&D in the
business sector, the estimated elasticity should
be significantly negative.
-  R&D expenditures by the higher education
sector (HERD) in percentage of GDP.
- Government sector R&D expenditures (GO-
VERD) in percentage of GDP.
When estimating these elasticities, the level of
development and the degree of specialisation in
high-tech activities of the country are controlled for
using the following explanatory variables in the
regression:
- GDP per capita in constant purchasing power
parity.
38 For more details refer to Warda (1996) and OECD (2002).
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foremost, industry structure and the dynamics of
output growth matter. If a country is specialised in
industries typically characterised by a high degree
of R&D intensity, then aggregate business R&D
intensity will generally be high (European Commis-
sion 2003b, p. 59). Other factors affecting business
R&D spending include competition and (de)-regu-
lation policies as well as patent protection. In a
narrower sense, the government provides for a
research-prone, favourable business setting by
funding universities as well as research in public
laboratories: scientific knowledge from academic
research generates positive knowledge spillovers
thereby facilitating private business R&D and
fostering productivity in the corporate world. As
already discussed, apart from those indirect meas-
ures, the government can also stimulate business
R&D with direct measures, either through fiscal
incentives or by means of direct financial support.
The empirical literature evaluating the net effects
of such intervention is concerned with basically
three sources of negative (side-) effects. First, as
discussed previously, the issue of ‘input addition-
ality’ address the extent to which public R&D-
assistance induces companies to spend more own
additional resources on R&D than they would have
spent without the public R&D assistance; second,
and in the same vein as for direct support, indirect
support through the promotion of R&D
performed by universities and government
research organisations may substitute for R&D
projects which otherwise would have been under-
taken by the corporate world. If private firms
engage less in R&D because they cannot success-
fully compete against government-funded
research, allocative distortions are said to prevail;
finally, public sector R&D can act as a substitute
to the private R&D sector, as it not only uses
resources for R&D but also earns exclusive prop-
erty rights to the research results. This potential
source of crowding out arises if there is a shortage
in the most decisive factor of the R&D process,
that is, if high-skilled labour is scarce. Rising
demand for high-skilled human resources by
universities and government research organisa-
tions reduces the availability of the same for
private sector usage. In this case, R&D subsidies
could drive up the wages of scientists and engi-
neers enough to prevent significant increases in
real R&D (Goolsbee, 1998). For the US, Goolsbee
(1998) finds that increases in funding for public
R&D significantly raise the wages of scientists and
engineers. Under these circumstances part of the
gross R&D volume increase is eventually explained
by an increase in its unit price (crowding out
through prices).
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:17  Pagina 62Chapter 2 — European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&B
63
- Share of high-technology exports in total manu-
facturing exports. High-technology exports39 are
characterised by a high intensity of research and
development and measure the technology-intensity
of a country’s exports. It could be argued that the
share of high-technology exports is a measure of
innovation output rather than a factor explaining
innovation input. However, the share of high-tech-
nology exports also reflects the country’s degree of
specialisation in high-tech activities.40
The first question is whether public sector R&D is a
complement or a substitute for private R&D,
meaning whether it induces or crowds out private
R&D. Overall, one can expect the positive spillover
effects to dominate the potentially negative impacts
discussed above so that the net effect of public
sector R&D on business sector R&D is positive.
Should, on the other hand, public sector R&D
generally crowd out private R&D, then the elastici-
ties relative to higher education and government
sector R&D would be negative.
A second aim of this section is to investigate the
impact of direct support measures on business
sector R&D: Is government-funded R&D performed
by the business sector a substitute or a complement
for private R&D? Do R&D tax credits foster business
expenditure on R&D? The elasticities of business
R&D relative to government-financed R&D expen-
ditures in the business sector and relative to the B-
index will provide an answer to these questions.
Table 2.6 presents estimation results for the elastici-
ties of BERD with respect to R&D expenditures by
the higher education sector (HERD) and the govern-
ment sector (GOVERD), see Appendix 1 for
complete estimation results. These estimates show
that both government and university R&D are
significantly positively related to R&D intensity in
the business sector. As expected, HERD has a higher
impact than government R&D. In terms of marginal
impacts of public funding, a ￿ 1 increase in R&D
performed by universities leads to an additional ￿
1.3 in industry R&D while a ￿ 1 increase in R&D
performed by government institutions leads to ￿
39 They include high-technology products such as aerospace, computers, phar-
maceuticals, scientific instruments and electrical machinery (see OECD STI
Scoreboard 2003).
40 In the EU-15 countries, high-technology intensive exports account for 22 %
of total manufacturing exports in 2001. Differences among EU countries are
substantial: in 2001 the share of high-technology industries in total exports
ranges from 54 % in Ireland to 9 % in Greece. Between 1991 and 2001, high
technology exports as a proportion of total exports have grown rapidly in
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and United Kingdom. During this period
Finnish high technology exports as a percentage of total manufacturing
exports grew faster than in any EU-15 country.
Graph 2.5: Main policy tools towards business R&D and their potential impact
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Source: van Pottelsberghe et al. (2003).
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1.1 in industry R&D.41 Finally, the coefficient of
GDP per capita in constant PPP is positive and
significant.
Table 2.7 shows inference on the R&D stimuli
resulting from direct government intervention, i.e.
from tax incentives and direct R&D subsidies.
These results suggest that government-funded
R&D in the business sector has a positive and
significant impact on total business enterprise
R&D. In order to test whether government-funded
R&D in the business sector is a complement or a
substitute to private R&D in the business sector,
the estimated elasticities are transformed into
marginal effects. Note that the dependent variable
is total R&D expenditures in the business sector,
i.e. government-financed BERD is included. The
results suggest that an increase of ￿ 1 of R&D
subsidies will generate an increase of total business
sector R&D expenditures of ￿ 1.4. Since this effect
is higher than ￿ 1, one can conclude that govern-
ment-funded R&D is a complement for private
R&D. The elasticity with respect to the share of
high-technology exports in total manufacturing is
positive and significant. This indicates that coun-
tries with a large share of exports in technology
driven industries also have high business R&D
intensity.
Changes in fiscal incentives for R&D as measured by
the B-index significantly affect the R&D expenditure
41 The marginal returns of HERD and GOVERD are calculated as the product of
the respective elasticity estimates, 0.47 and 0.24, by the ratio of BERD to the
variable. The ratios of BERD to HERD and of BERD to GOVERD are 2.85 and
4.68 respectively.
Table 2.6: Impact of public sector R&D on business expenditures for R&D (BERD): Panel estimates
for 21 OECD countries
(1) (2)
coeff. coeff.
log public sector R&D % GDP 0.95***
log HERD % GDP 0.47**
log GOEVRD % GDP 0.24
log GDP per capita in constant PPP $ 0.69* 0.56
period dummy 1990-1994 -0.07 -0.07
period dummy 1995-1999 -0.05 -0.03
period dummy 2000-2002 -0.03 0.00
constant 2.82** 2.74*
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. Estimation period: 1986-2002 with data derived from three five-
year intervals and one three-year interval. Excluding the non-EU countries has little effect on the regression results. Specification (1): HERD and
GOVERD taken together as Public sector. Specification (2): separate impact-coefficients for HERD and intramural GOVERD.
Table 2.7: Impact of tax incentives and direct subsidies on business enterprise sector R&D (BERD):
Panel estimates for 21 OECD countries
including log HERD % GDP
coeff
log government-funded BERD % GDP 0.15***
log B-index -0.49*
log HERD % GDP 0.29***
log share of high-technology exports in total manufacturing exports 0.45***
log GDP per capita in constant PPP $ 0.53**
period dummy 1985-1989 0.01
period dummy 1990-1994 -0.07
period dummy 1995-1999 -0.15
period dummy 2000-2002 -0.16
constant 3.67***
marginal effect of government-funded business R&D 1.4
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. Estimation period: 1980-2002. Excluding the non-EU coun-
tries has little effect on the regression results. t-values are based on robust standard errors.
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in the business sector. The elasticity of about -0.60
indicates that a 10 % reduction in the price of R&D
(increase in generosity of tax incentives for R&D)
leads to a 6 % increase in the amount of R&D.
Given these elasticity estimates, it is possible to
calculate to what extent the observed change in the
BERD intensity can be attributed to changes in tax
incentives for BERD and direct R&D subsidies, initial
BERD intensity, GDP per capita, industry structure
and the spillover effects of higher education sector
R&D, see Appendix 1 for further estimation results.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the decomposition
analysis for two periods. Generally, the predicted
changes in BERD intensity are close to the observed
ones. The average annual growth rate of BERD
intensity over the period 1980-2002 is about 4.1 %
which is close to the prediction of 3.7 %. The main
cause of the increase in BERD intensity is the shift in
industry structure towards high-technology indus-
tries which explains half of the change in BERD
intensity. To the extent that reallocation of produc-
tion factors towards high-technology industries is
being hampered by lack of flexibility in factor
markets, structural reforms aimed at rendering
markets more flexible will play an important role in
increasing the level of business R&D across the EU.
Growth of GDP per capita is also an important
factor explaining almost a third of the increased
business R&D intensity. In contrast, the effects of
direct subsidies and tax incentives for R&D are quite
small. Finally, about 20 % of the increase in BERD
intensity can be explained by the increase in HERD
as a percentage of GDP, indicating substantial
spillover effects from academic research.
In order to analyse whether the contribution of tax
incentives has changed over time, the effects for the
sub-period 1990-2002 are also estimated. Again,
only 3 % of the increase in the ratio of BERD to GDP
can be explained by the increase in fiscal incentives
for R&D. In contrast, the decrease over time in
government financed BERD as percentage of GDP
has hampered the increase in R&D intensity in the
business sector by 3 percentage points.
2.3.3 Impact of public sector R&D 
on economic growth and research output
Impact of public sector R&D on GDP per capita
growth
University and government laboratory research has
both direct and indirect impacts on the economy.
Public sector research may directly lead to increases
in productivity through increased knowledge and
innovation. Examples include new information and
communication technologies and advances in the
health sector through medical research. Indirect
effects of public sector R&D can be caused by
spillovers contributing to the productivity of private
R&D. Examples include ‘spin-off’ projects from
higher education or research institutes with R&D
focus. In principle, total business expenditures on
R&D could be split up into industry and govern-
ment financed components. However, Griliches
(1979) argue that there is no reason to separate
private from government funds because a dollar is a
dollar, whatever the source of funding. Guellec, van
Pottelsberghe (2003b) argue that it is conceptually
not feasible to distinguish spillovers from privately
funded R&D from publicly funded R&D derived
from a given R&D project. Therefore, the analysis
here focuses on the effects of R&D performed by
the public sector (understood as government sector
and higher education institutions) and not on the
effects of publicly funded business sector R&D.
An econometric model42 is used to estimate the
determinants of growth. The set of variables used to
explain economic growth are: initial GDP per
capita, the share of investment in GDP, population
growth, human capital and the ratio of R&D expen-
ditures to GDP by performing sector (i.e. higher
education sector, government sector and business
sector).43 In the absence of spillovers, the effect of
public sector R&D should be equal to its income
share. The proxy measure for human capital used
here is the average duration of education among
the working age population (25 to 64 years of
age).44 The impact of average years of schooling is
expected to be positive. The main data source is the
OECD Economic Outlook database for the period
1960-2002.45 In order to avoid the potential corre-
lation between business cycles and the explanatory
variables, the analysis uses data averaged over five-
year periods rather than annual data.
Graph 2.6 displays the relationship between the
change in public sector R&D as a percentage of
GDP and GDP per capita growth. There is a positive
correlation of 0.68 that is highly significant. This
means that the change in R&D expenditures
42 A dynamic panel data model is used. For more information see Appendix 2
or ‘European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background
study prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report.
43 Under the assumption of a steady-state long-run growth path for the period
examined, growth rates can be expressed without reference to the stocks of
physical or human capital.
44 See de la Fuente, Domenech (2002). This indicator was also employed by
Bassanini, Scarpetta (2002). It must be stressed that this variable is a weak
indicator of human capital because it cannot account for differences in the
quality of one additional year of education (see Wößmann, 2003).
45 The group of countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and the United States.
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performed by the public sector (measured as a
percentage of GDP) is significantly higher in coun-
tries with a high GDP per capita growth. Since the
causality is likely to work in both directions, one
needs to be cautious in drawing conclusions.
Table 2.9 presents the results of the growth equa-
tion estimation with R&D expenditures disaggre-
gated by performing sector. In specification 1,
HERD as a percentage of GDP is included. Specifica-
tion 2 is basically the same as specification 1 except
that government sector expenditures on R&D as a
percentage of GDP is also included. In specification
3, all three different categories of R&D expenditures
are included. Given that the lagged endogenous
variable is included, the coefficients are to be inter-
preted as short-run effects. Since the estimates of
the adjustment coefficient are highly sensitive to the
model specifications, the interpretation of results
focuses on short-run elasticities.
The different R&D categories have the expected
positive sign but government expenditures on R&D
have a negative sign. The literature on the impact
of both business-sector and public sector R&D
capital on growth is quite thin. Using a panel of
five-year averages for 17 OECD countries for the
period 1980-1999, the German Council of
Economic Advisors (Sachverständigenrat) (2002)
investigates the relationship between R&D disag-
gregated by performing sector and GDP per capita
and find a negative impact of government R&D as
percentage of GDP on GDP per capita. Further-
more, HERD as percentage of GDP and BERD as
percentage of GDP both have a significant and posi-
tive impact on GDP per capita. Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe (2004) examine the impact of
domestic business-sector R&D, public sector and
foreign R&D capital stock on total factor produc-
tivity using panel data for 18 OECD countries
covering the period 1980-1998. The authors find a
positive and significant effect of total public sector
R&D (measured as R&D capital stocks) on the level
of total factor productivity. The results presented
here differ from Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe
(2004) in that an empirical growth equation is used
to estimate the impact of private and public sector
R&D. In particular, the R&D share of GDP by
performing sector is used rather than the rate of
growth of different types of R&D capital itself. In
growth regressions this avoids the need to specify
an initial R&D capital stock and assume a rate of its
depreciation. However, R&D intensity can be a poor
proxy for growth in R&D capital stocks.
Both HERD as percentage of GDP and BERD as
percentage of GDP are significant at the 5 % level
in the majority of cases, implying that increasing
higher education sector expenditures on R&D and
business enterprise R&D expenditures have a signif-
icantly positive impact on GDP per capita growth in
the OECD area.
The short-run elasticity of GDP per capita with respect
to HERD intensity is about 0.08 based on the third
specification.46 The effect of HERD is much higher
than the income share of HERD of about 0.42 % in
terms of GDP, indicating significant spillover effects.
The short-run elasticity of BERD is about 0.05 and is
46 Computed as 0.19*0.39, where 0.39 is the average HERD/GDP in percentage
points The corresponding long-run elasticity of GDP per capita with respect
to HERD is about 0.81 (=0.08/(1-0.91)). The large impact of HERD seems
implausible. Closer inspection suggests that this implausible result may be
due to the slow economic convergence in the 1980s and 1990s as indicated
by the high impact of lagged GDP. The estimated values of the adjustment
coefficients range between 0.16 (=1-0.84) and 0.09 (=1-0.91), implying that
between 9 % and 16 % of the adjustment take place within five years.
Table 2.8: Source of changes in BERD intensity  (EU-15)
1980-2002
4.1 3.7 -0.1 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.8
(-2) (3) (28) (51) (20)
1990-2002
3.9 3.8 -0.3 0.1 1.2 2.5 0.5
(100) (-7) (3) (31) (60) (12)
Observed
percentage
change in BERD
% GDP
Predicted
percentage
change in BERD
% GDP
Sources in percentage points (percent) of predicted change
B-index GDP per capita High-tech export
share
HERD % GDP Government-
funded BERD %
GDP
Notes: For the period 1990-2002, UK and Italy are excluded because the growth of the business R&D intensity was negative. The contribution of the
explanatory variables is calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients from table 2.7 by the change in the observed explanatory variable.
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Graph 2.6: Relationship between the GDP per capita growth and change in public sector R&D
Notes: Ireland is excluded from the above analysis because of the extraordinary high growth rate during this period.
Table 2.9: Impact of public sector R&D on GDP growth
(1) (2) (3)
coeff. coeff. coeff.
∆ln GDP per capita (t-1) 0.84*** 0.91*** 0.91***
∆Investment, % GDP (t) 1.15*** 1.17*** 1.17***
∆Average years of schooling (t) 0.03 0.03 0.03
∆Higher education sector expenditures R&D, % GDP (t) 0.18* 0.24** 0.19**
∆Government expenditures on R&D, % GDP (t) -0.29*** -0.36***
∆Business enterprise sector expenditures on R&D, 
% GDP (t) 0.04**
Population 15-64, growth (t) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year 1990-1994 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03*
Year 1995-1999 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Year 2000-2002 -0.03** -0.04** -0.04**
Constant 0.03* 0.02 0.01
Sargent test (p-value) 0.023 0.057 0.061
Number of observations (countries) 87 (27) 87 (27) 87 (27)
Short-run elasticities:
Higher education sector R&D expenditures, % GDP (t) 0.07 0.09 0.08
Government expenditures on R&D, % GDP (t) -0.08 -0.09
Business enterprise sector R&D expenditures, % GDP (t) 0.05
Long-run elasticities:
Higher education sector R&D expenditures, % GDP (t) 0.44 1.01 0.81
Government expenditures on R&D, % GDP (t) 0.00 -0.82 -0.99
Business enterprise sector R&D expenditures, 
% GDP (t) 0.50
Notes: p-value in parentheses. Number of countries: 16 (US, Japan and 14 pre-accession EU countries). Public sector R&D is the sum of HERD and
GOVERD. The relative citation index is a measure of relative prominence of scientific literature of a country. This index is the country’s share of cited liter-
ature adjusted for its share of published literature. A value of 1 would indicate that the country’s world share of cited literature is equal to the country’s
world share of scientific literature. A value greater (less) than 1 would indicate that the country is cited relatively more (less) often than indicated by the
country’s share of scientific literature.
Sources: OECD, MSTI and National Science Foundation.
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somewhat lower than the short-run elasticity of HERD.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the social
rate of return of research in the higher education
sector is higher than in the private R&D sector due to
spillovers. It is interesting to note that the magnitude
and statistical significance of HERD remains largely
unchanged when business expenditures on R&D are
included. This result concerning spillover effects from
higher education research reinforces the need to inte-
grate education policy reforms in the EU efforts to
foster research and innovation throughout the
economy. Unreported results show that there is a
unidirectional causality from BERD in percentage of
GDP and from HERD in percentage of GDP to growth
in GDP per capita.47 Furthermore, unreported results
indicate that the impact of these R&D categories on
growth is no different in EU countries than in the
other countries in the sample.48 Average years of
schooling shows the correct sign, though not signifi-
cant at the 5 % level. The poor performance of
average years of schooling as a measure of human
capital could be largely due to the fact that the differ-
ences in educational quality between the countries are
not captured.
The impact of public sector R&D on scientific
output and patents
The number of scientific publications, the number
of patents, the number of citations and the number
of highly cited papers are basic indicators of the
degree to which different R&D performers
contribute to R&D knowledge.49 This section looks
at the evidence for relationships between public
R&D and research output by means of a series of
cross-plots of research output and various public
R&D input indicators.
Table 2.10 shows the correlation coefficients
between the average annual change in various
49 There are of course some new indicators measuring the scientific output such
as the number of spin-offs generated by universities and government
research centres. However, they are not available from internationally compa-
rable sources (European Commission, 2003b).
47 Using panel Granger causality tests.
48 Interaction effects between both HERD and BERD and a dummy variable for
EU countries are not significantly different from zero.
Table 2.10: Correlation between the change in research output and public R&D
Average annual growth rate of
EPO patent applications per
million population between
1990-1999
(Absolute) change in relative
citation index between 1990-
1999
Average annual growth rate of
total scientific publications
between 1990-1999
Average annual growth rate
of public sector R&D in const.
PPP US-$ (HERD + GOVERD)
between 1990-2000
0.703
(0.002)
0.730
(0.001)
0.710
(0.002)
Average annual growth rate
of GBAORD in const. PPP
US-$ between 1990-2000
0.574
(0.020)
0.572
(0.021)
0.712
(0.002)
Average annual growth rate
of HERD in const. PPP US-$
between 1990-2000
0.541
(0.031)
0.753
(0.001)
0.609
(0.012)
Absolute change in public
sector R&D, % GDP
between 1990-2000
0.645
(0.007)
0.579
(0.019)
0.556
(0.026)
Absolute change in
government-funded R&D,
% GDP between 1990-
2000
0.293
(0.270)
0.604
(0.013)
0.029
(0.916)
Notes: p-value in parentheses. Number of countries: 16 (US, Japan and 14 pre-accession EU countries). Public sector R&D is the sum of HERD and
GOVERD. The relative citation index is a measure of relative prominence of scientific literature of a country. This index is the country’s share of cited
literature adjusted for its share of published literature. A value of 1 would indicate that the country’s world share of cited literature is equal to the
country’s world share of scientific literature. A value greater (less) than 1 would indicate that the country is cited relatively more (less) often than indi-
cated by the country’s share of scientific literature.
Sources: OECD, MSTI and National Science Foundation.
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measures of public sector R&D and changes in
different types of research output based on data for
the EU-15, Japan and the US. The correlation coeffi-
cient between the average annual growth rate of
public sector R&D (measured in constant PPP) and
the absolute change in the relative citation index is
about 0.73 and highly significant - see Table 2.10,
column 2.50 This means that countries with a high
growth rate of public sector expenditures on R&D
experienced a rise in their relative citation index.
Graph 2.7 illustrates the fact that countries with the
highest gains in the citation index such as Austria,
Spain, Finland and Ireland have a higher-than-
average growth of expenditures on R&D performed
within the public sector. This indicates a higher
marginal scientific productivity. In contrast, the
opposite group of countries, showing a lower
marginal scientific productivity are Japan, Sweden
and Portugal.
The results are robust with respect to the measure-
ment of public sector R&D expenditures (i.e.
average annual growth rate of HERD in constant
PPP, or alternatively the absolute change in public
sector R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP or
the average annual growth rate of GBAORD in
constant PPP). In all cases, the correlation coeffi-
cients are high and significant at the 1 % or 2 %
level. Furthermore, the correlation between the
absolute changes in government-funded R&D in
percentage of GDP and the change in the relative
citation index is high and significant.
Next the relationship between patents and public
sector R&D is examined. In the US, universities
have increased their patenting since the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 which gave universities the right
to patent and licence (National Science Founda-
tion, 2002). The Bayh-Dole Act was introduced to
encourage publicly funded research institutes and
universities to file patents, exploit their research,
and engage in collaborations with industry. In
recent years, in Europe, several national legisla-
tions have converged to solutions of the Bayh-
Dole Act type (European Commission, 2003c).
Other Member States where provisions of this
type have not yet been adopted are about to do
Graph 2.7: Correlation between the change in the relative citations index and change in public sector
R&D (in percent)
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Source: OECD, MSTI.
50 Note that citations are not a straightforward measure of quality for various
reasons: self-citations by authors; authors citing colleagues, mentors, and
friends; and a possible non-linear relationship of a country’s number of publi-
cations and citations to that output (see National Science Foundation, 2002).
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so. Column 1 in Table 2.10 shows the correlation
coefficients between the average annual growth
rates of EPO patent applications per million of
population between 1990 and 1999 and the
change in public expenditure on R&D (HERD and
GOVERD) during the same period.
Again, there is a strong positive and significant rela-
tionship between the change in public sector
expenditures on R&D and the change in EPO
patent applications. The magnitude of the correla-
tion coefficient is not very sensitive to the definition
and measurement of public sector expenditures on
R&D. Combining the change in the share of public
sector R&D with the average annual growth rate of
European patents per capita, it is clear that
Portugal, Ireland and Finland have a higher-than-
average marginal scientific productivity as the
growth of EPO patents per capita is higher than the
growth of public sector expenditures on R&D - see
Graph 2.8.
Finally, the correlation coefficients between the
growth of the number of total scientific publications
between the period 1990-1999 and the growth of
public R&D expenditures by performance/funds are
presented in column 3 of Table 2.10. The results
show that the correlation coefficients between the
growth rate of total scientific publications and
different measures of public sector R&D are positive
and significant at the 1 % level in all cases.
Some EU Member States have very low levels of
patenting per capita at the beginning of the period
but exhibit a strong upward growth trend. This also
holds for the number of publications and the rela-
tive citation index. Therefore, the correlation coeffi-
cients, based on the levels for EU-25, Japan and the
US, have also been computed and are presented in
Table 2.11. However, it is well known that compar-
isons in the level of patents between the US and the
EU may be biased due to the home advantage
effect. This means that EU Member States will be
dominant in EPO applications. Therefore, the corre-
lation coefficients for the EU-15 countries are also
presented in Table 2.11. For both sets of countries
there is a large and significant correlation between
EPO patents per capita (for the year 2000) and
public sector R&D expenditures. Within the EU-15,
countries with the highest level of patenting per
labour force such as Sweden, Finland, Germany and
the Netherlands spend a higher share of funds on
the public R&D sector. Finally, the lowest level of
both patenting and public sector R&D can be
found in Cyprus, Slovak Republic and Latvia.
Graph 2.8: Correlation between the change in public sector R&D in percent and change in EPO patent
applications in percent
Correlation=0.70; p-value: 0.0024 
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Again there is a high, positive and significant corre-
lation between the relative citation index in 1999
and public sector R&D expenditures as a
percentage of GDP in1998. This means that a
country with higher public sector R&D expenditures
as percentage of GDP has a larger number of
frequently cited literature in relation to the
country’s share of world literature. Highly cited EU
countries are the Nordic countries, Netherlands,
Denmark, UK and Germany which also have a
higher share of public sector R&D expenditures.
The next step in the analysis is to investigate the
relationship between patent applications and public
R&D when controlling for other factors such as
business expenditures on R&D and country-fixed
effects51 as well as time effects. Again, a distinction
is made between university and government labora-
tory expenditures on R&D.52
Table 2.12 presents the results for the relationship
between public and private sector R&D and patent
applications per capita. In specification (1), both
private and public sector R&D are included while in
specification (2) public sector R&D expenditures is
disaggregated into higher education sector R&D
(HERD) expenditures and government sector
expenditures on R&D, both measured as percent-
ages of GDP. In addition, business enterprise sector
R&D is split into publicly and privately financed
R&D expenditures (specification 3) - see Appendix 2
for further details.
Table 2.12 shows that both the coefficients of
private R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP and of
public sector R&D (HERD and government expendi-
tures combined) as a percentage of GDP are posi-
tive and significant, indicating a positive relation-
ship between the R&D sectors and EPO patent
applications per capita. This implies that countries
with higher shares of R&D activities in the public
sector have been able to achieve a higher level of
patents per capita. This finding is consistent with
the results of other empirical studies (see for
instance Furman et al., 2002; Faber, Hesen, 2004).
The elasticity of patents per capita with respect to
public sector R&D is 0.64. This means that a ten
percent increase in the ratio of public sector R&D to
GDP (e.g. from 0.68 to 0.75) is associated with a
6.4 % increase in the number of patents per capita.
Furthermore, the results indicate that the impact of
public sector R&D is higher than that of business-
funded R&D. The elasticity of patents per capita
with respect to business enterprise sector R&D is
0.49. When breaking down public sector R&D into
R&D conducted by the higher education sector and
R&D done by the government sector, both R&D
51 Country-specific effects control for factors such as the ‘home advantage’ bias.
52 Furman et al. (2002) suggest that university research tends to be more acces-
sible to industry researchers than government laboratory research.
Table 2.11: Correlation between research output and public 
Patents per LF  RCI 1999 Articles per
2000 capita 2000
EU-25, USA and Japan
GBAORD % GDP 2001 0.631 0.679 0.751
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Public sector R&D % GDP 2001 0.654 0.668 0.727
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Government-financed R&D, % GDP in 2001 0.705 0.745 0.723
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU-15
GBAORD % GDP 2001 0.539 0.700 0.666
(0.038) (0.005) (0.007)
Public sector R&D % GDP 2001 0.627 0.825 0.745
(0.012) (0.000) (0.001)
Government-financed R&D, % GDP in 2001 0.657 0.721 0.646
(0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Notes: p-value in parentheses. Relative prominence of scientific literature is measured on the basis of the relative citation index (RCI) of the country.
This index is the country’s share of cited literature adjusted for its share of published literature. An index of 1 indicates that the country’s share of cited
literature is equal to the country’s world share of scientific literature. Values greater (less) than 1 indicate that the country is cited relatively more (less)
than is indicated by the country’s share of scientific literature (NSF 2002).
Source: National Science Foundation and Eurostat, New Cronos.
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sectors significantly contribute to the number of
patents per capita. Furthermore, the ratio of
government-funded BERD to GDP also has a small
but positive effect on patents per capita.
A summing up
Using industry-level data for EU countries for the
period 1987-1999, estimation results suggest that
government-financed R&D expenditures comple-
ment domestic industry-financed expenditures on
R&D. In terms of marginal impacts of public
funding, ￿ 1 increase in government financed R&D
produces an additional ￿ 0.93 in domestic industry
R&D. Furthermore, using economy-wide data for a
panel of OECD/EU countries for the period 1981-
2002, the results suggest that both direct funding
of business R&D and tax incentives for R&D have a
significant and positive impact on business R&D
spending in OECD and EU countries. These two
policy instruments tend to complement each other.
The empirical evidence suggests that R&D tax
credits are an effective instrument.
The elasticity of tax incentives is about -0.5, indi-
cating that a 10 % reduction in the price of R&D
(i.e. an increase in the generosity of tax incentives
for R&D) leads to a 5 % increase in the amount of
R&D spending in the business sector in the long
run. For the OECD/EU area during the period 1990-
2002, the results suggest that the increase in fiscal
incentives for R&D contributed 0.1 percentage
points to the 3.9 increase in the ratio of business
R&D to GDP. In contrast, the decrease in direct
R&D subsidies intensity has hampered increases in
business R&D intensity by 0.3 percentage points.
However, other factors such as the shift to R&D
intensive industries seem to be more important
than tax incentives or direct support for R&D in
explaining the change in the R&D intensity in the
business sector across EU countries. To the extent
that reallocation of production factors towards
high-technology industries is being hampered by
lack of flexibility in factor markets, structural reforms
aimed at rendering markets more flexible will play
an important role in increasing the level of business
R&D across the EU.
The results also support the importance of public
sector R&D for productivity growth and for creating
spillover effects to the private R&D sector. Expendi-
tures on R&D performed by universities and public
research organisations are significantly positively
related to business enterprise sector expenditures
on R&D, indicating that public sector R&D and
private sector R&D are complements. For the
period 1990-2002, a significant part of the
increasing R&D intensity in the business sector can
be explained by the increase in R&D expenditures
performed by the higher education sector, indi-
cating substantial spillover effects from academic
research. When public sector R&D is disaggregated
into its two main components, both government
and university R&D spending are significantly posi-
tively related to the R&D intensity in the business
sector, with the impact of higher education R&D
larger than that of government R&D. In terms of
marginal impacts of public funding, an additional ￿
Table 2.12: Relationship between public R&D and EPO patent applications: Panel estimates
Dependent variable: log EPO patent applications per capita
(1) (2) (3)
coefficient coefficient coefficient
log total BERD % GDP (t) 0.49*** 0.47***
log industry-financed BERD % GDP (t) 0.43***
log government-financed BERD % GDP (t) 0.10
log (HERD+GOVRD) R&D, % GDP (t) 0.64***
log HERD % GDP (t) 0.36** 0.34**
log GOVRD, % GDP(t) 0.25* 0.23*
log years of schooling (t) 1.80* 1.68* 1.71*
Period dummy 1991-1994 0.03 0.04 0.04
Period dummy 1995-1999 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.34***
Constant -0.30 0.39 0.59
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. Estimation period: 1986-1999 with five-year interval data. Data
for Germany refers to West Germany only until 1990; data for unified Germany during the period 1991-1995 is excluded. The group of countries
includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US; excluding the non-EU countries has little effect on the regres-
sion results.
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1 spent in R&D performed by universities leads to
an additional ￿ 1.3 in industry R&D while ￿ 1
increase in R&D performed by government institu-
tions leads to an additional ￿1.1.
Estimation results of an economic growth equation
for OECD/EU countries suggest that expenditures on
R&D in the higher education sector significantly
stimulate growth of GDP per capita. The effect of
R&D performed by the higher education sector is
higher than the income share of this sector, indi-
cating substantial spillover effects. In addition, the
impact of university research is somewhat higher
than the impact of business R&D. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that the social rate of return of
research in the higher education sector is higher than
in the private R&D sector due to spillover effects.
Finally, another important finding is that public
sector R&D spending as a percentage of GDP has a
positive and significant impact on EPO patent appli-
cations per capita, even after private R&D spending
and country fixed effects have been controlled for.
In particular, the impact of R&D performed by
university and government research organisations is
higher than the impact of business enterprise sector
R&D. Also, correlation analyses of R&D expendi-
tures performed by universities and public research
organisations with indicators of research output
suggest significant and positive associations with
publication citations, number of patents per capita
and number of publications. The role of higher
education research in fostering R&D output and
economic growth reinforces the need to integrate
education policy reforms in the EU efforts to foster
research and innovation throughout the economy.
2.4 Impact of public funding
of business R&D on
R&D/innovation and private
patent outcome: 
country case studies
2.4.1 Public business R&D funding 
and private patent outcomes – 
Cross-country comparison and empirical
analysis of Germany and Finland
2.4.1.1 Introduction
This section provides a comparison between
Germany and Finland regarding public R&D
funding and innovation support and their effects in
innovation output as measured by patenting
performance. Despite the fact that these two coun-
tries have rather similar national innovation and
R&D policies and very similar public funding
systems and policy instruments, their innovation
performance over the last years has been surpris-
ingly different.
This section begins with an overview of general
trends in innovation policy and of policy instru-
ments fostering business R&D in Germany and
Finland. It compares the most important innovation
indicators and discusses the contribution of differ-
ences in innovation funding systems to the remark-
able performance of Finland. In sub-section 2.4.1.2,
input measures such as government budget appro-
priations and R&D personnel, and impact measures
such as patent applications, are examined. The
empirical analysis of the impact of public funding
on patent outcome links innovative input and
output and is presented in sub-section 2.4.1.3. A
key question is whether public subsidies in co-oper-
ative R&D activities affect a company’s probability
to patent. A discussion on whether this particular
policy tool is able to explain the remarkable differ-
ences in the innovation output (patents) between
Finland and Germany closes the discussion.
2.4.1.2 General trends of innovation policy 
in Germany and Finland
Innovation is a priority of all Member States of the
EU. Throughout Europe, a wide range of policy
measures and support schemes aimed at fostering
innovation have been implemented or are under
preparation. The diversity of these measures and
schemes reflects the diversity of the framework
conditions, cultural preferences and political priori-
ties in the Member States. As a distinctive feature,
and in contrast to most European countries,
Germany and Finland have (a) a comparable
national innovation and R&D policy, (b) compa-
rable policy instruments aimed to stimulate business
R&D, and (c) a comparable public funding system.
(a) Innovation and R&D policies
In Germany, the main objective of innovation policy
(in a broad sense) is to accelerate the diffusion of
new technologies and to ensure that Germany is
able to keep pace with international technological
developments. In 2001, the Federal government’s
expenditure for R&D amounted to ￿ 7 099 million,
which represents a 2.8 % increase as compared to
2000 (OECD, 2003).
The contributions made by the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology (BMWi), the Federal
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Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and the Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) account
for almost 90 % of total federal R&D funds. Nearly
two-thirds of all federal R&D expenditure is
financed by the BMBF’s budget. In recent years,
improvements have been achieved through three
lines of promotion - innovation, cooperation, tech-
nological consulting. R&D expenditure growth for
the BMBF has been stable and far higher than the
average. An increase in 1999, when the BMBF’s
R&D expenditure was up 3.5 % from 1998 levels,
was followed up in subsequent years - 2.9 % in
2000, 3.9 % in 2001 and 3.5 % in 2002 (cf. Fier,
2002; BMBF, 2000).
In recent years, Finland’s technology policy has
focused on the creation and application of new
knowledge and skills, on the integration of sustain-
able development and the capacity for continuous
renewal. Finland strives for the creation of an envi-
ronment favourable to innovation and business
activities. Finnish economic and societal develop-
ment have been based on developing and diffusing
high technology, both domestically and internation-
ally, where the latter resulted in an increased effort
to foster exports.53 Eventually, the efforts resulted in
a favourable international competitiveness of the
Finnish economy. In various international compar-
isons, Finland ranks as one of the leading European
countries for innovation measured in terms of
growth, competitiveness, technological sophistica-
tion and infrastructure.
In Finland, the Science and Technology Policy
Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, plays a key
role in the coordination of innovation policy activi-
ties at the national level. The main tasks of the
Council include directing science and technology
policy, dealing with the overall development of
scientific research and education, and issuing state-
ments on the allocation of public science and tech-
nology funds to the various ministries and inter-
ested bodies.
Similar to the German structure of ministries, the
two most important ministries in the Finnish
national innovation system are the Ministry of
Education and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In
2003 the former administered 41.7 % and the latter
34.4 % of government outlays on R&D (Statistics
Finland, 2004).
In general, Finland’s performance has been deter-
mined by a fundamental structural shift from a
resource-based economy to a knowledge-based
economy. Clearly, R&D was a key factor in this
development. R&D growth in Finland over the
course of the 1990s outpaced that of all other
OECD countries except Iceland, and by the end of
the 1990s, Finland was by far the largest R&D
spender (relative to GDP) of all OECD countries (cf.
Werner, 2003). During this period, Germany has
had to cope with the consequences of reunification.
The transition to a market economy of the former
DDR put strains on budgets and resources have
been absorbed in the transformation process.
(b) Policy instruments fostering business R&D
Innovation policies rest on several pillars: Direct
subsidies for research projects within thematic
programmes, promotion of SMEs in three promo-
tion lines (innovation, cooperation, technology
consulting) and by four types of support (subsidies,
loans, venture capital, and infrastructure supply) in
the fields of information and consulting. In general,
firms can compose an individual mix of public
support out of the different pillars which best suits
their specific challenges. In contrast to other
Member States, Germany and Finland do not
provide for special fiscal treatment of innovation -
such as tax credits or tax subsidies.
Direct subsidies are the most important innovation
policy tool in Finland and in Germany. Such subsi-
dies belong to the group of policy instruments
focussing on innovation financing, that is, the provi-
sion of finance for innovation activities, including
measures designed to deliver or stimulate the
delivery of financial support for innovation. Two
important policy aspects must be stressed regarding
direct subsidies for R&D and innovation: First, they
are given as ‘matching grants’54 (cost sharing of
total R&D project expenditures by the applicant
and the government); second, they give preference
to collaborative research projects (cooperative
research of different firms and/or universities and/or
research centres).
Matching grants for R&D projects are directed at
thematic programmes, adoption of programme
structures based on technology foresight, regular
tenders and peer review-based selections, and
special approaches (e.g. joint projects of industry
and science or large firms and SMEs, regional
networks, and start-ups). The administration of such
54 In Germany, direct project funding is carried out almost exclusively through
grants, while the Finnish funding system also grants loans to the companies. As
the loans amount to less than 20 % of the grants to firms and universities (Tekes,
2004b) no explicitly distinction between grants and loans is made here; further-
more, the source of the data used does not make possible this distinction. 53 High-tech products account for 20.6 % of exports.
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business-related funding is delegated and carried
out in Finland by Tekes (National Technology
Agency) and in Germany by ‘project leaders’
(Projektträger).
Collaborative research for R&D projects is preferred
because cooperation has advantages such as posi-
tive spillovers as well as cost and risk sharing (cf.
Audretsch, 2003). In an empirical study, Cassiman,
Veugelers (2002) and Dachs, Ebersberger, Pyka
(2004) explore the effects of knowledge flows on
R&D cooperation. Their results suggest that firms
with higher incoming spillovers and higher appro-
priation ability have a higher probability of cooper-
ating in R&D.
Networking and close cooperation between univer-
sities and industry are seen as a key strength in
Finland as well as in Germany. About 50 % of the
innovating companies in Finland have been involved
in cooperative research and development. Judged
by the frequency in 1998-2000, suppliers (41 %),
customers and clients (38.1 %) as well as universi-
ties (29.1 %) are the most important partners for
collaborative research (Statistics Finland, 2002).
About one fifth of innovating firms collaborates
with competitors and research labs, even though
they are some of the least important collaboration
partners. According to OECD data, Finland has the
second largest share of firms with cooperation
agreements with universities or government
research institutes.55 Finland is also engaged in
international cooperation.
In Germany, during 1998-2000, 16.5 % of firms had
cooperation agreements (corresponding to 15.1 %
among SMEs and 46.4 % among firms with more
than 500 employees). In total, 15.3 % of the
German firms cooperate with partners in Germany
and 6.7 % have foreign cooperation partners.
Around 10 % of German firms cooperate with
universities.56 The share of firms with a cooperation
partner has declined in 1998-2000 relative to 1994-
1996. The only exception is the share of firms
cooperating with commercial laboratories and R&D
enterprises.57
The comparison between the German and the
Finnish collaboration pattern reveals a strikingly
higher propensity to collaborate in Finland (Foyn,
2000). Two reasons may explain this: First, the small
size of the Finnish economy facilitates networking
due to comparably low transaction costs in finding
the right collaboration partner. However, as rather
large differences in the propensity to collaborate are
found even in economies of comparable size such
as Austria (cf. Dachs, Ebersberger, Pyka, 2004; Foyn,
2000), size cannot be the sole factor explaining the
differences; secondly, strengthening of inter-firm
networking and cooperation, as well as science-
industry collaboration, has been a top priority of
Finnish technology policy. One could argue that
over the course of time, a collaboration culture has
developed in Finland as the country experienced a
longer history of collaboration-targeted public
funding policy than most other European countries
(Schienstock and Hämäläinen, 2001). Since the
National Technology Agency (Tekes) started its first
technology programme in the early 1980s, collabo-
ration has been a part of the financing principles
(see e.g. Lemola, 2002).58
(c) Public funding system
Within the administration of German and Finnish
ministries, particular organisations (intermediaries)
are responsible for the R&D and innovation funding
process and have a central position in planning and
financing. In Germany, the administration of public
funds is mainly delegated to and carried out by
‘project leaders’ (Projektträger); in Finland this tasks
belong to the National Technology Agency (Tekes).
The  German ‘project leaders’, generally research
centres and other organisations, are responsible for
the technical and organisational realisation of minis-
terial projects. Through all stages of the project,
qualified experts of different scientific and technical
areas and competent contact persons perform
several functions59 and ‘project leaders’ are the key
contact persons in the promotion of research. To
cope with the responsibility of the funds entrusted
to them60, they must ensure that projects are
realised at a high professional level and that the
legal framework of the promotion of the project is
considered.
In the Finnish innovation system, Tekes (National
Technology Agency) is the counterpart to the
German project leaders. It focuses on supporting
firms as well as scientific institutes. It seeks to
promote the competitiveness of the Finnish industry
and service sector by promoting research and appli-
58 Tekes’ notion of collaboration includes different types of networks covering
the wide spectrum of activities from basic R&D up to marketing.
59 In particular, the following functions: (i) Conceptual work at the preparation
of new support programmes and emphases, (ii) project management (advi-
sory service for applicants, professional and administrative phase-out of
current projects, evaluation), (iii) supervision of EU support programmes, (iv)
support in international research cooperations and (v) public relations.
60 ‘Project leaders’ hold in trust subsidies amounting to up to ￿ 500 million per
year.
55 Sweden ranks first.
56 10.2 % (1998-2000) and 10.9 % (1994-1996).
57 Values based on CIS data.
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cations in the field of technological development.
Tekes coordinates national technology programmes
and provides funds for applied technical research.
Being in the administrative domain of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry, it also contributes to the
preparation of national technology policy. With its
share of 27.1 % of Government appropriations for
R&D (￿ 392 million in 2003), Tekes is the largest
organisation in the field (Tekes, 2004a). In 2003,
Tekes supported R&D efforts by means of industrial
R&D grants (39.8 %), research funding to universi-
ties and research institutes (41.3 %), industrial R&D
loans (10.2 %) and capital loans for R&D to compa-
nies (8.7 %). The type of funding for companies
depends on the stage of innovation and the nature
of the project.
In Germany and Finland, industrial R&D grants run
from about 15 % to 50 %. Capital R&D loans run
from 35 % to 60 % and industrial R&D loans from
45 % to 70 % of eligible costs (Finland). In both
countries, funding is mainly restricted to domesti-
cally owned companies with domestic R&D activi-
ties. The funding share for research institutes and
universities ranges from 50 % to 100 % of the
eligible costs and is restricted to research work done
at the institute or university. Those projects are
usually cooperations with companies or other
research facilities. Technology programmes are initi-
ated by Tekes or the German ‘project leaders’ and
concentrate on specific technologies. The duration
of the programmes is about three to five years. Both
intermediators usually finance about half of the
costs of the programmes. The remaining financing
originates from the participating companies
(‘matched grant concept’).
Input and output indicators on R&D and innova-
tion
The Finnish government spent about ￿ 1 400
million on R&D activities in 2002. Although this is
less than one tenth of the German government
support of about ￿ 17 000 million, Finland spends
3.4 % of its GDP on R&D whereas Germany spends
2.5 % (2001). Moreover, the public R&D intensity
in Finland at 0.96 % exceeds Germany’s by 16
percentage points (OECD, 2003).
In the late 1990s, Finnish government outlays for
R&D were markedly increased by a decision to allo-
cate  ￿ 500 million to research and development
over the years 1997 to 1999. This additional appro-
priation for R&D was financed by privatisation
revenues. In 1999, an additional increment (￿ 250
million) was introduced permanently. The objective
of the additional appropriation was to foster the
national system of innovation and to create a bene-
Graph 2.9: R&D funding systems in Finland and Germany
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ficial environment for business, employment and
the economy. The final aim was to raise R&D to
2.9 % of GDP by 1999; this goal was already
achieved in 1998.
Between 1995 and 2001 Finland’s R&D expendi-
ture increased by a higher rate (90 %) than the
R&D expenditure in Germany (23 %). Aggregate
R&D expenditure in Finland is shaped by the
private ICT (Information and Communication
Technology) sector (Nokia effect61). With
increasing importance of the electronics industry
its share of private R&D expenditure rose from
about 25 % in 1990 to about 54 % in 1999
(Statistics Finland, 2001).
Concerning the outcome of funded R&D activities,
Germany and Finland have different incentive struc-
tures. The German Federal Government stimulates the
development of patent, licensing and exploitation
expertise in their funding procedures. When an R&D
recipient firm files an application it has also to submit a
plan for the utilisation of the outcome – initially in form
of an outline which subsequently will become more and
more detailed. All publicly funded R&D recipients are
expected and encouraged to assume responsibility for
their exploitation management. Wherever possible,
research findings have to be commercially utilised. In
order to give an incentive to the grant recipients, the
Federal Government allows them to keep all proceeds
from the exploitation of patents for at least two years. If
the recipient does not apply for a patent within two
years, the R&D results become a public good (BMBF,
2000).In contrast to German practice, the funding
scheme in Finland does not give the funded companies
any additional incentive to patent the results of the
funded research.Box 2.3 briefly presents the evolution
of several R&D input and output indicators in Finland
and Germany for the period since 1990.
61 The European Discussion on ICT up to the early 1990s was dominated by
Finland and Nokia. (Finland as a typical large area country like Sweden has
long years of experience in the sector of mobile communication. In contrast
to other European countries, the infrastructural organisation is on behalf of
the single communes and not centralised. The consequence is that regional
traders have learned to provide common standards of technology.) Thus,
Nokia became the ‘third leg of Finland’s economy’ besides Wood and Paper,
and Metal (see Mosaic Group, 1998). The ‘Nokia Effect’ described the ICT-
led success of an economy. The term was established by the stock exchange
speculators to describe decreases in the technology values of other countries’
firm at the stock market caused by Nokia (cf. Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2000).
Box 2.3
Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD): Splitting GERD into its public and private shares shows that the ratio of public
to private R&D in Germany is constant at about 1:2 in the period under consideration. In Finland, the relative importance
of public R&D declined from 1990 to 2003: Public R&D expenditure could not keep pace with the fast increasing private
R&D expenditure fuelled by the successful electronics industry.
Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D by socio-economic objectives (GBAORD): Although GBAORD is much
lower in Finland than in Germany, it has grown at a higher rate in Finland. From 1990 to 2003 GBAORD rose by 113 %
in Finland whereas in Germany 2002 it increased just by 50 % between 1990 and 2002. Relative to GDP, both GBAORD
and GERD in Finland exceeded German figures by a small amount. Focussing on the composition of GBAORD in
Germany during the period 1990-2003, the share of the defence budget declined continuously, whereas general univer-
sity funding grew. In Finland, the most significant changes are a decline in space programme investments in favour of
the share of non-oriented research programmes.
R&D Personnel (FTE): Whereas the absolute number of researchers is higher in Germany, the pattern of growth shows
significant progress in Finland. In the period 1998-2000, the number of researcher grew by more than 30 % in Finland
and by 17 % in Germany. It has been argued that the success of the Finnish innovation system can be attributed to the
fact that, amongst other characteristics, it has been able to supply an ever-increasing number of science and engineering
graduates (c.f. Georghiou et al, 2003).
Beside these R&D ‘input’ indicators, some innovation outcome indicators (‘output’) such as patents have displayed a
remarkable catching-up in Finland in the 1990s. Patents play a key role in the innovation process, not only as an instru-
ment to protect inventions, but also as a source of information for the planning of further R&D activities. The number of
patents as an output variable is seen as an important indicator of a nation’s technological competitiveness in the future.
Number of ‘triadic’ patent families62: The evolution in the number of triadic families in Germany is close to the evolution
in the European Union with a small decrease in the 1991 and a growth of about 30 % since 1990. In contrast, Finland
has experienced an increase of 170 % in this indicator, with a large increase in 1994 shortly before Finland became a
member of the EU and of the EPC (European Patent Convention).
Number of patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO): Germany shows a trend close to that of the European
Union while in Finland this indicator had a much steeper growth. EPO applications in Finland show no significant increase
in 1994: this suggests that the hump in the 1994 triadic patents is more a consequence of the developments in the elec-
tronics field than the result of Finland’s EU or EPC membership.
Number of patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO): Both Germany and Finland exceed the EU
average growth in USPTO patent applications. In contrast to the EPO and triadic patents, German patent applications
have grown much faster than Finnish applications at the USPTO. This suggests that German inventions, relative to Finnish
ones, are more directed to the US markets.
62 ‘A patent is a member of the [triadic] patent families if it is filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and is granted by the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)’, (OECD, 2003).
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2.4.1.3 Empirical analysis of public funding
cooperation and patent outcome
Focus of the analysis
This section reviews how different firm characteris-
tics affect the probability to patent. If significant
spillovers are produced by collaborative research
activities, firms participating in R&D networks will
exhibit higher innovation productivity. Following
the arguments by Hagedoorn, Cloodt (2003), the
patenting behaviour of firms is used as a proxy for
innovative performance. It is expected that R&D
cooperations show a higher productivity in terms of
patent applications due to positive spillover effects.
However, it is unclear how publicly funded research
networks differ from privately financed collabora-
tions. On the one hand, it may be that public R&D
networks are less productive. It could be the case
that the focus on cooperative research of modern
public technology policies forces firms to collabo-
rate in order to receive public grants. If policy
schemes had been different, those firms might have
preferred to keep their knowledge secret and
conduct only research projects on their own. In this
case, the publicly funded R&D networks would not
benefit from spillovers as firms pursue secrecy
concerning their research when interacting with
their research partners involved in the project. On
the other hand, publicly funded networks and the
partners involved may exhibit a ‘higher quality’ of
research carried out as the research projects have
passed the governmental quality control. Non-
public R&D cooperations could have failed in such a
process or only dealt with research less important
for technological progress (cf. Czarnitzki, Fier,
2003).
The analysis focuses on the impact of public
funding on innovative output. As public funding
schemes both in Germany and in Finland focus on
inducing companies to engage in collaborative
research, both the effect of public funding and that
of collaboration must be considered. The analysis
addresses the following questions:
• Question 1: Do funded companies have a higher
innovation output than their output would have
been, had they not received funding?
• Question 2: Do funded and collaborating compa-
nies exhibit a higher innovation output compared
with the situation of neither collaboration nor
funding?
• Question 3: Does collaboration increase innova-
tion output, even if no funding is involved?
• Question 4: Does funding increase innovation
output, even if no collaboration is involved?
• Question 5: Given that companies collaborate
and receive funding, what would have happened
if these firms had not received funding?
• Question 6: If a collaborating but non-funded
company is funded, does this increase the innova-
tive output?
Neither the fact that companies receive public
funding for their R&D nor the fact that companies
collaborate for innovation can be reasonably inter-
preted as the result of a random process. Both
receiving funding and collaboration are subject to a
selection bias. Concerning funding, companies
themselves choose to apply or not to apply for.
Also, the funding agency selects from the pool of
applications based on certain criteria. As collabora-
tion for innovation is part of the companies’ inno-
vation strategy; it is the companies themselves that
choose whether or not to collaborate. The selection
bias results in the empirical fact that the group of
funded companies is quite different from the group
of non-funded ones, as well as the group of collab-
orating companies is quite different from the group
of non-collaborating ones. The presence of this
selection bias requires that an appropriate estima-
tion procedure be used – see Appendix 3 for more
information on data, methodology and estimation
results.
Estimation results63
Variable description
The main question of this analysis is whether patent
activities of firms are stimulated by public funding
and/or cooperations. This patent activity is meas-
ured with a dummy variable (PATENT), indicating
whether the particular firm has filed at least one
patent application during the past three years.
About 27 % of German and 16 % of Finnish firm in
the sample have filed at least one application.64
Explanatory variables include two dummy variables:
collaboration (CO), and subsidised arrangements
63 Appendix 3 presents in more detail the data sources, methodology and
econometric results. See also ‘European Productivity, Innovation and Public
Sector R&D’, background study prepared for the 2004 edition of the Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report.
64 The data used for the empirical analysis are from the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS). In this analysis, the period used is 1994 to 2000 based on data
from CIS II and CIS III. CIS data has been complemented by data taken from
Statistics Finland’s employment register as well as from patent statistics. With
regard to the German database, West German companies instead of all
German companies are used since West German firms are most similar to
Finnish companies.
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(FUNPUB).65 The share of firms performing collabo-
rative research is about 17 % (Germany) and 34 %
(Finland). In the German (Finnish) sample, about
12 % (26 %) of all firms get an R&D subsidy. Other
variables to control for firm heterogeneity are also
used. Firm size is captured by number of
employees,  EMPL. The square of this variable,
EMPL2, is also included to allow for non-monoto-
nicity.66 Export orientation, EXQU, is measures as
exports divided by turnover. The patent stock,
PATSTOCK, summarizes the historical technological
experience and level of innovation activities. In
addition to previous patenting activities, the current
potential to patent clearly depends on the current
R&D engagement of firms. This is measured by the
number of R&D employees divided by number of
employees (share of R&D employees, RDEMP) and
its squared value is also included. Eight sector
dummies capture different technological opportuni-
ties among business sectors. Finally, a time dummy
reflects the changes in patenting activities over
time.
Probability to patent
A first regression estimates the impact of the various
explanatory variables on the probability to patent.
Table 2.13 displays these results - the coefficients
have no straightforward interpretation other than
their sign and statistical significance.
A positive and significant coefficient for FUNPUB
indicates that funded firms exhibit a significantly
higher probability to file a patent than non-funded
firms. This holds true for both Germany and
Finland. A positive impact of collaboration on the
propensity to patent in both countries is also
evident as is the impact of patenting history of the
companies (captured by the variable patent stock).
It is likely that this stems from experiences in the
patent application procedure at the national or
international patent offices.
Furthermore, larger firms are more likely to file a
patent. The Finnish results suggest that beyond a
size of approximately 1 700 employees, the propen-
sity to patent declines with size, while the German
sample suggests a turning point of 1250
employees67. Despite the statistical significance of
the negative coefficient in the squared employment
term, the employment values in the sample are
mainly below the peak value in both countries68
indicating a positive relationship between firm size
measured by employment and propensity to
patent. An inverted U-shaped influence can also be
found for the R&D employment variable. In the
Finnish case, the probability to patent increases up
to a level of 18 % of highly educated employees
and decreases beyond that value. The German esti-
mates suggest a share of R&D employees of about
60 % to be the peak of influence of employment in
R&D. The different results in magnitude of the peak
values for Germany and Finland can be attributed
to the different entities measured by the variable in
both country samples (see Appendix 3). Again, the
data show that in the region of declining influence
of employment in R&D only few firms are present in
both countries suggesting that in the relevant range
the impact of R&D employment on the propensity
to patent is positive. In general, these firms are
small and operate in high-tech sectors. Here,
65 Collaboration in this context means the active collaboration of all partners
involved in the project; contracting-out of R&D is excluded.
66 From a theoretical point of view, it would be desirable to include a variable
indicating the age of the company. As the Finnish data does not contain reli-
able information on this an age variable is not included in either case.
67 Employment is measured in thousands. The inverted U-shaped relation
results from the negative sign of the coefficient of the squared size.
68 Firms with size above the turning point are less than 0.5% in Finland and less
than 4% in Germany.
Table 2.13: Estimation of patenting probability
Germany Finland
PATENT Coefficient Coefficient
EMPL 2.195*** 1.241***
EMPL2 -0.878*** -0.370*
RDEMP 5.286*** 4.433**
RDEMP2 -4.748*** -12.786*
PATSTOCK 0.871*** 0.926***
EXQU 0.915*** 0.526***
FUNPUB 0.375*** 0.462***
CO 0.621*** 0.688***
_CONS -2.532*** -2.577***
Note: A Probit model was used in the estimation. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %); equations include eight industry dummies
and one time dummy.
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secrecy instead of patenting may be preferred
because with the patent disclosure, knowledge
assets become at least partly public.69
Table 2.14 presents the impact of the different
explanatory variables on the probability of being
funded (upper panel) and on the probability of
collaborating (bottom panel).
Probabilities of collaborating and of being funded
Fundamentally, the data support the hypothesized
selection bias as the group of funded (collaborating)
companies is significantly different from the group of
non-funded (non-collaborating) companies. The
regressions yield comparable results for both coun-
tries. One of the differences relates to the significant
influence of the squared R&D intensity in the estima-
tion of the German sample. For companies with more
than 60 % R&D employees, the regressions reveal a
decreasing likelihood to collaborate on innovation. As
mentioned previously, these companies are generally
small and operate in high-tech sectors, where innova-
tion competition can be regarded as exceptionally
fierce. The reluctance to collaborate may be caused by
the companies’ fear of losing marketable knowledge.
This effect is not present in the Finnish data.70
The second difference is the influence of the export
orientation on the companies’ propensity to receive
funding. In the Finnish sample, there is a highly
significant positive influence. In the German
sample, the influence is not significant at the 10 %
level. As the National Technology Agency (Tekes),
which distributes the largest fraction of project-
related funding in Finland, puts strong focus on the
economic viability of the results of the funded
project, special effort is put on the companies’
competitiveness and the competitive advantage of
the technology involved in the project (cf. Tekes,
2004a). In a small open economy, the companies’
competitiveness leads to an emphasis on export-
oriented companies.
Finally, on the basis of an econometric technique
that addresses the selection bias problem, the main
conclusions concerning each of the six questions
dealing with the influence of R&D collaboration and
public funding on patenting activity are
summarised below.71
Question 1: Do funded companies have a higher
innovation output than their output would have been,
had they not received funding?
71 These results are based on a matching estimator using the propensity scores
on the collaboration and funding variables derived from the regression
presented in Table 2.14. More details on this estimator and on the econo-
metric results can be found in Appendix 3 or in ‘European Productivity, Inno-
vation and Public Sector R&D’, background study prepared for the 2004
edition of the European Competitiveness Report.
69 Note that patents are published in Europe 18 months after the (first) appli-
cation, even though the patent may not have been granted yet (see e.g.
OECD, 1994, p. 27).
70 The coefficient of the squared R&D employment is not statistically significant
for Finland, therefore the higher the share of R&D employees the higher
propensity to collaborate.
Table 2.14: Impact on probabilities of receiving funding and of cooperating
Germany Finland
FUNPUB Coefficient Coefficient
EMPL 1.181*** 1.861***
EMPL2 -0.399** -0.649***
RDEMP 6.252*** 5.778***
RDEMP2 -5.110*** -13.607**
PATSTOCK 0.322*** 0.555***
EXQU 0.213 0.833***
_CONS -2.079*** -1.588***
CO Coefficient Coefficient
EMPL 1.374*** 3.165***
EMPL2 -0.442*** -1.470***
RDEMP 5.831*** 2.555**
RDEMP2 -4.809*** -4.190
PATSTOCK 0.289*** 0.496***
EXQU 0.533*** 0.742**
_CONS -1.917*** -1.100
RHO 0.459*** 0.737***
Note: Bivariate probit estimation on FUNPUB and CO. *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %). All estimations include eight industry
dummies and one time dummy.
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This question concerns the differences between
companies that receive funding and those that do
not. In both countries, the average company not
receiving funds is smaller, less R&D-intensive, has a
lower level of past technological experience and a
lower export orientation. Also, the average funded
company reveals a significantly higher propensity to
patent than the average non-funded company. The
differences in the propensity to patent in the
German and the Finnish sample are most likely
caused by the different composition of the samples.
Funded companies in Finland are smaller but consider-
ably more export-oriented than the German compa-
nies. About 63 % of the funded German companies,
but only 37% of the Finnish companies, have patented
before. After controlling for other characteristics that
differentiate these two groups, differences in the
average funded and the average non-funded company
vanish: on average, both groups have an equal proba-
bility of receiving funding and of collaborating. Yet, a
significant difference in the propensity to patent
remains. Funded companies have a higher likelihood to
patent than non-funded companies. Funding increases
the probability to patent by 75 % in Germany. In
Finland, however, funding causes the patenting proba-
bility to double. This means that both in Germany and
in Finland public funding exerts a positive influence on
the funded companies’ propensity to patent. Regard-
less of their collaboration behaviour, public funding
exhibits a positive impact on the funded companies
innovative output.
Question 2: Do funded and collaborating companies
exhibit a higher innovation output compared with the
situation of neither collaboration nor funding?
After controlling for firms’ characteristics, on
average, the initial dissimilarity between the two
groups (firms which collaborate and are funded vs.
those which do neither) vanishes. In both groups,
Germany shows a relatively higher propensity to
patent (70.8 % in the collaborating/funded group
and 47.1 % in the other group after controlling for
characteristics) than Finland (46 % and 12.8 %,
respectively). Yet, the impact of simultaneous
collaboration and public funding is larger in Finland
(33.2 %) than in Germany (23.7 %). Both effects
are significant. The impact of public funding is even
more pronounced if public funding induces compa-
nies to collaborate.
Question 3: Does collaboration increase innovation
output, even if no funding is involved?
This question focuses on the impact of collaboration
in the absence of public funding. There is a signifi-
cantly positive impact of collaboration, even in the
situation where no public funding is granted. The
magnitude of the impact, however, differs between
German and Finnish firms. In the absence of public
funding, collaboration increases the propensity to
patent by 22.4 percentage points in the German
sample, whereas the increase in the Finnish sample
only amounts to 14.4 percentage points. Thus,
even without public funding, increased collabora-
tion has a positive impact on companies that collab-
orate, compared with their situation had they not
collaborated.
Question 4: Does funding increase innovation output,
even if no collaboration is involved?
This case investigates whether funding increases
innovative output even if companies do not collab-
orate. The results reveal a significantly positive
impact of public funding, even if companies do not
change their collaboration behaviour. For the
sample of non-collaborating firms, public funding
has a positive impact on the innovative output of
funded companies.
Question 5: Given that companies collaborate and
receive funding, what would have happened if these
firms had not received funding?
This case investigates whether funded and collabo-
rating companies would have achieved equal inno-
vative output had they not been funded. The results
for the German sample suggest that, once compa-
nies collaborate, funding does not increase the
innovative output. Having concluded that funding
together with collaboration (Question 2) has an
impact on the innovative output and collaboration
without funding also yields positive effects (Ques-
tion 3), it can be said that in Germany, funding
does not significantly increase innovative output
once companies collaborate. The result on Question
4 for the German sample indicates that among the
companies that do not collaborate, public funding
does cause an increase in innovative output. The
result here suggests that the impact of public
funding varies according to the collaboration deci-
sion of the firms. In the Finnish sample, however,
even if companies decide to collaborate, funding
has a positive impact. In contrast to the results for
Germany, funding exerts a positive impact regard-
less of the collaboration decision in the case of
Finland.
Question 6: If a collaborating but non-funded
company is funded, does this increase the innovative
output?
This question investigates whether removing funding
has a negative impact on the innovative output.
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Consistent with the findings for Question 5, there is
no impact in the German sample but in the Finnish
data the impact is significant. Even more so, it is of
the same magnitude (but the opposite sign, of
course) as the impact in the context of Question 4.
A Summing up
The evidence reviewed here concerns the signifi-
cance of innovation policies and R&D collaboration
in Germany and Finland as representative of the set of
such policies used in the Member States. Although
both countries have very similar innovation policies,
they have very different records of success. In
Germany, as in other large EU Member States, there
has been a moderate increase of R&D investments
whereas Finland is representative of the success
smaller Member States have seen in recent years.
Particular attention was paid to the significance of
collaborative research. The effects on the innovative
output of companies, measured by their patenting
activity, of both public funding and R&D collabora-
tion were analyzed. The main conclusion from this
case study is that public funding and collaboration
have a positive impact on innovative output for firms
in Finland. In Germany, however, only collaboration
and the combination of subsidies with collaboration
show significant effects. Through this crucial mecha-
nism policy makers can improve Europe’s innovative
performance by means of the ‘Action Plan 2010’ -
incentives for R&D collaboration seem a particularly
promising recipe. The relevance of collaboration in
fostering innovative performance identified in this
analysis reflects the importance of the interconnec-
tions between public and private agents in driving
innovation. It is precisely in this area that the EU tends
to score low relative to the US where public and
higher education research institutions have devel-
oped a far more effective system of linkages with the
world of innovation.
In Germany there appears to be a large innovation
potential in the group of firms that receive R&D
subsidies but do not engage in collaboration. This
potential could be exploited by having recourse to
R&D collaborations. In Finland this effect is substan-
tially smaller, possibly due to the high share of firms
already engaged in collaboration.
2.4.2 Impact of government funding on
R&D and innovation: the case of Austria
2.4.2.1 Introduction
This second country case study is devoted to
Austria, another typical medium-size country. Con-
trary to the case study of Germany and Finland,
which focused on the propensity to patent, the
present one measures the outcome of public
support for innovation in terms of innovation inputs
and outputs. The input side of innovation is meas-
ured by the intensity of R&D expenditures.72 The
output of innovation is measured by the share of
total sales due to innovative products, i.e. new or
substantially modified products. Moreover, the
share in sales of new products can relate to prod-
ucts new to the firm or new to the market. The
former includes true innovation and imitation, the
latter only true innovations. Both dimensions of
novelty will be examined.
The objective is to evaluate whether firms that
receive government support are performing better
than those that do not receive funding for innova-
tion. Public support can relate to R&D expenditures
but also to other innovation activities like
promoting new products and providing informa-
tional support for the introduction of new products.
The relative effectiveness of national versus EU-orig-
inating public support is also considered here.
As before, the analysis uses micro data from the
latest Community Innovation Survey, CIS 3,
covering the years 1998-2000. The data make it
possible to examine the effect of government
support both on the propensity to be innovative
and on the amount of innovation.
2.4.2.2 Data
The analysis is based on the CIS 3 microdata for
Austria covering the period 1998-2000.
Respondents were asked the following questions:
• During the period 1998-2000, has your enter-
prise introduced into the market any new or
substantially improved products?
• During the period 1998-2000, has your enter-
prise introduced any new or substantially
improved production process?
• By the end of 2000, did your enterprise have
any ongoing innovation activities?
72 The Community Innovation Surveys contain information on another
(broader) definition of innovation inputs, the expenditures on innovation,
comprising intramural and extramural R&D, acquisition of machinery and
equipment for the production of new goods, the costs of acquisition of
patents, licenses, know-how, training for innovation, design, and market
introduction of new products. Statisticians do not consider these
responses very reliable and report many non-responses on this question.
It was therefore decided to consider only R&D expenditures as a measure
of innovation inputs.
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• During the period 1998-2000, did your enter-
prise have any innovation activities that were
abandoned?
A first way to characterize innovators is to consider
as innovators those that have responded ‘yes’ to
any of those four questions. It is also possible to
consider different types of innovators - product
innovators are those who have responded affirma-
tively to the first question, process innovators those
who responded affirmatively to the second question
and potential innovators those who had either
ongoing but incomplete innovation activities or
those who were not successful in their innovation
activities in the three year time-span. Among
product innovators, it is possible to identify innova-
tors with products new to the firm but not to the
market, those who are imitators, and those with
products new to the market who can be regarded
as true innovators.
The final data set73 consists of 1287 observations.
Of those, 42 % declare themselves as innovators.
Among those, 77 % are product innovators offering
products new to the firm and a lower fraction,
35 %, have come up with products new to the
market, 63 % innovate in processes, 75 % are
unsuccessful or not yet successful innovators, and
12 % have had to abandon some innovation proj-
ects - see Table 2.15. Clearly, a firm may belong to
various groups of innovators. Almost half of the
Austrian innovators are both product and process
innovators, and many successful innovators during
the period 1998-2000 have ongoing innovation
activities which might produce new processes or
new products in the future. The remainder of the
analysis focuses on product innovators because only
for these does the CIS 3 dataset contains data on
innovation.
Distribution of various types of government
support
In the CIS 3 dataset, firms are asked about four
sources of public support for innovation: local and
regional government, central government, the EU
and, in particular, the EU 4th and 5th Framework
Programmes for RTD. The central government,
including agencies working for the central govern-
ment, is the most often cited source of public support
for innovation, followed by the local government,
the EU and the Framework Programmes for RTD, be
it for innovators, R&D performers, new to firm or new
to market product innovators. Again a firm may
receive various kinds of public support.
Table 2.16 indicates that R&D performers are more
likely to obtain support for innovation than the
innovators. Support for innovation is thus more
concentrated on the input side than on the output
side of innovation. It is also noticeable that new to
market product innovators are more likely to receive
public support of some kind than new to firm
product innovators.
2.4.2.3 Methodology
Are firms that receive government support more
innovative than those that receive no governmental
support? Two sides of the innovation process can be
examined: on the input side, R&D expenditures, and
on the output side, the share of innovative sales.
Graph 2.10 illustrates the relation between govern-
ment intervention and innovation activities. R&D
feeds into the innovation process, which yields new
products while government intervention can affect
the input and/or the output side of innovation.
Econometric model
Since the CIS 3 questionnaire asks only innovators
about sources of government funding, it is not
73 For details on how the final dataset was constructed from the original dataset
see ‘European Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background
study prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report.
Table 2.15: Distribution of innovator types in Austria, 1998-2000
Number of  Percentage all Percentages with
observations firms respect to 
innovating firms
Total 1287 100 %
Innovators 546 42 % 100 %
New to firm product innovators 418 32 % 77 %
New to market product innovators 190 15 % 35 %
Process innovators 346 27 % 63 %
Ongoing innovation activities 409 32 % 75 %
Abandoned innovation activities 63 5 % 12 %
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possible, as in the cross-country comparison between
Germany and Finland, to compare the means of inno-
vation output between supported and non-supported
firms but only the means among innovators of
different types. This leaves too few observations to use
a matching estimator where each firm receiving
support is matched to a similar firm receiving no
support, thereby controlling for other determinants
like size, network or industry affiliation. The alternative
is then to model the endogeneity of innovation and of
public support.
The model treats government support, R&D and
innovative sales as endogenous. Box 2.4 describes
the model in a formal way and specifies the distri-
bution assumptions about the error term.74
• The first two equations deal with the determi-
nants of government support for innovation.
Two sources of support are considered: those
emanating from the central government and
those emanating from the EU.75 As modelled in
González, Jaumandreu, Pazó (2004), firms form
expectations about government funding for
innovation from domestic and EU sources.
These expectations then enter the R&D and
innovation output equations.
• The third equation concerns the determinants of
(intramural and extramural) R&D. Since not all
firms are R&D performers, there might be a
selection bias if only firms that perform R&D are
considered. To correct for selectivity, a Tobit
model, which posits a latent variable that
explains simultaneously the R&D intensity equa-
tion and the observed non-R&D performing
enterprises for which the latent variable falls
below a critical threshold, is used.
• The fourth equation concerns innovation
output. The focus is on product innovations for
which the dataset provides both qualitative
and quantitative information. Since there are
Table 2.16: Distribution of government support among innovators, Austria, 1998-2000
All R&D New to Firm New to Market
Innovators performers Product Product
innovation innovation
Nb Perc. Nb Perc. Nb Perc. Nb Perc.
Local Government funding 113 (20.7 %) 78 (25.8 %) 89 (21.3 %) 56 (29.5 %)
Central Government funding 172 (31.5 %) 150 (49.7 %) 145 (34.7 %) 91 (47.9 %)
EU funding 64 (11.7 %) 51 (16.9 %) 51 (12.2 %) 32 (16.8 %)
4th or 5th RTD Framework 46 (8.4 %) 40 (13.2 %) 39 (9.3 %) 22 (11.6 %)
Graph 2.10: Government funding and innovation activity
74 For a presentation of the asymptotic least squares estimation procedure that
is used to estimate this model see ‘European Productivity, Innovation and
Public Sector R&D’, background study prepared for the 2004 edition of the
European Competitiveness Report.
75 The CIS 3 dataset for Austria is too small to analyse separately the four sour-
ces of government support contained in the questionnaire.
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both innovators and non-innovators, it is
necessary to use again a Tobit model with a
latent variable that is equal to the observed
intensity of innovation for innovators and
which falls below the innovation threshold for
non-innovators. Two variants of this model are
used, in one the innovation output is
composed of products new to the firm (corre-
sponding to imitators and true innovators) and
in the other it consists of products new to the
market (characterizing true innovators). The
latent variable for R&D enters the latent vari-
able for innovation. The more R&D firms do,
the higher the chance they come up with a
new product. Government support for innova-
tion can thus affect innovation output directly
or indirectly by stimulating R&D.
This model allows to analyse which type of
government support has a significant effect on
innovation, and whether is affects innovative sales
directly or via R&D. Endogeneity and selectivity
are explicitly taken into account in the estimation
of the model.
Information necessary to estimate this model is only
available for the 42 % of firms in the sample that
are innovative in some way. The analysis is done
only for this sub-sample of innovating firms.
Control variables
In each equation, there are controls variables for
determinants other than the policy and innovation
variables. The main control variables used are:76
Industry Dummies
Dummy variables account for industry specific effects
in each equation. The government might be more
willing to foster certain industries, like biotechnology,
because it is promising to invest in new technologies.
Due to data restrictions, industries are classified in
three clusters: the high-tech cluster (vehicles, chemi-
cals, machinery, electrical products, plastics,
telecommunication, computer services, engineering
services, support auxiliary transport activities, and
not elsewhere classified industries), the low-tech
cluster (food, textiles, wood, non-metallic mineral
products, basic metals, supplies, finance and trans-
portation), and wholesale industry, which is strongly
represented in the sample;
Box 2.4: Model equations
1 dom g if 0 1 1 1
* > + = ε α z gdom ; = 0 otherwise
1 = EU g if 0 2 2 2
* > + = ε α z gEU ; = 0 otherwise
0 & = D R if 0
*
3
*
2 3 1
* ≤ + + + = r EU r dom r r g g z R ε β β β ;
= R* if  0 *> R
0 = inno  if 0 * * 4
*
3
*
2 4 1 ≤ + + + + = i i EU i dom i i R g g z inno ε β β β β ;
=  * inno  if  0 * > inno  
where 
ε , ε2, εr, εi
 are normally distributed error terms with zero means and, respectively,
1, 1, σr and σi standard deviations;
z1 , z2 , z3 , and z4  are control variables;
dom g (domestic government support),  EU g (EU government support), R&D
(R&D/sales), and (share of innovative sales) are the endogenous variables.  inno
1
=
76 The choice of the control variables in the model is not a trivial one. To identify
the parameters of the model it is necessary to impose exclusion restrictions, i.e.
exclude some explanatory variables in some of the equations in order to iden-
tify the other ones. The choice of exclusion restrictions is partly done on theo-
retical grounds (sources of information are more likely to determine innovation
directly than through government support), and partly based on the signifi-
cance of estimated coefficients. Non-significant coefficients might be bad
instruments to identify other key parameters of the model.
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Domestic Group
Governments might be less willing to intervene if
firms belong to a group because it is expected that
these firms benefit from group support;
Foreign Group
Government might be even less willing to finance
projects of subsidiaries of foreign companies using
taxpayers’ money but to favour domestic firms. The
group variables are dichotomous appearing only as
determinants of financial support;
Size
Large firms might innovate more and do more
R&D. Government support may be targeted more
towards SMEs but it might also be concentrated in
large firms if government is too risk averse to
finance R&D in small firms. Size is measured by the
logarithm of the number of employees and enters
as an explanatory variable in each equation;
Competition
The more competition a firm faces, the more assis-
tance might be considered to be a good policy.
Competition is measured by whether or not the
international market is the perceived predominant
market;
Cooperation
When financing research or innovation, the govern-
ment normally supports the collaboration of firms at
the research stage, especially with universities and
research institutes. Cooperation is a dichotomous
variable directly constructed from CIS 3. Competi-
tion and cooperation affect R&D and innovation
only through government support.
Human Capital
The higher the qualification of workers, the higher
the capacity of the firm to succeed in the innova-
tion process. Human capital is constructed as the
number of workers with higher education divided
by the total number of workers in the firm. It enters
as a determinant of R&D intensity.
Appropriability problems
The capacity to appropriate the output of research,
be it by patenting, by secrecy or other means, is
regarded as a significant determinant of R&D (see
Cohen, Levin, 1989). Appropriability problems are
proxied by the perceived importance of economic
risk as an obstacle to innovation.
Financial difficulties
Because the market failures in information goods,
innovators might find it difficult to obtain appro-
priate financing for their innovation. Financial diffi-
culties are measured by the perceived difficulty in
access to finance.
Externalities form science
The other possible important source of information
necessary to control for are externalities deriving
from basic research at universities and public
research institutions. Appropriability, access to
finance and externalities are binary variables.
Human capital, appropriability problems, financial
difficulties and externalities from science enter as
determinants in the R&D intensity equation.
Externalities form clients
Clients are often recognized as an important source
of information concerning the needs in the market
(see von Hippel, 1988). In the case of product inno-
vations, it seems reasonable to expect information
from clients to have an influence.
2.4.2.4 Results
Table 2.17 presents the magnitude and the direc-
tion of the marginal effects of the various explana-
tory variables on the probability of receiving
government support for innovation. When a firm
shifts from a low-tech industry to a high-tech
industry it increases its probability of obtaining
government support. For example, support from
the central government increases in that case by
11.1 percentage points, EU support by only 3
percentage points. In Austria, the wholesale trade
sector is more likely to get support from the
national government or the EU than the low-tech
sectors. Firms that belong to a group are less likely
to get innovation support, probably because they
are supposed to have access to resources emanating
from the group. Government is even less likely to
finance firms belonging to foreign groups, probably
because taxpayers’ money is supposed to help
domestic firms. The national government prefers
funding firms that are independent, that have a
certain size, that operate mostly in foreign markets,
that cooperate in innovation activities and that
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experience difficulties in financing their innovation.
Firms that face international competition have a 15
percentage points higher probability to be funded
by the central government. Enterprises which coop-
erate in innovation are more likely to get help from
both national and EU sources. Doubling size
increases by 7.7 percentage points the probability
of receiving support from the central government
and by 4.6 percentage points from the EU. Support
from national sources is more responsive than from
EU sources. There is not a substantial difference in
the factors determining local and central govern-
ment support or EU and RTD support for innova-
tion, but there is some difference between national
and EU support in general.
Table 2.18 reports the estimation results obtained
with the broad measure of innovation: products
new to the firm, i.e true product innovators
together with imitators. Table 2.19 reports the
results for the narrower measure of innovation:
products new to the market, corresponding to true
product innovators. As expected, the major differ-
ence between the two variants of the model is in
the innovation equation. Since the variant with true
innovators selects a more homogeneous set of
firms, the estimates of variant 2 are slightly more
precise.77
As the comparison of columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.18
reveals, when government support is treated as
endogenous, as it should be, the effect on R&D inten-
sity of some of the exogenous variables (central
government support, human capital and science
externalities) doubles. Central government support
appears to be one of the most important determi-
nants of R&D. Receiving central government support
increases by 2.3 percentage points the intensity of
R&D, which is a high value given that the mean R&D
intensity is 2.8 %. Doubling the number of
employees decreases R&D intensity by half a
percentage point. One percentage point increase in
human capital, which is large given the mean value of
human capital of 5.2 percentage points, is connected
to only one tenth of a percentage point increase in
R&D intensity. The only other significant effect comes
from the science push: ceteris paribus, firms that
benefit from information emanating from universities
or government labs have an R&D intensity 1.1
percentage point higher.
Unlike for R&D intensity, treating government
support measures as endogenous or exogenous
makes hardly any difference on the estimates of the
innovation equation (compare columns 2 and 4 in
Table 2.18). R&D has a significant effect on innova-
tion. The rate of return of R&D in terms of innova-
tive sales is of the order of 10 %. The externalities
due to clients increase the innovation intensity by
half a percentage point. The higher intensity of
innovation in high-tech than low-tech and in low-
tech compared to wholesale trade reflects and
confirms the ad-hoc classification used here.
Columns 5 and 6 report the marginal effects when
central and local government support are merged
(under the title ‘national government support’) and
EU support is merged with RTD support from the
77 In both cases, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions does not reject
the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions hold, even with a
10 % margin of error, when government support is explained by the model.
In this sense the data do not reject the model specification. When govern-
ment support is treated as exogenous, however, the Sargan test rejects the
model specification at the 5 % level.
Table 2.17: Marginal effects of determinants of various sources of innovation support, Austria, 1998-
2000, CIS 3, probit estimation
High-tech sectors -0.513*** -0.389*** -0.470*** -0.408***
Low-tech sectors -0.624*** -0.419*** -0.586*** -0.435***
Wholesale trade -0.598*** -0.363*** -0.530*** -0.379***
Austrian group -0.141*** -0.084*** -0.197*** -0.085***
Foreign group -0.126*** -0.121*** -0.216*** -0.122***
Size 0.077*** 0.046*** 0.083*** 0.048***
Competition 0.152*** - 0.180*** - -
Cooperation 0.129*** 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.111***
Financial difficulties 0.105*** - 0.117*** - -
Support from the 
European Union
Support from 
national sources 
(local or central 
Government)
Support from European
Union and 4th or 5th RTD
Framework 
Programmes
Support from central
Government
Explanatory variables 
*Significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, ***significant at 1 %
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4th and 5th Framework Programmes (under the title
‘all EU support’).78 The effects are of similar magni-
tude as when only two of the four measures are
singled out (previous columns).
The last two columns of Table 2.18 report the results
of the experiment when government support meas-
ures are allowed to affect innovation directly in addi-
tion to their indirect effect through R&D. The results
suggest that direct effects are not significant.
It is noticeable that EU support always turns out to
be non-significant. Since a large fraction of firms
that receive central government support also get EU
support it is likely that the effects of the latter are
confounded with those of the former. It may also be
the case that some EU money is handed out by
national agencies and is perceived by firms as being
nationally funded. Financial difficulties and appro-
priability problems play no significant role on R&D,
nor does size on innovation.
Table 2.19 reports the marginal effects of the
explanatory variables for the new-to-market product
innovations. An increase in the marginal effects when
the public support measures are treated as endoge-
nous is again apparent, also in the effect of R&D on
innovative sales. The robustness of the results to the
use of two specific versus two merged government
78 Collinearity would not allow the estimation of the separate effects of all four
sources of innovation support.
Table 2.18: Marginal effects of determinants of new to firm product innovations, Austria, 1998-2000,
CIS 3, ALS estimation
Exogenous support Endogenous support
R&D Innovative R&D Innovative R&D Innovative R&D Innovative 
sales sales sales sales
Central 
government 
support 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.023*** -0.004
EU support 0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.016
National 
government 
support 0.017***
All EU 
support 0.000
R&D 1.106*** 1.097*** 1.070*** 1.087**
High-tech 
industries -0.008** 0.143*** 0.022 0.150*** 0.009 0.150*** 0.021* 0.187**
Low-tech 
industries -0.017*** 0.115*** 0.015 0.123*** 0.001 0.122*** 0.013 0.156**
Wholesale 
trade -0.018*** 0.080*** 0.010 0.085*** -0.003 0.084** 0.009 0.113
Size -0.000 -0.010 -0.005*** -0.010 -0.003** -0.010 -0.005*** -0.013
Human 
capital 0.064*** 0.130*** 0.113*** 0.128***
Appro-
priability 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.005
Financial 
difficulties 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
Externalities 
from science 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011***
Externalities 
from clients 0.052*** 0.050** 0.051** 0.053**
* Significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, ***significant at 1 %.
Notes: Columns 1 and two report the results of the estimation treating innovation support as exogenous; the remaining columns treat support as
endogenous. Columns 5 and 6 presents results using ‘national government support’ by merging central and local government support, and ‘all EU
support’ by merging EU support with RTD support from the 4th and 5th Framework Programmes. Estimation results presented in columns 7 and 8
allow for a direct effect of support measures on innovation.
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support measures is also confirmed. The marginal
effects of the explanatory variables on new to market
product innovations are similar to those on new-to-
firm product innovations, except for the rate of
return on R&D: where ￿ 1 of R&D generates ￿ 0.53
of sales of products new to the market against ￿ 1.1
of sales of products new to the firm. Therefore, the
rate of return on R&D is only half as high in gener-
ating sales of products new to the market as in
generating sales of products new to the firm only.79
The major difference between true innovators and
the group true innovators together with imitators is
in the specification presented in the last two columns
of Tables 2.19 and 2.18 which allows for direct
effects of government support on innovation. Central
government support leads to an increase of 2.7
percentage points in innovative sales (for an average
of 2.8 percent) in addition to the 0.7 (0.023*0.303)
percentage points due to the indirect effect through
R&D. The total effect of central government support
measures amounts to 3.3 percentage points.
2.5 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to analyse empirically
the influence of public sector R&D on output and
industrial innovations in the European Union. Since
the gap in public research spending (measured as
higher education and government sector R&D)
between the European Union and the United States
is quite small, government policies should be
directed at stimulating business R&D spending. The
two main policy tools are to provide favourable tax
treatment for firms who undertake R&D or to
directly subsidise private R&D projects.
Using industry-level data for EU countries for the
period 1987-1999, the results suggest that govern-
ment-financed R&D expenditures complement
domestic industry-financed expenditures on R&D. In
terms of marginal impacts of public funding, an
increase of ￿ 1 on government financed R&D
produces an additional ￿ 0.93 in domestic industry
R&D. Furthermore, using economy-wide data for a
panel of OECD/EU countries for the period 1981-
2002, the results suggest that both direct funding of
business R&D and tax incentives for R&D have a
significant and positive impact on business R&D
spending in OECD and EU countries. These two
policy instruments tend to complement each other.
The empirical evidence suggests that R&D tax credits
are an effective instrument. A 10 % reduction in the
price of R&D (i.e. an increase in the generosity of tax
incentives for R&D) leads to an 8.1 % increase in the
amount of R&D spending in the business sector in
the long run. For the OECD/EU area during the
period 1990-2002, the results suggest that 0.01
percentage points of the increase in the ratio of busi-
ness R&D to GDP can be explained by the increase in
fiscal incentives for R&D (representing 3 % of total
increase). In contrast, the decrease over time in
government financed BERD as percentage of GDP
has hampered the increase in R&D intensity in the
business sector by 3 percentage points. However, the
majority of the increase in the average R&D intensity
cannot be explained neither by the tax credits nor by
direct funding. Thus, other factors such as the shift to
R&D intensive industries seem to be more important
than direct support for R&D in explaining the change
in the R&D intensity in the business sector across EU
countries. To the extent that reallocation of produc-
tion factors towards high-technology industries is
being hampered by lack of flexibility in factor
markets, structural reforms aimed at rendering
markets more flexible will play an important role in
increasing the level of business R&D across the EU.
Another conclusion from this chapter is the impor-
tance of the public R&D sector for productivity
gains and spillover effects to the private R&D sector.
Expenditures on R&D performed by universities and
public research organisations are significantly posi-
tively related to business enterprise sector expendi-
tures on R&D, indicating that public sector R&D
and private sector R&D are complements. For the
period 1990-2002, a significant part of the
increasing R&D intensity in the business sector can
be explained by the increase in R&D expenditures
performed by the higher education sector, indi-
cating substantial spillover effects from academic
research. When public sector R&D is split up into
the two main parts, both government and univer-
sity R&D spending are significantly positively related
to the R&D intensity in the business sector, with the
impact of higher education R&D being larger than
that of government R&D spending. In terms of
marginal impacts of public funding, an additional
euro in R&D performed by universities leads to an
additional 1.3 euro in industry R&D while a an euro
increase in R&D performed by government institu-
tions leads to 1.1 euro in industry R&D.
Results for OECD/EU countries suggest that expen-
ditures on R&D in the higher education sector
significantly stimulate growth of GDP per capita.
The effect of R&D performed by the higher educa-
tion sector is higher than the income share of this
sector, indicating substantial spillover effects. In
addition, the impact of university research is some-
what higher than the impact of business R&D. This
79 Part of the difference may be due to the fact that these results do not
account for distributed lags or mark-ups which could differ between prod-
ucts new to the market and products new to the firm only.
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is consistent with the hypothesis that the social rate
of return of research in the higher education sector
is higher than in the private R&D sector due to
spillover effects.
Another important finding is that public sector R&D
spending as a percentage of GDP has a positive and
significant impact on EPO patent applications per
capita, even after private R&D spending and
country fixed effects have been controlled for. In
particular, the impact of R&D performed by univer-
sity and government research organisations is
higher than the impact of business enterprise sector
R&D. Also, correlation analyses of R&D expendi-
tures performed by universities and public research
organisations with indicators of research output
suggest significant and positive associations with
the citations of publications, number of patents per
capita and the number of publications.
The analysis of the effectiveness of public support to
R&D and innovation using microdata for three
member countries (Germany, Finland and Austria)
suggested that the public sector has an important
role to play in innovation by giving financial
support and/or stimulating cooperation. The largest
impact is achieved when collaboration and public
funding are conducted simultaneously. In Germany,
public funding has no additional impact once firms
cooperate already, but it does have an impact in
Finland. In Austria, central government support
increases the companies’ share of products new to
the firm in total sales by 2.5 percentage points (for
an average of 19.8 percent) and the companies’
share of products new to the market in total sales
by 3.3 percentage points (for an average of 5.8
percent). The relevance of collaboration in fostering
innovative performance identified in this analysis
reflects the importance of the interconnections
Table 2.19: Marginal effects of determinants of new to market product innovations, Austria, 1998-
2000, CIS 3, ALS estimation
Exogenous support Endogenous support
R&D Innovative R&D Innovative R&D Innovative R&D Innovative 
sales sales sales sales
Central 
government 
support 0.010*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.027**
EU support 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.016
National 
government 
support 0.018***
All EU 
support -0.003
R&D 0.376*** 0.530*** 0.506*** 0.303*
High-tech
industries -0.008** -0.080*** 0.021* -0.085*** 0.007 -0.084*** 0.021* -0.076**
Low-tech 
industries -0.017*** -0.091*** 0.015 -0.090*** 0.000 -0.090*** 0.014 -0.075**
Wholesale 
trade -0.018*** -0.093*** 0.011 -0.093*** -0.004 -0.093*** 0.009 -0.078***
Size -0.000 0.008*** -0.005*** 0.008** -0.003** 0.008** -0.005*** 0.004
Human capital 0.059*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.123***
Appropriability 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.006
Financial 
difficulties 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
Externalities 
from science 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012***
Externalities 
from clients 0.028** 0.027** 0.027** 0.025**
* Significant at 10 %, **significant at 5 %, ***significant a 1 %
Notes: Columns 1 and two report the results of the estimation treating innovation support as exogenous; the remaining columns treat support as
endogeneous. Columns 5 and 6 presents results using ‘national government support’ by merging central and local government support, and ‘all EU
support’ by merging EU support with RTD support from the 4th and 5th Framework Programmes. Estimation results presented in columns 7 and 8
allow for a direct effect of support measures on innovation.
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between public and private agents in driving inno-
vation. It is precisely in this area that the EU tends
to score low relative to the US where public and
higher education research institutions have devel-
oped a far more effective system of linkages with
the world of innovation.
These results have some implications for public
policy. Given the significant and positive impact of
tax incentives on R&D spending, increasing the
generosity of R&D subsidies may become instru-
mental in increasing business R&D to levels closer
to those of other main world players. This is likely
to be particularly true for countries with little or
no tax incentives (e.g. the new EU member coun-
tries and some large EU countries, notably
Germany and Italy for large firms). Firm level
results suggest that university-industry partner-
ships appear to accelerate technological diffusion
via patents. Policies should improve the collabora-
tion of public research organisations with firms
and foster technology transfer through funding
and specific programs. There is also a need to
improve the infrastructure for commercialisation
of research findings such as technology transfer
offices and providers of risk capital.
Furthermore, one can conclude that governments
should provide appropriate funding of R&D
conducted by public institutions, in particular
research and development in the higher education
sector. The role of higher education research in
fostering R&D output and economic growth rein-
forces the need to integrate education policy
reforms in the EU efforts to foster research and
innovation throughout the economy. Government
research institutions are asked to contribute more
directly to social economic welfare by demon-
strating the relevance of their research. However,
the decline in funding for government research
organisations in the EU implies that restructuring
will be accomplished through the reallocation of
existing resources. There is also an increasing pres-
sure on public sector organisations to engage in the
systematic evaluation of their programs. The evalu-
ation should include researchers and programmes
as well as institutions.
The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences proposed a list of indicators that might be
used to evaluate the social benefits of public
research. These indicators include a number of
aspects such as scientific excellence (measured by
the number of publications and citations analysis),
products (e.g. healthcare technologies and services,
instruments, programmes), and presentations for a
non-scientific audience.
As the analysis above implies, the public sector
appears to play an important role in stimulating the
basic scientific and technical knowledge that firms
then incorporate into patents and hopefully into
licences, new products, processes or services. Yet,
even though these results support innovation policy
interventions such as matched grants and the stim-
ulation of cooperations, several important ques-
tions, such as the optimal mix of different innova-
tion instruments, remain. If European Member
States target to become the most competitive
federation by 2010, they still have to exchange
their experiences on the impact of R&D policies and
evaluations to learn from each other.
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financed business R&D at the industry level
Table A.2.1 presents the results for the impact of
publicly funded business R&D on business R&D
using industry data for 13 EU countries under three
specifications.
Impact of government support and public sector
R&D on business R&D
Table A.2.2 presents estimation results under two
specifications of the model and two estimation
approaches (fixed effects model and a dynamic panel
data model). The first specification deals with the
more indirect channels of public R&D assistance
(HERD and GOVERD). In a second specification, sepa-
rate impact-coefficients for HERD and intramural
GOVERD are also reported.80 Since the lagged
97
dependent variable is not significant, the discussion of
the results should focus on the fixed effects model.
Table A.2.3 shows inference on the R&D stimuli
resulting from direct government intervention, i.e. from
tax incentives and direct R&D subsidies. Note that the
lagged dependent variable is not significantly different
from zero and hence the discussion of the results should
rely on static fixed effects model. However, in order to
compare the results with previous studies using a
dynamic model, the dynamic panel data models are
presented as well. This also indicates that there is hardly
any catch-up observable in private R&D levels across
OECD/EU countries. The dynamic specification finds a
long-run elasticity of -1.05. This finding is consistent
with former evidence on the triggering effect of tax
incentives. Bloom et al. (2002), for instance, find a long-
run price elasticity of industry-financed and
industry–performed R&D with respect to the price of
R&D of about -1.0. Their estimates are based on data for
eight OECD countries for the period 1979-1997. Euro-
pean Commission (2003a) suggests a median price
elasticity of -0.81. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe
(2003b), however, find the long-run elasticity of the B-
index to be somewhat lower; using OECD data for 17
countries, they obtain a coefficient of about -0.31. 
Appendix 1 
Impact of public sector R&D 
and government support on business R&D
Table A.2.1: Relationship between industry- and government-financed BERD (pooled over EU industries
and countries)
ln government- In BERD ln real Constant Number  Number R
2
financed financed value of  of  groups (within) Government Financed
BERD, from added observations funded from
constant abroad, BERD abroad
prices constant 
prices
(1) 0.21*** 3.85*** 1319 255 0.22 1.69
(2) 0.19*** 0.03** 3.77*** 1035 226 0.25 1.14 0.26
(3) 0.13*** 0.04*** 0.37*** 2.50*** 687 156 0.28 0.93 0.37
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level respectively. Dependent variable: log domestic industry-financed BERD meas-
ured in constant $ 1995 prices and PPPs. Unbalanced industry panel over the period 1987-1999. Fixed effects estimates, time effects are included, but not
reported. The sample includes data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom. The marginal effect is calculated as the product of the estimated elasticity and the ratio of industry-funded BERD to government-funded BERD.
Specification (2) controls for BERD financed from abroad and specification (3) controls for both BERD from abroad and for real value added.
80 Contrary to Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, annual data are not employed.
Instead, averages derived from five-year periods and one three-year period
(2000-2002) are used. First and foremost, the rationale for doing so lies in the
limited availability of relevant data for many countries. Also, it can be argued
that the B-index displays little annual variation and that only a longer period
interval is suitable to capture the effects of changes in the fiscal system. This
approach using averages leaves only five data points for each country.
marginal effect
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Table A.2.2: Impact of public sector R&D on business expenditures for R&D (BERD): Panel estimates
for 21 OECD countries
coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
log BERD % GDP (t-1) 0.14 1.10 0.15 1.22
log public sector R&D %
GDP (t) 0.95 3.95 0.65 3.64
log HERD % GDP (t) 0.47 2.61 0.47 4.52
log GOEVRD % GDP (t) 0.24 1.65 0.12 1.41
log GDP per capita (t)c 0.69 1.93 0.56 1.47 0.89 3.13 0.70 2.62
period dummy 1990-1994 -0.07 -1.13 -0.07 -0.97 -0.22 -3.43 -0.25 -3.83
period dummy 1995-1999 -0.05 -0.53 -0.03 -0.33 -0.14 -2.67 -0.15 -2.84
period dummy 2000-2002 -0.03 -0.22 0.00 0.03 -0.13 -2.30 -0.12 -2.17
constant 2.82 2.15 2.74 1.93 0.12 2.67 0.14 2.96
number of observations 72 72 72 72
R2 (within) 0.48 0.43
Notes: The dynamic panel data model is estimated using the one-step GMM estimator in first differences. Dependent Variable is log total BERD % GDP
(within-transformed or in first differences). The long-run elasticity of BERD % GDP with respect to public sector R&D % GDP is 0.76 (=0.65/(1-0.14)).
Estimation period: 1986-2002 with data derived from three five-year intervals and one three-year interval. Excluding the non-EU countries has little
effect on the regression results.
dynamic panel data model fixed effects model
(2) (1) (2) (1)
Table A.2.3: Impact of tax incentives and direct subsidies on business enterprise sector R&D (BERD):
Panel estimates for 21 OECD countries
fixed effects model dynamic panel data model
excluding log  including log excluding log including log
HERD % GDP HERD % GDP HERD % GDP HERD % GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
log BERD % GDP (t-1) 0.16 0.82 0.07 0.41
log government-funded 
BERD % GDP (t) 0.23 5.70 0.15 3.10 0.15 4.13 0.11 2.94
log B-index -0.60 -2.26 -0.49 -1.90 -0.88 -3.76 -0.75 -3.46
log HERD % GDP (t) 0.29 2.98 0.28 2.17
log share of high-technology 
exports in total 
manufacturing exports 0.46 5.49 0.45 5.71 0.37 3.74 0.35 3.29
log GDP per capita
in constant PPP $ 0.58 2.17 0.53 2.06 0.69 2.36 0.65 2.51
period dummy 
1985-1989 0.03 0.54 0.01 0.23
period dummy 
1990-1994 0.01 0.15 -0.07 -0.97 -0.06 -1.27 -0.11 -2.86
period dummy 
1995-1999 -0.04 -0.39 -0.15 -1.44 -0.08 -2.71 -0.10 -3.74
period dummy 
2000-2002 -0.05 -0.39 -0.16 -1.26 -0.04 -0.97 -0.04 -1.42
constant 3.67 2.04 3.67 2.04 0.09 1.82 0.10 2.01
number of observations 99 99 73 73
R2 within 0.78 0.81
marginal effects 
of government-funded 
business R&D
short run 1.5 1.0
long run 2.2 1.4 1.7 1.1
long run elasticity 
of the B-index -1.05 -0.81
Notes: The dynamic panel data model is estimated using the one-step GMM estimator in first differences. Dependent variable is log BERD % GDP (within-trans-
formed or in first differences). The long-run elasticity of BERD % GDP with respect to the B-index is public sector R&D % GDP is -0.81 (=-0.75/(1-0.07)). Esti-
mation period for the dynamic model: 1985-2002 with data derived from three five-year intervals and one three-year interval. Estimation period for the static
model: 1980-2002. Excluding the non-EU countries has little effect on the regression results. t-values are based on robust standard errors. Long-run elasticities
are calculated as the ratio between short-run elasticities (i.e. estimated beta-coefficients) and the partial adjustment coefficient. The partial adjustment coeffi-
cient is defined as (1 – coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable).
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Decomposition of changes in BERD intensity 
as presented in Table 2.8
(sub-section 2.3.2)
Taking the total differential for the estimated R&D
equation and rewriting in terms of growth rates,
the percentage change in BERD intensity can be
written as:
Where  ∆χnt/χnt and  ∆znt/znt denote the actual
growth rate of the BERD intensity and the explana-
tory variables respectively and εχzj denotes the elas-
ticity of BERD intensity with respect to variable zj.
The actual growth rate should be close to the
predicted one.
,
4 , 3 , 2 , 1 jnt
jnt
j
j x
nt
nt
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z
z
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ε
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growth
Using panel data, the steady-state GDP per capita
equation can be written as:
where  γi,t is per capita GDP (expressed in 1995
purchasing power parities) in country i in period t,
χi,t-r is a row vector of determinants of economic
growth, ηi is a country-specific effect, γt is a period-
specific effect and εt,t is an error term. The choice of
the variables χi,t-r depends on the particular variant
of the neoclassical growth model one wishes to
examine. The country-specific effect captures the
existence of time-invariant determinants of a
country’s steady state that are not already
controlled for by χi,t-r. The obvious candidates for
these determinants are differences in the tech-
nology level (Islam, 1995). The equation in first
differences can be written as:81
Impact of public sector R&D on scientific output
and patents
The following equation describes the relationship
estimated in Table A.2.4.
101
where PATit/Lit denotes EPO patent applications per
capita. SUBit/GDPit, INDBERDit/GDPit denote govern-
ment- and industry-funded BERD expenditures as a
percentage of GDP, HERDit/GDPit denotes the ratio
of higher education section R&D expenditures to
GDP and GOVERDit/GDPit denotes the ratio of
government sector R&D expenditures to GDP;
schooling denotes the average years of education
among the working age population; λt is a period-
specific effect and uit is an error term. Country
dummies are included to control for omitted
country-specific fixed factors such as the ‘home
advantage’ bias. The ‘home advantage bias’ means
that a country generally takes more patents in its
domestic market than in other regions.82
The upper panel shows the results for the dynamic
panel model using GMM first-differences, while the
lower panel shows the results using the fixed-effects
estimator. Since the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable is not significantly different
from zero, it appears that very little or no ‘catch-up’
in patents per capita among the OECD countries
took place between 1986 and 1999.
Note that when interpreting the coefficients on
government-funded BERD as a percentage of GDP,
one has to take into account the high collinearity
between government-funded and industry-funded
BERD with a correlation of 0.71. An F-test for the
joint significance of industry- and government-
funded R&D reveals that both variables are signifi-
cant at the one percent level.
Appendix 2: 
Impact of public sector R&D on economic
growth and research output
82 One method which has been proposed for eliminating the ‘home advantage’
bias is the usage of triad patents (i.e. those patents that are applied for at all
three patent systems (EPO, USPTO and JPO).
81 This introduces a moving-average with unit root in the disturbance. Instru-
mental variables methods applied to first differences can be employed (see
Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991). In this case, lagged
values (using lags t minus 2 or earlier) can be used as valid instruments for
the lagged change in per capita GDP. For the other explanatory variables, all
(or selected) past values are used as instruments in the regression.
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Table A.2.4: Relationship between public R&D and EPO patent applications: Panel estimates
Dynamic panel data estimates using GMM first differences
(Change in dependent variable: ∆log EPO patent applications per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
∆ log EPO patent applications per capita (t-1) 0.10 0.59 0.05 0.32 0.08 0.52
∆ log total BERD % GDP (t) 0.33 3.03 0.26 2.34
∆ log industry financed BERD % GDP (t) 0.22 2.20
∆ log government financed BERD % GDP (t) 0.07 1.58
∆ log (HERD+GOVRD) R&D, % GDP (t) 0.44 1.92
∆ log HERD % GDP (t) 0.23 1.84 0.21 1.63
∆ log GOVRD, % GDP(t) 0.35 2.51 0.30 2.07
∆ log years of schooling (t) 4.10 3.97 4.15 4.03 3.65 3.37
Period dummy 1991-1994 -0.15 -1.22 -0.18 -1.45 -0.14 -1.15
Period dummy 1995-1999 0.15 1.01 0.13 0.86 0.16 1.06
Constant 0.08 0.55 0.14 0.95 0.12 0.82
Number of observations (countries) 68 (25) 68 (25) 68 (25)
Fixed effects estimates (Dependent variable: log EPO patent applications per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
log total BERD % GDP (t) 0.49 4.93 0.47 4.75
log industry-financed 
BERD % GDP (t) 0.43 4.66
log government-financed 
BERD % GDP (t) 0.10 1.58
log (HERD+GOVRD) 
R&D, % GDP (t) 0.64 2.93
log HERD % GDP (t) 0.36 2.58 0.34 2.37
log GOVRD, % GDP(t) 0.25 1.89 0.23 1.76
log years of schooling (t) 1.80 1.96 1.68 1.75 1.71 1.80
Period dummy 1991-1994 0.03 0.68 0.04 0.77 0.04 0.82
Period dummy 1995-1999 0.32 4.26 0.34 4.34 0.34 4.34
Constant -0.30 -0.14 0.39 0.17 0.59 0.26
Number of observations (countries) 68 (25) 68 (25) 68 (25)
R2 (within) 0.93 0.93 0.93
Notes: Upper panel: One-step GMM estimates (in first-differences); the long-run elasticity of EPO patents per million of population with respect to public
sector R&D is 0.44; estimation period: 1986-1999 with five-year interval data; it should also be noted that data for Germany refers to West Germany only
until 1990; data for unified Germany during the period 1991-1995 is excluded; the group of countries includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US; excluding the non-EU countries has little effect on the regression results.
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on innovative output. Since public funding schemes
both in Germany and in Finland focus on inducing
companies to engage in collaborative research,
both the effect of public funding and that of collab-
oration must be considered. The analysis encom-
passes several questions that are analysed struc-
turally in the same way: A (sub)sample of compa-
nies will be described by one (or more) properties.
Companies within this (sub)sample will be charac-
terised by an additional property. Companies with
this property are the treated companies, whereas
companies without this additional property are the
control group. The basic question is: ‘What would
have been the innovative output of treated compa-
nies if they had not been treated’. Table A.2.5
summarises the research questions. For both groups
of companies the characteristics of the treated and
the control group are given in terms of public
funding and collaboration.
Data and methodology
Data sources
The data used for the empirical analysis are from
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS).83 The CIS
surveys collect firm-level data on inputs and outputs
of the innovation process across a wide range of
industries and across Member States and regions.
These data are collected at enterprise level and
comparable at the European scale. Data collection is
done at regular intervals, now for the third time.
This continuity in CIS provides a major source of
information on innovation at the enterprise level for
firms in the EU Member States. In this analysis, the
period used is 1994 to 2000 based on data from
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CIS II and CIS III. CIS data has been complemented
by data taken from Statistics Finland’s employment
register as well as from patent statistics. With regard
to the German database, West German companies
instead of all German companies are used since
West German firms are most similar to Finnish
companies.
Methodology
Evaluation problem and selection bias
Each research question addresses a counterfactual
situation84 ‘What would a treated firm with given
characteristics have done if it had not been
treated?’ This is central to assessing the impact of
treatment (funding or collaboration) as the impact
is the difference between the output of the firm
under treatment and the output of the firm had it
not been treated.85 As the counterfactual situation
cannot be observed, it has to be estimated.
Neither the fact that companies receive public
funding for their R&D nor the fact that companies
collaborate for innovation can be reasonably inter-
preted as the result of a random process. Both
receiving funding and collaboration are subject to a
selection bias. Concerning funding, companies
themselves choose to apply or not to apply. Also,
the funding agency selects from the pool of appli-
cations based on certain criteria. As collaboration
for innovation is part of the companies’ innovation
strategy; it is the companies themselves that choose
whether or not to collaborate. The selection bias
results in the empirical fact that the group of
funded companies is quite different from the group
Appendix 3: 
Public funding of business R&D and private
patent outcomes: empirical analysis 
of Germany and Finland – Econometric results
84 For the treated companies, only their output under treatment can be
observed but not their output if they had not been treated. The latter situa-
tion is called counterfactual as it cannot be observed.
85 A more technical exposition of the evaluation problem can be found in ‘Euro-
pean Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background study
prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report.
83 The CIS, launched in 1991 jointly by Eurostat and the Innovation and SME
Programme, aims at improving the empirical basis of innovation theory and
policy at the European level through surveys of innovation activities at the
enterprise level in the Member States.
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of non-funded ones, as well as the group of collab-
orating companies is quite different from the group
of non-collaborating ones. Assessing the impact of
the treatment based on a comparison of the treated
group (funded and/or collaborating) and the group
of non-treated companies may generate dubious
results as the groups are not comparable due to the
selection bias.
Matching
The matching approach has been developed to
identify treatment effects when the available obser-
vations on individuals or firms are subject to a selec-
tion bias (see Heckman et al., 1999, Heckman et al.,
1997 for surveys). Hence, the matching estimator
generates the counterfactual situation and controls
for the selection bias simultaneously. The matching
is based on the insight that the counterfactual situ-
ation for the treated companies can be estimated
from the sample of non-treated observations. The
matching estimator amounts to creating (i.e. esti-
mating) from the control group a sample of non-
treated observations which is comparable to the
sample of treated observations, whereas compara-
bility relates to a set of a priori defined characteris-
tics (x). In the empirical application below, the esti-
mated sample of non-treated observations is
denoted matched controls.
As the matching procedure requires the definition
of the characteristics x, dimensionality problems
might occur. If the number of matching criteria is
large, it will hardly be possible to find any control
observation. Therefore, the propensity score
matching will be used (see Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). The idea is to estimate the propensity score
of participation for the whole sample and find pairs
of participants and non-participants that have the
same probability value of participation.86
Estimation results
Variable description
The main question of this analysis is whether patent
activities of firms are stimulated by public funding
and/or cooperations. This patent activity is meas-
ured with a dummy variable (PATENT), indicating
whether the particular firm has filed at least one
patent application during the past three years.
Exogenous variables are basically two dummy vari-
ables: collaboration (CO), and subsidised arrange-
ments (FUNPUB).87 Other variables to control for
firm heterogeneity are also used. Firm size is
captured by number of employees, EMPL. The
square of this variable, EMPL2, is also included to
allow for non-monotonicity.88 Export orientation,
EXQU, is measures as exports divided by turnover.
The patent stock, PATSTOCK (), summarizes the
historical technological experience and level of
86 In this analysis, a ‘kernel-based matching’ is used that estimates the counter-
factual on the basis of all non-treated companies in the sample. As matching
criteria, both the propensity score for the subsidy dummy (funpub) and also
the propensity score obtained by regressing the innovative activities dummy
(innov) on the exogenous variables are used. This selection of matching
criteria ensures the similarity of the treated and the non-treated companies
both in terms of funding probability and in terms of the likelihood of carrying
out innovative activities. For more details on this methodology see ‘European
Productivity, Innovation and Public Sector R&D’, background study prepared
for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness Report.
87 Collaboration in this context means the active collaboration of all partners
involved in the project; contracting-out of R&D is excluded.
88 From a theoretical point of view, a variable indicating the age of the
company would be desirable to include. As the Finnish data does not contain
reliable information on this an age variable is not included in either case.
Table A.2.5: Research questions
Treated Control Research question
Case Fund. Coll. Fund. Coll.
1 yes – no – Do funded companies have a higher innovation output
compared with the case if these companies had not received
funding?
2 yes yes no no Do funded and collaborating companies exhibit a higher
innovation output compared with the situation of neither
collaboration nor funding?
3 no yes no no Does collaboration increase innovation output, even if no
funding is involved?
4 yes no no no Does funding increase innovation output, even if no collab-
oration is involved?
5 yes yes no yes Given companies collaborate and receive funding, what
would have happened had these firms not received funding?
6 no yes yes yes If a collaborating but non-funded company is funded, does
this increase the innovative output?
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innovation activities and is computed by the
perpetual inventory method.89 In addition to
previous patenting activities, the current potential
to patent clearly depends on the current R&D
engagement of firms. This is measured by the
number of R&D employees divided by number of
employees (share of R&D employees, RDEMP) and
its squared value is also included.90 Eight sector
dummies based on the NACE classification capture
different technological opportunities among busi-
ness sectors. In principle, these dummies are
created according to the NACE two-digit sectoral
classification. However, some sectors are merged
due to a low number of observations. Finally, a time
dummy reflects the changes in patenting activities
over time.
Matching estimations
As it is inappropriate to assume that the errors of
the estimation of CO and  FUNPUB to be inde-
pendent, a bivariate probit model to regress the
collaboration dummy and the public funding
dummy on the exogenous variables is used
(Greene, 2002, Ch. 19.6). Results are presented in
Table A.2.6.
Fundamentally, the data support the hypothesized
selection bias as the group of funded (collaborating)
companies is significantly different from the group of
non-funded (non-collaborating) companies.
The matching estimator is computed using the
propensity scores (XBCO and  XBFUNPUB) derived
from the regression above. The correlation coefficient
(RHO) is significant because collaboration and
funding are linked to each other, ex post supporting
the hypothesis leading to the application of the
bivariate probit estimation. Tables A.2.7 to A.2.12
report the results. They illustrate that the selection
bias is removed by the matching procedure: If the
mean of the treated group and the control group
was significantly different before the matching, this
significance vanishes after the matching. The main
conclusions concerning each of the six questions
dealing with the influence of R&D collaboration and
public funding on patenting activity are summarised
below.
Table A.2.6: Bivariate probit estimation on the funding (FUNPUB) and the cooperation (CO)
Germany Finland
FUNPUB Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
EMPL 1.181*** 0.237 1.861*** 0.267
EMPL2 -0.399** 0.128 -0.649*** 0.193
RDEMP 6.252*** 0.621 5.778*** 1.592
RDEMP2 -5.110*** 0.648 -13.607** 5.280
PATSTOCK 0.322*** 0.842 0.555*** 0.071
EXQU 0.213 0.163 0.833*** 0.974
_CONS -2.079*** 0.141 -1.588*** 0.096
CO Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
EMPL 1.374*** 0.223 3.165*** 0.269
EMPL2 -0.442*** 0.122 -1.470*** 0.190
RDEMP 5.831*** 0.578 2.555** 1.097
RDEMP2 -4.809*** 0.612 -4.190 2.634
PATSTOCK 0.289*** 0.077 0.496*** 0.071
EXQU 0.533*** 0.151 0.742** 0.095
_CONS -1.917*** 0.130 -1.100 0.087
RHO 0.459*** 0.041 0.737*** 0.021
Note: *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %). All estimations include eight industry dummies and one time dummy.
89 The patent stock PATSTOCK (∏) is computed by the perpetual inventory
method: ∏i,t = (1-δ) ∏i,t-1 + πi,t where πi,t denotes the number of patent appli-
cations and δ represents the depreciation rate of knowledge assets and is set
to δ = 0.15 (see e.g. Hall, 1990). The initial value of the variable, in 1980, is
set to zero. The bias arising from this assumption should be negligible
because the patent data are available since 1980, but the period under
review in the regressions starts in 1994.
90 In the Finnish data set, the share of highly educated employees with a tech-
nical education as proxy for the R&D employees is used. The data is from
Statistics Finland’s employment register and merged with the CIS data. As
the share of highly educated technical employees is available for the whole
population of firms, using this variable eliminates the effect that only innova-
tors answered the R&D input question in the innovation survey.
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Table A.2.7
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.415 0.204*** 0.410 0.221 0.090*** 0.234
0.028 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.004 0.009
EMPL2 0.419 0.152*** 0.399 0.153 0.035*** 0.197*
0.054 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.010 0.015
RDEMP 0.152 0.046*** 0.148 0.018 0.001*** 0.017
0.014 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.000
RDEMP2 0.087 0.023*** 0.082 0.003 0.002*** 0.003
0.014 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
PATSTOCK 0.632 0.318*** 0.614 0.374 0.113*** 0.366
0.027 0.010 0.013 0.018 0.007 0.012
EXQU 0.291 0.180*** 0.288 0.415 0.226*** 0.410
0.014 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.006 0.007
XBFUNPUB -0.788 -1444.107*** -0.797 -0.275 -0.936*** -0.287
0.033 0.011 0.032 0.025 0.012 0.025
XBCO -0.563 -122.464*** -0.568 0.002 -0.595*** 0.001
0.036 0.013 0.034 0.026 0.011 0.023
PATENT 0.635 0.220*** 0.476*** 0.408 0.075*** 0.205***
0.027 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.006 0.007
# obs 310 2,232 310 713 2,082 713
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the funded companies and the control group contains all not funded firms, The column ‘matched control’
displays the control group after the matching. Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However, the distribution over industries differs before
matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
Both in Germany and in Finland public funding exerts a positive influence on the funded companies’
propensity to patent. Regardless of their collaboration behaviour, public funding exhibits a positive impact
on the funded companies innovative output.
Case 1: Do funded companies have a higher innovation output compared to the case if these companies
had not received funding?
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Table A.2.8
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.494 0.182*** 0.439 0.257 0.076*** 0.241
0.045 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.004 0.012
EMPL2 0.569 0.128*** 0.449 0.186 0.030*** 0.176
0.092 0.011 0.027 0.020 0.005 0.018
RDEMP 0.172 0.037*** 0.173 0.020 0.009*** 0.022
0.021 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.001
RDEMP2 0.099 0.018*** 0.096 0.003 0.002 0.004
0.021 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000
PATSTOCK 0.689 0.284*** 0.635 0.408 0.093*** 0.380
0.037 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.007 0.014
EXQU 0.318 0.166*** 0.316 0.430 0.212*** 0.412
0.020 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.007 0.009
XBFUNPUB -0.675 -1.507*** -0.694 -0.207 -0.994*** -0.239
0.042 0.011 0.028 0.041 0.013 0.028
XBCO -0.400 -1.303*** -0.421 0.105 -0.666*** 0.076
0.043 0.013 0.042 0.030 0.011 0.029
PATENT 0.708 0.168*** 0.471*** 0.460 0.041*** 0.128***
0.036 0.008 0.017 0.021 0.005 0.011
# obs 161 1,963 161 553 1,690 553
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the funded and collaborating companies and the control group contains the not funded and not collabo-
rating firms. The column ‘matched control’ displays the control group after the matching. Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However,
the distribution over industries differs before matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
The impact of public funding is even more pronounced if public funding induces companies to collaborate.
Case 2: Do funded and collaborating companies exhibit a higher innovation output compared to the situ-
ation of neither collaboration nor funding?
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Table A.2.9
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.360 0.182*** 0.379 0.148 0.076*** 0.148
0.026 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.004 0.010
EMPL2 0.315 0.128*** 0.353 0.061 0.030*** 0.074
0.046 0.011 0.020 0.009 0.005 0.008 
RDEMP 0.107 0.037*** 0.106 0.015 0.009** 0.014
0.012 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001
RDEMP2 0.052 0.018*** 0.056 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.012 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.001
PATSTOCK 0.564 0.284*** 0.562 0.204 0.093** 0.195
0.030 0.010 0.016 0.020 0.007 0.013
EXQU 0.283 0.166*** 0.268 0.290 0.212*** 0.283
0.015 0.005 0.007 0.016 0.015 0.010
XBFUNPUB -1.002 -1.507*** -1.022 -0.679 -0.994*** -0.707
0.036 0.011 0.035 0.030 0.013 0.029
XBCO -0.673 -1.303*** -0.695 -0.283 0.667*** -0.315
0.036 0.013 0.035 0.031 0.011 0.030
PATENT 0.598 0.168*** 0.374*** 0.220 0.041*** 0.076***
0.030 0.008 0.015 0.021 0.005 0.005
# obs 266 1,963 266 387 1,690 387
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the not funded but collaborating companies and the control group contains the neither funded nor collab-
orating firms. The column ‘matched control’ displays the control group after the matching. Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However,
the distribution over industries differs before matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
Even without public funding, increased collaboration has a positive impact on companies that collaborate,
compared with their situation had they not collaborated.
Case 3: Does collaboration increase innovation output, even if no funding is involved?
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Table A.2.10
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.306 0.182*** 0.347 0.081 0.076 0.072
0.029 0.007 0.017 0.012 0.004 0.008
EMPL2 0.219 0.128* 0.316* 0.027 0.030 0.021
0.046 0.011 0.027 0.014 0.005 0.007
RDEMP 0.115 0.037*** 0.117 0.012 0.009 0.012
0.018 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.002
RDEMP2 0.060 0.018** 0.064 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.018 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000
PATSTOCK 0.559 0.284*** 0.554 0.243 0.092*** 0.231
0.041 0.010 0.022 0.035 0.007 0.024
EXQU 0.261 0.166*** 0.251 0.358 0.211*** 0.372
0.021 0.005 0.010 0.023 0.006 0.018
XBFUNPUB -0.954 -1.507*** -0.968 -0.532 -0.994*** -0.550
0.046 0.011 0.045 0.047 0.013 0.046
XBCO -0.776 -1.303*** -0.789 -0.396 0.667*** -0.413
0.054 0.013 0.053 0.043 0.011 0.041
PATENT 0.545 0.168*** 0.372*** 0.209 0.041*** 0.072***
0.041 0.008 0.019 0.034 0.005 0.011
# obs 145 1,963 145 148 1,690 148
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the funded but not collaborating companies and the control group contains the neither collaborating nor
funded firms. The column ‘matched control’ displays the control group after the matching. Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However,
the distribution over industries differs before matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
Public funding has a significantly positive impact, even if companies do not change their collaboration
behaviour. For the sample of non-collaborating firms, public funding has a positive impact on the innova-
tive output of funded companies.
Case 4: Does funding increase innovation output, even if no collaboration is involved?
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Table A.2.11
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.500 0.370** 0.434 0.221 0.148*** 0.186**
0.045 0.027 0.022 0.013 0.010 0.009
EMPL2 0.579 0.330** 0.419 0.141 0.061*** 0.081***
0.092 0.047 0.037 0.018 0.009 0.008
RDEMP 0.179 0.109*** 0.166 0.018 0.017 0.021
0.021 0.012 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.001
RDEMP2 0.106 0.053** 0.096 0.003 0.004 0.004
0.021 0.012 0.013 0.001 0.002 0.000
PATSTOCK 0.693 0.565*** 0.730 0.371 0.204*** 0.373
0.036 0.030 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.015
EXQU 0.318 0.286 0.345 0.410 0.289*** 0.402
0.020 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.010
XBFUNPUB -0.658 -0.986*** -0.670 -0.301 -0.690*** -0.317
0.043 0.036 0.041 0.027 0.032 0.026
XBCO -0.385 -0.654*** -0.394 0.016 -0.285*** 0.005
0.044 0.037 0.043 0.028 0.026 0.027
PATENT 0.712 0.602** 0.712 0.430 0.219*** 0.352***
0.036 0.030 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.012
# obs 163 269 163 530 392 530
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the both funded and collaborating companies and the control group contains the collaborating but not
funded firms. The column ‘matched control’ displays the control group after the matching, Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However,
the distribution over industries differs before matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
In Germany: once companies collaborate, funding does not increase the innovative output. Given that
funding together with collaboration (Case 2) has an impact on the innovative output and collaboration
without funding also yields positive effects (Case 3), funding does not significantly increase innovative
output once companies collaborate. Among the companies that do not collaborate, public funding does
cause an increase in innovative output (Case 4). The result here suggests that the impact of public funding
varies according to the collaboration decision of the firms.
In Finland: Even if companies decide to collaborate, funding has a positive impact. In contrast to the results
for Germany, funding exerts a positive impact regardless of the collaboration decision.
Case 5: Given companies collaborate, and receive funding, what would have happened, if these firms had
not received funding?
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Table A.2.12
Germany Finland
Treated Control Matched Treated Control Matched 
Mean control Mean control 
Std,err Std,err 
EMPL 0.375 0.516*** 0.398 0.149 0.281*** 0.164
0.027 0.046 0.018 0.010 0.016 0.010
EMPL2 0.335 0.607*** 0.407 0.062 0.220*** 0.087
0.047 0.093 0.036 0.009 0.023 0.010
RDEMP 0.111 0.186*** 0.114 0.015 0.020 0.011
0.013 0.021 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.001
RDEMP2 0.054 0.110** 0.058 0.003 0.003 0.002
0.012 0.021 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.000
PATSTOCK 0.574 0.699*** 0.571 0.205 0.419*** 0.202
0.030 0.036 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.012
EXQU 0.290 0.324 0.283 0.290 0.439*** 0.305
0.015 0.020 0.011 0.016 0.014 0.010
XBFUNPUB -0.941 -0.633*** -0.933 -0.673 0.163*** -0.664
0.034 0.044 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.029
XBCO -0.647 -0.357*** -0.644 -0.278 0.148*** -0.272
0.037 0.047 0.035 0.031 0.031 0.025
PATENT 0.611 0.717** 0.572 0.220 0.475*** 0.292**
0.030 0.035 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.012
# obs 265 166 265 389 586 389
Note: *** (**,*) indicate the significance level of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) in a two-tailed t-test on equal means of the corresponding group and the treated
firms. Here the treated group consists of the not funded but collaborating companies and the control group contains the both funded and collabo-
rating firms. The column ‘matched control’ displays the control group after the matching. Mean differences of sectors are not presented. However,
the distribution over industries differs before matching and vanishes after the estimation of the control group.
Consistent with the findings in Case 5, removing funding has no impact in the German sample but in the
Finnish data the impact is significant. Even more so, it is of the same magnitude (but the opposite sign, of
course) as the impact in Case 4.
Case 6: If a collaborating but not funded company is funded, does this increase the innovative output?
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3.1 Introduction
The health care sector is one of the most important
sectors in any economy, representing one of the
largest service industries in developed countries.
Currently its output accounts for about 7 % of GDP in
the EU-15, larger than the roughly 5 % accounted for
by the financial services sector or retail trade sector
(O’Mahony and van Ark, 2003). Therefore trends in
productivity and efficiency in this sector will have a
large impact on these performance measures in
economies as a whole. Moreover, the performance of
the health sector will affect the competitiveness of
the overall economy via its effect on labour costs,
labour market flexibility and the allocation of
resources at the macroeconomic level. The final
output of this sector – ensuring a healthy population
– will have an impact on the productive capacity of
the workforce in general and so have consequences
across all sectors of the economy. Hence the func-
tioning of the health sector will have an important
impact upon the standards of living of Europe’s citi-
zens. However, evaluating performance in services,
and the public sector in particular, is fraught with
difficulties (O’Mahony and Stevens, 2002). Doing so
for the health sector is more difficult than in other
service sectors since both the system of provision and
the nature of the production process have a number
of unique features.
This chapter examines the economic, organisational
and innovation characteristics of the health sector and
reviews some evidence on performance. To place
current trends in context, section 3.2 begins with an
account of how health care systems have developed
over time, before outlining the nature of the produc-
tion process in health, with particular emphasis on
why the health sector differs from other service
sectors. Developments in the health sector have
significant consequences for the overall economy,
hence a discussion of this critical relationship follows.
Given the significant nature of this link, the impor-
tance of evaluating health sector performance is clear.
The structure of the health care system is an important
factor for consideration in the assessment of perform-
ance. Differences across countries in preferences
between equity and efficiency considerations mean
that health care systems have developed in different
ways; section 3.3 presents an overview of current
systems of provision in the Member States. Section 3.4
then discusses the theoretical framework underlying
attempts to understand developments in health care
performance, concentrating on efficiency arguments
but also considering the impacts on equity. The influ-
ence of technology on performance is also explored.
Available evidence on performance of the EU health
care sector is then reviewed in section 3.5. The health
sector possesses several distinctive features that
complicate the measurement of performance. There-
fore, performance is evaluated through more than one
approach. Section 3.5 begins by considering evidence
regarding health outcomes and expenditures, taken
from both macroeconomic studies covering the entire
sector or large sub-sectors and microeconomic studies
focusing on specific diseases. A discussion of the use of
capital, labour and pharmaceuticals follows, as the
utilisation of inputs also plays a significant role in deter-
mining performance. Finally, this section considers
recent attempts to improve efficiency through reform
in the context of organisational changes. Section 3.6
concludes by drawing some conclusions for policy.
3.2 The characteristics 
of the health sector
3.2.1 The system of health provision
The health care sector is subject to a high degree of
government intervention. Governments intervene
both directly, through provision and funding, but
Chapter 3:
Performance in the EU Health Sector
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also indirectly, through regulation. Governments
have to balance the often conflicting goals of equity
and efficiency of health provision. The potential
conflict between these goals is fundamental to
understanding both the development of systems of
provision and attempts to reform these systems.
Hence it is important to place the development of
the health care system in historical context. In a
recent overview of international trends in health
care performance, Cutler (2002) divides the devel-
opment of the sector into a number of stages. He
suggests that the origins of medical care systems in
most countries were fundamentally driven by equity
considerations, with little concern about efficiency.
Guarantees of equal access to medical care for all
citizens led to the development of universal insur-
ance coverage. Initially governments could ignore
efficiency considerations since medical care could
do little for sick people. However, beginning with
the development of antibiotics, the post-war period
has been one of rapid change in our understanding
of the causes of illness and technological change in
treating illness. This in turn gave rise both to rising
costs associated with new treatments and
increasing demand as citizens became more aware
of the benefits of medical interventions. These
increases in costs and demand led to an increasing
conflict between the two goals of equity and effi-
ciency. Cutler (2002) suggests that since the 1960s
the rapid increase in medical care expenditure led
to governments facing severe financial constraints
and so commitments to complete equality became
unaffordable. The initial response of many countries
was first to place regulatory limits on costs,
reducing provider fees and rationing access in the
1970s and 1980s. While these policies had some
success in cost containment, the controls led to
increased waiting times and greater access restric-
tions with resulting dissatisfaction on the part of
consumers. The result was a greater emphasis on
ensuring efficiency with many countries moving
away from regulation towards more market-
oriented solutions in the 1990s. A consequence is
that systems have become less equitable – the poor
do not have the same access to health care as the
rich in price-rationed systems. Hence the equity/effi-
ciency trade-off has become more apparent, with
differences across countries in the preferences of
policy makers with regard to these two goals
leading to differences in the extent to which
market-based reforms have been implemented.
3.2.2 The nature of the production
process
In some ways, the health sector is just like any other
service sector. Inputs such as capital, labour, and
materials are employed to produce health care
outputs. However there are reasons why standard
assumptions employed to measure productivity in
private market services do not translate easily to
measuring performance in the health sector. In
many countries, public provision means that market
prices for outputs are not readily available. An alter-
native might be to use quantity indices, but the
nature of the output is such that it is difficult to
define what precisely is being produced. Health
care is a sector where information asymmetries
abound, since service provision through public
funding or insurance schemes creates a wedge
between the final consumers and service providers.
It is relatively easy to measures the activities of the
sector, e.g. number of medical treatments, but the
extent to which alternative treatments lead to
improvements in the health of the consumer is diffi-
cult to gauge.
Another impediment to an analysis of the perform-
ance of the health sector is the fact that the output
of medical care treatments is difficult to disentangle
from other influences on health, such as lifestyle
and diet. In the health care sector extraneous influ-
ences tend to be very large and often dominate
changes in medical care provision. For example
Tunstall-Pedoe et al. (1999) emphasise the impor-
tance of declining incidence of heart disease
episodes in explaining the reduction in mortality
rates from heart disease over a ten year period. In
turn, this declining incidence is likely to be most
influenced by lifestyles and changes in risk factors
such as smoking.
On the input side developments in technology have
an important influence on all three main categories,
labour, capital and materials. The health care sector
is regarded as being highly skill-intensive and there
are likely to be complementarities between the use
of high technology equipment – e.g. CT scanners –
and skilled labour. Drug use is an important inter-
mediate input and so rapid technological change in
the pharmaceuticals sector will be an important
contributory factor to performance. Also, the use of
new treatments is frequently embodied in capital
equipment. Hence, it is important to take account
of both the quality of inputs used as well as their
quantities in evaluating productivity performance
across countries.
A further potential difference between health care
and private service provision is the possibility of
diminishing returns. Baily and Garber (1997)
suggest diminishing returns are fundamental to the
sector. They suggest that many conditions will
respond to additional units of treatment or
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resources devoted to diagnostic and other manage-
ment with successively smaller units of health
output. In addition, if patients who derive the
greatest benefit from care are the first to receive it,
diminishing returns are also likely to characterise the
expansion in the number of patients treated.
Against this, Berndt (1997) argues that physicians
may in fact treat patients on a first come, first
served basis and that it is not clear that the most
cost effective treatments are undertaken first. The
possible existence of diminishing returns has the
implication that a country that devotes more
resources to a disease will have lower average
productivity than other countries.
Finally the nature of technological change also has
features that distinguish the health care sector from
other services. Changes in medical technology are
generally considered to add to, rather than replace,
old methods. It is a sector where advances in knowl-
edge have increased the capabilities of medical
interventions, and so have led both to rapidly rising
costs and increased demand. The Technological
Change in Health Care (TECH) Global Research
Network (2001) suggests that technological change
is responsible for much of the increased expenditure
on health care world-wide, arguing that other
factors that contribute to expenditure growth
appear to only explain a small fraction.
3.2.3 The effects of the health sector 
on competitiveness
Developments in the health sector have significant
consequences for the competitiveness of the
economy. On the one hand the health sector is very
different from other sectors; there is very little inter-
national trade in health services and so EU health
providers face little competition. This lack of interna-
tional competition may lead to inefficiencies which
have a knock-on effect on the rest of the economy,
leading to the potential for misallocation of
resources. In addition the output of the sector,
ensuring a healthy population, may affect produc-
tivity and competitiveness in the economy in general.
Poor relative performance in the healthcare sector
may affect competitiveness through the misalloca-
tion of resources at the macroeconomic level.
Excessive expenditure in the healthcare sector will
shift resources away from other, potentially more
productive, sectors of the economy. In addition,
there are two main channels whereby the health
sector will affect the competitiveness of the overall
economy. The first is the effect that the system has
on labour costs, and hence international competi-
tiveness. The second is the effects the system will
have on job mobility and hence labour market flex-
ibility. If the health sector is allowed to expand
without control, this will affect labour costs via tax
rates and insurance contributions. Labour costs are
an important determinant of international competi-
tiveness and increased taxation or insurance contri-
butions will affect it negatively, unless the increased
health spending brings with it a parallel increase in
productivity, such as reductions in the numbers of
days lost through ill-health. If there is over-
consumption of healthcare services – due to prob-
lems of supplier induced demand for example – the
increase in costs is unlikely to result in such an
increase in productivity.
The method of healthcare funding will have implica-
tions for job mobility and thus labour market flexi-
bility. Unlike general taxation or national insurance
schemes, occupational insurance schemes (whether
social or private) will increase the costs of moving job.
Research in the US suggests that many workers are
reluctant to move jobs because of the fear of losing
insurance coverage (General Accounting Office,
1995; Gruber, 1998). However, research on
Germany, where the price (although not the benefits)
of insurance may change after a job move, has found
little evidence for this theory (Holtz-Eakin, 1994).
The output of the health sector is the increase in the
health of the population. A healthier economy is in
general a wealthier one. Health has been shown to
play a significant role in determining economic
growth (Bloom, Canning and Jamison, 2004). For
example, improved health has been identified as
one of the key factors behind the East Asian growth
‘miracle’ (Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 2000).
Jamison, Lau and Wang (2004), using data on 53
countries, found that over the period 1965-1990,
approximately 11 % of growth could be attributed
to improvements in health, as proxied by the
survival rate of males aged between 15 and 60
years old. However, this effect was strongest in
those countries that initially had lower levels of
health. Their analysis suggests that health impacts
on growth through its direct effect on output levels
rather than by changing the rate of technological
advancement. Nevertheless, there are considerable
difficulties in measuring the precise relationship
between health and economic performance
because the causality may work in both directions
and dynamic influences may come into play.
Graph 3.1 illustrates how a country’s economic
growth is affected by the health of its population,
drawing on work by Bloom, Canning and Jamison
(2004). Bloom et al. (2004) suggest two channels
through which health affects GDP.
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First, health affects GDP via its impact on labour
productivity. An individual in good health is, ceteris
paribus, more productive than an individual in poor
health. However it is not only adult health that
plays a role here. Child health is also important as
this influences adult health. It is also of considerable
significance with regard to future labour produc-
tivity. A healthier child is likely to gain more from
their education and their cognitive ability is
enhanced. This provides the grounding for a well-
skilled labour force in the future, boosting labour
productivity and therefore GDP.
Second, Bloom et al. (2004) note that a healthier
adult population increases the size of the available
labour force. A larger labour force results in a lower
dependency ratio, which in turn boosts GDP per
capita. Although this is true for countries with a
very low life expectancy, it is likely to be of less
relevance when considering the EU and other
developed countries. While better health among
adults of working age serves to reduce the depend-
ency ratio, this may not be the case if improve-
ments in health are mainly experienced by those
adults past retirement age. If such improvements in
health lead to an increase in life expectancy, this
may actually cause the dependency ratio to rise,
having a negative impact on GDP. This is particu-
larly relevant in current worries about aging popu-
lations in many developed countries. The increase
in the numbers of retired people will create an
increasing burden similar to that being placed on
countries’ pension systems, where fewer workers
are contributing per retirees claiming. A relatively
stable or even declining workforce in most EU
states has to finance the healthcare for increasing
numbers of elderly citizens.
Graph 3.1 depicts the channels through which
increased health may affect GDP but the causality
could run both ways. In countries with low levels of
health, economic growth provides the resources to be
able to provide a better health system, but this
becomes increasingly difficult (Clarke and Islam,
Graph 3.1: The relationship between health and GDP
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Source: Adapted from Bloom, Canning and Jamison (2004).
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2003). However, economic growth may also have a
negative effect on health, for example due to
increased pollution or facilitating lifestyle changes,
such as over-consumption of fatty foods, both of
which can be damaging to health. Finally the chart
depicts a static situation but there may well be
dynamic impacts that are difficult to gauge. For
example one solution to the ageing population
problem is to extend the age of retirement. Better
provision of medical care may facilitate this since
increased health makes it more likely that people are
able and willing to work for a greater number of years.
3.3 Overview of EU Health
Systems
The structure of the health care system is a key
factor for its efficiency. Across the EU, and indeed
internationally, a number of different approaches to
providing health care are apparent. An overview of
the EU and US systems, including the ways in which
health care is both financed and delivered, is
provided in Box 3.1.91
Ensuring that all residents have access to health
services is an important goal in all EU countries, and
as such all have universal or almost universal
coverage. Even in the Netherlands, where only
65 % of the population are covered by a compul-
sory scheme, with voluntary private insurance avail-
able to the remainder, only 1.6 % of the population
are without health insurance. This is in stark
contrast to the US, where 16 % of the population
aged under 65 are uninsured.
Most health care in the EU is publicly financed.
Taxation or social insurance schemes provide the
main sources of funding. Taxation may be
collected at either the national or local level, or
both. Social insurance contributions are generally
made by both employee and employer. Some
countries have a small number of health insur-
ance or sickness funds, such as France, while
some have many, such as Germany. Individuals
may have free choice of insurance fund, or
membership may be determined by occupation.
Although one system will generally predominate,
most countries use a combination of insurance
and taxation to finance health care.
The role of private insurance varies between coun-
tries. In most EU countries, there is the option to
take out voluntary health insurance; this is insurance
that an individual may choose to purchase, either
directly or through an employer scheme. However,
this is generally a supplement to, rather than a
substitute for, the main health care system. The
exceptions are Germany and the Netherlands,
where some of the population are covered by
substitutive private insurance. In the US, most
health care is funded by private insurance, although
the public sector still provides a significant amount
of health care funding.
Individuals are increasingly required to pay part of
the cost of medical care received. This cost-sharing
may, for example, comprise co-payments (the
payment of a fixed amount for a service) or co-
insurance (where the individual pays a proportion
of the cost of care). Their use varies among coun-
tries, with countries such as the UK restricting these
to services such as pharmaceuticals, dental and
optical care, while countries such as Finland also use
cost-sharing for ambulatory and inpatient care.
Cost-sharing can help to reduce unnecessary
demand for services by making consumers bear
some of the expense of treatment, and may there-
fore help to improve efficiency. However, it also has
negative implications for equity in situations where
individuals do not receive the treatment they
require because they cannot afford the cost. To
combat this, exemptions and limits are in place in
all the countries reviewed here to ensure that the
poorer and more vulnerable groups of society are
not adversely affected by these measures.
The payment system used for physicians is also an
important factor as this can affect expenditure and
impact on incentives. For example, some doctors
receive salaries, some are paid on a fee-for-service
basis, and some are paid on a capitation basis. Fee-
for-service means that a payment is made for each
service provided, while capitation systems involve
the payment of a fixed amount for each patient
enrolled per time period. Fee-for-service systems
tend to be more expensive as they can lead to over-
supply of services. Salaries tend to be better at
containing costs but may provide little incentive to
increase output. In response to these problems,
some countries have introduced payment systems
that combine two or more of these methods.
Delivery of health care can be provided by either
the public or private sector, and is most commonly
provided by a combination of both. Increasingly,
contracts are used whereby purchasers contract
with either public or private providers to deliver
91 This lists the main features of the systems of health care provision, under the
broad headings of finance, delivery and other important attributes. Typolo-
gies of health care systems, focusing on the extent of public/private
financing and service provision, are common in the literature (see e.g. OECD,
1994). These, however, become less useful when dealing with a large
number of countries. In particular it is difficult to classify the health care
systems in the new member states to these typologies.
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services. Alternatively, care may be provided
directly, through an integrated model. Choice of
provider varies between countries. Some allow free
choice of both doctor and hospital, which may
serve to increase competition and is also partly
aimed at increasing patient choice and satisfaction.
Some countries allow direct access to all levels of
health care, while others employ a gatekeeping
system where a referral is necessary to obtain
hospital and sometimes specialist care. Gatekeeping
can help to improve the continuity of health care
services that a patient receives.
The EU enlargement has introduced even greater
diversity into the range of health care systems in the
EU. The consequences of enlargement and the chal-
lenges that lie ahead not only for the new Member
States but also the impact on the existing members
are the subject of much current discussion; see for
example, MacLehose and McKee (2002) and Busse
(2002). A brief description of current health systems
amongst the new Member States is presented in
the second half of Box 3.1.
The new Member States have seen dramatic
change in their health systems in recent years. They
have moved from highly centralised, planned
systems to a much more decentralised approach.
Reforms are ongoing, and in particular these coun-
tries have continued to undergo change in order to
comply with the conditions necessary for EU acces-
sion. Although some provide universal coverage,
others are yet to achieve this completely.
These countries now all have a health system based
to varying degrees on a compulsory social insurance
system. The most notable exception to this is Latvia,
where most health care is financed through taxa-
tion, and although there is a so-called ‘health insur-
ance system’, in reality the main role of the sickness
funds is administration of the health care budget.
Voluntary health insurance (VHI) generally plays a
small role, if any. Cost-sharing has been estab-
lished in all systems, for example with the intro-
duction of co-payments. An important additional
feature of health systems is informal payments,
which are an area for concern. Murthy and
Mossialos (2003) discuss a number of reasons
why such payments take place, including poorly
paid health care professionals, limited private
provision, and a lack of both transparency and
funding in the health system, as well as cultural
factors. They also propose that this is one possible
reason why the market for VHI is often small in
such cases, as individuals would rather make
direct payments to the doctor than make contri-
butions to a private insurance company.
Two new Member States, Cyprus and Malta, have
very different historical backgrounds to the central
and eastern European countries. However, their
health systems are also undergoing significant
change, with both countries currently in the process
of introducing social insurance systems.
Box 3.1: Overview of Health Systems in the EU and US92
Belgium
Finance: Mandatory health insurance system, 65 % funded by social insurance contributions, 35 % by federal govern-
ment subsidies. Co-payments apply for several services, including in ambulatory and inpatient care. Most doctors are
paid on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. Increase in popularity of supplementary voluntary health insurance (VHI), provided
by both mutualities and private insurers.
Delivery: Health care is mostly privately provided. Primary care is mostly provided by independent doctors. Approxi-
mately 60 % of hospitals are private, non-profit making organisations, remainder are publicly owned. Free choice of
provider and hospital. No formal gatekeeping system, although a patient would generally be referred to a hospital by a
general practitioner (GP) or specialist.
Other: Almost universal coverage. 88 % are covered by the main insurance scheme for both major and minor risks, while
the self-employed are only covered for minor risks.
92 The descriptions below draw heavily on information from the European Observatory on Health Care Systems, in particular the ‘Health Care Systems in Transi-
tion’ publications (see references). Information was also obtained for the fifteen existing EU member states from Jakubowski and Busse (1998), and for the new
EU member states from the World Health Organisation (2000, 2001) ‘Highlights on health’ publications and the Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und -
gestaltung e.V. (2003). In addition, the following country-specific sources were used: Riesberg and Busse, 2003 (Germany); Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Health
and Welfare (Greece); Imai, Jacobzone and Lenain, 2000 (France); Department of Health and Children, 2001, 2004 (Ireland); Schaapman, 2003 (Netherlands);
Department of Health, 2004a (UK); Royal College of General Practitioners, 2002 (UK); Republic of Cyprus, 2003 (Cyprus); Palu and Kadakmaa, 2001 (Estonia);
Ministry of Health, 2004 (Malta); Jasiutowicz, 2000 (Poland); Girouard and Imai, 2000 (Poland); Docteur, Suppanz and Woo, 2003 (US) and National Center for
Health Statistics, 2003 (US). Helpful advice on updating these descriptions was received from the following individuals: Klara Frecerova, Director of Department
of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Health; Dr. Svatopluk Hlavacka, Director of Health Care Department, Ministry of Health, Slovak Republic; Jarno Habicht, WHO
Representative for Estonia; Catharina Hjortsberg, The Swedish Institute for Health Economics (IHE); Maria Hofmarcher, Institute for Advanced Studies, Austria; Jutta
Järvelin, Centre for Health Economics at Stakes (CHESS), Finland; Jautrite Karaskevica, Health Statistics and Medical Technology Agency, Latvia; Liuba Murauskiene,
Director, Health Economics Center, Lithuania; Frances O’Brien, Department of Health and Children, Ireland and Sarah Thomson, London School of Economics.
While we have endeavoured to ensure that each country profile is as up-to-date as possible to the best of our knowledge, the constantly evolving nature of health
care systems means that it is possible that changes have occurred to the descriptions reported here.
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Denmark
Finance: National health service (NHS), financed mainly through state, county and municipal taxation. Co-payments
apply for some pharmaceuticals, dental care, physiotherapy and spectacles, also for group 2 GP option (see below). GPs
are mainly paid by a combination of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Approximately 28 % of the population have
some form of additional VHI, often in order to obtain cover for co-payments.
Delivery: State-controlled but highly decentralised. Most primary care is provided by self-employed GPs. Most hospitals
are publicly owned and managed at the county level, private sector accounts for less than 1 % of hospital beds. Free
choice of hospital offered since 1993, but not widely used.
Other: Universal coverage. There are two options for GP care; in group 1, restricted choice of GP and free access to
secondary care requires referral, while group 2 allows for free choice of GP or specialist but the patient must pay extra
for this privilege (1.7 % of population).
Germany
Finance: Compulsory social insurance scheme, financed mainly by insurance contributions. Above a certain income level,
it is possible to opt out of the statutory system and purchase private insurance – applies to about 9 % of the population
(including some employees covered by employers). Use of co-payments has recently increased, including for ambulatory
and inpatient care, following implementation of the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization (SHIM) Act. Doctors
working in ambulatory care are paid FFS. Largest VHI market in Europe, all are entitled to purchase supplementary private
insurance.
Delivery: Strict separation between primary and hospital care. Most primary care is provided by private doctors – free
choice of GP, direct access to specialists. Hospital care is provided by both public and private providers – very few are for-
profit. A referral is generally required for access to hospital care. Free choice of hospital in theory, but in practice this is
not always possible.
Other: Almost universal coverage, less than 0.2 % are uninsured.
Greece
Finance: Mix of NHS and social insurance system, funded 46 % by social insurance contributions, 12 % from taxation (in
2000). 42 % of health care expenditure financed privately, mainly direct payments to private providers, but also some
co-payments. Mix of physician payment systems, including FFS in private sector and for those on contract to insurance
funds, while those employed by health centres are generally salaried.
Delivery: Mix of public and private providers, health care is delivered through health care units belonging to the NHS,
the insurance funds and the private sector. 25 % of hospital beds are provided by the private sector. Individuals can
choose any public or private hospital that is contracted by their fund, but must pay if they choose a non-contract private
hospital.
Other: Almost universal coverage. Those who are not insured have free access to public hospitals and health centres.
They can also pay directly for private treatment if they wish.
Spain
Finance: National health service, mainly financed through general taxation. Co-payments of 40 % for prescription phar-
maceuticals, but not for public primary, outpatient or inpatient care. Hospital doctors are paid by salary, as are most
primary care doctors (with some capitation). Some supplementary voluntary private insurance.
Delivery: Most health care provided publicly. Primary care is publicly managed and delivered. Patients have the right to
choose a GP but unlikely to consult a GP outside of their health area. Most hospitals are publicly owned. ‘Three-stage’
gatekeeping system in operation – to access hospital care, required to first see a GP then an ambulatory specialist.
Other: Almost universal coverage - 99.8 % in 2000.
France
Finance: Compulsory health insurance system, mainly funded by insurance contributions - most of the employee’s
component replaced by the ‘general social contribution’ tax since 1998. Co-payments apply for a wide range of services.
Over 90 % of the population now have some form of supplementary VHI, since free VHI cover was made available to
those on low incomes in 2000. GPs and specialists in ambulatory care are generally paid by FFS, while hospital staff are
normally salaried.
Delivery: Free choice of provider (doctor and hospital). Most ambulatory care is provided privately. No referral system, an
attempt to encourage this has not been widely taken up. About 2/3 of hospital care is provided by the public sector.
Other: Universal coverage attained following introduction of Universal Health Coverage Act (CMU) in 2000.
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Ireland
Finance: National health service system, mainly financed through general taxation. Some voluntary private insurance,
accounting for roughly 6.8 % of total health spending in 2001. Co-payments apply, additional charges for non-medical
cardholders for certain services, including GP visits. GPs are paid by capitation for patients who are medical cardholders,
but FFS for non-medical cardholders (no set charges).
Delivery: Mix of public and private provision. Most hospitals are publicly owned. Some purely private hospitals, but often
possible to receive private care in a public hospital. GPs are independent, those belonging to the General Medical
Services (GMS) scheme can provide services to medical cardholders through contracts with the health boards. Some
choice of GP. A referral from a GP is normally required in order to access hospital care.
Other: All residents are entitled to health care, but while approximately 30 % are medical cardholders (those aged over 70 years
old as well as those on low incomes) and entitled to mainly free services, the remainder are subject to charges for some services.
Italy
Finance: National health service, mainly financed by taxation. A regional tax on productive activities replaced social insur-
ance contributions in 1997. Use of co-payments, including for diagnostic services, pharmaceuticals and specialist visits.
Some supplementary private insurance. GPs are paid on a capitation basis, hospital doctors are salaried.
Delivery: Most health care is publicly managed. The majority of hospitals are publicly owned. Gatekeeping system – a visit
to a specialist must be authorised by a GP, but the patient has free choice of any NHS accredited specialist.
Other: Universal coverage.
Luxembourg
Finance: Compulsory health insurance. State contributes a maximum of 40 % to the health insurance system, the
remainder is funded through insurance contributions. Co-payments apply for various health services. 75 % of the
working age population have voluntary complementary private health insurance. GPs are paid by FFS.
Delivery: Primary health care is provided mainly by independent GPs. Patients have free choice of GP or specialist, with
direct access. No gatekeeping system. One private for-profit hospital, remainder are divided between non-profit organi-
sations and those run by local authorities.
Other: Almost universal coverage.
Netherlands
Finance: Mixed insurance system. All residents are covered for long term and high cost care under the Exceptional
Medical Services Act (AWBZ). General health care provided through compulsory membership under the Sickness Funds
Act (ZFW) for individuals below a certain income level (65 % of population). AWBZ and ZFW are mainly funded by insur-
ance contributions, also receive state subsidies. Those not covered by ZFW can purchase voluntary private insurance
instead. Supplementary private insurance is available to all from both the sickness funds and private insurers. GPs are paid
by capitation for those patients insured under ZFW, but FFS for those with private insurance. Co-payments apply for
various health services, under all three insurance components.
Delivery: Ambulatory care mainly provided by private GPs. Over 90 % of hospitals are private non-profit institutions. Free
choice of GP. Gatekeeping system – a referral is needed from a GP in order to access specialist care, but there is free
choice of specialist.
Other: 1.6 % of population are uninsured. New insurance system proposed from 2006.
Austria
Finance: Compulsory social insurance. Social insurance contributions fund just over half of health care expenditure.
Increasingly, a greater proportion of health care is financed through private expenditure. Approximately 1/3 of the popu-
lation have supplementary private insurance. Several co-payments apply, in both primary and hospital care. GPs are
mainly paid FFS - with higher fees charged by ‘non-contract’ doctors.
Delivery: Most primary care is provided by private self-employed doctors, although increase in outpatient care in hospi-
tals is resulting in a mix of public and private provision in ambulatory care. Most hospital care is provided publicly. Some
use of gatekeeping. A patient is free to choose any doctor contracted by their fund – can also choose to see a ‘non-
contract’ doctor but rate of reimbursement is lower.
Other: Universal coverage, not possible to opt out of the insurance system.
Portugal
Finance: National health service, mainly funded by general taxation. In addition, ‘health sub-systems’ provide health care
for particular professions (about 25 % of population), funded by employer and employee contributions. Co-payments for
pharmaceuticals, as well as for other services including consultations, emergency and home visits. About 10 % of the
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population have supplementary voluntary health insurance. NHS doctors are salaried, private doctors are paid FFS. Many
doctors combine NHS work with private practice.
Delivery: Primary care is publicly and privately provided. Free choice of GP. Under the NHS, GPs act as gatekeepers for
secondary care, but members of health subsystems can directly access any specialist or hospital allowed by their scheme.
Most hospital care is provided directly by the NHS.
Other: Universal coverage.
Finland
Finance: National health service, most health care funded through taxation, with shift in financing from the state to the
municipalities in recent years. In 2000, 18 % of total health expenditure was paid by the state, 42 % by the municipali-
ties and 15 % by the National Health Insurance (NHI). Patients pay directly for private care and generally can reclaim
one-third of the cost through NHI. Co-payments apply for various services, including in ambulatory and hospital care.
Very small voluntary insurance sector. Private doctors are paid FFS. Hospital doctors receive salaries. So are most health
centre doctors, although some receive a combination of salary, capitation and FFS.
Delivery: Primary care generally provided through publicly owned health centres. Hospitals are mostly publicly owned.
Little choice of GP – some choice within health centre. Patients need a referral to access specialist care at hospitals. Direct
access to specialists in the private sector, who can also refer to public hospitals. No real choice of hospital.
Other: Universal coverage.
Sweden
Finance: National health service, mainly funded through local taxation, with some subsidies from national government.
In 1999, social insurance contributions funded 21-25 % of health spending. Co-payments include flat-rate fees for many
health services, set by county councils. Very small market for supplementary VHI. Public doctors in ambulatory care are
salaried.
Delivery: Ambulatory care is provided by public and private doctors, and hospital outpatient departments. Free choice of
first-contact provider. Hospitals are publicly owned, very few private hospitals. It is possible to access secondary care
directly through a hospital outpatient department. Some choice of hospital, a referral is not always necessary.
Other: Universal coverage.
UK
Finance: National health service, mainly funded through general taxation. Almost 10 % of total health care expenditure
financed through national insurance contributions. Co-payments apply for some services, including for pharmaceuticals,
dental and optical care. Some supplementary private VHI. GPs are paid by a combination of capitation, allowances and
fees for particular services. Hospital staff are salaried. Private doctors are usually paid by FFS.
Delivery: Primary care is provided mainly by GPs, together with other health care professionals, through primary care
trusts (PCTs). PCTs play an increasingly important role in the health system. Some choice of GP, but must live within
designated area. Very small number of private sector GPs. GPs act as gatekeepers to secondary care. Most hospitals are
publicly owned, less than 5 % of hospital beds are in the private sector.
Other: Universal coverage.
Cyprus
Finance: The public health sector, accounting for less than 40 % of total health care spending, is financed through
general taxation. This provides free or reduced rate health care to those who are eligible – approximately 55 % of the
population. Emergency services are available to the entire population at no charge. The private sector plays a significant
role, this is mostly financed by direct payments; the private insurance market is fairly small. In addition, there are schemes
that cover certain sections of the population, these are generally organised and funded by employers.
Delivery: Mix of public and private provision. Health services are provided publicly under the government health system.
The ‘special schemes’ may sometimes use both the public and private sectors to deliver health care.
Other: A National Health Insurance System (NHIS) is to be implemented by 2006. This should lead to universal coverage.
The Health Insurance Organisation will contract both public and private providers to deliver health care services. All indi-
viduals will be able to choose a GP to register with; some choice of specialist and hospital will also be possible.
Czech Republic
Finance: Compulsory health insurance system, financed by contributions from individuals, employers and the state.
Health insurance finances more than 80 % of health care expenditure. Some use of cost-sharing, mainly for certain phar-
maceuticals, dental care and medical aids. Very small market for supplementary voluntary insurance. Doctors in public
hospitals are salaried, while, since 1997, GPs are paid mostly by capitation with some FFS.
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Delivery: Mix of public and private providers, who enter into contracts with the insurance funds to provide care, regard-
less of ownership. Most ambulatory care is privately delivered. Patients have free choice of doctor. No gatekeeping
system as yet. Most hospitals are publicly owned – only roughly 10 % of total beds are in private hospitals.
Other: Universal coverage, not possible to opt out of insurance system.
Estonia
Finance: Social health insurance system, accounts for approximately 65 % of total health care expenditure. General taxa-
tion accounts for approximately a further 10 %. Use of cost-sharing, including co-payments for pharmaceuticals, most
dental care, visit fees for outpatient care and bed-day fees for inpatient care. Private VHI plays a very small role,
accounting for 1 % of total health care spending. Primary care doctors are independent, entering into contracts with the
insurance fund to provide services, and physician payment methods vary. Hospital doctors are paid mainly by salary, but
hospitals may also choose to include a performance related component.
Delivery: Reforms to primary care introduced in the 1990s were largely implemented by 2003. GPs are now independent
contractors. All Estonian citizens have enrolled with a GP, patients have free choice of any GP or specialist that is
contracted by their insurance fund. GPs have some gatekeeping role, but patients can still access certain outpatient
specialists directly. Outpatient care providers and hospitals are also contracted by the Estonian Health Insurance Fund. At
present, most hospitals are publicly owned, but this is an area currently undergoing reform.
Other: In 2001, estimates suggest that 93.5 % of the population were covered by health insurance. Emergency medical
care is available to those who are not insured.
Hungary
Finance: Compulsory National Health Insurance Fund, accounts for the majority of health care expenditure. In addition
to insurance contributions, a health care tax, payable since 1997, is another important source of funding for the insur-
ance system. Co-payments apply for some services. Very small VHI sector. Most doctors are public employees and receive
a salary. However, the majority of GPs are now paid mainly on a capitation basis.
Delivery: Public sector is dominant in the provision of health care, the private sector plays only a small role. Free choice
of GP. Most GPs now operate under a contract system, but some are employed directly by local government. Some use
of gatekeeping, but not particularly strict, still possible to access some specialists directly. Delivery of health care is still
largely hospital-centred. Only a small percentage of hospital beds are under private ownership.
Other: Almost universal coverage, roughly 1 % are not insured.
Lithuania
Finance: Compulsory health insurance system introduced in 1997. Health expenditure is financed by a combination of
insurance contributions and taxation. Small VHI market. Some co-payments apply, mainly for pharmaceuticals and
medical aids. Doctors in public hospitals and clinics are paid mainly by salary. Health care providers contracted by the
Health Insurance Fund are permitted to charge for some services, in line with legal regulations. Primary care is now remu-
nerated on a capitation basis.
Delivery: Most health care is publicly provided. Some private sector involvement, mostly in the provision of outpatient
care. Growing private provision of primary care. Choice of primary care facility and of GP within this. A referral is required
to access specialist care. Without a referral, the patient must pay, except in an emergency case. Hospitals are publicly
owned.
Other: All residents should be covered by the health insurance system, but if no contributions are paid a patient receives
care at no cost only in an emergency.
Latvia
Finance: Most health care expenditure is financed by taxation collected at the central level. A ‘health insurance system’
is in place, but the main purpose of the sickness funds is actually to administer the health care budget. Resources are allo-
cated to the sickness funds, who contract with providers to deliver health care. Cost-sharing applies to many health care
services. The market for voluntary private health insurance is small but increasing. Variety of physician payment systems.
Delivery: On-going reforms to primary care. Free choice of GP, although in practice this may not be possible in more rural
regions. Primary health care doctors may be directly employed or work on a contract basis. A referral is necessary to
access most specialists and secondary care. Hospital care is mostly provided by the public sector, small number of private
hospitals. Patients have free choice of hospital among those that are contracted by their sickness fund.
Other: Universal coverage in theory, in practice some individuals experience difficulty in accessing care due to not being
able to afford treatment and because of distance from health care facilities.
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Malta
Finance: National health service, funded from general taxation. Cost-sharing applies for pharmaceuticals, some dental
and optical care. Significant private sector - increasing role of voluntary private insurance, but many also pay directly to
see private GPs and specialists. Doctors in the public sector are salaried, those in the private sector are paid FFS. Most
doctors working in the public sector also provide health care privately.
Delivery: Most health care is hospital-based. Hospital care is available from public hospitals under the NHS. A few private
hospitals also exist. Under the state system, primary care is provided mainly in public health centres. Patients are not
registered with their own GP, seen by duty doctor. Although a gatekeeping system is in operation, not always effective.
Possible to indicate a preference for a certain specialist. Many choose to pay for private primary care – estimates suggest
that 2/3 of primary care is provided privately. Private specialists can be accessed directly.
Other: Universal coverage. Malta is currently reforming its health system, funding will in future come from the National
Insurance Fund rather than general taxation, and the current integrated model will be replaced by a contract system.
Poland
Finance: Compulsory national health insurance system, introduced in 1999, financed mainly by insurance contributions.
Some co-payments, mainly for pharmaceuticals, dental care and medical aids. Small role for private health insurance.
Remuneration in primary care is mainly by capitation. Hospital physicians working in the public sector are mostly paid by
salary with some additional payments, for example, for providing specific services. FFS is the usual method of payment
for private care.
Delivery: Health care is provided by both the public and private sectors. The sickness funds contract with providers from
both sectors to deliver services. Some use of gatekeeping, a referral is generally needed to access secondary care,
although some specialists are directly accessible. Free choice of any provider that is contracted by the sickness fund. It is
also possible to receive care from a private provider not contracted by the fund but in this case the individual must bear
the cost. Most hospitals are publicly owned.
Other: Almost universal coverage.
Slovenia
Finance: Health insurance system, statutory insurance contributions fund the majority of health care spending. Co-
payments apply for various services. Supplementary VHI is available in order to cover cost of co-payments and some extra
services. Doctors employed in the public sector are paid mainly by salary with some incentive payments. Private sector
doctors working on a contract basis are paid according to the terms of the contract, those without contracts are paid FFS.
Delivery: Primary care is provided by both the public and private sectors. Patients can choose a primary care doctor in a
public health centre or a private doctor that is contracted by the insurance fund. Use of gatekeeping – a referral is
required to access secondary care but patient has choice of provider. Most hospitals are publicly owned.
Other: Almost universal coverage, not possible to opt out of the mandatory insurance system.
Slovak Republic
Finance: Compulsory health insurance system, mainly funded by insurance contributions. Some use of cost-sharing,
including for certain pharmaceuticals and medical aids. Public sector doctors are salaried. Independent GPs (98 %) are
paid by capitation, private specialists (75 %) are paid on a FFS basis.
Delivery: Primary care doctors are independent and have contractual agreements with the health insurance funds to
provide care. Individuals have choice of GP although in certain areas this may be limited. Gatekeeping system, although
some specialists can be accessed without a referral. Private specialists, working on a contract basis, operate alongside
public sector specialists. Most hospitals are publicly owned.
Other: Universal coverage.
United States
Finance: Mostly private insurance, with the majority of the working-age population covered by employer insurance
schemes. Public sector involvement still significant, particularly, for example, with the Medicare and Medicaid
programmes. Co-payments apply. Variety of payment systems for doctors, including FFS and capitation.
Delivery: Mostly privately managed and delivered. Most hospitals are community hospitals, of which 2/3 are private, not-
for-profit organisations. A few are operated by federal government. Significant increase in ‘managed care’ during 1990s,
these plans sometimes involve use of gatekeeping. However, the restrictions on freedom of both consumers and physi-
cians led to considerable dissatisfaction, and there has been a shift away from very tight management in recent years.
Other: Approximately 16 % of the population under 65 years of age were uninsured in 2001.
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and the rest of the economy; how they are allo-
cated to areas within the healthcare system; and
within areas. Clearly, over-consumption or over-
supply in the healthcare sector may shift resources
away from other, potentially more productive,
sectors of the economy, either through increased
insurance premiums and taxation or through the
reduction of government spending from potentially
more productive areas. Other problems of allocative
inefficiency include the relative demand for different
factors of production, such as capital versus labour,
or different types of labour.
3.4.3 The influence of market structure
on performance
Healthcare is essentially provided by insurance,
either private or social insurance or through taxa-
tion. This enables the risk surrounding the demand
for healthcare to be pooled. In common with other
insurance markets, the health sector is liable to a
number of imperfections. In addition, the market
for health care may be such that it produces an
unsatisfactory or inappropriate outcome, from the
point of view of society as a whole. Some aspects of
healthcare – for example infectious diseases – have
the features of a public good, in particular the pres-
ence of positive externalities, i.e. external benefits
to other members of society from the provision of a
health service. If individuals, their insurance funds,
or the government pays the marginal private
benefit of a medical intervention for its provision,
society as a whole will under-consume healthcare.94
In addition to the issue of externalities, there are
three main mechanisms whereby the structure of
the market will impact on equity and efficiency in
the health sector resulting from imperfect informa-
tion: moral hazard, adverse selection and risk selec-
tion. Their effects will generally be to increase
consumption and expenditure.
3.4.3.1 Moral Hazard
A healthcare system based on insurance or taxation
will suffer from problems of moral hazard because
the very act of being insured creates incentives for
individuals to change their behaviour in two impor-
tant ways. First, they may seek less diligently to
prevent illness, knowing that their insurance will
cover the monetary costs arising. Second, in the
light of any health problem, they are likely to over-
consume healthcare because of its low cost
European competitiveness report 2004
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3.4 The determinants 
of health sector performance
This section considers factors affecting the perform-
ance of the health sector, how EU governments
have responded and the effectiveness of these poli-
cies. It is important to note that the health sector is
the subject of considerable governmental interven-
tion across the world, even in the US. In order to
understand the performance of the sector, it is
important therefore to understand why this is so.
Essentially, the health sector is subject to a number
of market imperfections that are likely to increase
the consumption and supply of and hence expendi-
ture on healthcare.
3.4.1 Reasons for government
intervention
There are two main sets of justifications for govern-
ment intervention in the health sector: equity
considerations and reasons of economic efficiency.
The health sector is subject to a number of – often
interrelated – market imperfections and information
asymmetries. These problems impinge upon the
efficiency of the sector as they affect incentive struc-
tures, resource allocation and the development and
dissemination of technological advances. Perverse
incentives may be created, encouraging over-
consumption/provision of health services.93
3.4.2 The efficiency of the health sector
Economic efficiency is made up of two components:
technical and allocative efficiency. Technical effi-
ciency refers to the ability to obtain maximal output
from its inputs. Allocative efficiency refers to
whether the outputs and inputs are used in the
correct proportions, given their prices. Efficiency
problems can often create or exacerbate inequality
in the availability of healthcare, as in the case of risk
selection. However, often the cures for inefficiency
have a negative impact on the equitable distribu-
tion of healthcare. One example of this is the use of
cost-sharing to overcome the moral hazard created
by the availability of care at zero marginal cost. The
majority of the discussion of this chapter involves
technical efficiency, but allocative efficiency will also
impact upon the competitiveness of EU economies.
The funding system for healthcare can affect alloca-
tive efficiency at three levels (Mossialos and Dixon,
94 Unless there is only one insurer, in which case the externality is internalised
because the additional costs will be borne by the insurer.
93 It is possible that they will also lead to under-consumption in certain sectors
of the economy, because of risk-selection and wealth effects, which will lead
to an inequitable health outcome.
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:17  Pagina 124Chapter 3 — Performance in the EU Health Sector
125
compared to the situation where they pay the full
cost of their actions. This is exacerbated by supplier-
induced demand whereby health providers under-
stand many aspects of a patient’s medical state
more than they themselves or their insurers do and
they also are more aware of the potential medical
interventions. The possession of this knowledge can
be exploited to the provider’s gain by manipulating
the quantity, quality and price of healthcare services
in ways not readily apparent to the patient. Another
aspect of this is the incentive to demand new – and
possibly more expensive – medical technology over
old (Zweifel and Manning, 2000; Weisbrod, 1991).
A number of policies have been implemented to
overcome the problem of moral hazard, primarily
with the intention to mitigate its effects on expen-
diture. Many countries have implemented budget
caps in an attempt to contain spending, with
varying degrees of success. Experience suggests
that such measures are most effective in health
systems where financing and delivery of health
care are or have been integrated, for example in
Denmark and the UK. However, this is not always
the case, as other countries with integrated health
systems, including Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain have not enjoyed similar success (Docteur
and Oxley, 2003). Budgetary measures have
generally not been particularly successful in health
systems financed by social insurance, such as
France. Alternatively, some more indirect measures
to contain expenditure have been applied; for
example, during the mid-1990s, Germany
restricted spending to the rise in revenue from
insurance contributions, which were set at fixed
rates (Docteur and Oxley, 2003).
Most EU countries have increased their use of cost-
sharing for pharmaceuticals, dental and ophthalmic
treatments, especially during the 1990s. The effect
of this is to reduce expenditure by directly shifting
expenditure from the government or insurer to the
individual. By shifting part of the cost to the
consumer, such policies can also reduce over-
consumption. However, research by Siu et al.
(1986) suggests that it is not the case that co-
payments reduce ‘unnecessary’ treatment by any
more than ‘necessary’ treatment – both types of
care appear to be affected to the same extent. Cost-
sharing may even lead to a decline in efficiency if it
results simply in a shift in the place where individ-
uals seek treatment – from general practitioners to
hospitals, for example (Docteur and Oxley, 2003).
One way to overcome the problem of supplier
induced demand via the incentive structure is
through capitation.95 Capitation attempts to predict
the demand for healthcare by the population and
pay healthcare providers the expected costs. This
can be done simply at an aggregate level, or it may
depend on personal characteristics, such as age,
morbidity and social circumstances. Capitation can
be done simply by assigning an equal amount of
funding to every citizen, regardless of their charac-
teristics or circumstances, as it is in Spain. Alterna-
tively it can depend on personal characteristics,
such as age (as in France), or a progressively more
sophisticated set of demographic, morbidity and
social circumstances from gender (as in Germany)
through to marital status, housing tenure and
employment status (as in Stockholm County).
3.4.3.2 Adverse selection
Asymmetric information between population and
insurer in voluntary insurance schemes can result in
adverse selection as insurers cannot calculate an
actuarial premium for each individual and so
charges an average premium. This will create the
incentive for above average risk individuals to
purchase insurance but those with below average
risk to forego it, causing overall risk, and hence
premiums, to increase. Governments attempt to
overcome this problem by financing the system
through taxation or by legislating to make contribu-
tions to insurance compulsory.
3.4.3.3 Risk selection
The converse of adverse selection is risk-selection,
where insurers will refuse insurance to individuals
with above-average risk. High risk individuals will
not reap the benefits of risk pooling and therefore
may not be able to afford insurance. As with
adverse selection, governments attempt to over-
come this problem by financing the system through
taxation or by legislating to make access to insur-
ance, and hence health services, open to all.
3.4.3.4 Lack of competitive forces
It has long been known that a major potential
problem with public sector service provision is the
lack of a price mechanism to allocate resources.
Public sector intervention, therefore, is likely to
eliminate or at least reduce the financial incentives
95 A market solution to over-consumption, over-supply or over-pricing is
managed care, whereby an agent (typically the insurer) attempts to control
costs by directly managing the relationship between provider and insured
individual. This can include many situations from the restriction of the set of
providers to fully integrated systems of insurance and service providers
(Glied, 2000). However, the evidence on managed care is mixed. Whilst
there may have been an initial effect on total expenditure, these were short
lived (Maynard and Bloor, 1998; Maynard and Dixon, 2002).
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increasing productivity or promoting technological
advances. The effects of this may be felt throughout
the sector. For example, if individuals do not have
any choice with regard to their service provider, the
latter have little incentive to maintain ‘competitive’
prices. Governments have attempted to overcome
the lack of a functioning market by introducing
wage or price controls or by creating some form of
pseudo markets.
Wage controls have been most commonly used in
those countries with integrated health care systems.
This has been applied to both the hospital sector, as
in Denmark, Ireland and the UK, and also in ambu-
latory care where staff are salaried, for example, in
Finland, Spain and Sweden (Docteur and Oxley,
2003). Price controls have also been widely applied.
A variety of approaches have been taken to control-
ling prices, including the direct setting of prices by
government. With the exception of Germany, all
other EU countries have some form of price controls
for pharmaceuticals (Docteur and Oxley, 2003).
Another approach to controlling prices has been
used both in Germany, in its ambulatory sector, and
Austria, in its hospital sector. These countries have
introduced systems which exert control over prices
by adjusting these according to the quantity of
services provided, in order to remain within a set
budget.
In systems where a purchaser/provider distinction is
in place, price negotiations may take place between
the two parties, introducing potentially competition
between providers. The UK is one example but
competition, notably at the level of hospitals, can
also be found in Denmark, Finland and some
Swedish counties. Docteur and Oxley (2003) note
that sometimes such negotiations have collapsed,
for example, as has previously occurred in Belgium,
France and Luxembourg, and prices have had to be
set directly as a result.
Systems based on salaries provide little incentive to
increase output; hence the introduction of fee-for-
service contracts in some countries (e.g. Belgium,
Denmark, Greece, France, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Austria, and Finland), usually in the private
sector. Fee-for-service systems tend to be more
expensive and can lead to over-supply of services,
as opposed to salaries, which tend to be better at
containing costs. This has led to some countries
introducing combined payment systems.
Box 3.2: The influence of market structure on performance
Moral Hazard
Problem: low or zero marginal cost of service
Effects: increase in demand for services by individuals and supplier induced demand leading 
to increased overall costs
Policies: cost-sharing, capitation, managed care
Adverse selection
Problem: asymmetric information between population and insurer/funding body
Effects: the use of average risk premiums leads to high risk individuals taking up insurance 
and low risk ones foregoing it.
Policies: compulsory contributions, taxation
Risk selection
Problem: asymmetric information between population and insurer
Effects: private firms tend to ‘cherry-pick’ insurees, no insurance for high risk people
Policies: compulsory contributions, taxation
Lack of competitive forces
Problem: public sector intervention reduces or eliminates financial incentives increasing productivity 
or promoting technological advances.
Effects: high prices of services, equipment and pharmaceuticals as well as high wages.
Policies: purchaser-provider split, price and wage controls, fee-for-service, contracting-out
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3.4.4 Technology and innovation in the
healthcare sector
Technology is an important determinant of the
performance in the health sector where technology
is changing rapidly. Sixty years ago, the healthcare
system involved mainly diagnosis, prediction of the
likely outcome and guidance while illness took its
own course; nowadays there are a wide variety of
possible interventions (Weisbrod, 1991). Tech-
nology is generally accepted as the main explana-
tory factor behind increasing health expenditure
(e.g. Newhouse, 1992, Moise, 2003a). Gelijins and
Rosenberg (1994) identify three ways in which
health expenditure is influenced by technological
developments. First, expenditure may increase
when a new technology is introduced. Second,
expenditure will be affected by the intensity with
which existing technology is applied. Finally, expen-
diture will also be affected by the rate and extent of
expansion of use of new technology. However,
recent research (Cutler and McClellan (2001)
suggests that while new technology generally
increases expenditure, the benefits of improved
technology may outweigh the extra costs. New
developments can be cost-enhancing by increasing
the quality of treatments or cost-reducing by
increasing the efficiency with which a given
problem is treated. Although the latter will increase
the productivity of the sector, the effect of the
former is ambiguous and its evaluation requires
difficult measurement of quality change.
Basic research in health care is global, with
advances in knowledge publicly available in medical
journals or disseminated at conferences. Also knowl-
edge about new health care products is widely
disseminated as drugs and other medical devices
are often sold on world markets. However, while
new technologies are used in all countries quickly
after they are available, the extent of use varies
enormously. According to McClellan and Kessler
(2003, p. 4): ‘although technological change in
health care may be driven ultimately by discovery
and invention of new techniques and devices, cross
national studies of the cause and consequences of
technological change focus on differences in rates
of actual use of technologies.’ Thus, when consid-
ering the impact of technology on productivity the
primary interest is in diffusion.
The organisation of the health sector will have an
important influence on the development, dissemi-
nation and implementation of new technology. The
funding mechanism will have an important influ-
ence on the type of research that is undertaken via
the incentives it provides to practitioners and
researchers (Weisbrod, 1991). The structures of
health care systems also have consequences for the
diffusion of technology, especially supply-side
factors such as physician and hospital payment
mechanisms, as well as the regulation of technology
(Moise, 2003a).
Any health system that does not create an incentive
for agents to consider the costs of treatment (i.e.
moral hazard) is likely to promote cost-raising R&D.
As with any investment, if there is no return to cost-
reducing R&D, there is no incentive to undertake it.
It has been argued that the greater emphasis on
cost control in the predominantly state-controlled
(whether by taxation or social insurance) EU health
sector has led to a slower implementation of cost-
enhancing technology (Weisbrod, 1991; Cutler,
2002). The EU health sector has, therefore, been
able to take advantage of the development of new
technologies elsewhere as it has been able to intro-
duce them slowly, after the expensive early stages
of implementation. Whilst there is little evidence on
the overall impact on productivity in the EU, the
result is likely to be lower average costs at the
expense of a delay in implementation.
3.5 The performance 
of the EU health sector
Given the share of the health sector in national
income, measurig its performance is extremely
important. Unfortunately, as with many public serv-
ices, the measures employed for private services do
not easily translate to deriving internationally compa-
rable measures in the health sector. National
accounts sources, which often form the bedrock of
estimates for private services, cannot be used in this
sector given the past propensity to measure outputs
by inputs. While EU countries are embarking on
employing quantity indicators to measure real output
changes in the national accounts, this process is still
at the experimental stage. In addition, national
accounts statisticians are concerned with measuring
quality change, an important consideration in the
health care sector given the rapid progress of knowl-
edge and technology, but agreed methods to adjust
for quality have not yet emerged.
Considering sources other than national accounts,
international comparisons of health sectors are
fraught with problems. Whilst measures of aggre-
gate expenditure are readily available (see below),
comparisons of aggregate health expenditure have
been hampered by the lack of theoretical basis for
the determinants of health expenditure (Gerdtham
and Jönsson, 2000).
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:17  Pagina 127European competitiveness report 2004
128
This section first considers aggregate performance
indicators, examining the cost of providing health
care and whether variations in costs are related to
outcomes; next it examines why expenditures vary
across countries and whether EU countries have
been successful in containing costs; and, finally, it
looks at the relationship between expenditures and
economic growth. In addition, selected studies at
the microeconomic, disease-based, level are
reviewed; these, are increasingly seen as an impor-
tant method to fill the gaps in aggregate indicators.
Input use and organisational change are also
discussed separately.
3.5.1 Macro indicators
3.5.1.1 How much does health care cost?
Graph 3.2 shows total health spending as a propor-
tion of GDP in the EU and the US in 2000. It is clear
that despite the variation in expenditure within the
EU, all EU countries spend substantially less on
health care as a percentage of GDP than does the
US. In 2000, the highest spender in the EU was
Germany, at 10.6 % of GDP compared to 13.1 % in
the US. In the future, expenditure in the EU and US
must consider the implications of the expansion of
Medicaid in the US to cover the 16 % of the US
population currently without health insurance of
any kind. Given the fact that coverage is almost
universal across Europe, this is likely to increase the
gap in spending between the US and the EU
Member States.
Graph 3.3 shows the total amount of spending on
health care per capita, broken down into public and
private sectors. The picture of overall expenditure is
similar to that in Graph 3.2 but there are changes in
the ordering within the EU. Luxembourg has a
slightly higher per capita spending on healthcare
than Germany. The most notable difference
between Graph 3.2 and Graph 3.3 is the relative
size of the health sectors in EU-15 and in the new
Member States measured as a percentage of GDP
and in absolute $PPP terms. One implication of this
is that differences in per capita spending between
the EU-15 and new Member States are largely due
Graph 3.2: Total Health Expenditure in the EU and US, 2000 (percent of GDP)
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to differences in GDP. Graph 3.3 also shows that
although public expenditure in the US accounts for
a considerably smaller proportion of total health
expenditure than the EU, per capita public health
expenditure in the US is still higher than all EU
countries but Luxembourg.
The reasons for the variations in health expenditure
are unclear. Expenditure may be greater because
the output of its health sector is higher, but also
because it does not operate efficiently or its popula-
tion are generally more prone to illness. Both
output and efficiency may be a function of the type
of system in place. The overall income of the nation
also affects the overall expenditure on healthcare.
3.5.1.2 Is expenditure related to outcomes?96
The health of a country’s population is both an
input to and output of the health sector. This is
because the health status of a population reflects
not only the quality of health care in the country,
but also its dietary and other socio-economic
factors. Countries with higher consumption of
alcohol and tobacco, for example, are likely to place
a heavier burden on their health sectors than
others. Some have argued that differences in health
are due almost entirely to differences in socio-
economic and demographic factors. It is argued
that the amount that can be attributed to the
health sector is minimal (Wilkinson, 1996; Navarro,
2000). Clearly, variables such as wealth, health
expenditure and technology are highly collinear.
Life expectancy, which has been rising over time, is
a commonly used measure of the health status of a
population. There is little variation in this indicator
across the Member States as shown in Table 3.1 but
the US is at the bottom end of the country distribu-
tion, in stark contrast to its position in terms expen-
diture per capita, even if on the basis of life
expectancy at age 65 it fares more favourably. Also,
the US has considerably higher neonatal mortality
rates than the EU (Baily and Garber, 1997) which is
likely related to the lack of universal insurance
96 There are a large number of output/outcome indicators provided by the
World Health Organisation (WHO).
Graph 3.3: Public and Private Per-Capita Health Expenditure in the EU and US, 2000 (USD in PPP)
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coverage amongst the poorer sections of the popu-
lation and immigrants. Clearly, if the sole interest
were in the performance of the providers of health
care then the US position is not too bad. But if
equity considerations are also given a weight in
performance measures then the relevant outcome
(life expectancy) show the US in a very poor relative
position.
Graph 3.4 plots the relationship between expen-
diture and life expectancy at age 65. The data
suggest that countries that spend more on health
per capita record higher life expectancy.
However, it is clear that there are two distinct
groups, the EU-15 and the new Member States.
For EU-25, the correlation coefficient between life
expectancy and expenditure is 0.75 and is signif-
icant at the 5 % level (although not at the 1 %
level) but for EU-15 alone there is no evidence of
such relationship.97 One reason for this is likely
the general impact of income on life expectancy.
As there may be a positive relationship between
GDP and life expectancy, using expenditure as a
percentage of GDP, rather than per capita
spending, may weaken the relationship between
expenditure and life expectancy at 65. For
example, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic
both spend a smaller proportion of GDP on
health than all other EU countries (except Latvia),
but have much different life expectancies –
Slovakia one of the lowest and Luxembourg one
of the highest. The first panel of the graph shows
that this may in part be because the two coun-
tries spend much different amounts per capita on
healthcare, with the relatively wealthy Luxem-
Table 3.1: Life expectancy in the EU and US
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Belgium 72.8 74.2‡ 79.6 80.8‡ 16.9 17.6‡
Denmark 72.3 74.1* 78.0 78.9* 16.2 16.8*
Germany 72.1 75.2 78.6 81.3 16.4 18.1
Greece 74.8 75.8* 79.6 81.0* 17.1 18.0*
Spain 73.4 76.0 80.6 83.0 17.5 19.0
France 73.4 75.2* 81.8 82.8* 18.7 19.2*
Ireland 72.1 74.0 77.7 79.3 15.2 16.5
Italy 73.8 76.8 80.5 83.0 17.3 19.0
Luxembourg 72.2 75.0 78.7 81.9 16.5 18.5
Netherlands 73.9 75.7 80.4 80.8 17.1 17.6
Austria 72.5 75.6 79.1 81.5 16.8 18.4
Portugal 70.5 72.6 77.5 79.7 15.7 16.7
Finland 71.0 74.3 79.1 81.3 16.2 17.9
Sweden 74.9 77.5 80.7 82.3 17.5 18.7
United Kingdom 73.1 75.7 78.7 80.5 16.4 17.7
EU-15 73.1 75.6 79.8 81.7 17.1 18.4
USA 71.8 74.1 78.8 79.5 17.2 18.0
Cyprus na 75.6 na 80.2 na 17.3
Czech Republic 67.6 71.8 75.5 78.6 13.8 15.8
Estonia 64.7 65.4 75.0 76.3 14.5 15.3
Hungary 65.2 67.6 73.9 76.3 14.0 15.2
Lithuania 66.5 66.8 76.4 77.6 15.7 16.3
Latvia 64.2 64.9 74.6 76.1 14.5 15.3
Malta 73.8 76.0 78.4 80.3 15.7 17.0
Poland 66.6 69.8 75.6 78.1 14.6 15.9
Slovenia 70.0 72.3 78.0 80.1 15.8 17.0
Slovak Republic 66.8 69.3 75.8 77.6 14.4 15.2
Notes: * indicates 1999 data, ‡ indicates 1997 data.
Source: OECD Health Data 2003; WHO European Health for All Database 2004; Health, United States, 2003, National Center for Health Statistics.
Male life expectancy 
at birth, years
Female life expectancy at
birth, years
Life expectancy at 65 years,
male and female
97 This is also true if health expenditure as percent of GDP is used although the
overall relationship is weaker.
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bourg spending over three times as much.
Clearly, many other factors contribute to life
expectancy beyond the health care system (such
as wealth, diet and lifestyle) and it is difficult to
determine whether there is a significant relation-
ship.
Life expectancy is just one outcome which the
health sector seeks to influence. The evidence on
the relationship between overall spending and age-
standardised death rates (SDR) for ischaemic heart
disease, cerebrovascular disease and malignant
neoplasms are shown in Graph 3.5.
Unlike life-expectancy at 65, there does appear to
be a relationship between overall health expendi-
ture and the SDR for ischaemic heart disease in the
new Member States but not for the EU-15. Within
the former, countries with higher health expendi-
ture per capita and GDP tend to have lower SDRs
for ischaemic heart disease. Also new Member
States with higher health expenditure per capita
also tend to have lower SDRs for cerebrovascular
disease. There is no evidence of a relationship
between expenditure and the SDRs from malignant
neoplasms at any level. However in the latter case
expenditure on health care is frequently palliative,
relieving symptoms, rather than life enhancing so
that outcomes should also take account of quality
of life.
It is important to note that these indicators relate
only to a small subsection of the health sectors’
services. One attempt to obtain an overall perform-
Graph 3.5: Age-standardised death rates (SDR) for major illnesses and expenditure on health
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ance measure that accounted for the many – often
conflicting – goals of health systems was attempted
by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The
World Health Report 2000 (WHR) was a comprehen-
sive and controversial attempt to create a measure
of the overall attainment and performance of the
health sector. Overall attainment was considered in
terms of three goals – not only better health, but
also the fairness of financial contribution and the
responsiveness of the health system in terms of
respecting individual’s dignity, autonomy and confi-
dentiality. Given the WHO’s belief in the importance
of equity issues, distribution of both health and
system responsiveness were included as well as their
levels. These indicators were then weighted and
added to create a single index of ‘attainment’. The
index and rankings of the EU Member States and
the US are presented in Table 3.4, along with the
reported uncertainty interval.
The data suggest that, as with the individual
outcome indicators, the main difference is between
the EU-15 and new Member States. In particular,
there is little to separate many of the original EU-15
countries and that any differences are encompassed
by the uncertainty intervals surrounding the data.
Therefore, despite the variation in health systems and
overall expenditure, there is little evidence that these
are reflected even in this broad measure of outcomes.
By comparison, the attainment of the US health
system is around the middle of the EU-15 countries,
but higher than all of the new Member Sates.
The World Health Report 2000 also considered the
efficiency of health provision.98 While the overall
attainment index shown in Table 3.4 provides an
absolute measure of achievement, the performance
indices, shown in Table 3.5, provide an indication of
a country’s performance in relation to its expendi-
ture. Performance is considered both in terms of
overall health system attainment and level of health.
The first panel is based on overall attainment from
Table 3.4 relative to expenditure. In the second
Table 3.4: WHO overall attainment indicators and rankings
Belgium 91.29 90.21 - 92.31 13 7 - 18
Denmark 90.86 89.98 - 91.83 20 13 - 24
Germany 91.28 90.36 - 92.23 14 8 - 20
Greece 90.52 89.70 - 91.32 23 17 - 25
Spain 90.96 90.10 - 91.81 19 12 - 23
France 91.93 91.01 - 92.91 6 3 - 11
Ireland 90.23 89.33 - 91.11 25 20 - 26
Italy 91.35 90.47 - 92.24 11 7 - 21
Luxembourg 92.00 90.97 - 93.00 5 2 - 11
Netherlands 91.62 90.70 - 92.55 8 4 - 15
Austria 91.47 90.52 - 92.44 10 6 - 18
Portugal 87.64 86.31 - 88.86 32 29 - 32
Finland 90.78 89.82 - 91.72 22 13 - 25
Sweden 92.01 91.08 - 92.97 4 2 - 11
UK 91.61 90.87 - 92.34 9 6 - 13
Cyprus 88.58 87.42 - 89.61 28 27 - 31
Czech Republic 87.77 86.90 - 88.68 30 28 - 33
Estonia 81.75 80.18 - 83.14 48 44 - 55
Hungary 83.35 82.19 - 84.39 43 39 - 47
Lithuania 81.04 79.53 - 82.46 52 48 - 59
Latvia 77.96 76.23 - 79.86 67 63 - 88
Malta 87.72 86.89 - 88.54 31 29 - 32
Poland 85.77 85.00 - 86.61 34 33 - 37
Slovenia 87.92 86.49 - 89.20 29 27 - 32
Slovakia 84.68 83.01 - 86.02 39 35 - 43
USA 91.07 89.86 - 92.28 15 7 - 24
* Rankings are relative to all 191 WHO states included
Source: WHO World Health Report 2000
Index Uncertainty interval Rank* Uncertainty interval
98 Although puzzlingly the WHO called it ‘performance’ – it has since changed
this confusing nomenclature.
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Table 3.5: WHO overall performance indices and rankings
Belgium 0.915 0.903 - 0.926 21 18 - 24 0.878 0.860 - 0.894 28 23 - 30
Denmark 0.862 0.848 - 0.874 34 32 - 36 0.785 0.769 - 0.801 65 61 - 72
Germany 0.902 0.890 - 0.914 25 22 - 27 0.836 0.819 - 0.852 41 39 - 47
Greece 0.933 0.921 - 0.945 14 13 - 19 0.936 0.920 - 0.951 11 9 - 13
Spain 0.972 0.959 - 0.985 7 4 - 8 0.968 0.948 - 0.989 6 3 - 8
France 0.994 0.982 - 1.000 1 1 - 5 0.974 0.953 - 0.994 4 2 - 7
Ireland 0.924 0.909 - 0.939 19 14 - 22 0.859 0.840 - 0.870 32 29 - 38
Italy 0.991 0.978 - 1.000 2 1 - 5 0.976 0.957 - 0.994 3 2 - 7
Luxembourg 0.928 0.914 - 0.942 16 13.5 - 21 0.864 0.847 - 0.881 31 27.5 - 35
Netherlands 0.928 0.914 - 0.942 17 14 - 21 0.893 0.875 - 0.911 19 17 - 24
Austria 0.959 0.946 - 0.972 9 7 - 12 0.914 0.896 - 0.931 15 13 - 17
Portugal 0.945 0.931 - 0.958 12 10 - 15 0.929 0.911 - 0.945 13 10 - 14.5
Finland 0.881 0.866 - 0.895 31 27 - 33 0.829 0.812 - 0.844 44 41 - 50
Sweden 0.908 0.893 - 0.921 23 20 - 26 0.890 0.870 - 0.907 21 18 - 26
UK 0.925 0.913 - 0.937 18 16 - 21 0.883 0.866 - 0.900 24 21 - 28
Cyprus 0.906 0.879 - 0.932 24 16 - 30 0.885 0.865 - 0.898 22 19 - 28
Czech Republic 0.805 0.781 - 0.825 48 43 - 54 0.765 0.749 - 0.779 81 73 - 83
Estonia 0.714 0.684 - 0.741 77 68 - 85 0.677 0.657 - 0.694 115 107 - 118.5
Hungary 0.743 0.713 - 0.768 66 59 - 74 0.698 0.682 - 0.714 105 101 - 111
Lithuania 0.722 0.690 - 0.750 73 65 - 82 0.724 0.705 - 0.742 93 89 - 103
Latvia 0.630 0.589 - 0.665 105 94 - 118 0.655 0.631 - 0.677 121 115 - 125
Malta 0.978 0.965 - 0.993 5 3 - 7 0.989 0.968 - 1.000 2 1 - 4
Poland 0.793 0.762 - 0.819 50 45 - 59 0.742 0.723 - 0.758 89 84 - 94
Slovenia 0.838 0.813 - 0.859 38 34 - 46 0.797 0.781 - 0.813 62 55 - 66
Slovakia 0.754 0.721 - 0.781 62 54 - 73 0.742 0.729 - 0.757 88 85 - 92
USA 0.838 0.817 - 0.859 37 35 - 44 0.774 0.758 - 0.789 72 67 - 78
Source: WHO World Health Report 2000
* Rankings are relative to all 191 WHO states included
Health Level (DALE) Performance
Index Rank* Index Rank*
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panel, the level of health is measured by disability-
adjusted life expectancy (DALE), defined as ‘expec-
tation of life lived in equivalent full health’ (WHO
World Health Report, 2000). For each country, the
performance index for the level of health is calcu-
lated as the difference between the observed DALE
in that country and that which would exist in the
absence of modern health system, divided by the
difference between the maximum DALE achievable
given health expenditure per capita and the DALE
in the absence of a modern health system.99
There is greater variation in these indices and rank-
ings and, by implication, differences in EU countries
are largely due to inefficiency (although it cannot
be ruled out that the DALE calculations are influ-
enced by unmeasurable exogenous influences). On
both measures some of the Member States show
better than average performance (France, Italy) and
others score significantly below average (Denmark,
Finland). Nevertheless, as with the overall WHO
attainment index, the main difference is between
the EU-15 and the new Member States.
3.5.1.3 Why then does expenditure vary?
If differences in expenditure do not lead to differ-
ences in health outcomes, how can we explain the
substantial differences in health expenditure across
countries, and in particular between the EU and the
US? One possibility is that this may be due to the
different structure of health systems. For instance,
the main source of funding could be related to the
level of expenditure.
The public sector has a larger role in the health sector
in general in EU economies than in the US (Table 3.6).
Again there is fairly wide variation within EU
99 The  World Health Report 2000 was the first concerted attempt to provide a
comprehensive comparative analysis of health systems. However, it has been crit-
icised at many levels in many respects (e.g. Almeida et al, 2000; Mulligan, Appleby
and Harrison, 2000; Navarro, 2000; Williams, 2000; McKee, 2001; Asada and
Hedemann, 2002). Nevertheless, the important issue here is the difficulty in distin-
guishing the health sectors within the original EU-15 and within the new Member
States. Just like the single dimensions of heath we discussed earlier, it is impossible
to come to any conclusions about the influence of health systems on performance
within the EU beyond the fact that performance appears to be higher in the EU-
15 countries than the new Member States.
Table 3.6: Public health expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure
Public expenditure as % of total health expenditure
1980 1990 2001
Belgium na na 71.1
Denmark 87.8 82.7 82.4
Germany 78.7 76.2 74.9
Greece 55.6 53.7 56.0
Spain 79.9 78.7 71.4
France na 76.6 76.0
Ireland 81.6 71.9 76.0
Italy na 79.3 75.3
Luxembourg 92.8 93.1 87.8
Netherlands 69.4 67.1 63.3
Austria 68.8 73.5 67.9
Portugal 64.3 65.5 69.0
Finland 79.0 80.9 75.6
Sweden 92.5 89.9 85.2
United Kingdom 89.4 83.6 82.2
EU-15 na 77.3 75.0
USA 41.5 39.6 44.4
Cyprus 52.4 40.0 33.4
Czech Republic 96.8 97.4 91.4
Estonia na na 77.8
Hungary na na 75.1
Lithuania na 90.0 71.6
Latvia na 100.0 68.3
Malta na na 65.7
Poland na 91.7 71.1
Slovenia 100.0 100.0 86.7
Slovak Republic na na 89.3
Note: 2001 data is not available for Luxembourg, graphs shown here are for 2000; most recent data for Poland is for 1999.
Source: WHO European Health for All Database, 2004 and OECD Health Data 2003, 2nd edition.
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economies, with the public sector accounting for over
80 % of total health expenditure in Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and the UK in 2001, against less 60 %
in Greece. The US stands out as having a far lower
public input. Nevertheless, the general trend in EU
economies has been to reduce the proportion of total
health expenditure accounted for by the state. It is
only in Greece and Portugal that the proportion of
public health expenditure has increased over the past
twenty years, although it has increased in Ireland
during the 1990s after falling previously.
As noted previously, a free market in health care may
result in over-consumption. This possibility is consistent
with the data of Graph 3.6. The Graph suggests a weak
relationship between total expenditure on health care
and the proportion of this expenditure made by the
public sector. The highly market-orientated US health
sector is very different with its low levels of state inter-
vention and high total expenditure compared to the EU
countries. However, within the EU, this relationship is
weaker with the economies with the highest and lowest
expenditure on health care (Germany and Latvia,
respectively) having similar levels of public involvement
in terms of expenditure.
3.5.1.4 Have EU countries been successful 
in containing costs?
It was noted earlier that rising expenditure on health
care is an important concern in all EU countries. Table
3.7 shows the growth in total health expenditure as a
percentage of GDP. For the period 1990-2000, this
increased by 1.2 percentage points in the US,
compared to 1.0 percentage points in the EU-15. In
the 1980s, however, growth in the US was much
higher than all EU countries for which data were
available.100 The US did not impose limitations on
costs to the same extent as other countries did
(Cutler, 2002). In contrast in some Member States
growth was negative for that time period. Finally, the
1970s was a period where healthcare expenditures
grew as a percent of GDP in most countries, with EU
growth generally higher than in the US.
Graph 3.6: The relationship between public and total health expenditure in 2000
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Source: OECD Health Data 2003, 2nd edition.
100 One exception to this is Ireland, which saw a large fall in spending during
the 1980s, but this was after a decade of falling spending.
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3.5.2 Microeconomic studies 
of performance
The difficulties in tying macroeconomic indicators
to resource use and a desire to understand the
process of technology diffusion and links with
supply side constraints has in recent years led to a
focus on disease specific microeconomic studies.
These studies concentrate on persons diagnosed
with specific diseases, and frequently also particular
population cohorts thus controlling to some extent
for extraneous influences. The analysis is generally
based on micro data from administrative records,
individual data and surveys. Many studies were
multi-disciplinary involving, among others, medical
researchers and health economists. This section
outlines briefly some main findings from these
studies, especially those that include some interna-
tional comparisons.
The McKinsey Global Institute published one of the
first international comparative studies in 1996
(McKinsey, 1996, summarised in Baily and Garber,
1997). This study had two main objectives. The first
was to assess differences in relative productivity at the
disease level comparing the US, the UK and Germany.
Productivity is defined as the physical inputs used to
achieve a given level of health outcomes. The second
was to examine the causes of observed differences in
terms of variations in diagnostic and treatment
approaches and to relate these to each country’s
system of provision, concentrating on provider incen-
tives and supply constraints.
The project focused on four specific common
diseases - diabetes, gallstones, breast cancer and
lung cancer - with data from the late 1980s. Inputs
were measured as labour (physicians, nurses, tech-
nicians and others), supplies (drugs, surgical instru-
ments etc.) and capital, with the weighted sum of
inputs used to measure aggregate physical inputs
for each disease treatment process in each country.
Outcome measures were derived by comparing the
expected health outcomes with treatment in each
country to the outcomes without treatment.
• The diabetes study was carried out only for the
UK and the US. Inputs were measured by
Table 3.7: Growth in total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Growth in total health expenditure as a % of GDP
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000
Belgium na 2.4 1.0 1.3
Denmark na na -0.6 -0.2
Germany na 2.5 -0.2 2.1
Greece na 0.5 0.8 2.0
Spain na 1.8 1.3 0.8
France na na na 0.7
Ireland 1.4 3.3 -2.3 0.3
Italy na na na 0.2
Luxembourg na 2.3 0.2 -0.5
Netherlands na na 0.5 0.6
Austria 1.0 2.3 -0.5 0.9
Portugal na 3.0 0.6 2.8
Finland 1.8 0.8 1.4 -1.1
Sweden na 2.1 -0.6 0.2
United Kingdom 0.6 1.1 0.4 1.3
EU-15 na na na 1.0
USA 1.9 1.8 3.2 1.2
Cyprus na na 1.7 1.4
Czech Republic na na na 2.1
Estonia na na na na
Hungary na na na na
Lithuania na na na 2.8
Latvia na na 0.4 2.3
Malta na na na na
Poland na na na 0.7
Slovenia na na 1.2 2.4
Slovak Republic na na na na
Source: WHO European Health for All Database, 2004 and OECD Health Data 2003, 2nd Edition.
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labour since this is by far the most important
for this disease and outcomes focused on the
relative rates of developing selected complica-
tions. Baily and Garber showed that diabetics in
the UK were less likely to develop complications
than those in the US, resulting in superior
outcomes in the UK. Since the UK also used
some 34 % fewer inputs, productivity was
found to be significantly higher in the UK.
• In the case of gallstones, treatment is costly and
invariably involves surgery. Here, the UK - US
comparisons showed that on a per operation basis
the US and the UK had similar outcomes but the US
used 71 % fewer inputs leading the authors to
conclude that the US had higher average produc-
tivity. The authors also conclude that the US was
also more productive than Germany.
• In the case of breast cancer, inputs included all
labour, supplies and capital employed in the
four phases of treatment (screening, assess-
ment, therapeutic and follow-up) and
outcomes were five year age-adjusted survival
rates following diagnosis. The results show the
US and the UK with much greater productivity
than Germany but it was not possible to distin-
guish between the UK and US. Screening had a
significant effect on differences in overall input
consumption and productive efficiency, with
the greater screening in the US coming at a
relatively high cost. The main reason behind
the poor relative German performance was the
much longer length of hospital stays. Finally in
the case of lung cancer, the US was found to
have higher average productivity followed by
Germany with the UK very far behind. The US
had shorter hospital stays and greater use of
outpatient chemotherapy and better targeting
of those most likely to benefit from treatments
(using CT scans), with again some small offset
from higher staffing levels in the US. Surgical
frequency was highest in Germany.
In explaining the differences across countries, the
McKinsey report emphasises differences in regulation
and competition. They suggest that the per-diem
payment system in Germany gave greater incentives
to extend hospital stays than the generally fee-for-
service payment system in the US although this effect
may be overstated. In addition, McKinsey point to
the separate control and regulation of primary and
hospital care in Germany which hampers substitution
of outpatient for inpatient treatments. They also
emphasise the lower diffusion of technological
changes in Britain and link this again to provider
payment systems and lack of competition.
The McKinsey report suggests higher productivity in
the US relative to other countries in contrast to
many of the findings using macroeconomic indica-
tors. In terms of reconciling these differences
McKinsey point to higher incidence of disease in the
US, greater US administrative costs, higher neonatal
mortality in the US and higher costs of inputs, in
particular payments to physicians and drugs. Of
these, higher payments to physicians were found to
be by far the most important explanation.
Grieve et al. (2001) found, on the basis of detailed
patient data from European hospitals, a very wide
variation in costs and outcomes and in the amount
of staff time allocated and the type of staff used
across 13 centres covering ten European countries.
The evidence suggests some positive relationship
between resource use and outcomes. The authors
conclude that the way resources are organised, in
addition to the level of resources used, may be
important in explaining variations in outcomes.
Perhaps one of the most systematic and detailed
international comparative study of the performance
of health sectors was the OECD age related disease
(ARD) project. This focused on a particular age
cohort, the elderly, with, to date, results available for
three diseases, ischaemic heart disease, breast cancer
and stroke; results are summarised in OECD (2003).
Ischaemic Heart Disease (IHD) is the world’s leading
cause of death and accounts for about 10 % of total
expenditures on health. The ARD project
(summarised in Moise, 2003b) showed that, while
there was little cross-country correlation between
intensity of use and outcomes, the US did show lower
fatality rates than other countries. The author
concludes that the results show some support that
supply side constraints have an impact on intensity of
treatment and the diffusion of technology. Results for
stroke (Moon, 2003) did show a relationship
between the use of resources and health outcomes
with the important exception of the UK where high
fatality rates went hand in hand with high resource
use. Confirming the findings of Grieve et al. (2001)
the ARD project suggests that it is not just how much
money is spent but how it is spent that is important.
In the case of breast cancer the results suggest that
there is no clear association between technological
inputs and survival rates, except in the UK where
much lower availability of machines was associated
with very poor outcomes. Also, state-of-the-art
machinery alone is not sufficient to achieve high
performance rates; better performance arises from
well organised screening programs and following the
latest clinical guidelines.
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The TECH Global Research Network 2003 study
(McClellan and Kessler, 2003) links differences across
countries to economic and regulatory incentives.
They find that financial and regulatory incentives for
technological change differ enormously across coun-
tries, providing a potentially useful foundation for
careful cross-country comparisons of the diffusion of
technology and its consequences. The results suggest
that supply side incentives appear to be important
determinants of trends in high-tech treatments but
are less so for low-tech treatments. Utilisation is likely
to be higher in fee-for-service systems than in those
where physicians are paid salaries. Macro technology
regulation was also found to be a key determinant of
technological change.
In summary, the microeconomic studies highlight
the difficulties in matching resource use and tech-
nological diffusion to outcomes in order to explain
why little hard evidence can be gleaned using
macroeconomic indicators. In particular these
studies suggest much of the observed improvement
in health outcomes are likely to fall outside the
health care system and that diminishing returns are
an important issue in evaluating relative perform-
ance. Nevertheless the studies suggest that varia-
tions in supply-side incentive systems do have an
impact on utilising cost-effective treatments and
technology diffusion. Hence, even if it is not
possible to precisely quantify performance, changes
to the systems of provision are likely to impact on
productivity.
3.5.3 Use of inputs
3.5.3.1 Labour input
The labour force is probably the most important
resource in any health care system, and its utilisa-
tion is certainly a significant determinant of the
performance of the health sector. Expenditure on
the labour force accounts for the greatest propor-
tion of current spending – estimates suggest that in
many countries this is between 60 and 80 %
(Buchan, 2000). This section first considers employ-
ment trends using national accounts sources and
then discusses issues relating to the deployment of
labour input in the health care sector.
Trends in employment and total hours worked can
be obtained on a reasonably consistent basis from
national accounts sources for the combined health
and social services sector. Table 3.8, using data in
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003), shows labour input,
either measured by numbers employed or total
hours worked, growing faster in the US than in the
EU-15, with the percentage point differences more
pronounced in the 1980s than in the decade since
1990. For both the US and the EU-15, growth in
hours worked has been higher in the health sector
than in the total economy (O’Mahony and van Ark,
2003). Data for selected Member States highlight
variation across countries. Thus, both Germany and
the Netherlands show considerably larger increases
in labour input than do France or the UK.
Trends in aggregate labour input conceal consider-
ably diversity by type of labour employed. Many
countries are currently facing a shortage of health
professionals, and without an adequate number of
staff a country’s ability to improve its performance
will be impaired. Equally important is that the
labour force possesses the necessary skills, particu-
larly in the face of continuing advances in tech-
nology and knowledge. It is also crucial to find a
suitable balance between different types of workers.
Consideration should be given to the roles of health
care professionals, as in certain circumstances it
may enhance efficiency if use of overqualified and
Table 3.8: Growth in number employed and hours worked in the health and social work sector
US EU-15 France Germany Netherlands UK
Growth in total number employed, average % per annum
1979-1990 3.9 2.7 2.3 3.6 2.8 2.8
1990-1995 3.1 1.7 1.4 3.8 2.4 1.5
1995-2001 1.9 1.7 1.0 2.8 3.2 0.5
Growth in total hours worked, average % per annum
1979-1990 4.1 2.0 0.6 2.9 1.0 2.4
1990-1995 3.0 1.4 1.3 2.8 1.6 1.8
1995-2001 2.3 1.4 0.3 2.3 2.7 -0.2
Source: O’Mahony and van Ark (2003).
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expensive staff is avoided where it is possible for the
same tasks to be carried out perfectly adequately by
others. While medical professionals are the first
group that spring to mind when we think of the
health sector workforce, the role of managerial and
administrative staff should not be forgotten.
Training of non-medical staff is therefore also crucial
if the performance of the health system is to be
maximised.
Considerable variation exists between countries in
terms of the number of health care professionals.
Table 3.9 shows the number of physicians per
100,000 population in 1980, 1990 and 2000. The
ratio of physicians to the population in those coun-
tries with the highest number of doctors is more than
double that of the ratio observed in the countries
with the fewest. Thus in 2000, the greatest number
of physicians per 100,000 population were in Italy
(599) and Greece (444) with both Belgium and
Lithuania, also having ratios of more than 400 physi-
cians for every 100,000 of the population. This
compares with 223 physicians in Ireland, 218 in
Slovenia and 220 in Poland. Recent data on a compa-
rable basis are not available for the UK, but OECD
suggest a graph of about 200, placing it among
those countries with the fewest physicians (OECD
Health Data, 2003). Similarly OECD data for the US
puts the number of practising physicians in the
middle to low range. The number of physicians has
been increasing over time in all EU countries, with the
exception of Estonia and Latvia, which have seen
some decline between 1990 and 2000, and
Lithuania, which has experienced a very slight fall.
A shortage of health care professionals is an issue of
concern in many countries. Even in countries where
there is no overall shortage of workers, it may be
the case that certain rural areas are not well served
(Docteur and Oxley, 2003). In other countries there
is an oversupply of physicians, generally in the
Southern European countries - for example in Spain
where oversupply has led to unemployment among
this group. While a country may not have an overall
Table 3.9: Physicians per 100,000
Physicians per 100,000
1980 1990 2000
Belgium 249 344 414
Denmark 218 311 345
Germany n.a. 300 326
Greece 243 338 444
Spain n.a. 226 324
France 201 305 328
Ireland 131 156 223
Italy 312 462 599
Luxembourg 148 201 249
Netherlands 191 251 319
Austria 165 222 312
Portugal 196 283 318
Finland 174 242 307
Sweden 220 259 304
United Kingdom 140 160 200**
EU-15 216 299 349
USA n.a. 240** 270**
Cyprus 110 207 259
Czech Republic 226 271 337
Estonia 294 350 322
Hungary 250 280 310*
Lithuania 340 403 401
Latvia 362 412 320
Malta n.a. 201 265
Poland n.a. 214 220
Slovenia 177 199 218
Slovak Republic 255 294 323
Source: WHO European Health for All Database.
Notes: * indicates 1999 data, ** OECD estimates.
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shortage of physicians, in some countries there is a
tendency to have an oversupply of certain special-
ists while at the same time experiencing a shortage
of generalists (Saltman and Figueras, 1997).101
The WHO data suggest even greater variation in the
number of nurses per capita. Nurses account for a
very significant part of the health care labour force.
While some countries suffer from a shortage of
doctors and others have an oversupply, the lack of
nurses is a concern in many countries. Fawcett-
Henesy (2000) notes that a shortage of nurses and
midwives is a problem for almost all of Western
Europe. Nursing is currently underdeveloped in
many Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries, and is an issue that needs to be addressed.
In some countries, the increasing emphasis on
primary care and the contemporaneous restruc-
turing of the health system has led to an oversupply
of specialists with a shortage of general practice
physicians. This has been a particular problem for
Central and Eastern European countries and needs
to be resolved if primary care reforms are to be
successful. Changes to training are required to
rectify this imbalance, both in the short-term to
provide specialists with the necessary skills to work
in general practice, but also over the longer term,
requiring changes to the teaching curricula of
medical schools. Estonia, for example, has intro-
duced a specialist training programme for GPs
(Saltman and Figueras, 1997).
As labour accounts for such a large proportion of
recurrent expenditure, some countries have
attempted to reduce spending on staff in efforts to
contain total health expenditure. Indeed, the varia-
tion in the number of health care professionals
across countries may indicate that there are gains to
be made by reducing the number of staff in some
countries (Docteur and Oxley, 2003). However,
while this may have helped to control spending in
the short run, in the longer term difficulties may
arise. Firstly, if the number of professionals is
reduced, this is likely to increase the workload of
those remaining and can have damaging effects on
morale and can affect the ability to recruit staff in
the future. In both the UK and Denmark, earlier
reforms to control spending have meant that the
health systems are now currently struggling to meet
demand even as financial resources have been
increased. Such shortages also give medical profes-
sionals greater bargaining power to increase their
wages as strikes in France and Finland have demon-
strated.
To boost supply of professionals in the UK in recent
years there has been a 60 % increase in the number
of medical school places since 1997 (Department of
Health, 2004b). A measure to restrain the rising
number of professionals has been to restrict the
number of doctors allowed to bill public insurers, as
in Denmark and the Netherlands, and in Austria
professional associations restrict the number of
ambulatory care physicians (Docteur and Oxley,
2003). However, some countries have struggled to
contain growth in the number of professionals
despite such constraints. As noted previously, it is
not only the physical number of health care profes-
sionals that matters but also that they are appropri-
ately skilled. Implementation of health care reform
depends on the availability of appropriately skilled
labour and with continuing advances in technology
and knowledge, it is increasingly difficult to remain
up-to-date and requires that training continues to
adapt to changing circumstances. There is also
increased emphasis on the development of new
skills in the face of changing working environment,
such as teamwork and communication skills.
The escalating shortage of nurses has created much
concern, and appears to be a global phenomenon.
Irwin (2001) reports that the International Council
of Nurses (ICN) found nursing shortages across
much of Europe. For example, in 2001, the Nether-
lands had a shortage of 7000 nurses, and the UK a
shortage of 22000. Fewer individuals are training to
become nurses, and experienced nurses are leaving
their profession. Irwin notes that both demand and
supply factors have contributed to the nursing
shortage. Demand has increased as a result of a
greater emphasis on primary care, technological
change and an ageing population. Supply has fallen
as nursing has decreased in popularity as an occu-
pation. Women, who were traditionally the main
recruits, now have a greater variety of career oppor-
tunities. There has also been much interest in how
nurses, and the appropriate use of their skills, may
enhance the cost-effective use of resources.
Increasing the autonomy of nurses is part of a wider
move concerned with redefining the roles of health
professionals. Fawcett-Henesy (2000) notes that
nurses are now carrying out some of the duties that
would previously have been the responsibility of
doctors, while similarly, health care assistants and
other professionals are adopting some of the work
previously performed by nurses. This trend has been
particularly apparent in primary care. Some coun-
tries, including the Netherlands, UK and the Scandi-
101 Saltman and Figueras (1997) discuss some of the factors that have resulted in
an oversupply of physicians in certain areas of Europe, which include historical
and cultural factors and a tendency to substitute labour for capital. They report
that medical unemployment has not lessened this problem and suggest that
entry to (especially private) medical schools should be monitored.
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navian countries have improved opportunities for
nursing education and training an measures have
been adopted to retain nurses in the profession.
The mobility of nurses has already been the subject
of considerable debate. The nursing shortage in the
UK led to considerable recruitment from abroad,
including Australia, South Africa, the Philippines and
Nigeria in addition to recruits from EU countries
(Irwin, 2001). Tjadens (2002) reports that, while
other European countries have also recruited from
abroad, this has generally not been so extensive.
There are some concerns regarding recruitment and
training costs and subsequent retention rates (Irwin,
2001), as well as ethical questions relating to
recruiting nurses from countries that may them-
selves face shortages.
There are concerns over whether the new Member
States can retain sufficient health care professionals
to provide the services required in their own
country, when it may be unable to compete with
other countries in terms of pay and standards of
living. Dubois, Nolte and McKee (2004) cite the
example of Poland, which has invested heavily in
changes to the training of health professionals,
particularly nurses, and may now lose these skilled
workers to other countries. However, enlargement is
unlikely to result in a dramatic surge in general
labour migration (European Commission, 2001)
and, besides, increased labour mobility will create a
need to harmonise training across countries to
ensure comparable levels of quality and skills.
A factor that will soon have greater effect on health
care professionals is the EU working time directive.
Pickersgill (2001) points out that many European
health systems will be affected by changes in
August 2004, when junior doctors will be restricted
to working 58 hours per week, decreasing to 48
hours by 2009. There is also concern that many
European countries will be confronted with a loss of
a considerable number of professionals as the baby-
boom generation retires while the population will
be ageing and demand will be increasing as supply
falls.
3.5.3.2 Capital input
For selected countries data are available from
national accounts, on investment in the health
sector (including social services). From these data
capital stocks were estimated assuming geometric
decay. Buildings represent a significant component
of investment in the health sector, equal to about
70 % of total investment in the European countries
and about 40 % in the US since 1979. Given the
fact that much of new technology is embodied in
equipment investment, capital stocks were esti-
mated separately for structures and equipment.102
Table 3.10 presents growth rates of capital stock for
selected time periods for the US and four EU
Member States. There is large variation across the
countries considered but, in general, growth rates
in equipment tend to be larger than structures. The
US shows high growth rates in equipment capital
throughout and higher than in the EU countries
other than France before 1995. From the latter date
there was a pronounced acceleration of growth of
equipment capital in the US not matched in the EU
countries. For the total economy since 1979, annual
average growth rates of US structures and equip-
ment investment were about 1.8 % and 3.3 %,
respectively; in the UK investment was about 2.5 %
for both assets and in France 1 % and 4 % for struc-
tures and equipment, respectively. Thus it appears
that capital growth in the health sector has been
rising faster than in the economy as a whole.
Much of the greater US investment is in information
and communications technology (ICT). The Euro-
pean countries have also increased their shares of
ICT but at lower rates than in the US, mirroring
total economy trends presented in O’Mahony and
van Ark (2003). O’Mahony and van Ark classify
health and social work as a non-ICT intensive
service sector, with average ICT use lower than in
private (for example, financial and business) serv-
ices. In terms of high technology capital, increased
investment in advanced medical equipment and
instruments is likely to be more important in driving
equipment investment rates. Unfortunately the
national accounts data do not contain sufficiently
disaggregated data by asset type to allow examina-
tion of trends in medical equipment.
Anell and Barnum (1998) find that differences in the
accumulation of capital have occurred for a variety
of reasons, including institutional arrangements and
geographical factors. Hospitals comprise the
greatest part of the health system capital stock. This
is partly a result of past investment patterns, but
also because the nature of hospital care is more
capital intensive compared to other areas such as
primary care (Anell and Barnum, 1998). Recent
years have seen a reduction in the number of
hospital beds per capita across Europe, in Western
Europe from the 1980s and in Central and Eastern
Europe since the 1990s.
102 Depreciation rates were set at 0.021 for structures and 0.167 for equipment,
based on investment by asset type and depreciation rates employed in the
US; see Inklaar et al. (2003) for further details on methods to estimate capital
stocks and data sources.
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This has partly been the result of reforms to contain
costs but advances in technology have also reduced
the need for some forms of hospital care. How to
account for variations in quality and technology use
is, of course, an issue. Technology has reduced the
length of stay required for many illnesses and it thus
affects the desirable allocation of capital. Anell and
Barnum (1998) note that a conflict arises here as
changes to the capital stock occur gradually, while
advances in technology and knowledge are rapid.
This creates difficulties in planning capital invest-
ment and in achieving efficient use of resources. In
general then, there is little systematic evidence
across countries on the utilisation of capital inputs
in the health sector.
3.5.3.3 Intermediate input: Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceuticals are crucial to the performance of
the health sector since they influence health
outcomes. At the same time, expenditure on phar-
maceuticals has been increasing, contributing to
the general rise in health spending.
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals has been
increasing as a proportion of GDP over the last
three decades and accounts for an average of
approximately 15 % of total health expenditure in
OECD countries (Jacobzone, 2000). Pharmaceutical
expenditure generally accounts for a higher propor-
tion of GDP in poorer countries (ibid). In 2000, the
proportion of total health spending accounted for
by pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables
varied among countries, from 8.7 % in Denmark to
34 % in the Slovak Republic (OECD Health Data,
2003). This compares with a share of 11.9 % in the
US. Differences in expenditure may also reflect
different patterns of usage. The use of pharmaceuti-
cals differs greatly across Europe. This is particularly
true when we consider certain drugs – the
consumption of antibiotics in France, for example,
is four times higher than in the Netherlands
(Maynard, 2003).
Why has expenditure on pharmaceuticals risen?
There are many reasons, including the development
of expensive new drugs and an ageing population
increasing demand for pharmaceuticals (Mossialos,
1998). The higher growth in pharmaceutical
spending relative to GDP may also be a conse-
quence of the stronger growth of the pharmaceu-
tical sector compared to the overall economy
(Jacobzone, 2000). Another explanation is that
countries spending a higher proportion of GDP on
health tend to have higher usage of new pharma-
ceuticals than others.
In the face of pressure to contain health care costs
generally, countries have attempted to restrain the
increase in pharmaceutical expenditure in order to
contain total health spending. Actions have been taken
to influence both the demand for and supply of phar-
maceuticals. Cost-sharing, which has been widely
used, may take various forms including flat-rate
Table 3.10: Growth rates of capital stock in the health sector
US France Germany Netherlands UK
Growth in real capital stock, % per annum
Structures
1979-1990 6.90 1.23 1.58 4.33 4.10
1990-1995 3.34 1.53 3.21 3.64 4.61
1995-2001 4.37 0.64 2.40 2.99 3.34
Equipment
1979-1990 5.69 8.92 3.29 3.48 5.60
1990-1995 6.67 7.56 6.02 1.15 5.94
1995-2001 9.29 6.33 5.65 3.51 3.29
Real Investment shares, annual average
Structures (1979-2001)
0.39 0.46 0.53 0.71 0.69
Share ICT investment in equipment
1979-1989 0.116 0.073 na 0.104 0.122
1990-1995 0.198 0.091 na 0.171 0.061
1996-2001 0.337 0.197 na 0.326 0.269
Sources for investment data: US, Bureau of Economic Analysis; France, INSEE; Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt; Netherlands, Statistics Netherlands;
UK, Office for National Statistics – see Inklaar et al. (2003) for details.
Note: ICT assets comprise, computing equipment, software and communications. The UK investment statistics do not show computers and commu-
nications equipment separately from other tangible equipment so were estimated using data from Input output and supply use tables.
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payments per prescription, co-payments of a fixed
percentage of the cost or a requirement to pay the
difference if the patient opts to use a branded drug
rather than a cheaper generic alternative. By transfer-
ring some of the cost of the medicine to the consumer,
this should help to reduce any unnecessary consump-
tion; there is some evidence that co-payments reduce
consumption.103 Reference price systems, where the
consumer pays the difference if they request a branded
drug when a cheaper generic alternative is available,
can also help to reduce expenditure on pharmaceuti-
cals. These have gained in popularity in recent years
and the use of generics appears to have increased as a
result (Jacobzone, 2000).
Several countries have also introduced prescribing
guidelines to encourage the appropriate use of
pharmaceuticals. Doctors’ prescribing patterns are
influenced by the incentives implicit in their reim-
bursement system. Doctors working in the tax-
financed national health systems in Northern
Europe tend to be less likely to over-prescribe, for
example (Jacobzone, 2000). Prescribing patterns
may also be influenced by the pharmaceutical
industry itself, which invests heavily in marketing its
new products to physicians (Maynard, 2003). On
the supply-side, most countries control pharmaceu-
tical prices to some extent. Some countries, such as
Italy and the Netherlands have set pharmaceutical
prices with reference to prices in other countries
(Docteur and Oxley, 2003). It may be the case that
such price controls have led to partial convergence
of pharmaceutical prices across Europe (Ljungkvist
et al, 1997; Jacobzone, 2000). Clearly, developing
new pharmaceuticals is a lengthy and expensive
process and prices must be set so as to reward inno-
vation but also to avoid possible abuse of monopoly
power while the drug is under patent. Finally,
because consumers will not generally possess the
knowledge to assess the safety, quality and effec-
tiveness of medicines and intervention, rectifying
this information asymmetry has led to all countries
to develop strict pre-marketing rules and the estab-
lishment of the European Medicinal Products Evalu-
ation Agency in 1995 (Docteur and Oxley,
2003).104 Maynard (2003) points out that the aim
of this is to promote the efficient allocation of
resources, not to reduce overall expenditure. In
health systems with strict price controls, industry
has tended to concentrate on developing products
where the innovation element is relatively small
(Jacobzone, 2000). In this way, the industry may be
avoiding strict price regulation, but not contri-
buting greatly to improving treatment.
The pharmaceutical market is different to other
parts of health care systems, partly because of its
international nature. There is some evidence to
suggest that the European pharmaceutical sector
has become less competitive in comparison to the
US (Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli, 2000).
However, there are considerable differences across
countries, with the deteriorating competitive posi-
tion largely the consequence of the performance of
the industry in Germany and Italy. In contrast, the
pharmaceutical sectors in the UK, Denmark,
Sweden and Ireland have performed rather well.
Several reasons are responsible for this loss of
competitiveness, including that growth in both
capital and R&D seems to result in less growth in
pharmaceutical sales than in the US; others include
the stricter requirements for the testing of pharma-
ceuticals and the effect of policies to contain health
spending. However, others have suggested (GAO,
1994) that reforms to contain costs in some coun-
tries do not necessarily lead to a reduction in global
R&D, as firms still have the opportunity to earn
profits in the international market.
3.5.4 Organisational change
Organisational changes are increasingly being
recognised as an important channel through which
productivity can be improved and have recently
become the focus of considerable research in
market sectors (e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and
Hitt, 2002). The drive to improve efficiency in the
health care sector in many EU countries in the
1990s led to a number of organisational changes.
This section describes two such sets of changes that
have had particular impact in the health sector,
decentralisation and increasing patient choice.
Devolution and decentralisation in the health
sector
Decentralisation has been a common theme in
health care reform across the EU although no
Member State has an either completely decen-
tralised or completely centralised system. Decentral-
isation is a broad concept permitting to classify
various reforms under this heading. The European
Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000) defines
decentralization as ‘(c)hanging relations within and
between a variety of organizational structures/bo-
dies, resulting in the transfer of the authority to
plan, make decisions or manage public functions
103 For example, the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse, 1993)
found that co-payments of 25 % decreased demand by around one quarter.
104 There is also increasing interest in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of phar-
maceuticals, with several countries having introduced new authorities for this
purpose, such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in
England and Wales and the Agence nationale pour le développement de
l’évaluation médicale (ANDEM) in France. The increasing use of such ‘phar-
macoeconomic assessment’, has been found to be useful for determining the
value-for-money of new pharmaceuticals, as well as for aiding reimburse-
ment and pricing decisions (Dickson, Hurst and Jacobzone, 2003).
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from the national level to any organization or
agency at the sub-national level’.105
Various factors have led countries to pursue decen-
tralisation. One is dissatisfaction with centralised
systems whose disadvantages include an overly
bureaucratic nature and inefficiency, slow reactions
to changing needs and circumstances, and few
incentives for innovation. Decentralisation in health
care is not an isolated issue – it is often part of a
much wider political change, as in the new Member
States where there has been a move towards much
more decentralised systems since the breakdown of
the previous regimes.106
Intuition suggests that by decentralising decision-
making to a lower level, health care should become
more responsive to the needs of the actual popula-
tion.107 If resources are allocated more appropri-
ately to reflect local circumstances, this may be
beneficial for both efficiency and equity.108 While in
theory decentralisation should allow greater respon-
siveness to the local population, in reality they may
not possess this freedom. Wilkin et al. (2001) report
that, in the UK, primary care groups have been
subject to numerous performance targets and direc-
tives, leading to tensions between the different
levels of management. Decentralisation may also
speed up responsiveness to changing circum-
stances, particularly if communication improves as a
result.109
The effect of decentralisation on equity is unclear.
Decentralisation has the potential to reduce inequity,
for example, if it leads to a better geographical distri-
bution of resources. However, if it reduces uniformity
in decision making across regions, it may increase
inequality. So far, research has not shown any direct
relationship between decentralisation and reduction
in equity, as there are many other contributory
factors.110 Finally, significant disadvantages of decen-
tralisation are the possibility of fragmentation and
duplication of services.
Privatisation has raised particular concerns with regard
to equity. Privatisation of financing is much more likely
to affect equity than privatisation of service provision,
but there is still some dispute.111 It is possible that
privatisation of services increases consumer choice, but
equity may be adversely affected, if choice is increased
for the wealthy but not for the poor. Privatisation in
some countries has also led to problems with cost
containment. When delivery is privatised, but funding
is provided by the public sector, this can lead to consid-
erable increase in expenditure with greater difficulty in
containing costs, as the experience of some county
councils in Sweden, where they have chosen to
increase private sector involvement in provision (Dide-
rischen, 1999), has shown.
While decentralisation has been a popular compo-
nent of health care reform, there are considerable
differences between countries in their approach
reflecting political and social factors that exert
considerable influence. Broadly speaking, those
countries with NHS style health systems have
tended to be more centralised while those with
social insurance models have been more decen-
tralised (Hunter et al., 1998). Leys (1999) suggests
that differences in culture and particularly expecta-
tions will play an important role. He cites Spain and
the UK, arguing that the Spanish, who have histori-
cally been much more accustomed to variations in
health care across regions, will have different expec-
tations with regard to equity than those in the UK
where the national health service, with equity as a
fundamental principle, has been in place for a
longer period of time. Therefore any inequalities
arising as a result of decentralising reforms are more
likely to be tolerated in Spain.
Despite the potential advantages of decentralisa-
tion, evidence has shown that there are particular
110 For example in the highly decentralised health care system in Finland, when
costs had to be contained during the economic crisis in the 1990s, certain
groups, including alcoholic and psychiatric patients, were more likely to have
access to care reduced and expenditure on services contained (Koivusalo,
1999). Similarly in Sweden, Diderischen (1999) argues that while in theory
the decentralised system has allowed greater responsiveness to the local
population, with adjustments in funding across counties to take account of
differences in income and health, recent pressure to contain costs has
reduced access to care.
111 Sweden, for example, has recently banned any further privatisation of hospi-
tals largely as a result of concerns about equity (Burgermeister, 2004). Private
companies will no longer be allowed to run hospitals that treat both state
insured and privately insured patients, although they will be allowed to treat
just privately insured patients.
105 Decentralisation is commonly classified into four types; de-concentration,
devolution, delegation and privatisation (e.g. Hunter et al., 1998; Cheema
and Rondinelli, 1983). De-concentration or ‘administrative decentralisation’
refers to the passing of administrative responsibility to a lower level. Devolu-
tion, or ‘political decentralisation, involves the transfer of responsibility to a
lower political level. Delegation occurs where responsibility for certain tasks
are transferred to a lower organisational level (Hunter et al., 1998). The
fourth type of decentralisation, privatisation, refers to the shift of public
sector functions to the private sector, although commentators acknowledge
that this last channel is somewhat different from the previous three. The
potential advantages of decentralisation have been widely documented.
Indeed, Hunter et al. (1998) note that all too often policymakers have been
quick to acknowledge the advantages without paying full attention to the
associated disadvantages.
106 Although in some cases the disadvantages have led some countries to reverse
direction; for example, in Hungary, the former 19 regional health insurance
funds were brought together into one national fund (Mossialos et al., 2002).
107 This was one of the main factors behind Sweden’s decision to devolve
responsibility for health care to county councils in 1982 (Diderischen, 1999).
108 The importance of this is noted by Reverte-Cejudo and Sánchez-Bayle (1999)
in a discussion of decentralisation in the Spanish health care system. Spain
established a National Health Service system in 1986 with 17 autonomous
health services, but currently only seven of the Autonomous Communities
have considerable responsibility for health care. There are a number of areas
where the system could still be improved, for example there is inequity both
within and between regions, excessive regional bureaucracy, and also some
duplication.
109 Enthoven (2000), in an article discussing modernisation of the NHS in the
UK, argues that decentralisation allows important local information to be
taken account of, that may not be available to central authorities, especially
if there are weak information systems.
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activities of the health care sector that should not
be subject to decentralisation (Hunter et al., 1998).
Firstly, general health policy decisions should not be
decentralised. Secondly, decisions regarding the
future of health sector resources, such as the
number of health care professionals to be trained,
are probably best made at the national level. Some
regulation is also required at a centralised level,
although it is crucial to find the appropriate level of
effective regulation. Finally, monitoring of popula-
tion health and of health care services should be
carried out centrally.
Improving choice
The UK was the first EU member to launch compe-
tition in the public health market, via provider
competition, in the 1980s (Le Grand, Mays and
Mulligan, 1998). In the early 1990s, Nordic coun-
tries, like Sweden, also adopted some aspects of
provider competition (Saltman et al. 1997 and
1998). In tax-financed countries like the UK and the
Nordic countries, the main element of health sector
reform was to introduce purchaser-provider splits.
In social health insurance countries like Germany
and the Netherlands, the focus was on introducing
competition on the demand side in the mid 1990s.
The extent of patient choice of health care provider
varies considerably among EU countries (see section
3.3). However, most countries have tried to increase
consumer choice in recent years, particularly in
primary, but also in secondary, care. Reforms have
attempted to improve patient choice in order to
increase quality and accountability of services,
improve patient satisfaction and ultimately raise
health outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that
improvements in health outcomes have been
achieved by patients becoming increasingly
involved in managing their own health (Wold-
Olsen, 2003). But greater consumer choice and
involvement in health care depends on an ability to
make choices and as well as on whether consumers
wish to actually choose (Rijckmans et al, 2002).
There is evidence from some Member States that
resource allocation and patient satisfaction can be
improved through greater consumer choice.112
3.6 Conclusions
Given its significant share of aggregate economic
activity, and its consequences for the competitive-
ness and functioning of the overall economy, it is
clear that measuring the performance of the health
sector is important. While the health economics
literature generally emphasises the unique nature of
this sector, it is necessary to analyse its performance
in a wider framework than is usual for service indus-
tries. Its unique features range from its historical
development, with its original concentration on
equity rather than efficiency goals, to the high
degree of government intervention and regulation
and to the importance of technological change in
understanding both expenditure increases and
input use. In addition information asymmetries
make it difficult to distinguish between activities
and outputs, whereas final outcomes are highly
influenced by extraneous influences such as lifestyle
changes. Thus performance is difficult to measure
as is drawing conclusions on the relative efficiency
of systems of provision.113
The health sector is characterized by a number of
market imperfections, including moral hazard,
adverse selection and the presence of externalities.
Recently many EU Member States have embarked on
reforms in order to promote efficiency and produc-
tivity growth. The relationship between technology
and performance is critical. While rapid advances in
technology are responsible for much of the increase
in health expenditure, this must be weighed against
the considerable benefits that they produce in terms
of improvements in health outcomes.
Both the macro aggregate indicators and micro
studies show some weak evidence that increased
expenditure on health care leads to better outcomes,
with the evidence somewhat stronger in the case of
microeconomic disease based studies. Attempts to
ascertain the presence of a relationship between
health expenditure and outcomes based on macro
indicators produced mixed results. The findings of
micro studies suggest that health sector productivity
may well be affected by changes to the system of
health care provision, with supply-side incentives
influencing the use of treatments and technology
diffusion. However, a significant point to note is that
much of the observed improvements in health
outcomes appear not to be a result of the health care
system itself but to depend on other outside factors
which exert a much greater influence. The evidence
113 A step towards developing a more comprehensive and comparable empirical
basis for the analysis of the health sector is the work on the System of Health
Accounts undertaken by Eurostat and the Member States.
112 In Denmark, for example, individuals can choose from two possibilities for
primary care and it appears that the’ system is performing well (Vallgårda et
al, 2002). Vallgårda et al. (2002) also note that reforms introduced in 1993
that gave patients free choice of hospital have had a relatively small effect,
although there is evidence to suggest that this may now be rising. In the UK,
patient choice of provider is more limited than in some other European
countries. Reforms thought have been introduced to increase responsiveness
to patients needs and further reforms are underway to increase patient
choice; by December 2005, all patients will be offered a choice of 4-5
different providers when referred to secondary care (Hutton and Enqvist,
2003). Sweden’s 1999 reforms increased patient rights, including choice of
primary care doctor, provision of more information, choice of treatment
where possible and the option to obtain a second opinion. In 2003, the
county councils extended choice to other health care providers, accompa-
nied by the introduction of a database which allows patients to view waiting
times across hospitals (Hutton and Enqvist, 2003).
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to date, even from the microeconomic studies, high-
lights the diversity across countries in outcomes,
resource use and adoption of technological changes
and hence renders it difficult to draw concrete
conclusions. Demand-side incentives, such as cost-
sharing, may also influence health system efficiency,
although there is little by way of concrete evidence
on the impact of such policies.
Currently, many EU countries are engaged in a process
of reform with greater emphasis on efficiency targets.
Despite the paucity of evidence at the country level,
there is general agreement that the rise in expendi-
tures in health care provision world-wide requires
more consideration of efficiency than has hitherto
been the case. But the pace of reform will be deter-
mined by the historical evolution of systems of provi-
sion and preferences regarding equity. It is unlikely
that there are easy solutions to these issues. In private
market services, for example, a common argument is
that less competition and excess regulation in the EU
may hinder productivity growth (see the review in
Mason et al., 2003). To date there is little hard
evidence to support this thesis but proponents at least
can point to considerably higher productivity in the
past decade in the US, probably the most competitive
and least regulated industrial economy. In the health
care sector, in contrast, the US experience is not
consistent with a preference for unfettered competi-
tion and deregulation. Although there is a general
recognition that providing greater incentives may
enhance efficiency, equity considerations reveal the
weaknesses in the US health care sector.
On the input side, there appears to be some scope
for better use of resources, in particular labour. Thus
oversupply of physicians in some EU countries coin-
cide with shortages in others and in many there is
also scope to improve the mix between general and
specialist physicians and nurses. Better and more
co-ordinated training programs may be a policy
change that is worth exploring. Expenditure on
pharmaceuticals has been rising and therefore
subject to numerous cost containment reforms. At
the same time, pharmaceuticals contribute enor-
mously to improvements in health outcomes. A
balance therefore must be achieved between cost
containment and ensuring sufficient incentives for
continued innovation. Far less systematic evidence
is available to compare the role of capital across
countries, in both quantity and quality terms.
Finally, organisational change may play an impor-
tant role in performance. Reforms under way
suggest that each country needs to find the appro-
priate mix of both decentralisation and centralisa-
tion for its individual circumstances. The extent of
patient choice varies among EU countries. Many
have chosen to increase choice in order to improve
health outcomes, as well as the quality of care and
patient satisfaction. However, the literature suggests
that the success of such reforms is dependent on
the information available to individuals. Improving
the efficiency of the heath sector, securing benefits
from advanced technology at reasonable cost, and
ensuring equity and quality of services and products
are major challenges facing the EU.
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The purpose of this Chapter is to present an overview
of the European automotive industry and the sources
of its competitiveness. The analysis of competitive-
ness in this Chapter focuses on the ability to defend
and/or to gain market shares in open, international
markets by relying on price and/or the quality of
goods. This ability is affected by a wide range of
factors and conditions ranging from production costs
to technological and organisational innovation, from
the regulatory framework to macroeconomic devel-
opments. In view of this, the Chapter compares a
wide set of indicators internationally and assesses
their development over time.
The Chapter is organized as follows: the industry’s
economic importance, structure and major economic
actors are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on
market performance. The international markets are
explored by looking at the terms of trade and foreign
direct investment. Moreover, a more detailed review
of the developments in China and in the Russian
Federation is provided. Section 3 examines the charac-
teristics of the European home market as well as the
consequences of enlargement. Section 4 discusses
labour costs and productivity, R&D and innovation
patterns and trends. Section 5 focuses on regulatory
issues. In Section 6, an analysis of strengths, weak-
nesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) draws
together the possible implications of the various
elements identified in the previous sections. Section 7
concludes.
4.2 The European automotive
industry in a global context
This Section describes the European automotive
industry by reviewing industry specific indicators
such as value added and employment as well as
155
capital stock, investment and R&D. The importance
of the industry is illustrated by looking at its share in
total manufacturing, as well as by comparisons
across different economic regions and over time.
The industry is divided into car, truck and bus
segments. The key indicator is output measured in
terms of production units. The section also includes
a description of the supplier industry and its role for
manufacturers. The discussion singles out the
restructuring and consolidation process among
manufacturers and suppliers and, in particular, how
technology shapes the value chain. Finally, capacity
utilisation issues are discussed in some detail.
4.2.1 Economic importance
The automotive industry is one of Europe’s major
industries. It contributes about 6 % to total Euro-
pean manufacturing employment and 7 % to total
manufacturing output. In the EU-15, US and Japan,
the automotive industry accounts for less than two
percent of GDP and provides less than 1.5 percent
of total employment. The importance of the auto-
motive industry derives, to a large extent, from its
linkages within the domestic and international
economy. There is evidence that domestic upstream
inputs into the production of the automotive
industry amount to up to two times the volume of
value added in the automotive industry itself.
The automotive industry in the EU-15 is highly
concentrated, with Germany alone accounting for
close to half of total value added. In addition to
Germany, also Sweden, Germany and France, as
well as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
show a specialisation in auto manufacturing.
While the automotive industry is not a high-tech
industry, it is a major driver of new technologies
and the diffusion of innovations throughout the
economy. Almost 20 % of all R&D in manufacturing
is undertaken by car manufacturers. Its close links
Chapter 4:
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with many other manufacturing sectors (such as
chemicals, plastics, electrical and electronic parts,
etc.) contribute to the rapid diffusion of new tech-
nologies. Moreover, the industry is an important
demand source for innovations from other indus-
tries, including high-tech sectors such as ICT.
Finally, motor vehicles are one of the most impor-
tant consumer goods in terms of total household
expenditures. As the largest durable consumer good
in terms of expenses (next to housing), demand for
motor vehicles is highly correlated with the general
business cycle.
4.2.1.1 Value added
The automotive industry contributes about 7 % to
total manufacturing output in Europe. Total value
added produced in the motor vehicles industry in
the EU-15 in 2002 was roughly the same as in the
US, some ￿ 114 billion. The value added in the
production of motor vehicles in Japan was some
35 % lower, ￿ 74 billion – see Table 4.1.
Within the EU, the production of motor vehicles is
rather concentrated in a few countries. The largest
producers are Germany (which accounts for 45 %
of total EU-15 value added in motor vehicles
production), France (17 %), the United Kingdom
(11 %), Italy (7 %), Spain (7 %) and Sweden (6 %).
Together, these six countries account for about
93 % of motor vehicle production within the EU-15.
The share of motor vehicles in total manufacturing
value added has been stable since 1991 in Japan
and the EU-15, but has increased significantly in the
US.114 In 1991, the share was about 8 % in Japan
(9 % in 2000), 4 % in the US (8 % in 2000), and
6 % in the EU-15 (7 %). Within the EU, motor vehi-
cles production is most prominent in terms of its
share in total manufacturing in Sweden (15 % of
total manufacturing value added in 2002),
Germany (13 %), France (10 %), Spain (7 %),
Belgium (7 %), Austria (6 %), UK (5 %) and Italy
(4 %).
In the new Member States, the size of the automo-
tive industry in the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland, and possibly Slovakia, is similar to that of
Austria and the Netherlands, and they rank in the
lower middle field of European automobile
producers. The other new Member States belong to
the group of minor producers of parts, as do
Denmark, Finland, Greece and Ireland.
Although the automotive production of the new
Member States occupies rather small a share in the
overall European production, at national level this
industry is a major driver of the economy in those
new Member States that are specialised in it. In
2001, the share of the automotive industry in total
manufacturing value added reached 10.9 % in the
Czech Republic, 10.1 % in Hungary, 8.2 % in
Slovakia and 4.5 % in Poland. Due to the many
assembly plants, the value added shares of the
automotive industry in the new Member States are
typically lower than their production shares.
4.2.1.2 Employment
In 2002, the motor vehicle industry employed 1.91
million workers in the EU-15, 1.15 million in the US,
and 0.65 million in Japan (Table 4.2). The past years
have been difficult for the industry, where employ-
ment declined by about 12 % in the US, 2 % in EU-
15 and 5 % in Japan between 2000 and 2002.
Data on value added and employment suggest
much higher labour productivity levels in the Japan
and the US than in the EU. Recent trends indicate a
further widening of EU’s productivity gap in the
auto industries since the turn of the millennium. 114 Source: OECD/STAN data.
Table 4.1: Value added in the production of motor vehicles in EU, US and Japan (current exchange rates)
2000 2001 2002
EU-15 ￿ million 117,154 118,156 114,170
US USD million 120,400 109,334 120,800
￿/USD 1.086 1.118 1.062
￿ million 110,866 97,794 113,748
Japan Yen billion 8,129 8,753 9,254
1000JPY/￿ 0.1078 0.1215 0.1253
￿ million 75,408 72,041 73,855
Source: The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), International Auto Statistics 2003. OECD/STAN and ZEW calculations.
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Between 1991 and 2000, the share of the motor
vehicles industry in total manufacturing employ-
ment increased in Japan, the US and the EU-15. In
Japan, the share of motor vehicles rose from about
6.5 % of all manufacturing jobs in 1991 to 7.5 % in
2000, in the EU, from 5.5 % to 6.5 % and in the US
from 4.5 % to 5.5 %.115 Between 1995 and 2000,
the share of motor vehicles production in total
employment in the economy remained close to
1.4 % in Japan, 0.7 % in the USA, and 1.1 % in the
EU-15.
At the EU-25 level, total employment in the auto
industry in 2002 amounted to 2.13 million. Percent-
ages of manufacturing employment in the motor
vehicle industry were largest in Germany (11 %),
Sweden (10 %), the Czech Republic (8 %), Belgium
(8 %), Spain (7 %) and France (7 %). These shares
have increased since 1991 by about half to one
percentage point in all these countries with the
exception of France, where the share remained
stable.
4.2.1.3 Capital stock and investment
Motor vehicle manufacturing is an investment-
intensive industry. This is borne out by consistently
high levels of investment in fixed capital, plant and
equipment. In comparison to other manufacturing
sectors, its capital intensity (investment per person
employed) is inferior only to Mining, Oil Refining,
Chemicals, Paper and Basic metals.116
Trends in investment activity117 in the motor vehicle
industry are similar to those in total manufacturing.
Investment levels as percent of value-added and
production tend to remain stable.
4.2.1.4 Production, backward 
and forward linkages
Beyond its own production, the automotive
industry generates economic activity through back-
ward and forward linkages. A first indicator of the
backward linkages is the ratio of value added in an
industry to its total production (the difference
between production and value added represents
the inputs). Between 1991 and 2000, this ratio
varied between 20 % and 30 % in car manufac-
turing in the EU, US and Japan.118 Over the period,
the ratio increased in Japan (from 25 % to 27 %)
and the US (from 22 % to 30 %), but fell in the EU-
15 (30 % to 22 %).119
The above figures illustrate the large importance of
inputs from other sectors in the production of
motor vehicles. Since a part of the inputs are
foreign imports, they must be subtracted to obtain
the domestic backward linkage effect. As imports
account on average for approximately 25 % of total
production, the backward linkage is of a magnitude
of 2 – each euro of value added in motor vehicles
demands approximately two euros of domestic
inputs. A similar effect would be expected for
employment relationships.
A more precise way of quantifying the magnitude of
backward linkages is through input-output tables.
The analysis is restricted to the latest available
Input-Output (I-O) tables for Germany (published
by the Statistical Office in December 2003) since
EU-wide I-O tables are not available. Graph 4.1
shows the impact of a ￿ 1 increase in final demand
for cars on production values and imports (in ￿) of
goods produced by the automotive sector itself and
other sectors.120 The main impact of an increase in
final demand for cars is visible in the automotive
sector where the production of automotive prod-
ucts (including parts) increases by ￿ 1.4. Not
surprisingly, an increase in the demand for cars has
a large impact on steel production, the metal
working industry, high-tech manufacturing (i.e.
mechanical and electrical engineering, measure-
ment and control, electronics, etc.), chemical prod-
118 Source: OECD/STAN and own calculations.
119 In Europe, the value of automobile production increased faster than the value
added of the sector while in the US, the reverse happened. A possible explana-
tion for the diverging movements in value added relative to production might
be that outsourcing developed to a higher degree in the EU than in the US.
120 These estimates also account for secondary effects i.e. the additional demand
for cars resulting from the increase in the induced output of other sectors.
115 Source: OECD/STAN data.
116 Source: European Commission, Pocketbook of EU Sectoral Indicators, forth-
coming.
117 Source: OECD/STAN data.
Table 4.2: Employment in the production of motor vehicles in EU-15, US and Japan (thousands)
1999 2000 2001 2002
EU-15 1,901 1,944 1,933 1,907
US 1,312 1,313 1,212 1,151
Japan 705 683 664 646
Source: The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), International Auto Statistics 2003. OECD/STAN and own calculations.
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ucts and rubber. There are strong links between car
production and several service sectors, namely busi-
ness services (including R&D and IT services), finan-
cial services, transport and trade, and service sector
output is raised by nearly half a euro. These links
through the value chain demonstrate the impor-
tance of the automotive sector as an engine for
growth and employment.
The structure of the I-O tables masks major down-
stream effects for the automotive repair and main-
tenance services industries, since these services are
contracted through final users of vehicles. Domestic
demand for these services originates from, and is
proportional to, the total stock of new and used
vehicles owned by domestic firms and consumers.
4.2.1.5 Expenditure on R&D
The increasing importance attached to R&D by Euro-
pean car manufactures is shown by the rising share of
the motor industry in R&D expenditures of total manu-
facturing. Between 1995 and 2000 this share increased
by 20 % to reach around 19 % of the total manufac-
turing R&D-see Graph 4.2. This level exceeded compa-
rable figures of the US (~15 %) and Japan (~13 %).
At country level, R&D expenditures by German car
manufactures account for more than 30 % of total
manufacturing R&D expenditures in Germany. In
Sweden the share is 18 %, in France and in Italy
16 %. In these countries, R&D activities undertaken
by manufactures of cars and other transport equip-
ment have a significant impact on the national R&D
investments. It is the spectacular increase of the
R&D intensity of the German car industry that
accounts for the expansion of the EU’s worldwide
share in automotive R&D.
4.2.2 Industry profile: main actors
The automotive industry is characterised by large
internationally owned manufacturers and suppliers as
well as a number of small and medium sized compa-
nies which meet the criteria of component suppliers.
The definition of the European Automotive Industry
used in this report comprises the production of light
vehicles, heavy-duty vehicles i.e. trucks and buses,
as well as the manufacture of parts, systems and
technical units (in statistical terms, comprising
NACE 34) taking place within the EU-15, and as far
as possible in the EU-25. The car, truck and bus
sectors will be discussed individually.
The following definitions121 are used throughout
the report.
Graph 4.1: Backward Linkages of Final Demand for Automotive Products in Germany, 2000
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121 See Plunkett´s Industry Almanac.
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• An Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) is a
company that manufactures and/or assembles
the final product. In other words, while a car
made under a brand name by a given company
may contain various components, such as tires,
brakes or entertainment features which are
manufactured by different suppliers, the firm
responsible for the final assembly/manufac-
turing is the OEM;
• Tier 1 supplier: A component manufacturer
delivering directly to final vehicle assemblers.
Tier 1 suppliers work hand-in-hand with auto-
mobile manufacturers to design, manufacture
and deliver complex automobile systems and
modules, such as significant interior, exterior
or drive train units. Tier 1 suppliers in turn
purchase from tier 2 and tier 3 suppliers;
• Tier 2 supplier: These companies produce value-
adding parts in the minor sub-assembly phase. Tier
2 suppliers buy from tier 3 and deliver to tier 1;
• Tier 3 supplier: A supplier of engineered mate-
Graph 4.2: Share of R&D expenditures in the motor industry 1995 and 2000 (in % of total manufacturing)
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rials and special services, such as rolls of sheet
steel, bars and heat and surface treatments.
Tier 3 suppliers rank below tier 2 and tier 1
suppliers in terms of the complexity of the
products that they provide.122
4.2.2.1 Manufacturers
Global vehicle production consists of passenger
cars, commercial vehicles and buses.123 In the
following, each of these will be discussed in turn.
4.2.2.1.1 Passenger cars
In the production of passenger cars for the world
market, Europe leads with a share of 42 % of world
production, followed by Asia-Oceania with 35 %
and America with 21 % (Graph 4.3).
In terms of the number of cars produced, Europe’s
share is 37 % (15 million units). The leading car
manufacturer is Toyota, followed by General
Motors, Volkswagen, Ford, Honda and PSA (Graph
4.4). Within Europe, Germany has the highest
production share (29 %), followed by France
(18 %), Spain (13 %) and the UK (9 %).
4.2.2.1.2 Trucks
Also the commercial vehicles sector is dominated
by the big three: America, Europe and Asia-
Oceania – see Graph 4.3. In contrast to the car
sector, America takes the biggest share of the
market with 56 % of total production volume,
followed by Asia-Oceania with 30 %. Europe is
number three with just 14 %. One reason for the
strong positions of America and Asia are the long
distances in countries such as the USA, Brazil,
China or India. DaimlerChrysler – which has a
number of different assembly plants in North and
South America – covers Asia with an investment in
FUSO, an Asian commercial vehicle manufacturer.
Its purchase of Freightliner, originally an American
commercial vehicle company with different brands
in this sector, has further reinforced its global
position.
Asian companies are more important in truck
production than in car production (Graph 4.5). In
the truck market, also some Chinese manufacturers
have an important role. The company Dongfeng,
for example, is number three in China behind First
Automotive Works (FAW) and Automotive Industry
Corp. They are involved in joint ventures with
122 See Plunkett´s Industry Almanac.
123 Passenger cars are motor vehicles with at least four wheels, designed and
constructed for the transport of passengers, and comprising no more than eight
seats in addition to the driver’s seat. Light commercial vehicles are motor vehi-
cles with at least four wheels, designed and constructed for the carriage of
goods. Mass given in tons (metric tons), is used as a limit between light
commercial vehicles and trucks. Minibuses, derived from light commercial vehi-
cles, are designed and constructed for the carriage of passengers, comprising
more than eight seats in addition to the driver’s seat and having a maximum
mass not exceeding 5 tons. Trucks are vehicles designed and constructed for the
carriage of goods. Maximum authorised mass is above 3.5 tons. They include
tractors designed for towing semi-trailers. Buses and coaches are designed and
constructed for the carriage of passengers, comprising more than eight seats in
addition to the driver’s seat, and having a maximum mass exceeding 5 tons.
Graph 4.3: Car and truck production: world market shares in 2002
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Graph 4.4: Ranking of car manufacturers 2002 – Output in units
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Source: OICA; the typical unit perspective prevents some high value but low volume producers like Porsche (66.803 units in 2002) from appearing in
the graph.
Graph 4.5: Ranking of truck manufacturers – Output in units 2002
Source: OICA.
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Nissan, Peugeot and Kia which enable them to
supply over 240,000 commercial vehicles, more
than the output of Volkswagen or Volvo in this
segment.
In Europe, Spain, France, Germany and Italy
produce the largest share of output in terms of
units. The first position is taken by Spain with more
than 580,000 units, or a share of 24 %. The
majority of output is accounted for by light
commercial vehicles up to 3.5 t. The leading
company is PSA which produces 40 % of Spain’s
entire commercial vehicle output. This production is
not designated for the domestic market; 85 % of all
commercial vehicles are exported to the ‘rest of the
world’. France takes the second position with a
share of 17 %, followed by Germany with 14 % and
Italy with 12 %.
4.2.2.1.3 Buses
In comparison to cars and trucks, the bus sector
(including minibuses and coaches) reveals a
different picture. This market is strongly dominated
by Asian manufacturers (Graph 4.6). The region of
Asia-Oceania and China in particular constitutes a
huge market for buses. China has a share of 70 %
of output i.e. a production volume of more than
one million units in 2002. Number two in this
market is South Korea with a share of 14 %. Inter-
estingly, the Russian Federation steps ahead of Euro-
pean countries to be number three in this market
with a share of 4 %. The Western European coun-
tries, headed by Sweden, trail behind.
The majority of the big bus manufacturers originate
in Asia and primarily supply this region only. The
biggest player is Hyundai (Graph 4.7) and its affil-
iate Kia which has the highest output. The compa-
nies Changan Auto, Harbin Harfei and Changhe
Aircraft Industry dominate production in China.
DaimlerChrysler Omnibus with its brands Mercedes-
Benz and SETRA is strong in Europe and has a major
production basis for chassis in Brazil, supplying
global markets.
4.2.2.2 Suppliers
The supplier industry represents a vital element of
the automotive sector. The dramatic changes in the
value chain of the automotive sector mean that
manufacturer and supplier partnerships are now
indispensable. Suppliers are assuming more and
more responsibility for different parts of the value
chain, even the lion’s share in some cases. This
trend is expected to continue. According to a study
Graph 4.6: Bus production: world market shares in 2002
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Graph 4.7: Ranking of bus manufacturers – Output in units, 2002
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000
Tata
Nissan
Fiat-IVECO
UAZ
GAZ
Toyota
DaimlerChrysler
Changhe Aircraft Industry
Harbin Harfei
Changan Auto
Hyundai-Kia
Source: OICA.
by the German Association of the Automotive
Industry (VDA)/CAR there will be at least three
sources of opportunities for future growth in the
supplier industry:
• access to new markets,
• increased vehicle value, e.g. through innova-
tions in electronics,
• benefits from manufacturers’ outsourcing stra-
tegies.
These developments will necessitate major inputs in
terms of manpower, R&D expertise and financial
resources, if suppliers want to be able to accompany
manufacturers at their assembly plants all over the
world. All of the top 100 suppliers are internationally
operating firms with a turnover of at least ￿940 million.
The largest twenty supplier companies (see Annex
Table A4.1) fall into three geographical groups
dominated by the US, Germany, France and Japan.
There are traditional links between US OEM and US
first tier suppliers, French OEMs and French first tier
suppliers, and between German OEMs and German
first tier suppliers. As a rule, Japanese OEMs prefer
to use suppliers from their own conglomerates.
These traditional links are in decline. OEM globalisa-
tion tends to favour larger suppliers, resulting in
increasing M&A activity in this sector.
Graph 4.8 presents the new business locations
selected by German suppliers in the last five years
(1997-2002) and illustrates the increasing interna-
tionalisation of the industry. The priority accorded
to Eastern Europe,124 with 26 % of all new loca-
tions, is worth noting.
4.2.3 Consolidation and restructuring
4.2.3.1 The consolidation process
Consolidation and restructuring have radically trans-
formed the industry during the last decades. These
developments have accelerated in the last decade
with the opening to international competition of new
and increasingly important markets such as Eastern
Europe, China and Russia. The search for scale and
scope economies by large manufacturers and the
difficulty for smaller ones to sustain the investment
race have led to an ever decreasing number of inde-
pendent manufacturers in the market. Graph 4.9
illustrates this trend which resulted in the reduction
of the number of independent manufacturers from
36 in the seventies to 14 in 2003.
124 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:17  Pagina 163European competitiveness report 2004
164
Graph 4.8: New business locations chosen by German automotive industry suppliers in 1997-2002
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Graph 4.9: Restructuring in the European, U.S. and Japanese car industry125
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Source: Associated Press (AP).
125 A truly global perspective should certainly include producers from China, India and Russia. Given the focus of this study and the lacking availability of comparable historical
information, narrowing the scope to the major producing areas Europe, Japan and the USA should provide useful insights nevertheless.
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Despite the decline in the number of car manufac-
turers, competition in the regional, local and niche
markets has increased as larger companies are now
present in all of them. Mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) have played an important role in the process
by giving instant access to particular regions and
niche markets and continue to do so. As a result,
manufacturers have transformed themselves from
automobile companies to automobile groups.
A parallel adjustment is taking place also within the
supplier industry, in its search for more product
responsibility, larger innovation capabilities and
global presence126 (see Annex Tables A4.2 and
A.4.3 for recent M&A transactions concerning,
respectively, the manufacturers and the supply
industry).
Links within the automobile industry go far beyond
equity deals; each of the following types of linkage
is quite common:
• Joint venture;
• Interchange or buy-off of products;
• Marketing or distribution agreement;
• Technology or R&D agreement; and
• Assembly agreement.
Manufacturers maintain a complex web of several
such relationships, both among themselves and
with tier 1 suppliers, by which they manage the
organisation and strategic control of the whole
value chain. This is of paramount importance, espe-
cially in mature markets such as Western Europe
where customers expect additional enhancements
from vehicle manufacturers, but are not willing to
pay higher prices. Therefore, product innovations
have to be financed with an increased efficiency
along the value chain which includes component
suppliers as well after-sales-services.
4.2.3.2 Restructuring of the value chain: 
the role of technology
Future innovations in vehicle manufacturing will be
closely intertwined with electronics and software
control systems. These innovations have to be
linked with the traditional mechanical automobile
components. The traditional component supplier or
new entrants in the sector will take over these new
value-added activities. The result will be that more
R&D will shift to them. The vehicle manufacturer
will try to ensure his added value share with cost
pressure on the component supplier and cost opti-
misation on the side of their retail business. The
changes in organisation and market strategies
which will arise from technological innovations are
described below.
In the 1980s, the modern passenger car consisted of
up to 10,000 different parts. The special knowledge
of vehicle manufacturers concerned the manage-
ment of the complexity of the production process,
which required co-ordinating up to 2,500 suppliers
(Womack and Jones, 1991). In general, contract
periods for standard products were short and
suppliers were regarded as commodity suppliers
rather than strategic partners in innovation.127 For
manufacturers, a very high integration of the produc-
tion was an advantage in competition. Above all,
American manufacturers like General Motors
purchased 70 percent of their parts from own
production which required considerable innovation
capabilities and capital lockup (Terporten, 1999).
At the beginning of the nineties, the pressure to
innovate and to cut costs led to a reduction of
manufacturing tasks to the ‘core’ (Terporten, 1999).
In Germany, the share of the vehicle manufacturer
in total automotive value added declined from
18 % in 1995 to 12.8 % in 2001 (Graph 4.10).
Similar declines were registered for the UK (about
–5.9 percentage points), Italy (about –5.3
percentage points), Spain (-3.8 percentage points)
and France (-2.1 percentage points). Only in
Sweden did the vehicle manufacturers’ share in the
total value added of the automobile industry
increase. Simultaneously, the number of employees
declined in the automotive industry as a whole,
whereas within the supplier industry (NACE 34.3)
employment and gross value added increased.
The changes have not reduced the complexity of
the process of vehicle manufacturing, but rather
have relocated the tasks along the value chain.
Some suppliers are taking the responsibility for
larger systems (components/modules), for example
the petrol injection. The responsibilities of first tier
suppliers not only include the construction of
systems, the just-in-time delivery to vehicle manu-
facturers and the co-ordination of second and third
tier suppliers, but also the corresponding R&D. In
the last years, half of the total R&D activity of the
automobile industry has been carried out by the
127 See Fieten (1995).
126 A small number of transactions though seem to follow a financial investment
logic.
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suppliers. Manufacturers retain the highest control
only in the areas of engine and car body.128 First tier
suppliers are thus becoming a close partner in the
innovation and production process of vehicle manu-
facturers.
The trend to take on new responsibilities and the
pressures for additional cost cutting are expected to
result in a further consolidation and internationalisa-
tion of the supply segment, including down to
second tier suppliers.
A comparison of the developments in Europe,
North America and Japan reveals that European
vehicle manufacturers lead on the trend of modular
production and downstream integration. The Euro-
pean industry has at its disposal a large structure of
specialised firms for shared product development
and production tasks. ‘If the future lies in the
increased specialisation of actors in the value chain,
the European automotive industry seems to be
particularly well positioned in terms of structures
and capabilities’.129
The American companies – (but also PSA and Fiat in
Europe) – reduce in-house production via spin-off
activities (Jürgens, 2003). However, the share of
vehicle manufacturers in the total value added of
the American automobile industry still lies around
55 %, way above that in Europe. Japanese vehicle
manufacturers account for 15.4 percent of the value
added in the automotive sector in Japan, which is
more than in most car producing EU countries
(Graph 4.10). The modularization of production in
Japan has taken place in-house as Toyota and
Honda see a strategic advantage in the total control
of the value chain and avoid the handover of
responsibilities to the supplier industry (Jürgens,
2003).
The interface between suppliers and vehicle manu-
facturers is expected to change further. The
management consultant Roland Berger & Partners
expects a world-wide decline in the number of
suppliers from 5,600 at present to 3,500 by the end
of the decade. In this period the number of first tier
suppliers per modules/system is expected to fall
from today’s 7-8 to 5-3, with a simultaneous
decrease in the number of modules/systems per
vehicle from 20-18 today to circa 10 in the year
2010 (Berger & Partners, 2000). PricewaterhouseC-
128 See Larsson (2002) and McKinsey&Company (2003).
129 Jürgens (2003).
Graph 4.10: Share of ‘Manufacture and assembly of motor vehicles and engines’ (NACE 34.1) in gross
value added of the automotive industry (NACE 34.1-34.3)
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02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:18  Pagina 166Chapter 4 — The European Automotive Industry: Competitiveness, Challenges, and Future  Strategies
167
oopers – using a different definition of tier 1 and
tier 2 suppliers – expects a decrease in the number
of first tier suppliers from 800 to 35 and a reduction
of second tier suppliers from 10,000 to 800 in the
same time period (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003).
In any case, the upcoming innovations in the field
of automobile manufacturing are likely to lead to
a further transfer of R&D and other value gener-
ating activities, which are beyond the core
competencies of the vehicle manufacturers, to the
suppliers. McKinsey and Company (2003) expects
a 10 percentage-point decrease in the value
added share of vehicle manufacturers between
now and 2015 (Graph 4.11). This will reflect
mainly the externalisation of tasks in the area of
chassis technology (18 percentage points) and
engine technology (15 percentage points) to the
suppliers. Even in the core competencies – the
vehicle body – the value added shares of vehicle
manufacturers are expected to decrease by 6
percentage points to 66 %.
4.2.4 Capacity utilisation and structural
overcapacity
There is a close link between capacity utilisation and
profitability. As a rule, car makers break even when
capacity utilisation rates reaches 80 %, with some
variation between plants.
In a world-wide perspective, the current output
levels in the car industry are well below the produc-
tion potential. On the one hand, there is transitional
overcapacity which relates mainly to the cyclical
variation of demand for cars. On the other hand,
overcapacity is often seen as a more permanent
feature in the automotive industry. Short-run fluctu-
ations and long-run under-utilisation of existing
capacities are quite distinct phenomena and high-
light different aspects of car markets. Several
features of competition in automotive markets
contribute to overcapacity.
Car sales are cyclical, and a downturn in the car
market induces a temporary under-utilisation of
capacity. During the last fifteen years, movements
in capacity utilisation rates in the car industry have
been quite similar in the different EU-15 countries -
see Graph 4.12. Capacity utilisation rates declined
dramatically in the first half of the nineties and
recovered until 2000. Since 2000, capacity utilisa-
tion has declined gradually to pick up again in some
countries in 2003.
Even in boom periods capacity utilisation rates have
remained clearly below 100 %. National data reveal
that, as a rule, capacity utilisation rates in the final
assembly of cars are significantly lower than in the
manufacturing of parts (1st, 2nd and 3rd tier
suppliers). Hence, over-capacity is primarily a
problem of car manufacturers. Accordingly, over-
Graph 4.11: Expected development of vehicle manufacturers’ vertical integration
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capacity can be linked to the market strategies of
car manufacturers and the idiosyncrasies of the final
assembly of cars. Three main factors explain the
structural overcapacity:
• When setting up a final assembly plant, car
makers must assess the market potential for the
model(s) that will be produced in this assembly
several years ahead. Since the marginal cost of
an ex-post capacity increase is much higher than
the cost of building the capacity at the start,130 it
may be preferable to err on the optimistic side;
• In addition, the cost of extended delivery times
which are the result of lower capacity is espe-
cially high in market segments which are fiercely
competitive and where the possibilities of
product differentiation between companies are
relatively low. Also in this case, companies may
choose to build new plants on the basis of the
more optimistic variants of sales forecasts;131
• Finally, car manufacturers may seek first mover
advantages in new or emerging markets by being
the first to produce locally and reaching a signifi-
cant market share very early. As a consequence,
the overall capacity of new plants in emerging
markets often exceeds current and near-future
market potential quite dramatically.132 Presently,
this seems to be the case in the expansion plans of
automotive producers in China.
Hence, one should expect more significant overca-
pacity in the emerging markets. Indeed, capacity
utilisation rates in the boom year 2000, as shown in
Graph 4.13, were quite high in North America and
the EU-15, whereas significant over-capacity existed
in Eastern Asia and Latin America, but also in
Eastern Europe.
Low capacity utilisation in Asian plants can be
attributed to various causes. Japan, the leading car
market, grew only slowly during the 1990s. More-
over, exports of Japanese plants face additional
competition in the US and Europe from the new
Japanese plants there, leading to structural overca-
pacity. Similar factors have influenced the situation
in Korea, which was also severely hurt by the 1997-
98 Asian crises.
Eastern Europe faced a rapid expansion of produc-
tion capacities in the last decade. Capacity utilisa-
tion in the standard car segment in Eastern Europe
is far below that in the EU-15. A recent study by
PWC autofacts (2004) estimates capacity utilisation
for car plants in Poland at about 50 % and in
Slovakia at 40 % in 2004. The study forecasts the
average capacity utilisation rate to remain at the
present level in Poland, while a strong increase is
expected in Slovakia (to 70 %). Even in the long
run, capacity utilisation rates in the new Member
States are expected to remain below those of most
of the EU-15 countries. The excess capacity will put
traditional car producing locations in the EU-15
under pressure as well.
More recently, capacity utilisation rates in major
assembly facilities seem to be on the rise again. PWC
autofacts (2004) projects a slight increase in capacity
utilisation for car assembly plants in the EU: on
average, capacity utilisation is expected to rise to
around 78 % in 2004 (77 % in 2003; 76 % in 2002).
However, this is the result of capacity reductions, not
of an increase in demand, and new capacity is being
built up in the new Member States.
In summary, sluggish growth in major car markets,
together with a rapid expansion of production
capacities in emerging markets, will fuel over-
capacity. This will lead to stronger competition,
especially in the traditional segments of the car
market, and increase the pressure on production
costs. This should stimulate the search for product
innovation to escape fierce price competition in the
standard car segment, and process innovation to
keep production costs low. Overcapacity will stimu-
late competition between different local production
units within automotive groups, but also co-opera-
tion between brands within and between groups
will increase. The re-organisation of the industry will
probably increase the competitiveness of the EU car
industry since Europe offers both low cost produc-
tion possibilities in the new Member States and a
large potential for innovation. However, the process
of capacity reduction takes time and involves social
costs in local labour markets.
4.3 Competitiveness: A market
perspective
4.3.1 Introduction
In the context of a single industrial sector, the
simpler definition of competitiveness is the ability to
defend and/or gain market share in open, interna-
130 Admittedly, there is the possibility to change from a two-shift to a three-shift
and vice a versa, which gives some ex-post flexibility. However, changing the
number of shifts also induces different unit labour costs.
131 Therefore one should expect lower capacity utilisation rates for plants
producing standard cars than for those producing for the luxury or the SUV
segment of the market.
132 See Sturgeon (1997) for a more detailed discussion of this argument; as a
striking example Sturgeon and Florida (2000) report an average capacity util-
isation rate in transplants in Vietnam of around 10 %.
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tional markets by relying on price and/or the quality
of goods. This ability is affected by a wide range of
factors and conditions.
The Section begins with examining the perform-
ance of the European automotive industry in export
markets. It then reviews foreign direct investment
(FDI) developments. In automotive industry, FDI is a
major instrument in the internationalisation strate-
gies at both country and firm level. Subsequently,
the section reviews prospects in two emerging
markets, China and Russia, in more detail. Finally,
the section turns to the European home market to
identify sources  of competitiveness and concludes
with an assessment of the impact of enlargement
on the European automotive industry.
4.3.2 International markets
The automotive sector is characterised by a rela-
tively low trade/sales ratio. As a consequence,
market-oriented FDI is the dominant feature of
globalisation. However, trade and FDI are not
always substitutes, and the automotive industry
illustrates this. In order to determine how competi-
tive the European automotive industry is, it is neces-
sary to examine performance at both country and
company level. A brand-and-unit-based approach
offers some useful initial insights.
While the production of most automotive producers
in the world is spread over various countries in the
value chain, the brands are still considered to reflect
Graph 4.12: Capacity utilisation in the EU-15 car industry – 1988:Q1- 2003:Q4
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some national identity. Graph 4.14 shows the
market shares of major brands in a geographic
context.133
The EU-15 market is dominated by European
brands. Between 1998 and 2002, only minor shifts
took place in the market shares of different brands.
German and French brands hold by far the largest
shares, and were even able to expand their market
presence, while Italian and UK market shares
declined. Japanese brands are the largest external
players on the European markets, considerably
ahead of Korean brands. The market shares of both
Asian brand groups remained changed little
between 1998 and 2002. Large American manufac-
turers serve the European markets mostly through
their European branches and hence brands (e.g.
Opel). Therefore, while traditional American brands
might be absent from the European markets, the US
manufacturers are not.
The Japanese brands control almost completely the
Japanese market. Only some German brands have
made recognisable inroads into the Japanese market,
but they were not able to increase their market share
between 1998 and 2002. In the US market, American
brands hold the largest shares and even expanded
further between 1998 and 2002. Japanese brands
hold a sizeable, but declining stake. In contrast,
Korean brands gained considerably in the US
between 1998 and 2002. German brands hold the
third largest share of the US market; their share
declined slightly between 1998 and 2002. Nonethe-
less, for a number of European manufacturers of
premium quality cars the North American market is
of crucial importance, accounting for a substantial
portion of their total sales.
Intuitively, one could expect international trade and
foreign direct investment to be substitutes, so that
the creation of production capacity in a country
would lead to a decline in exports towards this
country. However, empirical research for the auto-
motive industry suggests the opposite: FDI and
trade flows go hand in hand. Trade in intermediate
inputs as well as exports from supplying firms facili-
tate this connection.
Internationalisation strategies may change over the
lifecycle of the product. Vernon (1966) argues that
the uncertainty associated with new products
requires closer customer interaction in production,
which could best be accomplished by on-site opera-
tions and hence foreign direct investment. Once the
product becomes more mature and standardised,
cost considerations become the central driver of
production decisions and therefore markets will best
be served through exports from the most cost effec-
tive production sites. The following sections review
the international performance of the European auto-
motive industry with regard to both trade and FDI.
4.3.2.1 International trade
Exposure to international competition invariably
forces domestic companies into a virtuous circle of
demanding customer feedback, peer pressure from
133 It is worth noting that market shares in terms of car registrations do not
reveal possible price differences across different brands and may thus differ
from market shares expressed in terms of pecuniary sales volumes.
Graph 4.13: Capacity utilisation rates in car assembly plants by major region during the 2000 boom
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global competitors and growing domestic excel-
lence in operations. In addition, trade generates
jobs, economic opportunities and growth as well as
tax revenues. Trade performance is an important
indicator of competitiveness.
In 2001, the combined worldwide exports of automo-
tive products (SITC 78) from all the OECD countries
were worth almost USD 523 billion (total merchandise
exports were almost USD 4 trillion). Of the automotive
exports, 58 % were exports of passenger cars (SITC
781), 10 % trucks (SITC 782), 3 % buses (SITC 783)
and 25 % parts (SITC 784).134 EU-15 accounted for
almost USD 270 billion of these exports but only USD
85 billion were exports outside EU-15. Poland, the
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary
exported a combined total of USD 13.6 billion to the
world. The US exported automotive products worth
USD 56.7 billion and Japan USD 80.8 billion. However,
the first largest export country in that field is Germany
with USD 105 billion exports. Canada is ranked fourth
(USD 52.7 billion), France is fifth (USD 38.9 billion). In
terms of export growth, automotive products as a
whole grew by the same rate as total merchandise
exports by OECD countries. Graph 4.15 shows that the
EU increased its share in total OECD exports between
1991 and 2001 while Japan and, to a much lesser
proportion, the US lost market share.
In 2001, OECD countries imported automotive
products worth almost USD 486 billion. The divi-
sion among the automotive segments is almost
identical to the export segmentation mentioned
above. EU-15 imported roughly USD 231 billion in
automotive products while only USD 46 billion orig-
inated outside EU-15; Poland, the Czech Republic,
the Slovak Republic and Hungary imported almost
USD 11 billion in automotive products. Automotive
product imports in the US account for almost USD
159 billion whereas Japan imported only USD 9.6
billion. This makes the US by far the largest import
country for automotive products followed by
Germany (USD 44.5 billion), the UK (USD 38.8
billion), Canada (USD 37.3 billion) and France (USD
30.7 billion).
The volume of trade in absolute terms gives a good
idea of the importance and the size of the sector for
the global economy. The performance of a partic-
ular country, though, is best assessed in comparison
Graph 4.14: New passenger car registrations/sales by brand in EU-15, Japan and USA, 1998 and 2002
Note: German brands (Audi, BMW, Ford, Mercedes, Opel, Porsche, Smart, Volkswagen); French brands (Citroen, Peugeot, Renault); Italian brands
(Alfa Romeo, Ferrari, Fiat, Lamborghini, Lancia, Maserati); British brands (Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lotus, Morgan, Rolls Royce, Rover, Vauxhall);
Swedish brands (Saab, Volvo); Japanese brands (Daihatsu, Honda, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, Toyota); American brands
(Chrysler, Ford, General Motors); Korean brands (Asia, Daewoo, Hyundai, Hyundai Prec., Kia, Ssangyong); Other European brands (Seat, Skoda).
Source: ZEW calculation using data from the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA); no comparable data were available for the new
Member States.
134 All numbers based on data from OECD: ITCS – International Trade by
Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 2001, 2002.
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with major competitors on the global markets.
Graph 4.16 shows the shares for major exporting
countries in total OECD exports in the main market
segments.
From a European perspective, the most prominent
feature of these data is the strong performance of
Germany across all market segments. It commands
world market shares well above 20 % for cars and
buses, with a significant lead in each segment. For
trucks and parts Germany is second. However,
Germany’s world market shares have remained
virtually identical as in 1991.
Japan occupies a second place in the passenger
cars segment. Even if 17.6 % is a high market share,
it is also significantly lower than the 27 % Japan
enjoyed in 1991 - see Annex Tables A4.1 and A4.2
for export market share developments, by country
and market segment). Canada follows in third place.
Both Canada and Mexico increased their world
market shares over the last ten years, most likely due
to NAFTA and the consequent easier access to the
large US market. The US itself accounts for only 6 %
of world car exports which is lower than France and
Belgium/Luxembourg, the European countries in
car exports behind Germany. On the downside,
while being among the major car producing coun-
tries in Europe, Italy’s share in the world trade
markets declined from 3.5 % in 1991 to 2.3 % in
2001. It is now also below the South Korean world
market share of 4 % which is South Korea’s only
significant showing in international markets apart
from the bus segment. South Korea’s car export
share is expanding slowly, from 3.2 % in 1995.
In the truck segment the strength of the NAFTA
countries is evident. Canada has the largest world
market share, Mexico is third and the US fourth. Only
Germany appears between them in second place.
Still, a fair amount of trade in trucks takes place
among the NAFTA countries. Canada and Mexico are
the most important trading partners for US truck
exports. While US and Canadian world market shares
are virtually unchanged compared to 1991, Mexico
remarkably increased its share from half a percentage
point in 1991 to more than 12 % in 2001. This trend
indicates that new truck assembly facilities in the
NAFTA region were largely built in Mexico to supply
the whole market. On the other hand, Japan lost
more than half of its world market share between
1991 (24 %) and 2001 (10 %). From a European
perspective the major truck producing countries
defended their world market during this ten year
time span. In particular, Spain doubled its share in
world exports from 2.2 % in 1991 to 5.2 % in 2001.
Apparently, Spain increased its competitiveness as an
operation site for truck assembly with the goal of
supplying foreign markets.
In the small and declining bus exports, Germany
has a dominant market position. What is more,
Graph 4.15: Shares of EU-15, Japan and US in total OECD exports (in percent)
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Source: European Commission calculation using data from OECD: ITCS – International Trade By Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 2001, 2002. Intra-EU
trade excluded.
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:18  Pagina 172Chapter 4 — The European Automotive Industry: Competitiveness, Challenges, and Future  Strategies
173
Germany expanded its world market share from an
already high level of 20.8 % in 1991. Canada and
Belgium/Luxembourg follow as distant second
and third. While the former increased its world
market share significantly since 1991, the latter
fell during that time from 13.4 % to 9.2 %. The
loss of world market shares is more extreme for
Japan whose 2001 share (6.9 %) is almost half of
what it was in 1991 (13.5 %). This decline might
be due to strongly increased bus production in
other Asian markets that traditionally relied on
imports from Japan but benefit now from lower
labour costs at home. South Korea was able to
expand its share in bus exports from 2.3 % in
1995 to 3.7 % in 2001. Italy held a bus world
market share of 4.6 % in 1991 which has almost
completely disappeared by 2001.
As automotive value chains become more interna-
tionally dispersed, exports of intermediate auto-
motive products, parts and accessories have
gained more importance. In this segment the US is
the undisputed world market leader. Some of this
remarkable lead might be due to the strategy of
major American car producers to supply foreign
markets through local subsidiaries. This would
necessarily appear in weaker export shares for cars
from the USA but would still open up export chan-
nels for intermediate products and parts from US-
based supplying firms. Mexico’s world market share
in the parts segment rose from 0.7 % in 1991 to
4.4 % in 2001 while Canada’s share remained rela-
tively stable during that time at 7.8 %. The contin-
uing lead of US parts export firms in direct compe-
tition with local competition at the international
Graph 4.16: Shares of major exporting countries in total OECD exports of automotive products, 2001
(in percent)
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assembly sites underscores the extraordinary
performance of the US in this field. The global
number two in world market shares for parts is
Germany which largely kept its 13.5 % share consis-
tently from 1991 till 2001. Japan as the third largest
player in international parts exports comes close
with 12.2 %. Still, compared with its share of
17.1 % in 1991 the loss is significant. The UK
(1991: 8.1 %; 2001: 4.7 %) and France (1991:
12 %; 2001: 9 %) lost market share, too.
Thus, the European automotive industry shows mixed
signs. First, the performance of the German and
French industry is strong; their success in international
markets is substantial and sustained. Spanish firms are
also growing successful while Italy and the UK have
lost market shares. The majority of trade of European
automotive companies happens within the EU. The
single market facilitates production concentration in
few sites from which subsequently the whole Euro-
pean market is supplied and this translates into more
import and export activities. A current study by ECG
(2004) shows that automotive manufacturers are
moving towards plants that produce a single model or
two, at maximum. Moreover, it shows that 75 % of all
vehicles produced in EU-15 are destined for another
country, 58 % for another Member State. The same
rationale appears to apply to the NAFTA areas where
stable or diminishing trends in Canada and the US,
respectively, are offset by the growing performance
and potential of Mexico. Apparently, the automotive
value chain configurations in the NAFTA region place
vehicle assembly in Canada and increasingly in Mexico
while the parts originate predominantly in the US.
Japan and South Korea show differing developments.
South Korea is expanding its presence on international
markets as Japan’s world market shares are declining.
4.3.2.2 Foreign Direct Investment
Investments abroad have become a significant factor in
corporate internationalisation strategies. Dunning
(1981) describes three major reasons why multina-
tional companies should invest in a particular country:
The ownership advantage stems from the multina-
tional corporation itself and may lie in size or better
resource capability and use; the location advantage is
associated with certain immobile factors that can only
be fully utilised in the area where they exist; and, finally,
the internalisation advantage originates in market
imperfections that might be of structural (e.g. imper-
fect competition) or cognitive nature (e.g. costly or
scarce information on the marketed products).
In the same context, Bartlett and Goshal (1989)
find three ‘leverage points’ that can be harnessed
through different forms of internationalisation:
• Efficiency (global economies of scale, compara-
tive advantage of location);
• knowledge leverage (use people and ideas
globally); and,
• responsiveness (adapt to local customer
demands).
The European automotive industry could potentially
benefit from all those leverage points. For this, FDI
appears an especially appropriate mechanism since
production expertise and customer preferences are
sticky, i.e. they can not be extracted and codified to
be transferred from one country to another without
substantial loss or at high costs. Investing in espe-
cially influential regions, be it for R&D, production
or distribution reasons, opens up a more efficient
channel for companies to harness these forms of
tacit knowledge from abroad. In addition, trade-
distorting measures may also pressure foreign
companies into investing directly in a particular
country. From an economic perspective this result is
far from efficient. Still, it is a reality on international
markets and should be born in mind when inter-
preting the results.
Concerning outgoing FDI, the German automotive
industry is the most active in Europe, followed by
France, Italy and the UK; but all are significantly
below the US - see Graph 4.17.
The strong outgoing FDI from Germany might be
related to decelerating growth in the home market
as well as to the increasing importance of foreign
markets for German brands. At present, some
important partners (countries of destination or
origin of FDI flows) are missing from FDI statistics.
From those that are known, one can infer the kind
of leverage sought by European FDI abroad. For
instance, flows into the US, a prime target of
German outgoing FDI, are consistent with a strive
to better adapt to customer demands (responsive-
ness) of an increasingly important market. The high
involvement of the French automotive sector in
Japan indicates a knowledge-leveraged FDI strategy.
The example of Renault and Nissan shows that
these transfers of knowledge can go both ways. As
industry experts indicate, Renault gained access to
Nissan’s excellence in production while Nissan
benefited from Renault’s abilities in streamlining the
value chain. At the same time, EU countries hold
substantial FDI positions in each other, pointing to a
search for efficiency and comparative advantages as
the single European market has made it easy to
supply the EU as a whole from few production or
distribution sites.
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Evidence of corporate strategies towards interna-
tionalisation beyond exports can also be found at
the company level. Graph 4.18 shows that not only
do motor vehicle producers realise sizeable, if not
dominant (Volvo), shares of their sales abroad but
they also hold significant assets there.135 This is
especially so for Honda, BMW and Volvo. In terms
of employment, Toyota, Volvo and Ford show the
strongest tendency for operating outside the home
market. On the contrary, DaimlerChrysler, BMW,
Nissan and Renault rely mostly on employees in
their home market. However, DaimlerChrysler
should be interpreted carefully here since it is
considered the only company with two home
economies (Germany and the US).
Large sales abroad appear to require also a strategic
shift in assets towards foreign countries. Those
investments abroad should generate the crucial
information from the target markets for the multi-
national company as a whole both in terms of a
knowledge (e.g. R&D infrastructure, access to clus-
ters of expertise) and a responsiveness (e.g. market
trends, customer needs) leverage. This must not
necessarily imply a massive shift of employment out
of the domestic country (BMW case). Still, most
manufacturers (Volvo, Toyota, Honda, Volkswagen,
Fiat) accompany their international market orienta-
tion in sales not only with investing in assets abroad
but also with transferring employment out of the
home market. These companies likely utilise all
leverage points (efficiency, knowledge and respon-
siveness) in their internationalisation strategies. On
the other hand, those enterprises with relatively low
shares of sales abroad (General Motors, Ford,
Mitsubishi) and high shares of employment abroad
appear to be following primarily an efficiency
leverage internationalisation strategy by utilising
comparative advantages especially in labour costs in
foreign countries.
The data in Graph 4.18 provide a perspective of
developments among global EU, US and Japanese
players that complements the discussion of export
in the previous section (see Graph 4.15. If one
considers Nissan as controlled by Renault, Volvo by
Ford and DaimlerChrysler as a German company, it
becomes apparent (see Graph 4.19) that the share
of EU and US companies in total sales increased
slightly while the share of Japanese companies
declined between 1995 and 2001.
These developments have been brought about
primarily through acquisitions, as several medium-
sized manufacturers became vulnerable to takeovers
in the last decade. In any case, and notwithstanding
135 All data provided by UNCTAD relies on company annual reports or revised
data based on company survey. The numbers should be interpreted as
proxies since precise asset classification and valuation (e.g. financial assets,
depreciation) can hardly be achieved at a cross-country comparison level.
Graph 4.17: Outgoing FDI (stocks abroad) from major automotive producing countries, ￿ million
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Graph 4.18: Share of foreign assets, sales and employment for major motor vehicle producing
companies, 2001 (home economies in brackets)
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Graph 4.19: Total sales shares by region of origin of manufacturer
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its completeness, the data support the suggestion
that the European automotive industry is defending
its competitive position with success. 
4.3.2.3 Emerging markets
With the Triad markets saturated to a large extent,
further growth of the automotive industry is
expected to depend on the development of new
markets in the emerging and developing
economies. Two markets will be reviewed in more
detail here, China which is regarded as the market
with the highest overall potential, and Russia,
because of its size and proximity to the EU.
4.3.2.3.1 China
The Chinese automotive market
As can be seen in Graph 4.20, the Chinese automo-
tive market is growing very rapidly. In the first nine
months of 2003 sales increased by 69 % reaching
up to 1.45 million cars (Automotive Resources Asia,
2003). Sales of commercial vehicles increased by
about 30 percent between 1999 and 2002 while
sales of buses doubled in the same time. According
to forecasts, China will be the third largest market
for automobiles by the end of the decade (the
German Association of the Automotive Industry
(VDA): World Auto Statistics, 2003).
Contrary to developments until recently, the crucial
market segment in the future will be private
demand, fuelled by the emergence of a middle
class. In spite of the persistence of negative factors
such as high import tariffs, high government-deter-
mined prices for imported and locally produced
cars by foreign companies, luxury, license number
plates and street taxes as well as expensive parking
lots, private demand is expected to grow further
and even accelerate.
Production conditions for the Chinese automo-
tive industry
The Chinese automotive industry is still burdened
with highly inefficient structural characteristics. The
number of independent enterprises is far too high
to allow for economies of scale. The bulk of the
enterprises is far below the critical size that allows
for cost effective production and sensible R&D
activities. But protected by local governments the
majority of these enterprises has been allowed to
exist in artificial niches up to now. Taking auto
manufacturing as an example, currently there are
117 whole-car manufactures – more than the
Graph 4.20: Index of new registrations or sales of passenger cars 1999-2002 (1999=100)
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Out of these, only two OEM manufacturers had a
production volume of more than 250,000 units in
2003, while nearly 100 of them had an output of
less than 10,000 units.
Since 1994, China’s government has been following
an explicit industrial policy for the automotive
sector. The objective is to set up an own and inde-
pendent automotive industry. To ensure interna-
tional competitiveness, the government’s strategy is
to involve international automobile corporations in
minority joint ventures with local firms. By doing so
China gains access to capital and technologies from
other countries, but also valuable know-how for the
domestic automotive industry. It also dictates the
rules for international companies: imports are
constricted, earnings have to be reinvested and
component suppliers and their prices are predeter-
mined, too (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999). In addition, by
getting into parallel agreements with more than
one foreign partners, Chinese companies can safe-
guard their independence. As can be seen from
Table A4.6 in the annex, for instance, the Shangai
Automotive Industry Association (SAIC) is involved
with both GM and Volkswagen; First Automotive
Works (FAW) is involved with Toyota, Daihatsu,
Mazda and Volkswagen etc. China’s policy is to
reduce drastically the number of manufacturers and
component suppliers and organise the remaining
ones around a few ‘national champions’.
A revision of the Chinese automotive policy issued
by the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion (NDRC) in Spring 2004 addressed some of
these issues (Yu, 2004): It introduced minimum
investment thresholds for new auto projects (2 bn
yuan) and production permit withdrawal mecha-
nisms to prevent a further fragmentation of the
market. The stated goal of the new policy is to
satisfy Chinese demand through domestically
produced vehicles before 2010 and enter interna-
tional markets significantly but the positive effect of
the new policy on automotive exports remains
doubtful. The combination of the need to source
from local less efficient and hence more costly
suppliers with the capital intensive production
methods of foreign producers that do not fully
leverage China’s advantage of affordable labour
puts Chinese automotive products in a difficult posi-
tion on international markets (Farrel, 2004).
Since China joined the World Trade Organisation
the automotive industry has been opening up to
international competition. Import quotas for foreign
automotive manufacturers will be increased by
20 % per year until 2006, starting from 30.000
units; the quota will be eliminated by 2006.
Furthermore, import duties will decrease from 80-
100 % to 25 % following 2006 (10 % on compo-
nents) (Weidner, 2004; Zhang, Taylor, 2001). Tech-
nical barriers, however, are expected to remain a
problem.
Table 4.3 shows current and planned production
capacities and the current (2002) exposure rate of
major car manufacturers in China. Planned capacity
and the elimination of import barriers point towards
increased rivalry and, hence, diminishing profit
margins. Although labour costs in China are low, it
remains to be seen whether Chinese plants will be
able to produce efficiently enough to turn potential
domestic excess capacity into exports.
There is no special pattern in the way European
companies enter the market compared to major
international rivals. Some manufacturers in the
premium segment (BMW, DaimlerChrysler) are
moving cautiously which might be due to fact that
the protection of intellectual property rights (e.g.
technology, design) is still difficult in China and there
are obstacles for the manufacturers in controlling the
quality of there value chain in services and repair.
Nearly all investment activities of foreign car manu-
facturers in China have been oriented towards
serving the local market, with the exception of
Honda,136 and national players are far from being
able to meet international standards in quality, tech-
nology and prices. Individual Chinese companies do
not have the potential to tap into the European
market, at present. In conclusion, there is no real-
istic medium term prospect for Chinese car exports
to Europe. Besides, all major players are increasing
their engagement in Eastern Europe at the same
time as they are enlarging their China-operations.
Oil dependency is an issue of concern for Chinese
authorities. Fuel efficiency standards for cars have
been adopted and will be phased-in gradually.
Know-how on implementing fuel-saving technolo-
gies will thus become a competitive factor in the
Chinese market.
4.3.2.3.2 The Russian Federation
The Russian automotive market
The Russian automotive fleet has more than
doubled over the last ten years from 10 million cars
in 1992 to 22 million at the end of 2002 with an
136 Honda is setting up a plant with a final production capacity of 300,000 units
exclusively for export.
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average annual growth rate of 8 %, reaching 152
cars per 1000 inhabitants – see Graph 4.21. This
rate of growth is stronger than in the EU and this
trend is likely to continue. The Russian government
estimates that car ownership in Russia will reach
230 cars per 1000 inhabitants within the next ten
years which means an additional growth by 12
million cars (Ashrafian, Richet, 2001; Pricewater-
houseCoopers, 2002).
About 70 percent of the market demand in 2,000 is
for passenger cars priced below USD 5,000. In the
near future demand is expected to shift to
passenger cars in the USD 5,000 – 10,000 price
range and to a lesser degree to USD 10,000 –
15,000 priced cars. The segment for more expen-
sive cars is expected to remain stable. These
changes will be the result of price increases for
locally produced cars and the introduction of
import tariffs on used foreign cars in the segment
below USD 5,000 (Ashrafian, Richet, 2001).
Replacement sales are a big factor. The average age
of cars is 10.8 years. Older vehicles will become
more expensive to operate as auto insurance
becomes compulsory by about mid 2004. Ernst &
Young expects these factors to push many people
into newer vehicles, including imported used vehi-
cles. Demand for new cars has been growing at an
overall rate of more than 10 percent annually and
there is great potential for even stronger growth
(Ernst & Young, 2003).
The automotive industry in the Russian Federation
Like China, Russian automotive manufacturers are
still organised as huge industrial complexes that
include auxiliary and component-producing facili-
ties. They supply 80 % of the market demand in
Russia. The biggest companies are AvtoVAZ, GAZ,
IzhMash-Auto and UAZ. The large manufacturers still
produce up to 70 % of their components on their
own, which prevents them from operating efficiently
(Kansky, 2000). Furthermore most of Russian manu-
facturers use outdated and inefficient technologies
which hamper improvements in product quality and
labour productivity. The models the plants produce
are 15 to 20 years out of date by world standards.
Still, this is the main reason why high production
volumes have been possible. There has been a lack of
investment to develop new models, although that
situation has changed with new Russian strategic
investors (Ashrafian and Richet, 2001).
Russian car manufacturers have to cope with the
new competitive environment, like the presence of
Table 4.3: Rated auto manufacturers exposure to mainland China market
Company Exposure to China market  Units
(2002)
Heavy existing or planned exposure
Hyundai Motor Co./Kia Motors Corp. 3 % of total unit sales Current: 100,000; By 2007: 650,000 (incl. Kia)
Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. Some import activity Current: 0; By 2010: 900,000 (passenger cars and
commercial vehicles)
Volkswagen AG 10.3 % of total unit sales Current: 600,000; By 2006: 1.6 million
Medium existing or planned exposure
Fiat SpA 1.5 % of total unit sales Current: 70,000; By 2007: 150,000
General Motors Corp. 3.3 % of total unit sales Current: 380,000; By 2006: 766,000
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 5.8 % of total unit sales Current: 120,000; By 2010: 300,000
Peugeot S.A. 3.0 % of total unit sales Current: 150,000; By 2006: 300,000
Toyota Motor Corp. 3.8 % of unit sales  Current: 180,000; By 2010: 650,000 (incl. 
(total Asia excl. Japan) Daihatsu)
Limited existing or planned activities
BMW AG 1.7 % of total unit sales Current: 0; By 2005: 30,000
DaimlerChrysler AG 4.4 % of revenues  Production capacity expansion from 80,000
(total Asia) to 100,000 units
Ford Motor Co. 3.3 % of revenues  Current: 20,000; Future: 150,000
(total Asia-Pacific)
Honda Motor Co. Ltd. 1.2 % of total unit sales Current: 150,000; By 2004: 290,000
Renault S.A. 0 0
Suzuki Motor Corp. n/a Current: 250,000; Expansion plans: 0
Source: ACEA and Standard&Poor’s (2004).
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foreign car makers in the country, the lowering of
tariffs and the new constraints coming from the
WTO regulation when Russia will join the WTO.
Recently, some companies began implementing
restructuring programmes which include shifting
component production to independent companies.
It seems likely that efficiency will increase. But that
also means that some companies might vanish from
the market.
Russian manufacturers have begun exploring ways
of cooperating with Western car and component
makers, mainly through joint ventures (Pricewater-
houseCoopers, 2002). BMW and Kia assemble their
cars (BMW 2,200; Kia 3,500 cars in 2002) at the
Avtotor facility in Kalingrad based on imported
assembly kits. Ford has chosen a green field invest-
ment near St. Petersburg. The current capacity is
25,000 cars a year but could be boosted up to
100,000 if demand remains increasing (Ward-
sAuto.com, 2003). Volkswagen, the most successful
foreign brand in Russia, has not announced any
intentions to produce in Russia so far while Toyota
signalled plans to produce their Land Cruiser model
there in 2006 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002).
In contrast with most other emerging automotive
markets, Russia and the EU are direct neighbours
with a shared land border. Hence, the potential
trade channels are broader and more flexible. Not
surprisingly, car exports from EU-15 to Russia have
sharply increased since 1993 – see Graph 4.22. At
the moment, this demand is covered through used
cars but these exports should give European
producers an edge in brand recognition once
incomes in Russia increase and customers begin
shifting their attention to new cars.
In summary, Russia may soon follow China as the
next big new market in this sector (Ernst & Young,
2003). Demand for vehicles is rising quickly but
manufacturers and suppliers face unique challenges.
The forthcoming entry to the WTO will spark expo-
sure to intense international competition.
4.3.3 The home market
4.3.3.1 Market size
A large home market enables domestic firms to
achieve economies of scale and scope. Hence, they
benefit early in the product life cycle from learning
curve effects and an increasing expertise in produc-
tion. In turn this leads to diminishing unit costs that
make the domestic products more competitive on
foreign markets. Furthermore, a large domestic
customer base provides invaluable feedback for
innovative products. A significant home market for
primary products also opens up new opportunities
for secondary products and services that might not
Graph 4.21: Index of car ownership per 1000 inhabitants for selected markets (1999=100)
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reach the necessary critical mass to evolve else-
where. Therefore, a comprehensive assessment on
home market size as a possible source of competi-
tiveness includes both the market in total numbers
but also its segmentation.
4.3.3.1.1 Passenger cars
With 209 million passenger cars in use in 2002 the
European Union (EU-25) is by far the largest single
market for cars in the world. It accounts for roughly
38 % of all cars on major international markets,
followed by the US and Japan – see Graph 4.23.
Size becomes more important in relative terms. Car
ownership in Europe varies widely indicating the rela-
tive importance of cars for citizens of different coun-
tries. On average, four out of ten EU inhabitants own
a car which is in line with Japan and the US – see
Graph 4.24. Luxembourg, Italy and Germany post
the highest values here among the Member States.
Why would the population in some countries buy
more cars than in others?
Obviously, there is the mere need for transporta-
tion. This factor should be especially important in
countries with low population densities, since the
citizens of those countries need to travel longer
distances on average for every aspect of social inter-
action. Clearly, there are generally other options
available as well but transport by car has some
unique advantages that make it the dominant
mode of transportation:137 it is essentially the only
one that enables the user to choose his/her travel
time and exact destination individually and the only
option that allows direct door to door trips.
On the other hand, cars and the relationship of
owners towards them appear to run much deeper
than their practical value in use. Today’s car manu-
facturers offer a startling variety of different models
to satisfy the needs of their customers. Those needs
include rational deliberations like the wish for
spacious family vans. However, cars have become
also an element of style through which their owners
can express their individuality. The choice in car
models reflects this clearly as does the wide variety
of supplementary interior and exterior car equip-
ment.138 Cars have a social signalling function,
proving that one can afford a special car or even
more than one. This fact certainly reflects a
country’s wealth but also its general tendency to
treat cars as a status symbol. Graph 4.25 shows the
relationship between car density and GDP per
capita and population density as proxy variables for
wealth and the need for transportation, respectively.
An accompanying multivariate regression analysis139
Graph 4.22: Index of new and used car exports value from EU-15 to Russia, 1993-2002
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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137 Passenger cars accounted for 80.4 % of all passenger kilometres in EU-15
2001 (European Commission, 2003).
138 Econometric analysis can disentangle to a certain extent the various func-
tionalities of a modern car and the values that consumers attribute to them.
Thus, in Germany higher price margins can best be achieved through
features that improve driving performance and convenience or make the
vehicle more exclusive or individual. At the same time, German customers
recognise quality through the car brand and are willing to pay for it accord-
ingly, accepting an up to 100 % price mark-up for an equally equipped car,
depending on its brand (see background study).
139 See background study.
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Graph 4.23: Passenger cars in use in major international markets, 2002
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Source: ZEW calculation using data from ACEA, the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) and Eurostat; data for Cyprus, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Malta are for 2001.
Graph 4.24: Cars per 1000 inhabitants, 2002
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shows that GDP per capita has a highly significant
positive impact on car density whereas population
density shows only a positive influence at an 80 %
significance level. In major European markets
(Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, UK) high car
density ratios can hardly be explained by the need for
transportation among sparsely populated areas.
Instead, these countries appear to support the argu-
ment of an affinity for cars beyond mere practical use.
The same is true for Japan. For the US, Australia,
Canada, Spain, Sweden and France affordability as
well as the transportation motive appear in more
congruence. Especially in the new Member States
high car densities appear to be mostly stipulated by
the requirement to own a car as the primary source of
mobility and less as a status symbol.
Consequently, the Member States of the European
Union extend over all customer segments in this rela-
tively broad classification which appears reasonable
for country comparisons. The mix of consumers with
a primary interest in affordable passenger transporta-
tion and better-off car-enthusiasts should prevent the
industry from myopic, idiosyncratic product designs.
This demand advantage is an attribute of the market
not the industry. It can become a competitive advan-
tage for those manufacturers that have complete
access to the relevant market and customer informa-
tion. The question remains whether European auto-
motive manufacturers benefit predominantly from
the size of their home market.
It is appropriate to consider a brand perspective
since the brands are the primary channels through
which customers recognise manufacturers. Graph
4.26 shows the market shares of major brands in
selected markets. It suggests a strong affiliation of
French and German car buyers towards brands that
originated in their respective home market. This
suggests an atmosphere of trust into cars that were
domestically built and designed. For Italian,
Swedish and British brands this link is weaker.
Customers there appear to be less focused on
domestic brands but keep a strong interest in other
European brands. Combined European brand shares
command more than 80 % of the market in the five
selected European markets. Korean and Japanese
brands exhibit significantly smaller shares but are
slightly better positioned in European countries
without a strong home market brand affiliation.
Japanese brands enjoy an enormous popularity in
their home market where all other brands are of
minor importance. In sharp contrast, American
Graph 4.25: Population density, GDP per capita and cars per 1000 inhabitants in 38 major car markets in 2001
Source: ZEW calculation using data from ACEA, the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), and World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Graph 4.26: Brand segmentation in first registration cars for selected markets, 2002
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Note: German brands (Audi, BMW, Ford, Mercedes, Opel, Porsche, Smart, Volkswagen), French brands (Citroen, Peugeot, Renault), Italian brands
(Alfa Romeo, Ferrari, Fiat, Lamborghini, Lancia, Maserati), British brands (Ford, Jaguar, Land Rover, Lotus, Morgan, Rolls Royce, Rover, Vauxhall),
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(Chrysler, Ford, General Motors), Korean brands (Asia, Daewoo, Hyundai, Hyundai Prec., Kia, Ssangyong); other European brands (Seat, Skoda).
Graph 4.27: Commercial vehicles in use in major international markets, 2002
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brands command only about 60 % of first car regis-
trations. At least in terms of units sold, Japanese
brands control a large portion of the US market for
new cars.
There is evidence that this demand advantage in
the home market has already translated into success
abroad. The average buyer of European brand cars
in the US has a far higher median household
income (USD 115,492) than the customers of Asian
(USD 70,353) or American brands (USD 58,154).140
This indicates that the demand for premium cars at
home and the subsequent customer feedback help
to shape products that are attractive to wealthy
customers abroad.
4.3.3.1.2 Commercial vehicles
The EU is the second largest market in the world for
commercial vehicles with slightly more than 30
million in use in 2002, followed by Japan and
China; still, the US’s 92 million commercial vehicles
make it a distant second – see Graph 4.27. Signifi-
cant parts of that gap might be due to the fact that
light trucks have made remarkable inroads in the US
market for passenger cars. In 2002, 8.1 million
passenger cars were newly registered in the US
compared to 8.7 million light trucks.141 There is
currently no meaningful distinction between light
trucks that replace passenger cars in the private use
segment and those that go into traditional
commercial use. Accordingly, this gap should be
interpreted carefully.
Demand for commercial vehicles reflects the impor-
tance of freight road transportation. This degree of
reliance on commercial vehicles is influenced signif-
icantly by an adequate infrastructure and the
opportunity costs of alternative modes of trans-
portation which include not only price differences
but also availability and flexibility in use. In Greece
and Ireland road transportation appears to be the
almost indisputably dominant form of transporta-
tion (Graph 4.28). This trend is also strong in Italy,
Portugal, Spain and the UK. On the contrary, only
40 % or less of goods’ transport in ton-kilometres in
140 See Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2003.
Graph 4.28 Percentage share of goods transport ton-kilometres on the road on total goods transport, 2001
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141 See THE GERMAN ASSOCIATION OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY (VDA):
International Auto Statistics 2003.
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Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Estonia and Latvia is
by road. Although the intermodal split of goods’
transportation is not uniform among Member
States, road transportation is a strong if not domi-
nant pillar in most EU countries transportation.
Accordingly, demand for commercial vehicles
should remain substantial.
By combining transported goods and kilometres trav-
elled, Graph 4.28 disguises the primary fields of use for
commercial vehicles in the EU. Graph 4.29 draws a
clearer picture in this regard. Most goods in the EU are
transported over rather short distances. Especially in
Ireland, Germany, Finland and Austria the majority of
transport happens over distances below 150 kilome-
tres. In other Member States this relationship is weaker
(Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg) but the share of short
distance transportation volume is still above 60 %. The
emphasis on shorter distance road transportation in
the European Union should give rise to commercial
vehicle concepts that address this specific need.
In conclusion, despite the special impact of light
trucks for private use in the US, the EU is still an
attractive volume market for commercial vehicles.
Most European countries rely heavily on road trans-
portation. This fact reflects heavy investments in a
suitable infrastructure both from the private (e.g.
value chain configurations) and the public sector.
These sunk costs discourage the development of
alternative modes of transportation and ensure a
stable demand for commercial vehicles in the fore-
seeable future. Transport over short distances is a
particularity of most road freight in the EU.
4.3.3.2 Market growth
A large market size can generate significant sources
of competitive advantage. Market growth is another
critical factor in this respect. Slow growth in large
markets can still represent high volumes but it
becomes increasingly difficult for them to provide
growth in relative terms. It is this type of new sales
opportunities that helps automotive companies to
continue growing and benefiting from up-to-date
trends in a dynamic market. As a result, market
growth is as much a prerequisite for competitive
advantage internationally as market size.
4.3.3.2.1 Passenger cars
Some measurement concepts of growth find it difficult
to cover cyclical fluctuations of demand or are highly
sensitive to the choice of the base year. To avoid those
pitfalls an alternative concept was developed, distin-
guishing between a long term trend and a short term
movement based on the last four years – see Graph
4.30. This concept aims at covering basic multi-year
market trends that can easily be compared among
countries. This approach was developed for that
specific purpose and should be treated as complemen-
tary not a substitute of traditional market analysis.
The long term trend in car sales is driven by more
fundamental elements such as customer preferences,
infrastructure, demographic development and
wealth. For car passenger transportation as well as all
other modes of transportation, infrastructure
upgrades (e.g. railway tracks, motorways) take years
to be planned and implemented. On the other hand,
short-term trends might be more influenced by the
overall economic outlook or changes in consumer
confidence. Since most new car sales today are for
replacing an older car, the majority of these sales can
be easily postponed. Hence, customers can easily
control their time of purchase which could severely
influence short term movements while the long term
trend should not be materially affected.
Graph 4.29: Share of million tons transported on the road by distance, 2001
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Individual countries can be classified according to a
combination of long and short term developments142
(Graph 4.31). For instance, the long term for most of
Members States is positive, promising a continuing
growth. At the same time, short term (most recent
four year observation period) developments were
negative in a majority of Member States indicating
that growth might be decelerating.
Developments outside the EU place these numbers
into perspective. The countries under consideration
with the strongest long term growth trend are Brazil,
India, Mexico, South Korea and Australia. On a long
term downward trend are Romania, Turkey, US and
Japan. However, the numbers for passenger cars in the
US might be somewhat misleading since demand for
light trucks in private use has significantly affected the
sales of traditional passenger cars.
Over the short term, there was a massive increase in
demand for cars in China, followed by South Korea,
Japan, Mexico and Brazil, that made these countries
the most promising markets for growth in
passenger cars. For Japan, this upward short term
trend indicates that the negative long term trend
may have been overcome.
4.3.3.2.2 Commercial vehicles
Graph 4.32 shows the results of the same approach
applied to the case of commercial vehicles. The long
term trend here is positive for almost all EU Member
States with the large markets of Italy, Spain, France
and the UK in lead. A notable downward trend is only
evident in the case of Poland. Over the shorter (four
year) period Italy, the UK and France perform the
best. Germany, Spain and Portugal exhibit the
strongest movement which indicates that their posi-
tive long term trends might come to an end. The EU-
25 would lose 24 000 new registrations annually if
the short term trends continue. EU-15, for which a
long term trend is available, adds more than 50 000
new registrations in commercial vehicles a year
according to the long term trend while the short
term trend is negative, implying a decline of almost
10 000 new registrations annually.
In the US long and short term growth trends are
strong which, again, should be interpreted carefully
since a significant number of light trucks in that
segment substitute for passenger cars instead of
going into traditional commercial use. Canada,
Australia, Brazil and Mexico show the best long
term growth trends. However, South Korea and
notably Japan are on a highly negative trend. Over
the last four years a number of countries have
142 See the Annex of the background study for the long and short term trend values
(slopes of linear trends expressed as thousands of units) for individual countries.
Graph 4.30: Illustration on slopes of short and long term trends
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entered a significant positive demand trend for
commercial vehicles. On top of the list is China
which would, if its four year trend continues, add
more than a quarter million new commercial vehi-
cles registrations to its fleet. Excluding the US,
Indonesia, Australia and Thailand are also on strong
short term growth trends. Declining demand for
commercial vehicles is evident in Turkey and
Argentina but primarily in Japan where the long
term downward trend appears to have accelerated
in recent years.
4.3.3.3 Enlargement and the European
automotive industry
Inward foreign direct investment plays a far bigger
role for the automotive sector in the new Member
States rather than in EU-15.143 Many global vehicle
producers and suppliers have established them-
selves in the region and the development of the
automotive industry in the individual countries is
closely linked to the location decisions of these
international producers. The countries which have
attracted most FDI in the automotive sector are the
same which show a strong specialisation in this
industry, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and, more recently, Slovakia. Slovenia is the
only country with a significant automotive industry,
but relatively little foreign direct investment. At the
end of 2002, the Hungarian automotive industry
showed the biggest stock of foreign direct invest-
ment, followed by the Czech Republic and Poland
(see Table 4.4).144
Taking into account the size of the economies, FDI
stock  per employee is a preferred indicator of the
144 For Hungary and Poland FDI data were available at the level of the transport
equipment industry (DM) only, including motor vehicles (34) and other
transport equipment (45). But as this industry is a minor target for FDI in the
new Member States, the data are fairly comparable.
143 Outward direct investment on the other hand does not play any role in these
countries.
Graph 4.31: Combinations of short and long term growth trends for passenger cars
 
1 Due to data availability long term trend was only estimated for 1995-2002.
Source: ZEW.
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relative attractiveness of individual countries for FDI
in the automotive industry. As shown in Graph
4.33, Hungary is still at the top position. Notably,
the FDI stock per employee is higher than the
average for manufacturing in all these nations. 
The disproportionate attractiveness of the automo-
tive industry for foreign direct investment is
confirmed by data on foreign invested enterprises
(FIEs). These data also demonstrate the dominant
role of foreign investors in the automotive industry in
new Member States – see Table 4.5.
In 2001 (the latest year available), FIEs owned 83 %
of the equity capital in the Czech automotive
industry, accounted for 94 % of all investment, sold
91 % of all vehicles and had a share of 94 % in the
industry’s exports. These shares were even higher in
Hungary and the lowest in Slovenia (equity:
76.7 %, sales 82.7 %, exports: 86.2 %). In all coun-
tries, foreign penetration has increased over time;
notably, FIEs are more export oriented as shown by
their higher share in export sales than in total sales.
TThe bulk of foreign direct investment in the new
Table 4.4: FDI stocks in the new Member States, 2002, ￿mio
Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovak Rep. Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Manufacturing (D) 11,539.7 13,522.7 16,378.7 2,713.1 1,696.2 759.0 407.5 1,119.0
Motor vehicles (34) 1,933.3 3,235.7 2,280.3 147.9 53.2 23.5 1.7 43.2
Source: WIIW FDI database.
Graph 4.32: Algebraic signs of short and long term growth trends for commercial vehicles
1 Due to data availability long term trend was only estimated for 1995-2002.
Source: ZEW.
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Member States originates in manufacturers of Euro-
pean origin - see Annex Table A4.7. But with
enlargement, overseas investors have become more
interested in the region, attracted by growing
markets but also using the new Member States as a
location for their all-European exports as well. This
has been stated, for example, by the Hyundai
company, which decided in March 2004 to estab-
lish its first European assembly plant in Slovakia,
with a capacity of 200 000 to 300 000 cars per
year. If the other two big investment plans already
announced materialize (namely, PSA Peugeot
Citroen (Slovakia) and a consortium of Toyota and
PSA Peugeot Citroen (Czech Republic) the produc-
tion capacity in the new Member States will rise to
over 2 millions passenger cars in 2006, roughly
double the production of 2002; this will undoubt-
edly be more than can be sold in the region.
These developments refer only to assembly plants.
Large component suppliers tend to follow manufac-
turers in their foreign locations and benefiting from
local cost advantages is an additional incentive for
establishing plants in the new Member States.
Graph 4.34 presents a site map of important manu-
facturers and suppliers there.
As a conclusion, enlargement is highly important for
the European automotive industry. First, a very
dynamic manufacturing cluster with high output
and export potential is developing in the new
Member States; second, investment in these loca-
tions reinforces the European value chain by adding
to it lower cost locations and permitting more
options in combining existing components and
intermediary parts; and, third, the European home
market is extended to include a high-growth poten-
tial customer base which displays a variety of pref-
erences in comparison to the EU-15 Member
States.145 However, increased capacity in the new
145 See Section 4.3.3.
Table 4.5: Foreign penetration of the automotive industry in the new Member States (NACE 34, 1995
and 2001, in percent)
Equity Sales Export sales Investment
Country 1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001
Czech Republic 1) 61.4 83.1 61.3 91.0 n.a. 94.0 70.0 94.0
Hungary 2) 73.7 99.6 88.1 93.9 94.1 96.6 94.4 97.5
Poland 62.5 83.3 55.4 93.2 88.4 98.4 52.9 95.3
Slovak Republic 3) 36.8 78.6 56.64) 95.1 n.a. n.a. 85.0 97.8
Slovenia 74.3 76.7 72.3 82.7 80.8 86.2 n.a. n.a.
Notes: 1) 1995, 1996 own capital. 2) 1995-1999 nominal capital. 3) 1995, 1996 DM (=NACE 34+35). 4) Output.
Source: WIIW FIE database.
Graph 4.33: Inward FDI stock per employee 2002/2001
Source: WIIW FDI database
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Member States - be it from European or overseas
owned plants - will exacerbate competition and
price pressures for existing locations.
4.3.4 Conclusion
Taking as a criterion performance on the global
market, one can conclude that the European auto-
motive industry is without any doubt competitive.
It has expanded its export shares, and has main-
tained or improved slightly its share in global sales.
Its position in emerging markets such as China and
the Russian Federation is strong and offers
prospects for further growth. This success of the
European automotive industry in international
competition is primarily based on its dominance of
a large, loyal, sophisticated and diversified home
market. Moreover, enlargement has been benefi-
cial to the industry through its productive base
and market effects.
However, not all is positive. If the performance of the
German, French and Spanish industry is strong, Italy
and the UK have lost market shares. The new produc-
tion locations in Eastern Europe will increase pressures
on existing locations. Finally, if the home market is
indeed the largest in the World, it relies mostly on the
replacement of existing cars and its growth potential
(at least for EU-15 countries) has peaked.
4.4 Innovation 
and competitiveness
4.4.1 Introduction
Innovation and R&D activities are central to competi-
tiveness. The Chapter begins with a review of produc-
tivity developments and then moves on to skilled
labour, R&D expenditures, innovation patterns and
technological trends, with emphasis on the concept of
lead market.
The ability of firms to compete in foreign and home
markets depends crucially on innovative products that
can be produced and sold at attractive prices. In the
short run, productivity and labour costs are important
competitiveness factors. In the long run, the ability of
firms to innovate and invest in R&D take over as crucial
determinants of competitiveness. This section reviews
these factors driving competitiveness more closely. The
analysis begins with examining labour cost and labour
productivity developments and then moves on to
skilled labour, R&D expenditures and innovation
patterns and trends in the automotive sector.
The Section reviews the position of Member States
relative to the most important car producing coun-
tries. Hence, the approach focuses on countries and
not firms and the interpretations of the data might
differ from a company-based view which is inde-
pendent of where the production takes place.
4.4.2 Labour costs, labour productivity
and unit labour costs
4.4.2.1 Labour costs
Low production costs are one of the main sources
of international competitiveness of an industry.
High cost countries can only compete against low
cost countries if their products are of superior
quality. Given increased openness and global pres-
ence of suppliers, standardised intermediate prod-
ucts will be increasingly similar in price. Likewise,
the international presence of major manufacturers
and large scale suppliers will tend to equalise the
costs of capital. Hence, international differences in
labour costs are a major source of differences in
production costs. In order to compare the level of
labour costs across nations it is necessary to convert
all data into the same currency. Here, purchasing
power parity (PPP) rates calculated by the OECD to
convert national currency to US dollars are used. In
addition to wages and salaries the comparison
Graph 4.34: A new regional cluster of automotive production
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includes other elements of labour costs such as
employer’s contribution to social security.
Table 4.6 provides data on total labour compensation
per hour, in US dollars. In the short run, movements
in exchange rates might also affect the ability of a
country to sell products internationally, therefore,
information for the dollar values of labour compensa-
tion based on current exchange rates is also
reported.146 The data refer to 1990, 1995 and 2001,
the most recent year for which data is available.
The most impressive result of this comparison is
that the EU-15 automotive industry has caught up
with the US in terms of hourly labour compensation
(based on PPP values). Now, the three most impor-
tant production regions for automotive products
(Japan, US, EU) are more similar with regard to
labour cost than before. Another feature of the
table is the stagnation of US hour labour costs
during 1995-2001, even in current values.
The high valuation of US dollar in 2001 resulted in
lower nominal hour labour costs in the EU and
Japan. This illustrates the influence of exchange
rates on the price competitiveness of the sector and
one can conclude that the current Euro/US dollar
exchange rate puts under pressure the competitive-
ness of the EU industry. However, it is also clear that
European producers will try to absorb the impact of
exchange rate fluctuations also by the international
distribution of production locations and the interna-
tionalisation of the supply chain.
Within Europe there are striking differences.147
Germany is the most expensive country with labour
costs per hour in the German automotive industry
8 % above the US in 2001. Labour compensation
per hour worked is below US and Japan in all other
Member States - labour costs in Portugal are only
54 % of the US level, for example. The high labour
costs in Germany endanger its competitiveness
unless they are matched by an above average
labour productivity. In addition, given the currently
low value of the US dollar, labour costs in the EU are
above US labour costs. This currently puts the cost
competitiveness of EU-produced cars against the US
locations at a disadvantage.148
The data in Table 4.6 suggest that over the 1990s
an initial and significant cost advantage of Europe
147 Labour cost differences also reflect differences in skill composition of the
labour force and also the composition of the automotive industry. Typically,
labour costs per hour worked are lower in the automotive parts (suppliers)
industry than in car assembly.
148 Using the average ￿/USD exchange rate, in 2001 labour costs in EU-15
amounts to 76 % of the US level. The average ￿/USD exchange rate in 2001
was about 1.12, the PPP value 0.88 ￿/USD.
146 Average yearly exchange rates and PPP-values are based on OECD data and
are taken directly from MSTI 2003-2.
Table 4.6: International comparison of hourly labour costs in the automotive industry
Conversion to US $ based on PPPs Conversion to US $ based on exchange rates
1990 1995 2001 1990 1995 2001
Korea 5.4 8.4 12.9 4.3 8.0 7.3
Japan 17.8 24.1 29.0 24.0 43.5 35.7
USA 25.4 34.3 33.8 25.4 34.3 33.8
EU-15 19.1 26.3 32.7 23.1 31.6 25.7
Austria 13.4 21.0 23.8 16.6 28.6 19.7
Belgium 20.7 27.9 31.5 24.4 34.7 25.2
Denmark 12.8 17.0 21.4 26.4 40.8 31.5
Finland 12.5 18.3 21.0 19.4 25.5 21.7
France 17.4 22.2 25.6 19.2 19.0 15.8
Germany 20.5 29.0 36.8 20.8 24.5 18.6
Greece 7.4 10.6 12.2 21.1 28.7 21.1
Ireland 9.5 13.1 17.5 6.5 9.3 8.0
Italy 17.0 21.4 23.9 10.9 13.3 15.6
Luxembourg 13.0 14.8 19.2 20.2 20.4 17.2
Netherlands 13.2 17.2 24.1 15.5 19.5 17.2
Portugal 8.1 14.7 18.3 15.7 21.8 19.7
Spain 17.9 19.4 23.3 5.9 11.7 11.1
Sweden 15.8 18.5 19.4 24.9 25.3 18.3
UK 17.9 22.3 26.2 19.2 23.0 24.2
Source: See text.
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against the US has been diminishing. The catch-up
in labour cost occurred not only in the high-wage
Member States but even more in the low-wage
ones where hourly labour costs increased sharper -
see for example the case of Portugal and Greece.
During this period, labour cost differentials within
EU-15 decreased and the wage increases became
increasingly more uniform.
Unit labour costs relate labour costs to the value of
production. Unit labour costs crucially depend on
the composition of automotive industry; usually,
they are higher in the supplier industry than in car
assembly. They are also affected by the degree of
outsourcing. Table 4.7 shows a wide variation of
unit labour costs between countries. Unit labour
costs have been traditionally low in France and also
in Korea, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain.
However, the reasons for this are different. In
Belgium, unit labour costs are low despite of high
labour cost per hour because of a high labour
productivity and an above average use of interme-
diate inputs from outside the automotive industry.
Also, in the Netherlands, France, and Spain high
labour productivity helps to keep unit labour costs
below average. Germany has seen a strong decline
in labour unit costs which is primarily caused by
increased outsourcing. This is reflected in the
increase of the share of labour costs in value added.
The ratio of total labour costs to value added
informs on the relative importance of labour costs
in comparison to capital cost and capital remunera-
tion. Table 4.7 shows no clear trend within the EU.
However, there are remarkable differences between
EU, US, Japan and Korea that point to a deteriora-
tion of EU labour cost competitiveness.
One of the important factors causing high labour
costs in the EU is the low range of effective working
hours per employee in automotive industry – see
Table 4.8).
Different trends prevail in the last decade in the
major automotive producing regions. Average
yearly working hours in the USA increased by about
1 % p.a. in the last 15 years. In Japan, Korea and
EU-15 there is a downward trend in annual working
hours in the last two decades amounting to about
–0.5 % per year. Japan and the US show a quite
similar yearly working time amounting to around
2000 hours per employee. Despite some recent
shortening of working time, the Korean automotive
industry still shows the largest working time. The
Table 4.7: Unit labour costs in the automotive industry
Total Labour Costs per Gross Production (%) Total Labour Costs per Value Added (%)
1990 1995 2001 1990 1995 2001
Korea 14.4 16.7 12.2** 41.0 46.2 42.1
Japan 12.9 15.2 15.1* 52.0 60.2 55.6
USA 19.0 21.1 18.7 88.1 70.7 59.7
EU-15 n.a. n.a. n.a. 75.0 73.2 78.9
Austria 20.8 18.1 15.9 74.6 64.9 53.1
Belgium n.a. 13.4 12.5* 76.3 70.1 73.2
Denmark 21.2 28.3 26.5 56.2 71.9 63.7
Finland 21.6 28.0 28.6 64.5 76.2 76.2
France 14.9 14.2 10.0 63.8 65.2 46.4
Germany 26.3 25.6 21.7 74.8 75.3 79.7
Greece n.a. 27.5 25.8 94.6 102.1 86.0
Ireland 19.6 17.5 14.1 98.0 95.3 n.a.
Italy n.a. n.a. n.a. 70.9 74.1 69.6
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 58.3 72.8 86.5
Netherlands 14.8 14.7 13.7* 74.9 74.0 73.9
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 98.5 75.5 50.8
Spain 22.9 14.9 13.5* 88.9 62.6 70.9
Sweden 21.1 15.9 n.a. 73.7 59.2 56.9
UK 24.0 21.8 20.1* 75.2 77.6 81.5
*: 2000; **: based on employees only.
Source: OECD Stan Database, Internet Version March 2004
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EU-15 reaches only about 75 % of the US labour
time. Again, there are significant differences within
the EU. German workers face the lowest working
hours amounting to only 70 % of the US level. The
strongest decline in working time in the last two
decades can be observed in France where it reached
about 1.1 % p.a. However, in some EU-15 Member
States the downward trend to shorter working time
stopped in the last 10 years. Some countries like
Spain, Finland, Italy and Greece even follow the US
trend of increased working time.
4.4.2.2 Labour productivity149
Labour costs represent only one side of the story.
Their impact on price competitiveness will depend
crucially on developments regarding labour produc-
tivity.
The EU-15 automotive industry shows a significant
labour productivity150 gap compared to the US and
Japan. However, it has recorded higher cumulative
growth rates in labour productivity during the
1990s than either the US or Japan when labour
productivity levels are compared with the help of
automotive unit value ratios (UVRs or, else, automo-
tive industry-specific purchasing power parities).
However, as can be seen from Table 4.9, the catch
up process has been slow. Using UVRs to convert
national currencies to US dollars, the data show that
Japan’s automotive industry is losing its competitive
edge compared to the US. Not surprisingly, there
has been a steep increase in the labour productivity
in Korea although there is still a considerable
productivity gap between Korea and the other
leading automotive producing regions.
The table shows that the picture of international
productivity trends strongly depends on the way we
convert national currencies to US dollar. Based on
automotive unit values, Japan is losing its leading
position. When we convert Yen to US dollar using
expenditure purchasing power parities relating to the
GDP (PPPs), we find a lower labour productivity level
in Japan in the 80s and a catching-up with the US
later. This difference rests on an upwards trend in the
Yen/$ relation in the automotive unit value ratio and
a decreasing one in the PPP conversion factors.
Within Europe, the picture is mixed with France
showing high productivity growth while Germany
149 We omit multi-factor productivity for two reasons: Data are only available for
some EU countries. International productivity differences as well as produc-
tivity growth differentials in the automotive sector reflect primarily develop-
ments in labour productivity itself (see e.g. MGI 2002, 2003).
150 Labour productivity is defined as value added per hour worked.
Table 4.8: Average yearly working hours in the automotive industry, by country
Hours worked per employee per year relative to US  Average working 
US = 100 hours  per year 
per employee
1981 1985 1991 1995 2001 2001
Korea 140.8 130.0 129.8 121.7 121.1 2460
Japan 114.8 112.3 115.6 98.4 99.6 2023
USA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 2032
EU-15 90.9 84.0 84.6 79.7 77.9 1583
Austria 97.6 91.1 92.9 81.5 80.0 1626
Belgium 92.5 86.1 87.7 80.2 77.2 1569
Germany 82.5 78.5 78.0 73.8 71.2 1447
Denmark 92.1 85.0 84.8 80.7 79.2 1609
Spain 102.8 92.3 94.2 88.6 89.3 1815
Finland 90.0 86.3 84.4 76.9 80.8 1641
France 101.1 87.3 84.6 79.1 77.4 1572
Greece 104.4 96.8 98.7 93.9 94.9 1929
Ireland 103.7 94.8 99.2 89.6 82.8 1682
Italy 87.4 80.7 84.2 77.8 80.3 1631
Luxembourg 89.6 82.1 84.6 76.5 76.8 1560
Netherlands 92.1 84.3 93.9 77.9 76.4 1552
Portugal 100.1 93.1 97.2 89.0 84.4 1714
Sweden 77.6 75.0 79.1 83.1 83.5 1697
UK 96.7 94.3 98.0 91.5 88.9 1806
Source: Groningen Growth Development Centre Industry Data Base, OECD/STAN.
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had a disappointing performance, albeit coming
from a high level. Recently, France is leading in
labour productivity not only in Europe but even
against the US and Japan. This reflects a variety of
reasons. First, lead French manufacturers produce
more standardised cars than the German industry
which increasingly relies on product differentiation
and offer a highly diverse set of automobiles; the
French strategy makes it easier to exploit economies
of scale. Second, the French industry seems to have
some strategic advantage with regard to
outsourcing (see MGI 2002). Finally, the German
automotive industry invests more heavily in R&D
than the French industry. A recent study of MGI
(2002) argues that there is significant potential in
the German automotive industry to increase the
efficiency of R&D investment.
Graph 4.35 shows the ranking of the Member
States according to labour productivity in the auto-
motive industry in 2001. France and Belgium show
a significant lead. The Dutch, German and Swedish
automotive sectors are slightly above EU-15 average
while Greece and Ireland show the lowest labour
productivity.
Graphs 4.36 and 4.37 present trend values of labour
productivity as well as trends in labour productivity
growth. The main messages are as follows:
• The speed of the catching-up process of EU-15
against the US and Japan is slow. This is espe-
cially true against the US since 1995. More
recently, the catching-up process of EU-15
against Japan nearly came to a halt. This could
be a attributed to the sluggish European car
market in the 1990s;
• The most remarkable development in EU-15 is
the French productivity upswing of the 1990s.
However, since the end of the 1990s trend
productivity growth in France is declining and
the German trend productivity growth is recov-
ering;
• Similar to France, labour productivity in the
Dutch, Belgian, Austrian and Swedish automo-
tive industries has also developed strongly but
lost momentum in recent years;
• Labour productivity developments in smaller
automotive producing countries are more
volatile than in countries with a significant
automotive industry.
4.4.2.3 Special focus on the new Member States
4.4.2.3.1 Labour productivity
Labour productivity, defined as gross output per
employee,151 in the automotive industry in the new
Member States is very high compared to the manu-
facturing industry as a whole, reflecting the impor-
tance of significant foreign direct investment and
technology transfer. Regarding the major vehicle
producers in the new Member States, gross output
per employee relative to manufacturing reached, in
2001, 471 % in Slovakia, 222 % in the Czech
Republic, 325 % in Hungary, 187 % in Poland and
319 % in Slovenia, which is a small producer but
with a relatively high specialisation. The produc-
tivity lead of the automotive industry is far larger in
the new Member States than in EU-15 where gross
output per employee was around 150 % of manu-
facturing productivity on average – although France
and Spain were recording a ratio of 195 % in 2000.
Nevertheless, because of the much lower overall
level of productivity in the new Member States,
productivity in the automotive industry is still lower
than in EU-15 in most countries – although to a far
lesser extent than in most other industries.
However, the exact size of this productivity gap is
difficult to measure, because of lack of adequate
data.
Table 4.9: Labour productivity relative to the US (levels, US=100)
Based on Automotive Unit Values Based on expenditure PPPs
1990 1995 2001 1990 1995 2001
EU-15 59.6 65.9 75.2 71.7 69.0 75.3
Korea 19.4 32.3 33.7 36.4 37.6 46.0
Japan 131.8 110.8 108.8 78.4 82.4 101.7
USA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ZEW calculations.
151 Value added and hours worked by sector are not available for all new
Member States.
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Table 4.10 presents two measures of PPP-based
(1999 weights) estimates of productivity differences
across the new Member States, PPPs for the whole
gross domestic product (PPPGDP 99) and PPPs for
gross fixed capital formation (PPPCAP 99). The latter
estimates for productivity are lower because prices
for investment goods in the new Member States are
higher in relative terms (higher share of imports).
For the rare cases where UVRs were available for
comparison,152 they showed a closer correspon-
dence to the latter measure and thus productivity
levels expressed at PPPCAP 99 are probably closer
to reality. However, PPP for GDP are more
frequently used by researchers.153
According to these estimates, labour productivity in
the automotive industry ranked highest in the
Slovak Republic (101.1 % – 172.3 %) and
Hungary(100 % - 149.1 %), probably even
surpassing the average productivity level of the
automotive industry in the EU-15, followed by
Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland, reaching
between 58 % and 97 % (PPPGDP) and 43 %-83 %
(PPPCAP) of the respective EU-15 level. Even on the
basis of the lower measure, Slovakia and Hungary
ranked among the top productivity performers in
Western Europe, just behind France and Belgium,
but ahead of Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain. In
Slovenia, productivity (measured at PPPCAP) is only
slightly lower than in neighbouring Italy. However,
the Czech Republic and Poland belong more
towards the lower end of the Western car producers
in terms of productivity.
4.4.2.3.2 Unit labour costs
High productivity in the automotive industry
combined with low wages gives the new Member
States a clear competitive cost advantage, reflected
in low unit labour costs (ULC).154 Using GDP PPPs as
a conversion factor, ULCs ranged between 9 % of EU-
15 average in Slovakia and 65 % in Latvia, in 2001.
Using PPPs for fixed investment, the range was
between 15 % and 107 % of EU-15 average. As
152 UVR estimates for the year 1996 are available for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland relative to Germany from a joint research project by
WIIW and the University of Groningen (Monnikhof and van Ark (2000)).
153 See, for instance, Dollar and Wolff (1993).
Graph 4.35: Labour productivity of Member States relative to EU-15 average, 2001
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Source: ZEW calculations.
154 Unit labour costs are defined as labour costs (LC) per unit of output (OUT). ULC
= LC/OUT. Labour costs were calculated as gross wages (W) multiplied by the
number of employees (EMP; W: gross wages). As labour productivity (LP) is
defined as output per employed person (LP =OUT/EMP), ULC may be rewritten
as wages divided by productivity (W/LP): ULC = (W*EMP)/OUT = W/(OUT/EMP)
= W/LP. Total labour costs would be more suitable than gross wages for interna-
tional comparisons. However, these data exist for some new Member States only
and, even there, they do not change the picture significantly.
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shown in Table 4.11, apart from Slovakia, Hungary
shows a particularly high relative cost advantage -
reflecting high productivity and relatively low wages
- followed by Lithuania - very low wages compen-
sating for low productivity - and the Czech Republic -
with a relatively high productivity but higher wages
than for instance Slovakia; Slovenia ranked 6th
because of its high wages and Poland ranked 7th,
showing a relatively lower productivity and relatively
higher wages than the other new Member States.
Given the existing very large cost advantage of
most new Member States in the automotive sector,
even substantial wage increases will not threaten
their competitive advantage compared to the EU-15
in the foreseeable future. However, different wage
developments in the individual new Member States
may, among other things, influence foreign
investors’ location decisions within the region.155
4.4.3 Human resources in science 
and technology
Well-trained workers and scientists are key actors in
the generation, rapid dissemination and utilisation
of know-how. In most Member States employees
classified as Human Resource in Science and Tech-
nology (HRST)156 count for about 25 % of all
employees in services and manufacturing and in
almost every Member State this share is increasing.
In the EU-15 medium high technology manufac-
turing sector – which includes the automotive
industry – almost one quarter of all employees (25-64
years old) can be classified as HRST. More precisely, in
Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, and the UK the
share of HRST in the motor industry is at some 30 %.
The structural and organisational changes of recent
years have had implications for human resource
management and have led to dividing the labour
force in the automotive industry. The share of low
skilled occupations has been reduced to a
minimum, resulting in a considerable decline in this
category of jobs. Low-skilled labour in car factories
was replaced or outsourced to other companies.
High-skilled labour became more valuable and an
Graph 4.36: Trend labour productivity by country, 1981-2001 (in US dollars; automotive UVR)
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155 As ULCs are expressed in Euros for international comparison, exchange rate
developments play a certain role as well.
156 HRST is defined as a person fulfilling one of the following conditions: success-
fully completed education at the third level in an S&T field of study; or, not
formally qualified as above, but employed in an S&T occupation where the
above qualifications are normally required.
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for R&D, engineering, industrial design and other
knowledge-intensive tasks. A similar development
took place on the supply side. Suppliers of high
quality products and services, based on high-skilled
workers, stabilised their market position and studies
predict that their importance will increase.157
Suppliers providing ubiquitous products and serv-
ices lost their market position and were substituted
by global sourcing.
157 See Dudenhöfer (2003).
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Table 4.10: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (NACE 34) Productivity in percent of EU-15, 2001
Country PPPGDP 99 PPPCAP 99
Czech Republic 83.6 58.0
Estonia 34.7 20.3
Hungary 149.1 100.0
Latvia 12.8 7.8
Lithuania 34.3 19.5
Poland 58.1 43.4
Slovak Republic 172.3 101.1
Slovenia 97.5 82.8
Source: WIIW Industrial Database; Panorama of Czech industries, Eurostat, New Cronos, SBS.
Graph 4.37: Trend labour productivity growth by country, 1981-2001 (in US dollars; automotive UVR)
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During the 1990s, the European automotive industry
was able to recover from the slump at the beginning of
the decade and the number of people employed has
remained more or less constant. In the supply sector the
workforce even expanded as a result of taking on addi-
tional tasks in the value chain. But the division of labour
in the work force increased even more. The general
labour qualification level in the EU motor vehicle
industry is relatively low (‘low skilled’), although a
dynamic use of highly qualified people in R&D and
knowledge-intensive occupations is taking place along
with a high and growing information technology (IT)-
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personnel intensity that is responsible for a relatively
high percentage of high skilled labour.158 Hence, a clas-
sification of the automotive sector as a ‘low skilled’
sector (see e.g. Robinson et al., 2003) is misleading
because of the increasing division along qualifications.
The case of the German automotive industry offers a
typical illustration of this qualification division (Table
4.12): in the sub-sector of motor vehicles and engines
(NACE 34.1) a relatively larger proportion of low skilled
jobs than in manufacturing (production intensity row
in Table 4.12) coexists with a higher proportion of
academics (graduates) and of engineers/natural scien-
tists (two last rows) in the work force.159
4.4.4 R&D and Innovation
4.4.4.1 Expenditures on R&D
In the industrial sector, technological R&D is crucial
for innovation activity and an important factor in
determining technological performance and
competitive advantages.
In Japan, the US and the EU-15 high-tech industries
account for 40 % to 45 % of manufacturing busi-
ness enterprise R&D (BERD), medium-high-tech
industries for about 45 %, and medium-low-tech
and low-tech industries for 10 % to 15 %.
Concerning the R&D expenditures of the motor
industry in the three major car producing regions, it
can be seen that EU’s share increased between 1995
and 2000, from 34 % to 38 %. - see Graph 4.38.
158 See European Communities (2003).
159 These figures on the skill structure in the German automotive industry rest on
different definitions than those in use in the HRST calculation. HRST also
include third level vocational training like the German ‘Masters’ degree and
technicians.
Table 4.11: Unit labour costs as percentage of EU-15, 2001 (calculated with gross wages, NACE 34)
Country PPSGDP 99 PPSCAP 99
Czech Republic 20.5 29.6
Estonia 36.3 62.2
Hungary 11.9 17.8
Latvia 65.3 107.2
Lithuania 18.7 33.0
Poland 33.8 45.2
Slovak Republic 8.8 15.1
Slovenia 30.2 35.5
Source: WIIW Industrial Database; Panorama of Czech industries, Eurostat, New Cronos, SBS.
Table 4.12: Skill structure in the German automotive industry
Manufacturing of
Production-Intensity1 72.7 72.0 74.3 73.7 63.3
Skill-Intensity in production2 43.7 46.6 63.0 32.5 46.1
Service-Intensity3 27.3 28.0 25.7 26.3 36.7
Intensity of academics in services4 32.7 35.8 17.0 28.7 20.9
Intensity of academics5 8.9 10.0 4.4 7.5 7.7
Intensity of scientists6 6.0 6.9 2.2 4.8 4.4
1) Share of blue-collar workers of all employees in %.
2) Share of skilled (blue-collar) workers of blue-collar workers in %.
3) Share of white-collar workers of all employees in %.
4) Share of academics (graduates) of white-collar workers in %.
5) Share of academics (graduates) of all employees in %.
6) Share of engineers/natural scientists of all employees in %.
Source: German Statistical Office.
Motor vehicles
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Vehicle bodies,
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At the company level, relating the annual growth
rate of R&D expenditure of the top 300 interna-
tional companies to absolute R&D expenditure
levels suggests interesting insights about the
competitiveness of the automotive industry. In
particular, ‘IT hardware’, ‘automobiles & parts’ and
‘pharmaceuticals & biotechnology’ constitute the
top three sectors in terms of absolute R&D expen-
diture levels in 2002 but ‘IT hardware’ has grown
hardly at all in recent years and the other two, espe-
cially ‘automobiles & parts’, have experienced rapid
growth.
A sector-by-sector comparison of business R&D
expenditure between EU-15 and US companies
from the top 300 international firms shows that EU-
15 companies spend substantially less than their US
counterparts in ‘pharmaceuticals & biotechnology’,
‘IT hardware’ and ‘software & computer services’,
but maintain a substantial lead in ‘automobiles &
parts’ and ‘electronics’ – see Graph 4.39. The data
suggests that the automotive sector is one of the
few sectors where EU-based multinationals have a
competitive edge compared to the other triad
regions.
4.4.4.2 Innovation patterns
Technical progress, competitiveness and innovation
are based on research and development. But even
in R&D-intensive industries, R&D is only one but
essential core of all innovation activities. Innovation
means in this context the development and
economic exploitation of new or improved products
and services, and the optimisation of business
processes. Innovation continuously redefines mar-
kets and opens up new sectors of economic activity.
It concerns every industrial sector, especially the
automotive industry. Discussions in this section are
based on data from the second Community Innova-
tion Survey of 1996 (CIS II).
As can be seen from Table 4.13, about 50 percent of
the companies of the manufacturing sector introduced
new or significantly improved products or processes,
and are categorised as innovating enterprises. In the
manufacturing of transport equipment160 the share of
innovators was slightly higher at nearly 60%. Germany
accounted for the largest share of innovators where
more than 70 % of the car manufacturers introduced
innovations, 72% developed product innovations, and
30 % are innovators with new products also new to the
market. Compared to Germany, the other European
car producing enterprises in France and Italy are less
innovative. The EU-15 manufacturers of transport
equipment account on average as 52 % product inno-
vators, and 24 % are innovating companies with prod-
ucts also new to the market. In total, the results for EU-
15 are influenced significantly by Germany – and to
160 Data are only available at the level of transport equipment (NACE 34-35).
Given the relative size of the automotive sector in terms of the number of
enterprises (NACE 34) results presented mainly reflect the data of automotive
sector. In addition, data from CIS III referring to the year 2000 are not avail-
able at the two digit level. For selected countries we obtained some informa-
tion of trends between 1996 and 2000 calculated in the Commission funded
IEEF project. We will mention trends between 1996 and 2000 in the text
where appropriate.
Graph 4.38: R&D expenditures in the motor industry, 1995 and 2000 (in % of the sum of EU, US
and Japanese R&D expenditures)
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Source: OECD Research and Development Expenditure in Industry database, 1987-2001.
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some extent by France, Sweden, and UK – based on its
weight in the European automotive industry.
A comparison of CIS II (1996) and CIS III (2000)
results shows declining shares of innovative active
firms in the leading car producing countries in the
EU; this may suggest that the contribution to tech-
nological progress has become more concentrated.
However, technological innovation in the automo-
tive industry is still above the average of the manu-
facturing sector. This shows that even second- and –
to a lesser extend – third-tier suppliers need to inno-
vate to stay in the market. At the same time,
however, cost pressures in small supplier companies
have increased and some companies have had to
stop their innovating activities for financial reasons.
Table 4.13: Share of NACE DM enterprises with innovation activity 1996 (in percent)
EU-15 60 42 52 24 69
Benchmark:
EU-15 manufacturing 54 39 44 21 68
Note:    NACE DM: Manufacture of transport equipment.
Source: Results of the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) © Eurostat.
Graph 4.39: R&D expenditure by top EU-15 and top US business R&D spenders in selected sectors, 2002
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Enterprises have their own innovation strategies and
follow different paths. One strategy is to develop in-
house R&D and to combine in-house activities with
additional R&D undertaken by external partners.
Another strategy is technology transfer through the
purchase of new equipment and machinery. For
companies with less internal and/or external R&D
the purchase of equipment, imitation and learning
by doing seem to be valuable innovation strategies.
Therefore, these firms invest in trial production,
training and tooling-up in combination with indus-
trial design and product design.
In general, EU-15 innovators spend most of their
innovation expenditures on R&D and invest in intra-
mural and extramural research projects – see Table
4.14. Especially German companies are following
this path of innovation. Here, 53 % of the innova-
tion budget goes into in-house R&D and 24 % is
dedicated to joint projects with external R&D part-
ners. The behaviour of firms in France and Sweden
is comparable to those in Germany. Firms in Italy
and the UK opt for other innovation processes,
using various channels of technology transfer and
innovating via R&D that is embodied in new equip-
ment. Here, the companies purchase new
machinery and equipment and integrate these
installations into the in-house production and inno-
vation processes. In Italy, industrial design is of
some importance in the innovation process and an
Italian strength.
The structure of innovation expenditure underlines
the importance of suppliers and their specific contri-
bution even during the R&D stage. The share of
external R&D in the automotive sector is consider-
ably larger than in manufacturing as a whole; this is
especially the case in those countries where auto-
motive R&D is particularly strong (Finland seems to
be an exception).
The combination of mass production with the
complexity of specific goods such as cars and other
transport equipment makes the risks of failure
related to radical innovations very high. Therefore,
processes and products are developed incremen-
tally. In-house R&D activities and product engi-
neering are the main sources of technical progress.
Table 4.14: Composition of total innovation expenditures (in % of total innovation expenditures)
1996, by NACE DM
Country
Belgium 8 33 5 1 4 47 2
Denmark 3 11 1 11 2 72 -
Germany 6 11 3 1 24 53 1
Spain 10 19 2 2 7 60 1
France 4 12 17 - 11 53 3
Ireland 4 28 6 5 3 52 2
Italy 16 41 5 3 4 29 2
Netherlands 3 18 2 1 13 60 3
Austria 6 20 6 1 7 55 5
Portugal 10 32 1 28 1 28 -
Finland 2 14 3 6 15 58 2
Sweden 13 15 7 5 9 49 3
United Kingdom 2 33 5 4 - 53 3
EU-15 7 17 5 2 16 51 2
EU-15 manufacturing 6 22 4 4 9 53 2
Note:   NACE DM: Manufacture of transport equipment.
Source: Results of the second community innovation survey (CIS2) © Eurostat.
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Additionally, the work of specialised suppliers –
sometimes research facilities – is integrated into the
value chain.
4.4.5 Trends in innovation activities
Many studies reflect on ‘the car and the future‘. After
euphoric forecasts on the introduction of technologies
for ‘automated guided driving’ or alternative propul-
sion technology, like the fuel cell, more recent studies
take a more sceptical view as concerns the time horizon
for the implementation of such technologies. This
change can be explained by a number of factors such
as the degree of maturity of these technologies, legal
problems of product liability or high opportunity costs
in comparison with other technologies. Hence, one
should expect the basic features of vehicles to be the
same for some time to come. Automated-guided-
vehicle-technologies for example will not take place in
the near future; innovations will be incremental rather
than radical and will be hidden to the end customer or
revealed only at second sight.
A study accomplished by Roland Berger & Partners
(2000) suggest the illustration of Graph 4.40 for the
expected growth in value added for different car
components induced by innovations.
This illustration highlights especially the importance
of incorporating IT into automotive innovation; it is
expected that 90 % of all future innovation will be
driven by IT [Electronics Engineer (Centaur Commu-
nications), 2002]. This affects both the electronics-
dominated spheres of multimedia and the tradi-
tional mechanical components as the chassis, body
or engine. For instance, the fraction of electronics in
the chassis will increase from 12 % to 40 %. Similar
developments are expected for safety features e.g.
pedestrians’ protection, traction control, backward
driving cameras, night-view display in windshield,
sensor controlled brakes or fuel economy regula-
tion. Even product differentiation will take place
more and more through electronics: engines
constructed in the same way could be adjusted to
different performances. The value of electronic
components in vehicle would rise from 20 % today
to 40 % in 2015. This development will undoubt-
edly have an impact on vehicle manufacturers and
their component suppliers. It appears likely that
component suppliers specialised on electronic inter-
faces could occupy this growth segment
(McKinsey&Company, 2003).
When and where technologies will be accepted
depends, first of all, on the characteristics of final
markets. Apart from differences in consumer’s prefer-
ences with regard to mobility, technical performance,
taste, costs, product reliability, environmental perform-
ance etc, the availability (and costs) of fuels play a
major role. In theory one might expect that due to
Graph 4.40: Technological Innovations
 
Source: Roland Berger & Partners-Automotives supplier trend study, March 2000.
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globalisation the same products are being consumed
and similar processes are being applied worldwide.
However, in reality significant regional, national and
even local differences can be observed in applied tech-
nologies and product designs. In the US, for example,
other automobile designs are preferred than in Europe
or Japan. This may be rooted in differences with regard
to the fit of local frameworks and technical specifica-
tions which then lead to county-specific innovation
designs. Road conditions, infrastructure, fuel prices and
customer preferences differ across nations. Even within
a region the markets differ. Some European consumers,
for example, seem to pay more attention than others to
the variable costs of ownership; for others car safety
may be of greater importance. As consumers are
increasingly more affected by the variable costs of a
motor vehicle (for example, fuel prices), a large
increase in the share of diesel-fuelled passenger cars in
first registrations can be noted – see Graph 4.41.
In contrast, diesel cars are not present in the Amer-
ican market because the incentive to buy is much
weaker due to the low fuel prices and due to the
fact that diesel cars have difficulties to meet the
environmental standards. This applies as well to
Japan. Accordingly, the European and Japanese
manufacturers are leading in the production of
diesel technologies and in related innovations.
Japanese manufacturers produce diesel cars mainly
for the European and the ‘third world’ market.
When and to what extent the diesel technology will
be used outside Europe will depend on future devel-
opments regarding fuel availability and fuel price
but also environmental performance.
The  Lead Market concept (Beise, 2001) suggests
that for many innovations lead markets exist that
initiate the international diffusion of a specific
design of an innovation. Once a specific innovation
design has been adopted by users in the lead
market subsequent adoption by users in other
countries is more likely. One can define lead
markets as regional markets with specific attributes
that increase the probability that a locally-preferred
innovation design becomes internationally
successful as well (Beise and Cleff, 2003). In addi-
tion, based on first mover advantages, producers
supplying these markets early on will have perma-
nent advantages when the technology spills over to
other countries. Several European countries show
the characteristics of a lead market concerning the
automobile branch. Porter (1990) describes the
demand conditions in Germany as one of the
factors explaining the success in export of German
firms. French companies seem to have an advan-
tage in designing cars as well due to the respon-
siveness of their local customers.
According to Beise and Cleff the lead market for
automobiles in Germany is characterised by a
combination of several factors:
• The high propensity to consume the automo-
bile leads to a comparatively high valuation of
Graph 4.41: Share of diesel cars in first registrations of passenger cars in Western Europe, 2002 (in percent)
Source: Eurostat and the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA): International Auto Statistics Edition 2003, Frankfurt 2003.
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this good which goes together with a willing-
ness to search, examine and select new prod-
ucts; this fosters the perception of product
innovations by the consumer;
• High fuel prices have stimulated the diffusion of
new engines with high fuel efficiency early on;
this may result in a price advantage due the
manufacturing experience of large lot sizes for
corresponding product innovations;
• The German automotive industry also benefits
from a transfer advantage,161 which is main-
tained through the strong presence of its firms
abroad and the established image of the
German automotive industry as high-quality
suppliers; the transfer advantage reduces
possible hesitations of foreign consumers
concerning a new innovation, hence leading to
an export advantage;
• The German automobile market is open and
overall intensely competitive especially between
local manufacturers. In addition, the size of the
German automotive industry leads to industry-
structure advantages through a dense network
of highly specialised and technologically
competent component supplier firms from all
industrial sectors. Those are – opposed to the
industry-structures in the US and Japan – not
bound to certain manufacturers but deliver
mostly to several manufacturers; therefore,
innovations in the area of parts and compo-
nents diffuse especially rapidly between the
companies and foster competition further;
• Finally, the lead market role is also strength-
ened by infrastructure and legal framework
(dense motorway network, no speed limits,
taxation) and this reinforces customers’
demand for driving qualities at high speed and
safety features.
ABS offers an example of the importance of the
market in the case of complex products and it is
discussed in the accompanying box.162
Lead markets do have an impact on the value chain.
Companies of a lead market convert the specific
demand to a demand of components and interme-
diary products, thus passing lead market impulses
upstream along the value chain. On the other hand,
idiosyncratic product innovation, which is
adopted locally but does not spread to other coun-
tries, limits the competitiveness of firms acting
within this country. A firm responding to idiosyn-
cratic markets can achieve a temporary local inno-
vation success but is later pushed to switch to the
dominant design. A consideration of the lead
market aspect in the national innovation policies
generally means the following:
(1) To support the competition between innova-
tion designs;163 the high competition between
the European automotive manufacturers and
between suppliers is particularly characteristic
for the European market;
(2) To be amenable to the diffusion of new tech-
nologies from other countries/regions and an
early adopter, or adapter, of new technological
trends; the case of ABS brakes is a good
example. Diffusion is further facilitated when
manufacturers and suppliers are global players,
which is particularly true for the European
suppliers and automotive industry;
(3) To operate an open markets policy, especially
by supporting the diffusion of international
standards.
Graph 4.43 lists innovations in vehicle manufac-
turing that are expected at different dates of intro-
duction in different regions of the triad. Europe and
Japan may be called a lead market for innovations
in the field of driving security (chassis and body).
Customers have a high interest in those aspects,
even if their willingness to pay for particular features
remains uncertain. Due to high fuel costs, the main
thrust of innovation on the Japanese market will be
in the field of power train technologies. Innovations
in driving assistance systems are also expected in
Japan and Europe. In North America many innova-
tions are expected to be introduced with a lag of
three to five years due to the legislation of product
liability and cost pressure. In addition, the organisa-
tion of the value chain and the limited role of
suppliers in innovation may hinder further an early
introduction by US firms.
The interest of society to protect the environment and
reduce accidents, shared throughout the world,
became a major driver for innovations. Key issues are
here the reduction of gaseous emissions, safety, mate-
rial recycling and noise. Since the overall trend in the
last 30 years is towards cleaner, safer, quieter and
waste-free vehicles, manufactures which invested
163 For example, the different power train technologies (petrol-operated engine,
diesel engine, liquid gas engines, electric motor, fuel cell) represent different
innovation designs.
161 A country has a transfer advantage if customer acceptance of innovations in
this country is indicative of acceptance in other countries’ markets as well.
162 For details, see M. Beise et al. (2002).
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The ABS
After the Second World War, ABS systems were at first developed by American and British companies, particularly for
aeroplanes and racing cars. The first development steps of German companies consisted of testing the existing (foreign)
ABS systems in the sixties (Bingmann, 1993). Due to insufficient technological maturity, it took until the late 70’s that a
– now electronic- system was introduced at the market as special equipment for luxury class vehicles Graph 4.42 shows
the estimated process of the diffusion of ABS in passenger cars in Germany, Western Europe, US and Japan.
At first, the additional costs for the ABS equipment were not fully reflected in the sale price in order to establish the ABS
at the German market. The prices could be cut even further through the realisation of economies of scale, the automati-
sation of the production and the rapid entry of new suppliers in the market, as the ABS could not be patented. In the US
the market for ABS developed with a delay of approximately two years. Because the US lower speed limit and drier
climate made ABS less usefull, its penetration of the market succeeded only when cost advantages of mass production
made possible lower prices. In addition, the US market is generally subject to a strict manufacturer’s liability which makes
US automotive manufacturers reluctant to introduce security innovations. Each novel electronic component in the vehicle
could lead to additional accidents by malfunction or faulty operation and even few accidents can lead to extremely high
compensation payments. For this reason, US automotive manufacturers normally wait until they observe the experiences
in Europe before offering innovations in vehicles on their own. The reason for the sluggish diffusion in Japan was the
additional price for ABS in proportion to the basic price of the vehicle (Bingman, 1993).
Due to the first-mover effect, German companies have a significant world market share in passenger car anti-lock braking
systems up to now. This national advantage has been extended to further developments of electronic brake control
systems (e.g. ESP, Sensotronic, ASR). Although the technical know-how was already well-known, German companies have
acquired lead function which is due to early adoption of this technology in Germany (Beise et al, 2002).
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early into appropriate technologies have an advan-
tage. Many of the innovations shown in graph 4.43
are driven by environmental concerns, e.g. power
train improvements and light weight materials.
Comparing the customer requirements for commer-
cial vehicles with those for passenger cars, there
seem to be differences that one may assume would
result in differences in innovation priorities, too. For
a buyer of a passenger car the cost of purchase is
most important, while a buyer of commercial vehi-
cles aims at minimising the ‘total cost of owner-
ship’. Innovations for minimising repair time
through self and remote diagnostics and for
Graph 4.42: International diffusion of ABS
Source: Beise (2001).
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lowering insurance rates through higher driving
safety (e.g. electronic driving assistance like night-
view display) do not vary from the needs of a
passenger car customer (McKinsey&Company,
2003).
For both passenger cars and commercial vehicles,
customer requirements go in some instances in the
same direction as regulation; for instance, lighter
car body materials can reduce the costs of utilisa-
tion but also contribute to lower emissions This
applies also to environmental concerns and it can
be expected that it will, in the medium term, lead
to innovations in fuel-injection technology and in
emissions-after-treatment systems which will affect
both sectors.
Graph 4.43: Innovation road map for different functional themes in the EU, US and Japan
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Chassis
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Source: McKinsey&Company: HAWK 2015 – Knowledge-based changes in the automotive value chain, Frankfurt 2003, pp. 20. ZEW calculations.
4.4.6 Price and technological
competitiveness – joining the threads
The automotive industry is characterised by an
increasing competition on a world-wide scale. All
leading manufacturers produce and sell in all major
regions of the world and customers are able to
choose from a wide variety of automotive products.
In order to be in the market manufacturers need to
remain competitive with respect to price but also
with regard to the technological dimension of
competitiveness.
A key factor is certainly productivity, and as explained
previously, productivity in the EU is lower than in, for
example, the US or Japan. This puts pressure on the
profit rates. The exchange rates between the main
currencies play also an important role in this respect.
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In recent years the EU-15 automotive industry has
been gradually catching-up in terms of labour
productivity which is contributing to improving price
competitiveness. However, the catching-up in the
area of labour costs has been slow. Taken together,
the EU automotive industry is since some years under
severe pressure with regard to price competitiveness.
This is especially true relative to the US which has
gained price advantages due to decreasing labour
costs relative to productivity growth.
Enlargement has added to the EU regions with
extremely low labour costs. This will help the auto-
motive industry to regain price competitiveness.
However, traditional locations of car or car-parts
production in the EU-15 will face an increasing
pressure resulting from the need of improving their
price competitiveness in world markets and from
competition by low cost production in the new
Member States. In summary, enlargement will help
the EU automotive industry to stay competitive and
to restructure the value chain.
Given the problems in the area of price competi-
tiveness EU automotive industry invests heavily in
R&D in order to foster product and process innova-
tion. The technological competitiveness of the Euro-
pean automotive industry rests not only on the
presence of leading car makers but also on wide-
spread innovation activities within the supplier part
of the industry. There are several indications that
this investment has already improved the techno-
logical competitiveness of the industry, especially in
the area of construction of car bodies and chassis.
In some other areas of technological innovation
(e.g. active safety features and engine technology)
the EU lags behind Japan.
4.5 The regulatory
environment
4.5.1 Introduction
In general, regulations address legitimate concerns
of general interest. However, they sometimes put
importers at a disadvantage because their obliga-
tion to comply is not accompanied by the benefits
of scale economies. In addition, regulatory require-
ments in many cases absorb R&D spending and
increase the costs of certain products. More gener-
ally, by affecting almost all aspects of doing busi-
ness, the regulatory environment is one of the
major determinants of competitiveness.
However, the impact of individual regulations on
competitiveness is far from being straightforward; it
can be positive if they lead to strengthened compe-
tition or to innovations that the market wants, or
negative, if they misdirect the course of innovation
towards areas where demand prospects may not be
promising. New regulations, at least in the short
run, are also generally associated with additional
costs. This section presents the major elements of
recent regulatory initiatives which affect the auto-
motive industry and reviews some specific regula-
tions, such as the block exemption or the end of life
vehicle directive, as well as the efforts of the
industry to take on the environmental challenges.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the automo-
tive industry is affected not only by regulations that
are specific to it (e.g. End-of-Life vehicle regulation)
but also by numerous regulations of broader scope
(e.g. industrial design protection).
The following list is indicative. It contains measures
that either were recently adopted or are in (some-
times early) discussion. Some of them are presented
more in detail later in this section. The list draws a
rough distinction between measures and proce-
dures that are supply-side oriented, and measures
with a focus on the demand side.
On the supply side, regulations have an impact on
various parts of the value chain such as procure-
ment, construction, production, distribution or serv-
ices; their influence on the cost structure of the
automotive industry is very likely. Among these
measures are:
• Block exemption: regulating the distribution of
cars and vehicle services;
• Industrial design protection and design patents;
• Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH);
• End-of-Life vehicle directive;
•C O 2 voluntary commitment;
• Mobile Air Conditioning (MAC): work on
possible options to reduce emissions of fluori-
nated greenhouse gases from air conditioning
systems fitted to or designed for vehicles;
• EURO 5: setting new limits for particle emis-
sions and other gaseous pollutants for light
duty vehicles for the medium term;
• Pedestrian protection directive: a measure to
reduce injuries to pedestrians and other vulner-
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able road user who are hit by frontal surfaces of
vehicles.
The EU type-approval system sets out the technical
requirements for motor vehicles. With the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe Agree-
ments of 1958 and 1998 a regulatory mechanism
was established to adopt global technical regula-
tions for motor vehicles. Some of the measures
listed above are part of the type-approval system.
On the demand side, regulation measures affect
consumer behaviour and the use of motor vehicles.
The intervention will probably have an impact on
business-to-business as well as business-to-
consumer interactions. The selection hereafter gives
an overview of some policy measures that are being
envisaged:
• Charging for external costs of transportation:
Encouraging competition between alternative
modes of transportation by charging for infra-
structure and social costs;
• Taxation: harmonisation of fuel taxes and
restrictions which currently differ widely across
the EU by fuel category (petrol versus diesel),
customer segment (industrial versus private
use), and purpose (heating etc.);164
• Fostering bio-fuels: a new directive will allow
tax breaks for hydrogen and bio fuels;
• Harmonisation of rules and penalties, i.e. disre-
garding road signs, laws on drink-driving or
speed limits;
• Setting common limits on lorry drivers’ working
hours;
• Harmonisation of weekend bans for lorries;
• Driver certificate: to enable inspectors from a
Member State to check whether a driver from
another Member State is lawfully employed;
• Proposals for the initial training for ‘new’ drivers
in the transport of goods and passengers and
ongoing training for all drivers.
Some of these measures are aimed directly at the
automotive sector while others affect it indirectly by
changing consumer preferences and demand atti-
tudes. Regulations with an impact on the level and
structure of costs will rapidly affect the competitive-
ness of manufactures and force them to react.
Compared with supply-side measures, those on the
demand side may take some time before they are
effective. When consumers change their buying
behaviour or postpone their purchase following
higher taxes or increased fuel prices a decline,
perhaps temporary, in market demand can be
expected. The same result may occur when trans-
portation businesses become less profitable due to
raising taxes, infrastructure tolls, new restrictions on
working hours, weekend bans etc.
4.5.2 Measures affecting the supply side
Given the oligopolistic structure of the final-
producers segment and the ongoing M&A activities
the automotive sector is tightly watched by compe-
tition authorities. One of the concerns about market
power which has an impact on European
consumers is related to the price differentials in the
European car market which prevails despite the
internal market. Recent regulation initiatives aim at
stimulating competition by putting restraints on
vertical relations between the vehicle manufacturer
and the car dealer. Special attention will be paid
here to the impact of Block Exemption Regulation
and the current discussion about the harmonisation
of industrial design for spare parts.
Another field of regulation addresses the environ-
mental impacts of transportation and the automo-
tive industry. The section will review the end-of-life
directive, the new chemical legislation, and actions
to reduce C02 emission.
4.5.2.1 Block Exemption Regulation
The sectors downstream of the vehicle manufacturer
comprise all motor vehicle retail enterprises (NACE
50.1), all motor vehicle maintenance and repair
enterprises (NACE 50.2) the sale of motor vehicle
parts and accessories enterprises (NACE 50.3), the
sale of motor bikes, motor bike maintenance and
accessories enterprises (NACE 50.4) and the retail
sale of automotive fuel (NACE 50.5). The sector
consists mainly of small-scale enterprises. In 2000,
42.5 % of all employees in the sector worked in enter-
prises with less than 10 employees. Only sectors
between NACE 50.1 and NACE 50.3 will be discussed
here (the retail and maintenance of motorbikes is not
covered by the block exception regulation).
Since October 2002 motor vehicle distribution and
servicing agreements within the EU have come
under the new Block Exemption Regulation - Regu-
164 It should be mentioned that fuel accounts for around 20% of the operating
costs of road haulage companies.
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lation no. 1400/2002, replacing Regulation
1475/95 which expired on 30.09.2002. The new
Block Exemption Regulation strives to foster compe-
tition between dealers of the same brand and in the
after-sales market, for example, by facilitating cross-
border sales.
Vehicle manufacturers have to choose between two
models of distribution (i.e. they cannot accumulate
both) (European Commission, 2002):
(4) In the ‘Selective Distribution Model’ no dealer
has an allocated sales territory. They can sell to
any customers in the EU except to other dealers
outside the manufacturers’ network. Sales to
supermarkets or internet-dealers are not
possible. Starting October 1, 2005 dealers are
allowed to open up other branches in optional
locations in addition to their original location.
(5) In the ‘Exclusive Distribution Model’ every
dealer has an allocated sales territory. Dealers
are permitted to sell outside their sales territory
only passively and they are also free to sell to
operators outside the manufacturers’ network.
In both models the sales and service processes will
be unbundled. Vehicle manufacturer cannot insist
on a mandatory link between sales and after-sales
services. ‘Any person who can fulfil the quality
criteria set by the manufacturer can become an
authorised repairer and carry out all servicing,
warranty and recall work on vehicles of the brand
for which they are authorised, without incurring an
obligation to sell vehicles’ (Emanuel, 2002). Further-
more, an authorised retailer will not need permis-
sion to take over another authorised retailer. This is
also true for a repairer. However, the acquisition of
a sales business by a repairer (or vice versa) requires
the consent of the vehicle manufacturer.
As in the previous block exception regulation, the
repairer cannot be forced to use original spare parts
anymore. Only if repair costs arise which are
covered by the vehicle manufacturer, for example
warranty work, free servicing and vehicle recall
work, the vehicle manufacturer can insist on the use
of original spare parts. Other than that, matching
quality spare parts of the manufacturers or of inde-
pendent suppliers can be used. A warranty, which is
guaranteed beyond the legal limit, may oblige
vehicle repairers to use original spare parts (Euro-
pean Commission, 2002).
Furthermore, the prohibition of multi-brand distri-
bution will be abolished, even though vehicle
manufacturers can still demand their brand to
represent at least 30 % of the dealer’s turnover.
However, even though multi-brand dealers are not
obliged to employ separate sales forces, manufac-
turers can impose requirements regarding the
display of brands and Corporate Identity (for
example the appropriate equipment of a show-
room) (European Commission, 2002).
Trends in retail of motor vehicles and parts
In the past, licensed dealers operated as legally
independent companies acting locally, selling the
producer’s vehicles on their own behalf and
expense. Exclusive agreements governed, among
other things, the size of the sales and exhibition
area, the scale of the new cars stock, quantity of
demonstration cars, placement of the spare parts
storage and the amount of marketing expenditure
(Terporten, 1999).
Since the mid nineties the margins of licensed
distributors have been increasingly under pressure
as, on one hand, a maturing market and sales from
unlicensed outlets tended to reduce prices while, on
the other hand, manufacturers’ requirements
regarding quality of service to the customers
tended to increase costs. Whereas it was possible in
the seventies to earn high margins in automobile
retail, nowadays this business has to be subsidised
with funds earned in the after sales, service and
accessories business. Graph 4.44 shows that the
gross operating rate in automobile retail (NACE
50.1) is well below corresponding values in auto-
mobile parts and accessories (NACE 50.3) and
considerably lower than in automobile repair (NACE
50.2).
The new Block Exception regime is expected to
reinforce competition further both at the sales level,
through improved access of hitherto ‘outsiders’ to a
brand’s retail business, and at the after sales level.
One possible outcome is increased concentration as
dealerships seek to balance out decreasing margins
with economies of scale. This will not necessarily
lead to a marked reduction of the number of sales
outlets but, more likely, to their absorption into
larger retail groups. For the vehicle manufacturer
the distribution costs will be lower with fewer
access points (Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, 2003).
It is also possible that dealers seek economies of
scope by including additional brands into their sales
range. Particularly those brands that were as yet
unable to assert themselves against large dealer
networks are expected to benefit from the higher
density of multi franchise dealers. Particularly Asian
vehicle manufacturer will win over dealers who
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:19  Pagina 211European competitiveness report 2004
212
already sell an upper-end car line (Cap Gemini Ernst
& Young, 2003). European vehicle manufacturers
are aware of this risk. Therefore, they are intensi-
fying brand specific investments. Downstream inte-
gration activities of the vehicle manufacturers estab-
lishing their own sales outlets can be observed.
Especially some ‘prestige manufacturers have been
buying up certain of their key dealerships in order
to retain control of those outlets’ (Emanuel, 2002).
For years, vehicle manufacturers have supported
concentration of the dealer network because of effi-
ciency aspects. This process would have continued
even without the Block Exemption, because new
distribution structures alongside the licensed dealers
would have been created, leading to stiffer competi-
tion and increasing consolidation pressure on dealers.
The new distribution structures are, among others, car
broker/online agents, internet,165 new players in the
industry, like supermarkets and international mega
dealers, as well as smaller non-authorized dealers. In
the case of EU re-imports to Germany, for example,
every fifth new car is sold by a non-authorized dealer.
Simulation studies (Dr. Lademann & Partner, 2001)
estimate the market share loss of franchised dealers
induced by the Block Exemption at around 35 %.
Trends in automotive repair and maintenance
Another problem for the dealers arises by the
unbundling of sales and service. As yet, the bulk of
the retailers’ margins were earned in service, to
some extent sales outlets were subsidised by after
sales service. These earnings threaten to decrease
when new competitors access the market. This
effect is amplified by the fact that the service needs
of vehicles are declining, and the loyalty of
customers having their service carried out by the
dealer has decreased and will continue to do so in
future (Dudenhöffer, 1997).
Unlike in Europe, the US service and sales sector is
remarkably independent. Franchise dealers in the
USA retain only 20 % of the overall maintenance
market. Even with respect to vehicles not older than
one year they hold no more than 40 % (autopolis,
2000). The amount of cars in use per establishment
in automotive repair and maintenance, however,
corresponds to that of Japan or to the European
average.
The technology development of cars themselves
and corresponding repair technologies will deter-
mine the degree to which competition in the repair
segment increases. Due to the increasing
complexity of vehicle technology, repair services
can only be carried out by those companies who
can afford the infrastructure required for diagnostic
systems and special tools. These are investments
that can hardly be generated by smaller companies.
165 Even if the internet was used by some vehicle producers for distributing new
cars – e.g. Fiat offered a special edition of its Barchetta in Italy exclusively via
the internet and Vauxhall (UK) offered substantial reductions on list prices for
internet purchasers (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000) – the internet is more
often used for used cars than as distribution channel for new cars. As regards
new car purchases it is primarily used to increase the customer’s knowledge
and to make consumers more demanding about benefits such as price and
warranty coverage (Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, 2003).
Graph 4.44: Gross operating rate of different downstream sectors, 1998 (NACE 50)
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Either they simply disappear from the sector or they
will have to content themselves with repairs with
lower value added.
Due to increased capital requirements, traditional
repair companies must generate further earnings
from other areas. This might include providing
service for other brands as well as using cheaper
‘matching quality’ spare parts (Emanuel, 2002). As
vehicle manufacturers continue to pursue their plat-
form and parts sharing policies, repair companies
are likely to benefit from synergy effects too (Cap
Gemini Ernst & Young, 2003). Smaller companies,
however, are less likely to profit from these oppor-
tunities.
4.5.2.2 Harmonisation of Industrial Design
Regulation on Spare Parts
At the time when the Community Directive
98/71/EC on industrial design protection was
adopted no agreement could be reached with
regard to the spare parts for complex products.
Presently, in some Member States (for example,
France, Austria, Denmark, Sweden) spare parts can
be protected by industrial design registration
whereas in others (for example, UK, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands) they cannot.
In order to complete the Single Market in this area
the Commission has ordered an impact assessment
of possible options (Technopolis, 2003). The impact
assessment concludes that a modification will
increase competition in the repair market. However,
the concrete impact will vary in different market
segments of the spare parts industry (glass vs. body
parts). Despite the increase of competition it is less
obvious whether the final consumer will see lower
repair prices. It may well be the case that the reduc-
tion of the market power of the vehicle manufac-
turers and, hence, the reduction in their profits will
be reaped by other actors down the value chain
(e.g. repair shops, producers of spare parts). In
addition, there are concerns about the impact of
the liberalisation of the aftermarket on the quality of
spare parts and hence on car safety.
Vehicle manufacturers (see ACEA, 2004) claim that
industrial design protection on ‘must match’ spare
parts is needed to recoup their initial investment in
the design of certain parts of cars; for instance, the
envisaged modification would endanger the
viability of the investment (e.g. extended testing of
bumpers) needed to fulfil the recent pedestrian
safety regulation. They also contest that dropping
the protection would result in any significant
consumer benefits.
Increased competition will put EU vehicle manufac-
turers and existing suppliers under pressure which
will likely induce innovation and foster competitive-
ness. Furthermore, new entrants in the spare part
markets will be primarily based outside the EU and,
hence, some of the rents currently earned by EU
industry will be lost. In any event, it will be neces-
sary to have a mechanism to ensure that spare parts
and original parts meet the same safety standards.
4.5.2.3 End-of-Life Vehicle (ELV) Directive
2000/53/EC
About twelve million vehicles reach their end-of-life
each year in Europe, around 25 percent of which go
to landfills as eight million tonnes of waste (Price-
WaterhouseCoopers, 2002b). After three years of
debate, the European Parliament and the Council
adopted on 18.09.2000 Directive 2000/53/EC
according to which vehicle manufacturers are
obliged to take back old vehicles, substitute certain
specific hazardous substances and, together with
other economic operators, such as dismantlers and
recyclers, increase the level of material re-use and
recovery up to 85 percent by 2006 and up to 95
percent by 2015.
The ELV Directive obliges the vehicle producer to
pay for the costs related to the collection and
further treatment of the end-of-life vehicle from the
delivery to an authorised treatment facility onwards.
Additional compliance costs stemming from the ELV
Directive have been estimated at ￿20 to ￿150
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002b) and ￿6 to ￿17
(Umweltbundesamt, 2003).
In addition to the impact on costs, the Directive
might also affect the value chain of the vehicle
manufacturer. For instance, in product development
vehicle manufacturers will have to avoid using
materials that reduce the share of recyclability. The
automobile industry criticises the fact that a high
recycling ratio collides with other environmental
protection measures, such as fuel consumption.
According to the automobile industry ‘Light-weight
construction, one way of fulfilling this objective, is
significantly hampered by the enforced recycling
ratio, since the cost of plastic parts and composites
would be particularly affected by a high material
recycling ratio.’ (Lucas, Schwartze, 2001). The
Commission services, addressing this question,
could not at this stage identify any negative reper-
cussions of the ELV Directive on the CO2 emissions
of passenger cars.
Economic operators are responsible for the obser-
vance of recycling ratios. Because tier 1 suppliers
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take more responsibility for R&D but are not
obliged to withdraw products, the ELV Directive
requires a close co-operation among operators
along the value chain.
Since the end-of-life vehicle directive concerns all
cars sold in Europe no cost disadvantage will arise
for European manufacturers compared to non-Euro-
pean ones. In fact, the proximity of the European
automotive industry with car-recycling firms consti-
tutes an advantage, considering that Asian manu-
facturers have not established as dense a network of
dealers up to now. In addition, Asian manufacturers
will have to invest in the general use of recyclable
materials as well.
4.5.2.4 Implications of the New EU Chemicals
Legislation (REACH)
On 29 October 2003 the European Commission
adopted the REACH proposal (Registration, Evalua-
tion and Authorisation of Chemicals) for a new EU
regulatory framework for chemicals. Enterprises
which manufacture or import one ton or more per
year and per manufacturer/importer of a specific
chemical substance would be required to register it
in a European-wide central database, managed by
the new European Chemicals Agency. The registra-
tion would include information on properties, uses
and safe ways of handling the products. This safety
information will be passed down the supply chain.
Some groups of substances would not have to be
registered because they are subject to a different EU
legislation.
REACH is meant to provide for coherence on a
European level in the different national and some-
times inconsistent rules and regulations on the
treatment of old and new materials throughout the
whole ‘life’ of a specific substance. Old materials
and new materials should be subjected to a stan-
dardised regulation replacing as many as 40
existing European directives and regulations.
While a wide agreement exists on the goals of the
proposal, there is disagreement with regard to its
effects on the capacity for innovation and the
competitiveness of the chemical industry and
downstream industries. The argument is basically
about the expenses resulting from additional
administrative expenditure and about the time
delay due to the procedure for the introduction of
new products and processes. The European
Commission doubts whether - compared to the
already existing directives and the different national
admittance regulations - significant additional cost
will arise at all while industry representatives
produced estimates that put such costs at a very
high level.
The chemical regulation has – through the applica-
tion of chemical products in components and inter-
mediate products and the typical supply of hundreds
of chemical parts to the aftermarket - a high rele-
vance for the automotive industry, because all actors
in the supply chain will be obliged to ensure the
safety of any chemical substance they handle. Where
a chemical is not used according to the original regis-
tration, the new uses or risk-reduction measures will
have to be reported to the European Chemicals
Agency if the volume is higher than 1 ton. Down-
stream users will have the right to demand from their
suppliers that they register substances for all their
uses, or the downstream user can choose, for reasons
of commercial confidentiality, to do their own Chem-
ical Safety Assessment and Report.
These registration and testing requirements may
involve additional costs, most probably by compo-
nent suppliers. At this stage, however, there is no
generally accepted estimation of the overall addi-
tional burden and its distribution within the Euro-
pean industry.
4.5.2.5 The Kyoto targets: CO2 Emission
Reduction – the Manufacturers’ Contribution
Containing the threat of climate change is one of
the greatest challenges facing the international
community. According to the Kyoto protocol166 the
European Union must reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 8 % compared to 1990 levels in the period
of 2008–2012; countries like Germany must reduce
emissions by 21 %.
Many countries throughout the world take meas-
ures to reduce the specific emissions for vehicles. In
particular, the traditional car producing countries
and regions have implemented legislation or have
set targets in order to increase the fuel efficiency of
cars, e.g. the US, Japan, China, Korea etc. At this
stage the targets set in the EU are more severe than
in these other countries.
The EU strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from
passenger established early a framework for meas-
ures to improve the fuel efficiency of cars. A corner-
stone of this strategy is the voluntary commitments
166 The Kyoto Conference took place in 1997. The protocol will enter into force if
it is ratified by at least 55 of the 160 signatory countries provided that these
countries account in total for at least 55 % of the emissions of the industrialised
countries. By the end of 2003 more than 100 countries, including the EU and
its member states have deposited their instruments of ratification. However,
some large countries have so far not ratified the protocol.
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of the car industry. The European Automobile Manu-
facturers Association (ACEA)167 negotiated a volun-
tary commitment with the European Commission in
1998 to undertake every effort to reduce average
CO2 emissions of newly registered cars to 140 grams
per kilometre (140gCO2/km) by 2008. At the time,
the average specific emissions of the ACEA’s car fleet
registered in the European Union were 165 g/km (see
Annex Table A4.8). Between 1995 and 2002, the
overall reduction achieved in the car fleet was
12.1 %. CO2 emissions and fuel consumption go
hand in hand so that the average consumption
(petrol and diesel) fell from 7.6 litres per kilometre
(7.6 l/km) to 6.5 l/km. Another positive sign is the
increasing share of passenger cars which emit 140
g/km CO2 or less. ACEA stated that some manufac-
turers plan to include more models which fulfil the
120 g/km criterion in their product range. The share
of these cars in new registrations was 5 % in 2002
compared to 0.7 % in 1999. Besides the many posi-
tive signs, the industry considers that the targets
remain extremely ambitious.
The members of the Japan Automobile Manufac-
turers Association168 (JAMA) made a commitment to
fulfil the 140 g/km level by 2009. The car fleet of
JAMA registered in Europe has an average CO2 emis-
sion of 174 g/km which is slightly more than the
European manufacturers’. They managed to reduce
average fuel consumption from 8.0 l/km to 7.3 l/km.
A different picture is drawn by the Korean Automo-
bile Association169 (KAMA) which reduced emissions
from 197 g/km in 1995 to 183 g/km in 2002. The
monitoring of their achievements indicates that
KAMA will have difficulties in achieving their indica-
tive target range for 2004 which lies between 165
and 170 g/km. KAMA has nevertheless reaffirmed its
commitment of a reduction to 140 g/km by 2009.
All manufacturers have to undertake dedicated
research work, involving themselves, suppliers,
research institutes and universities, in order to
develop promising technologies for the reduction of
CO2 emissions. Funding for this work is sought
from the EU Framework Programme for Research
and Development (European Commission, 2003).
There is a large number technologies used by
manufactures to reduce CO2 emissions from
passenger cars. In the past the improvement of
diesel engine power trains turned out to be most
efficient for the EU market. In future improvements
of the gasoline power train, the application of
hybrid technology and the usage of alternative fuels
look most promising.
The commitments have contributed to technology
developments that may be even more relevant in
the context of the recent increases of fuel prices and
the interest of many countries to secure their
energy supply.
In its strategy to reduce CO2 emissions, the EU
relies only in part on the commitment of the
industry. Consumers also need to be informed
about the importance of CO2 emissions and fuel
economy. Fiscal measures will be part of the
strategy to provide incentives for consumers to buy
cars that fulfil the requirements of low CO2 emis-
sions and fuel consumption (European Commission,
2004). National taxes should establish a more direct
relation between tax level and the CO2 perform-
ance of new cars. Such measures will also help to
develop a strong home market for fuel efficient cars.
4.5.3 Measures affecting the demand side
While investment in infrastructure and the mobility of
people, goods and services will boost productivity,
economic growth and employment, external (social)
costs, especially pollution are more likely to consume
resources and affect the economy adversely. Higher
living standards in Europe have given rise to demands
for environmental protection, quality of work, corpo-
rate social responsibility and health protection. While
transportation by car enhances the standard of living, it
also generates undesired environmental impacts that
can lead to human health problems and ecological
damage. In many ways, the demand for sustainability is
an enormous challenge and leads to developments
such as charging for infrastructure and social cost, taxa-
tion of motor vehicles in general, and CO2 taxes.
4.5.3.1 Charging for infrastructure and social
costs of transportation
The automotive industry depends on a highly devel-
oped and functioning transportation infrastructure
167 BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford, General Motors, Renault, Volkswagen,
Volvo, DAF TRUCKS NV, MAN NUTZFAHRZEUGE AG, Dr. Ing. h.c. F.
PORSCHE AG, PSA PEUGEOT CITROEN, SCANIA AB.
168 The members are: Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, Suzuki, Mazda, Toyota,
Daihatsu, Yamaha, Kawasaki, Isuzu, UD, Fuji Heavy Industries.
169 The members are: KIA, GM Daewoo, Renault Samsung, Hyundai, Ssangyong.
Hybrid Engines
Given present limitations in technologies such as
batteries and fuel cells, the most viable powertrain
alternatives are hybrid configurations that include a
relatively small internal combustion engine and an elec-
tric motor. In 1997, Honda Insight and Toyota Prius
became the first commercially available hybrid models.
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(e.g. uninterrupted road traffic) to assure that their
customers can turn their automotive investments
into economic profits. The capacity of the roads is
already too small even for today’s traffic. In its 2001
White Paper, the European Commission notes that
not only roads in major agglomerations but also large
sections of the trans-European transport network are
chronically congested. There are daily traffic jams on
7,500 kilometres of Europe’s roads – that is, on 10 per
cent of the trans-European trunk roads and motor-
ways. Users’ preferences for transport by road seem
to rely on flexibility, convenience, and independence.
Other modes of transport are not able to carry freight
from door to door, as road transport can.170
Many parts of the motorway and trunk road
network in Europe no longer comply with the
requirements of modern traffic. Maintenance claims
an increasing proportion of infrastructure funding.
Congestion seriously jeopardises the competitive-
ness of the economy. The external costs of conges-
tion on the roads alone amount to some 0.5 per
cent of the European Union’s GDP. Taking into
account further growth in transport, the Commis-
sion fears that the costs of traffic jams could rise by
142 per cent to ￿ 80 billion per year, which would
be equivalent to 1 per cent of EU GDP.171
The European Commission has recently started a
debate about the true cost of transportation.172
CO2 emissions from road transportation account for
19 % of total greenhouse gas emissions in the
EC.173 Further, there are roughly 41,000 deaths on
the road every year and 1.7 million injured. The
direct costs of road accidents are estimated at ￿ 45
billion plus ￿ 160 billion of indirect costs, almost
2 % of European GDP.
A large number of studies have been undertaken in
recent years to find a way to internalise social
costs.174 Work has been done on the definition of
different cost categories, the identification of cost
drivers and with a certain focus on the appropriate
method for monetary quantification. Although there
is agreement on the ultimate objective - that social
costs should be internalised - the strategies and
instruments put forward to achieve this differ widely.
In the 2001 White Paper the cost levels generated by
a heavy goods vehicle covering 100 km on a
motorway in open country at off-peak times are spec-
ified in an interval ranging from ￿ 8 to ￿ 36 of which
a little more than ￿ 8 correspond to infrastructure
charges. Broken down by different cost categories
there are the following average ranges: costs of air
pollution (cost of health and damaged crops) from ￿
2.3 to ￿ 15, climate change (floods and damaged
crops) from ￿ 0.2 to ￿ 1.5, infrastructure from ￿ 2.1
to ￿ 3.3, noise (cost on health) from ￿ 0.7 to ￿ 4, acci-
dents (medical costs) from ￿ 0.2 to ￿ 2.6 and conges-
tion (loss of time) from ￿ 2.7 to ￿ 9.3 (White Paper,
European Commission, 2001).
In the recent RECORDIT study175 internal and
external costs were estimated for 16 EU countries. On
a weighted average basis, the study found that an
amount of ￿ 0.21 of extra charge per kilometre was
necessary to offset the net external cost for a 40t
vehicle for road transportation. The latter consists of
the sum of (marginal) infrastructure176 costs and
external costs (i.e. air pollution, noise, accidents, and
congestion) minus already paid taxes.177 The compa-
rable costs for rail transportation are quantified at ￿
0.09/vkm. In order to compensate for the difference
between road and rail a tax increase or extra charge
on road transportation of ￿ 0.12/vkm would there-
fore be necessary.
The variance of price or extra charges for the use of
different modes of transportation is wide - a sign of
understandable uncertainty – reflecting the analyt-
ical method, assumptions and data sources used.
The outcome of additional charging178 for road
transport is critically dependent on the response of
the users. By changing the relative price of road
175 RECORDIT stands for real cost reduction of door-to-door intermodal trans-
port; see RECORDIT (2003).
176 The calculation of (marginal) infrastructure costs is based on the costs for
maintenance and operation by a vehicle movement. The capital costs of
infrastructure are regarded as fixed and not included in the analyses. The
problem of an adequate charging of full (variable and fix) infrastructure costs
for different modes is not solved yet. Therefore, price decisions or new
charging systems should be introduced with care. Unless all cost categories
are correctly quantified, prices are biased, and do not lead to an optimal
solution.
177 Some of these external and infrastructure costs are already covered by the
charges imposed on the transport vehicle itself, comprising fuel and vehicle
taxes and infrastructure charges. The different tax categories contain circula-
tion tax, registration tax, road tolls and charges, fuel tax.
178 The application in the charging system of price differentiation is suggested.
There are a number of differentiation criteria such as category of infrastruc-
ture, time of the day, distance, size and weight of the vehicle etc. that could
be taken into account.
170 Trends in the character of transported goods as well as the enlargement of
the EU will further stimulate road transport as flexibility and speed will
became even more important in the future. And enlargement will foster road
transport as it provides additional possibilities for reengineering value chains
in manufacturing to profit from EU wide costs and competences differentials.
171 This does not even take into account the massive development needs of the
new member states for their transport networks. The Commission estimates
that in these states, 20,000 kilometres of roads and 30,000 kilometres of rail
tracks need either building or expanding, which would mean additional costs
approaching 100 billion euros.
172 In 2002 the EU proposed a framework directive setting out the principles and
structure of an infrastructure charging system and a common methodology
for setting charging levels, offset by for the removal of existing taxes, and
allowing cross financing. The planned actions are meant to make the tax
system more consistent by proposing uniform taxation for commercial road
transport fuel by 2003 to complete the single market. See European
Commission White Paper (2001), and the earlier Green Paper (1995) of the
European Commission.
173 European Environment Agency, Annual European Gas Inventory, 1990-2002
and Inventory Report 2004.
174 RECORDIT, 2003; Link et al., 1999; Maibach et al., 2000; Prognos, 2001;
Quinet, 1997; Verhoef, 1994; European Commission, 1999; For the U.S.
Murphy and Delucchi, 1998.
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traffic other modes of transport should become
more attractive. But the demand for transportation
services does not depend exclusively on the price.
Quality and accessibility are further important
determinants of demand.
4.5.3.2 Taxation of passenger cars
Vehicle taxation systems implemented in the
Member States reflect a variety of influences
beyond the obvious need to raise revenue. At the
moment the approach to regulation of the automo-
bile varies among European countries, reflecting
different social priorities.179 The operation of 15
different vehicle tax systems within the EU has
resulted in tax obstacles, distortions and inefficien-
cies. In this respect, the car market in the EU is still
a long way from a true single market.
Taxes on passenger cars vary widely in terms of
structure and levels. They are based on one or a mix
of elements such as fiscal horsepower, engine
capacity, weight, kW, price of the car, fuel
consumption, or CO2 emissions. There are:
• taxes payable at the time of acquisition, or first
putting into service, of a passenger car, defined
in most cases as Registration Tax (RT);
• periodic taxes payable in connection with the
ownership of the passenger car, defined in
most cases as Annual Circulation Tax (ACT);
• taxes on fuel (FT);
• any other taxes and charges, such as insurance
taxes, registration fees, road user charges, road
tolls etc.180
Member States having a large car industry tend not
to apply a Registration Tax, or they apply a lower
registration tax, while car importing Member States
tend to levy higher Registration Tax. Tax levels
range, in extreme cases, between zero and 180 %
of pre-tax car price. In absolute terms average
Registration Tax ranged, in 1999, between ￿ 15
659 in Denmark and ￿ 267 in Italy. All Member
States apart from France apply Annual Circulation
Tax at national level. Very different objective factors
are used as tax bases (e.g. cm3, kW, CO2, weight).
The average Annual Circulation Tax paid in 1999
ranged from ￿ 30/vehicle in Italy, to ￿ 463/vehicle
in Denmark.
Excise duties on motor fuels are seen as an effective
fiscal instrument to influence the level of car use, or
for internalising environmental and social costs
linked to the use of passenger cars, such as infra-
structure costs, accident costs, and air pollution
costs. Usually, Member States applying no, or low
Registration Tax, compensate revenue losses by
higher fuel tax levels.181 Motor vehicle taxation
levels in the EU - measured as a tax percentage of
the net price of the car - vary from 16 % in
Germany up to 198 % in Denmark.182
The wide differences in tax systems have a negative
impact on the ability of the car industry - and Euro-
pean consumers - to reap the benefits of operating
within a single market. Car market fragmentation
prevents industry from exploiting economies of scale,
or to produce motor vehicles for the entire Internal
Market, applying the same specifications and does not
prevent pre-tax prices from varying significantly within
the internal market. Different taxation levels can
explain about 20 % of the European car price differen-
tials.183 Industry is often obliged to produce a specific
car model, with different specifications, in order to
soften the pre-tax prices, in particular when the vehicle
is destined to high taxing Member States. This gener-
ates additional costs that undermine the competitive-
ness of the European car industry.184 On the other
hand, precisely because of the differences in tax levels,
the car industry adapts its pre-tax prices taking into
consideration the level of taxation in Member States.
Pre-tax prices are much higher in those Member States
applying no, or a low, Registration Tax.
4.5.3.3 Fiscal measures in order to reduce
CO2 emission – CO2 taxes
Policies and options for future action in the field of
passenger car taxation are being envisaged and the
priority is to ensure the smooth functioning of the
Internal Market.185 That means a modernised and
181 With the only exception of the UK, they all apply lower tax levels on diesel,
traditionally used by commercial vehicles. Diesel is taxed on average about
140 EUR/1000 litres lower than unleaded petrol.
182 See ACEA (2003), Annual Tax Guide 2003.
183 TIS Study (2002), Study on vehicle taxation in the Member States of the EU,
TIS/PT.
184 In parallel, as tax requirements differ, cars marketed in one Member State
with specifications designed to meet national requirements and ‘tax influ-
enced’ demand (e.g. brackets of fiscal horsepower, tax policy regarding
diesel), are imperfect substitutes of and may not effectively compete with
cars sold in a different Member State, thereby undermining the benefits
which EU consumers should derive from a competitive and integrated
market.
185 In an earlier communication the Commission sets out its views on the funda-
mental priorities for tax policy in the European Union. See COM(2001)260
final, Tax Policy in the European Union - Priorities for the Years ahead.
179 COM(2002)431 final, Taxation of passengers cars in the European Union -
options for action at national and Community levels. See also the table in the
annex ‘Summary of tax, environment, transport and emission policy in
2003/4 by country’ taken from ACEA (2004), EU-15 Economic Report.
180 Value added taxes (VAT) for motor vehicles are generally subjected to the
standard rate of VAT. Value added taxes range from 15 % in Luxembourg,
16 % in Germany, up to 25 % in Denmark and Sweden.
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simplified vehicle taxation system, and in particular
an introduction of new parameters in the bases of
taxes related to passenger cars in order to make
them partially, or totally, CO2 based. The process
should lead to better co-ordination, and an
approximation of passenger car taxation systems
within the Internal Market.
The use of fiscal measures is one of the pillars of the
European Union’s Sustainable Development
Strategy. In the Commission’s opinion vehicle
taxation is an important complementary instrument
to support the realisation of the EU-target of 120 g
CO2/km for new cars by 2008-2010, and to
contribute to the accomplishment of the EU
engagements under the Kyoto Protocol.186 This
would imply establishing a more direct relation
between tax level and the CO2 performance of
each new passenger car, for instance, by replacing
existing vehicle taxes by taxes fully based on CO2
emissions or, alternatively, by adding a CO2
sensitive element to existing Registration and
Annual Circulation Tax. Add-on elements would also
allow taking into account other national
environmental objectives, e.g. the early
introduction of EURO IV or the forthcoming EURO V
standards.187
Taxation should take into account the increasing
importance of company cars, and provide a clear
and strong incentive to companies to use more
CO2 efficient cars. In most Member States, existing
corporate or income tax structures do not include
such an incentive.
The Commission is aware of the potential conflict
between the revenue objective of vehicle taxation
and other policy objectives. If Registration Tax
and Annual Circulation Tax were restructured in
an environmentally friendly direction, revenues
from these taxes could show a downward trend
as a result of a successful environmental policy.
However, this very much depends on the design
of the restructured taxes, and on the way car
buyers, and car drivers, react on new tax incen-
tives. In order to ensure stable revenue, and to
maintain the incentive function of these taxes, it
may be necessary to amend the design, and the
levels, of these taxes. Such amendments would
also take into account the potential for revenue
losses, due the expected higher fuel efficiency of
future passenger car generations.
4.5.4 Assessment and implications
The impact of a new regulation on the automotive
industry is difficult to evaluate. It can vary with time
and introduce dynamic effects that are difficult to
assess accurately. Measures like new pollution stan-
dards can have a negative effect on the perform-
ance and cost structure of carmakers, challenging
the competitive strength of the industry. At the
same time, dealing with the measures can be the
first step towards new markets and achieving tech-
nology or quality leadership.
The world-wide demands for safer and more envi-
ronment-friendly vehicles will continue. These
demands will drive research and innovation in
powertrains, fuels, electric vehicles and lightweight
materials. For manufacturers, finding low-cost ways
to meet these requirements is at least as important
as adding customer-desired features to vehicles. Of
crucial importance is to identify and implement
innovative solutions that will become global, thus
giving European industry a first mover advantage.
The key technological problem facing the automo-
bile industry today in all markets is the complexity
of the demands from society. The need to address
several issues at the same time can make the devel-
opment of technical solutions more demanding as
the underlying physical and technical characteristics
can give rise to trade-offs.
Things can be even more complex when conflicting
objectives from different policies must be taken into
account at the same time; for instance, passenger
safety requirements may tend to increase the
weight of the vehicle, which neutralises efforts to
reduce fuel consumption. Efforts to reduce pollutant
emissions may also tend to increase CO2 emissions.
In practice, however, these effects are low compared
to the technological potential for further CO2 emis-
sions improvements. Thus, the challenge is more an
economic one since several issues have to be
addressed at the same time, which puts pressure on
the R&D budgets. Therefore the regulatory measures
discussed previously may in the short term lead to a
greater administrative burden and higher costs for
companies. The extent to which it will be possible to
pass on these costs to consumers will depend on the
individual vehicle manufacturer and on the vehicle
class. The fact that price elasticity is smaller on Euro-
pean markets compared to the US market should
facilitate the transfer of at least part of the costs.
On the other hand, measures that manage to reduce
the wide differences in tax systems should have a
186 COWI (2001), Study on fiscal measures to reduce CO2 emissions from new
passenger cars, Consulting Engineers and Planners AS, November 2001.
187 Com(2002)431 final.
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positive impact on the ability of the car industry - and
European consumers - to reap the benefits of oper-
ating within a single market. Car market fragmenta-
tion prevents industry from exploiting economies of
scale, or to produce motor vehicles for the entire
Internal Market, applying the same specifications,
and contributes to significant variations of pre-tax
prices within the internal market.
The competitiveness of the automotive industry,
and of the European economy, depends also on a
stable, coherent, cost-effective regulatory frame-
work which correctly reflects the demands of
society and anticipates trends in the world
markets. This drove the Commission to assess the
repercussions of its legislation carefully, applying
the tools of ‘Better Regulation’, such as impact
assessment techniques with full involvement of all
stakeholders. Nevertheless, there is still progress to
be made as concerns reducing regulatory
complexity and taking into account possible
conflicts between regulations and their cumulative
impact, while improving the regulatory process
itself through better consultation and coordina-
tion, so as to come to a predictable and stable
regulatory environment.
4.6 Challenges 
and opportunities 
for the European 
automotive industry
The European automotive industry has been
defending its international position successfully,
both in terms of exports and worldwide sales.
Enlargement proved an opportunity to restore the
efficiency and cost effectiveness of its value chain.
Its positions in emerging markets are strong and
promising further growth and its innovation
potential remains strong. However, the many chal-
lenges facing the industry should not be underesti-
mated.
This section provides a systematic overview of
strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O)
and threats (T) - a SWOT Analysis. It is a well estab-
lished and straightforward concept which is helpful
in matching an industry’s resources and capabilities
to the competitive environment in which it oper-
ates. To extend this analysis into the future an addi-
tional scenario analysis was conducted to highlight
major connections and interactions among SWOT-
factors in a best and worst case scenario. These
steps lay the groundwork for the formulation of
implications and policy issues.
4.6.1 A summary of strengths and
weakness, opportunities and threats
4.6.1.1 Strengths
Large home market: The EU is the largest single
market for passenger cars and the second largest for
commercial vehicles. It is best positioned to
leverage economies of scale and scope.
Loyal European customers: European producers
profit the most from positive demand factors in
domestic markets since European customers
predominantly prefer European brands.
Sophisticated demand: EU customers enjoy their
cars beyond practical use. Many treat it as a status
symbol or a hobby. Advanced feedback from
sophisticated customers propels product quality.
Modular value chain: The value chain configura-
tion of the European automotive industry supports
flexibility and risk sharing. European producers have
achieved excellence in value chain management,
system standardisation and quality control.
Qualified labour: This industry is labour intensive
and needs qualified personnel to produce highly
complex, high-performance, quality products.
Today, the automotive products are more complex
and sophisticated than ever requiring a strong
know-how base for technological innovation and
flexibility to make possible organisation innovation
in the value chain.
High innovation capacity: High expenditures for
innovation and especially R&D indicate the confi-
dence and commitment of the European automo-
tive industry in the competition for innovative prod-
ucts and services.
Strong position in trade: Europe holds dominant
world market shares in most automotive product
categories.
Responsiveness for foreign demand: The Euro-
pean automotive industry is highly active in lever-
aging knowledge, customer and market information
from abroad. Those benefits can only be fully
exploited by operating on site. This engagement
opens up new trade opportunities for intermediate
products and parts originating in the European
home base.
Promising position in China: With China’s
membership in the World Trade Organisation, it is
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expected that the automotive industry will be one
of China’s largest and most powerful industries in
the next twenty years. All the major car manufac-
turers have already established different assembly
plant and are still planning to build up new produc-
tion capacities. The Volkswagen Group is still a step
ahead according to their first mover advantage.
Affordable labour in new Member States: The
privatisation of state-owned enterprises allowed
international companies to acquire existing produc-
tion plants and to employ their qualified labour
force.
New Member States as efficient production loca-
tions in known European regulatory framework:
New chances and possibilities arrive by the enlarge-
ment process of the EU. The ten new Member
States offer profitable production circumstances
based on their labour cost and tax policy together
with the already known regulatory framework of
the European Union.
Road transportation as major component of
value chains: Road transportation is the backbone
of the European transportation system. It is deeply
embedded in the value chains of almost all indus-
tries. This fact translates into investments, learning
curve effects and sunk costs that generate signifi-
cant barriers to entry for alternative modes of trans-
portation and subsequently stable demand for vehi-
cles. In addition, the demand for mobility of Euro-
pean citizens is steadily increasing which also stimu-
lates demand for affordable cars.
4.6.1.2 Weaknesses
Productivity: EU still lags behind the US and Japan
in term of labour productivity despite a significant
catch-up in recent times and despite the slowdown
of the speed of catching-up during the 1990s. Also,
this productivity disadvantage is not outweighed by
lower labour costs. On the contrary, the catch-up in
labour cost compared to the US is almost complete
and hourly labour costs in EU-15 are higher than in
Japan and Korea.
High labour costs and inflexible labour market
regulation: Modern automotive production relies
on high levels of flexibility and quality. To achieve
these ambitious goals highly qualified employees
are a prerequisite. This manpower is expensive and
automotive companies want to utilise it as produc-
tive as possible. Stringent arrangements make it
difficult to synchronise the use of the input factor
labour with the dynamics of the automotive
markets. Since other production locations catch up
in educated labour forces with less regulation, the
European competitive position is eroding.
Knowledge loss due to forced joint ventures: In
some countries (for example, China) the automo-
tive industry must face the challenge of a loss of
knowledge in return for market access. Some legal
requirements force manufacturers to hold a
minority stake of local companies. An insecure legal
position concerning intellectual property rights
leads not only to a loss of knowledge but also to a
loss of a competitive advantage. The framework of
FDI and IPR has improved in the major emerging
markets but uncertainties, affecting predominantly
internationally active supplier companies, remain.
Slow growth in the home market: The growth of
the European automotive markets has been flat in
recent years compared to promising markets espe-
cially in South America and Asia. In addition, some
advanced automotive markets (e.g. US in the
nineties) show more positive sales trends than EU
markets. As other markets continue to grow the
demand advantages from the large European
market diminish over time.
Fragmentation of the single market: the EU
market is not yet uniform, not least due to differing
vehicle taxation in the Member States.
Political influence on value chain decisions:
Success stories in automotive production have
become the synonyms for economic success in
many industrialised European countries. The Euro-
pean Union hosts many famous automotive produc-
tion sites that are politically difficult to give up in
favour of modern and more efficient facilities. This
can undermine the future success of the industry.
Myopic demand feedback for premium segment
in the home market: While demand in the home
market is a strong competitive advantage, European
customers might not be the best proxy for demand
in emerging markets. The latter might emphasise
affordability and robustness over de-luxe models
incorporating high-tech and comfort. Only recently
EU car manufacturers start to address the challenge
of mass motorization in low income, emerging
economies.
4.6.1.3 Opportunities
Strong position in world markets: While success
in trade certainly indicates excellence in production
it also generates valuable know-how in terms of
assessing, opening and servicing foreign markets.
This expertise can hardly be obtained without actu-
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ally operating in situ. As a major player in interna-
tional markets, Europe has established stable chan-
nels that constitute a competitive advantage.
Engagement in China: The Chinese automotive
market is growing very rapidly. Among other things,
the country benefits from FDI equal to around USD
60 billion per year. Market size, terms of investment
and an improving infrastructure provide the basis for
foreign automotive companies. The potential of the
Chinese market attracts not only manufacturers but
also the whole supplier industry.
Trend towards free trade: As the world trade
organisation expands its membership and activities
are under way for a new round of trade liberalisa-
tion, Europe as a major player in automotive trade
should be among the prime beneficiaries from the
opening of new markets and the strengthening of
existing relationships.
New technologies and fuels: The technology of
fuel cells presents new opportunities for business
and the environment, beyond transportation. Due
to the dominant part of motor vehicles in air pollu-
tion, manufacturers must develop products which
could reduce CO2 emission and energy consump-
tion. In addition, European automotive firms are
leading in some transitional drive-train and fuel
technologies which can become profitable before
the fuel cell technology is ripe for the mass market.
Since the security of fuel supply is an issue for many
markets, the large experience of European manufac-
turers with different types of fuels can be of crucial
importance for the future.
4.6.1.4 Threats
Idiosyncratic innovation: It could be a danger for
the European automotive industry that in some
cases regulation might push innovation into dead
end streets.
Impact of regulation on value chain flexibility:
While changes in taste and technology require
constant re-configurations in the automotive value
chain, the regulatory framework may make this task
more difficult and costly. Should these regulations
strain European domestic producers more than
importing competitors they could become the
cause of a competitive disadvantage.
Deficits in road infrastructure: Obviously, rising
levels of road congestion and lacking road mainte-
nance in combination with increasing traffic
volumes make road transportation and hence
vehicle demand less attractive. Additionally, the
shortcomings in road transportation links make the
geographically widespread automotive production
system of Europe less competitive.
Over-capacities: In recent years European, North
American and Japanese markets see a sluggish
development in demand. In Europe and Japan the
sluggish market now continues for nearly a decade.
On the other hand, a rapid capacity build-up in
emerging Asian markets and Eastern European
markets is taking place. Both developments may
induce world over-capacity and stimulate price
competition. Due to high labour costs and lagging
labour productivity EU producers are not very well
equipped for price competition in the standard car
segment. This may induce additional pressures for
consolidation of the industry e.g. via mergers.
However it remains to be seen whether the current
slump in most established markets will continue.
There are examples (e.g. UK, US in the 1990s) of
revitalising established markets when the macroeco-
nomic conditions become more favourable.
Macroeconomic trend in Europe: The recent
economic downturn in most of Europe has also
affected the demand for automotive products.
Producers have largely stimulated demand through
extensive sales tactics (e.g. rebates). Still, a
prolonged economic downturn at home would
threaten the global competitiveness of the Euro-
pean automotive industry.
Groundbreaking innovations challenge existing
excellence in production: The European manufac-
turers distinguish themselves with an excellent posi-
tion in different markets. However, the threat of
missing groundbreaking innovations is still on the
agenda. Success can breed failure, as manufacturers
are in danger of being locked in traditional products
and technologies and ignore revolutionising devel-
opments outside their traditional field of expertise.
Some of those major breakthroughs are on the
horizon in the automotive sector. They have the
potential to make conventional value chain configu-
rations obsolete and subsequently open up oppor-
tunities for new competitors.
Major innovation competition from Japanese
producers: The Japanese automotive manufacturers
have a very competitive position in global vehicle
production and they are strong competitors of
European and American companies. In some fields
like hybrid engine they lead the market significantly
ahead of other manufacturers.
4.6.2 Forward vision: A scenario approach
The previous SWOT analysis outlined the major
driving forces in the competitiveness of the Euro-
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pean automotive industry. While those items were
presented separately they will obviously interact
dynamically.
Even if it s not feasible to define all possible combi-
nations of future outcomes it is useful to define at
least the range of possible developments. Hence,
two hypothetical scenarios were developed, a best
and a worst case. Both scenarios attempt to review
developments over the next 10 to 15 years based
on the discussion of previous sections. Note though
that undoubtedly new issues influencing competi-
tiveness that have not been considered yet will
emerge. Nevertheless, the scenarios stress key
mechanisms and cross dependencies with a view to
stimulate discussion.
4.6.2.1 The worst case: Killing the engine
The worst case scenario begins by assuming that
the gap in productivity can not be closed, resulting
in higher car prices and lower profit margins. More-
over, energy consumption outstrips supplies and
drives up fuel prices. There is a consensus that even-
tually hydrogen will be the fuel of the future but the
time of its arrival in the mass market has been post-
poned by another ten years. European manufac-
turers bet heavily on diesel technology while US
manufacturers license hybrid technology from
Japanese competitors. The deep gap between diesel
technology demand in the home market and in
their largest export market would make it difficult
for European manufacturers to realise economies of
scale while, in this scenario, Japanese manufacturers
have a first mover advantage in the hybrid tech-
nology. Japanese manufacturers receive royalty
incomes from licenses in the US market which
combined with a strong diesel expertise for the
European market makes them the dominant player.
European hopes of exporting the diesel trend to
other parts of the world, e.g. the US, China or Japan
fade, too, as officials in these countries advocate
hybrid technology because of the learning effects
when the hydrogen engine eventually arrives and
because of its environmental advantage in
congested cities. By 2015 European manufacturers
would have lost their position in world trade and
focus primarily on the home market.
In the meantime, on the back of the large and
steadily growing home market and without a viable
alternative due to massive over-capacities and sunk
investments, China has become the world’s third
largest automotive exporter since 2010. Chinese
manufacturers have emerged as highly productive
producers who have transferred know-how and
competitive resources out of joint ventures into
companies which are completely under Chinese
control. While most trade tariffs are gone by now,
Chinese standards and regulations make it difficult
for European automotive producers to generate
additional growth through exports. On the
contrary, low-priced imports from China could
threaten their home market and export markets in
Eastern Europe.
Under the worst case scenario, European producers
find it difficult to compete as concerns production.
Innovation intensity and investment remains strong
but most of these activities are spurred by regula-
tory requirements not by the market. Accordingly,
they generate costs but rarely sales. Design – the
traditional mainstay of European cars – would be
not only limited by the dominant platform produc-
tion concept but also by regulatory requirements.
Product differentiation strategies become less
feasible; as European customers are offered less
design options, price would become the crucial
sales argument. Customer loyalty towards home
brands could suffer as a result. Hence, with the
exception of a few niche players, all manufacturers
would turn towards cost cutting. In a reverse of the
previous small and flexible production trend, Euro-
pean manufacturers would then rely again on
economies of scale. High costs for transportation,
especially through fuel prices, and chronically
congested roads could make it difficult to sustain
elaborate multi-plant multi-location value chains.
European manufacturers would refocus their
production system, leaving only marketing and
R&D facilities in Western Europe. Labour intensive
production operations are at first shifted towards
the new Member States and, as labour costs start
rising there too, they might move further east.
Naturally, some Member States would be hit harder
than others. The burden would weigh especially
heavily on the largest ones. Keeping production and
jobs there would become an issue of intense polit-
ical debate, possibly leading to mounting union
activism and pressures to subsidise and further
consolidate production. By 2019 only three Euro-
pean producers might remain, serving primarily
their home market, together with some smaller
players serving niches in the domestic and foreign
luxury car segments. They account for roughly 60
per cent of the home market; 25 per cent is held by
Japanese brands, the rest is covered by low-priced
imports from South Korea and China.
Under these hypotheses, the world market for auto-
motive products would be dominated by Japanese
and Chinese manufacturers, while NAFTA and Euro-
pean producers would have hardly any export
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success stories to tell. The vast majority of automo-
tive production would be performed on the eastern
border of the EU. EU employment in the sector
could be down to 350,000 jobs while the race is on
for the new hydrogen engine that will define auto-
motive competitiveness anew.
4.6.2.2 European automotive industry: Taking
the pole position
Under the best case scenario, the European manu-
facturers succeed quickly in their efforts to improve
productivity, taking full advantage of the enlarge-
ment. Moreover, the joint ventures in China allow
them to keep a high market share on the Chinese
market and to produce competitive vehicle models
for the Asian and US market. Own R&D efforts to
develop hybrid technologies, are successful and
complement technical breakthroughs in gasoline
technology and alternative fuel technology. Diesel
would become a viable option in the Chinese,
Japanese and US markets for passenger cars, permit-
ting the European automotive industry to benefit
fully from its competitive edge in efficient and clear
diesel technologies.
The groundbreaking innovation in commercialising
fuel cell technology is not that far away. An opti-
mistic perspective might see European governments
calling for zero emission cars by 2015 and the Euro-
pean industry benefiting from previous R&D proj-
ects. By 2015, the fuel cell would not only one of
the standardised products offered by European
manufacturers but also the beginning of new age of
technology.
In such a case, the European automotive industry
would gain high returns for its R&D investments
and make high profits thanks to increased produc-
tivity. It would be able to develop product differen-
tiation even further and create tailor-made cars for
new consumer groups. Passenger cars would also
offer different features to meet the needs of older
people as ageing advances.
The European automotive industry would, in this
case, take advantage of an already familiar regula-
tory framework in the new Member States and rela-
tively low wages. New clusters would emerge which
make possible serving the Russian market after
Russia’s accession to the WTO. Living standards in
China and Russia improve markedly and luxury
goods become accessible to larger consumer
groups.
In this view, by 2020 2.5 million people would work
in the automotive industry in Europe. The three
main players in global car markets remain Europe,
Japan and the US but their respective weights
would shift. Europe would control 55 % of the
world automotive output followed by Japan and the
US. The fuel cell would be part of almost every
modern car by now. Pollution would no longer be
an issue nor would traffic related deaths and
injuries, due to the development of active and
passive safety features. The automotive sector
would still be one of the backbones of Europe’s
economy and other sectors would prosper in its
shadow.
4.6.3 Policy issues
While the European automotive industry is currently
in a strong position compared to its major rivals there
are major challenges and opportunities ahead. The
fate of the industry will primarily depend on the
excellence and expertise of the individual companies.
There is also an important role for policy to play as an
enabler and facilitator and, more importantly, by
setting framework conditions that are conducive to
growth and innovation. Which are the policy areas
that are the most relevant to the competitiveness of
the automotive industry?
Increase labour productivity. The labour produc-
tivity gaps described in section 4.4.2 need to be
addressed. This is primarily the task of manufac-
turers; it would become easier if a well functioning
social partnership exists. Human capital investment
needs to be commensurate to the increasing need
for skilled and adaptable workers.
Technical innovation. The innovative capacity of
the European automotive industry depends prima-
rily on its own efforts; however, the effectiveness
and efficiency of the European and national innova-
tion systems play an important role also. In partic-
ular, given the structural shifts in the automotive
industry, the need for R&D investment for small and
medium sized suppliers has increased markedly. As
cars will still be one of the most popular means of
conveyance,  R&D objectives in the automotive
industry should be directed towards developing
environmental friendly vehicles. This includes in
particular finding adequate technology/fuel solu-
tions which ensure a long-term security of supply at
acceptable costs. Among others, one should aim at
developing fuel cells as standardised products
within the next twenty or so years.
Regulation. The importance of the car in the
economy and in everyday life places it necessarily at
the centre of many, sometimes divergent, regulatory
requirements. The industry has an interest in the
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continuation and fruition of efforts to better regulate
with a view to achieving a predictable and stable
regulatory environment and to develop lead market
advantages. In order to support the productivity
catching-up process regulators have to continue to
assess carefully the impact of future regulations on
the competitiveness of the automotive industry.
Regulations have to anticipate technology trends
and take into account that EU automotive compa-
nies, in order to exploit economies of scale and
scope, must be able to sell similar products in
Europe and on the world market. International regu-
latory harmonisation for motor vehicles through the
1958 and 1998 Agreement in the framework of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
becomes, therefore, crucial.
The automotive industry recognises the importance
of environmental concerns and of demands for safer
vehicles and has already taken, and will continue to
take, action to contribute to long-term solutions. In
the past, tax policies proved important to set incen-
tives for consumers to buy advanced technologies
and such a strategy could also prove successful
again in the future. Such tax policies should also be
used to further align the Member States’ vehicle
tax systems, so as to allow industry to reap the full
benefits from operating within a single market.
Strong competition in the home market is neces-
sary to succeed in international markets. An efficient
merger and acquisition (M&A) framework and the
rejection of possible attempts to adopt distortive
protective measures should contribute towards
preserving the competitiveness of the European
automotive industry. In this context, social partner-
ship, collective agreements and information and
consultation will be instrumental in smoothing the
social consequences of restructuring.
The European automotive industry is competitive
in international markets. Still, this strength can
only be fully utilised if barriers to free trade are
removed. While these include traditional tariffs
and quotas, major non-tariff barriers (for example,
the lack of international standards or an IPR
framework) should also be addressed. Moving
further in trade liberalization, especially in major
emerging markets and as concerns foreign invest-
ment, would certainly foster the competitiveness
of the automotive industry.
While a discussion of macroeconomic conditions
belongs elsewhere, it is important to note that
despite reform steps taken in recent years there is
still room for more flexible labour markets, improve-
ments in existing company taxation systems, etc.
For the automotive industry a functioning road
infrastructure is the necessary base for automotive
demand. More generally, road transport is the back-
bone of the European transportation system.
Neglecting Europe’s road transport could jeopardise
its competitiveness as a whole. Future transport
needs, fuelled by new logistics, more intense divi-
sion of labour and new characteristics of products,
will require flexible modes of transport. Given the
insufficiency of current transport infrastructure and
in view of the additional demands associated with
enlargement there is a strong need for additional
transport investment.
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
The European automotive industry provides jobs for
more than 2 million Europeans. One out of ten Euro-
pean automotive workers lives in the new Member
States. The industry produced 17 million cars in 2002
(42 % of global production) and 14 % of all trucks
produced world-wide. In EU-15, the industry
invested more than ￿ 30 billion in 2001 and
accounted for 38 % of R&D expenses of the three
leading automotive regions (Japan, USA and EU).
Some of the best known global automotive players
have their roots in Europe. German and French compa-
nies hold four positions in the global production top
ten. Additionally, Europe has some strong niche players
especially in the premium segment. Not surprisingly, a
strong European network of sophisticated suppliers has
developed. The role of suppliers in the production
process is increasing because of technological innova-
tion and especially through consolidation and the
restructuration of the value chain.
Recent trends in automotive production show a shift
away from large standardised fleets towards differ-
entiated products that follow customer tastes and
needs more closely. Value-chain operations have
adapted to this trend. The importance of economies
of scale in production has diminished in favour of
modular flexible production techniques. Large scale
production is still a major instrument in achieving
cost efficiency but this no longer applies to the
complete car but to the basic platform instead.
Therefore, high potential car factories are smaller
and more flexible production sites that operate at
the centre of an optimised supply and distribution
network. This development stands in sharp contrast
to gigantic production sites of the past. The modern
production facilities are designed to operate prof-
itably at almost all levels of capacity utilisation, no
matter whether fluctuations are triggered by macro-
economic shocks or by changes in tastes.
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The role of suppliers has been changing too. Suppliers
have traditionally been responsible for achieving
primarily cost efficiency in the automotive value chain
while vehicle manufacturers focused on customer
responsiveness. As suppliers are moving towards
manufacturing whole modules the line between
suppliers and manufacturers blurs, especially since the
former are becoming also responsible for module
innovation and development. This suggests increasing
strategic power for first-tier suppliers. However,
customers buy a product (a car) not an assembly of
components and vehicle manufacturers control the
prime element of this customer focus, the brand.
Hence, vehicle manufacturers will ultimately keep the
lead role in automotive production.
Europeans are avid car buyers. They used a total of
209 million cars in 2002 (38 % of all cars globally),
making it the largest single market in the world.
Apart from cars, the truck sector has also a consid-
erable size of more than 30 million vehicles in use in
2002. However, due to low economic growth the
demand for cars and trucks was sluggish in Europe
and Japan in the last decade. Presently, there is no
convincing sign for a sustained turnaround.
Europe’s vehicle manufacturers have established a
strong bond with domestic customers. These loyal
customers in the largest car market in the world are
a strong competitive advantage that can hardly be
copied or assailed by foreign competitors. Devel-
oping and introducing a new car model requires
considerable resources (time, finances and human
capital) and involves substantial risks as to whether
the investments can be recouped by future sales.
Hence, developing a new automotive product
isolated from its prospective market appears to be
not a feasible option. Customer feedback and inter-
action is necessary for a successful product. It is also
true that European automotive producers need to
invest abroad to generate access to tacit customer
and market information in order to be successful in
foreign markets. As long as these foreign engage-
ments are driven by the search for knowledge and
customer responsiveness abroad they make the
European automotive industry stronger, not weaker.
Based on its home market and its investments abroad,
the European automotive industry has maintained a
traditionally strong position in exports and global sales.
This supports the suggestion that its automotive
industry is competitive. Its presence in emerging
markets, such as China and the Russian Federation, is a
promising source of future growth and profits.
EU enlargement facilitates this development by
combining affordable labour with the proximity to
traditional European automotive clusters. The new
Member States have emerged as great production
opportunity for the European automotive industry.
Especially Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic and Hungary show a promising combina-
tion of a traditional expertise in the sector, afford-
able labour and the proximity to the large European
markets.
However, EU automotive industry still lags behind
the US and Japan in terms of productivity. The
catching-up process of the EU automotive industry
has slowed down in the last decade despite steep
increases in some Member States.
The level of labour costs presents an increasingly
serious problem for the automotive industry in
some Member States. Still, labour cost per hour
worked in the EU is somewhat below the US but
significantly higher than in Japan and especially in
Korea. In addition, Germany’s labour costs are even
higher than in the US. The US automotive industry
contained the growth of real product labour costs
in the last decade. The reverse is true for EU and
Japan. Given the current level of labour produc-
tivity, this is clearly an adverse development than
endangers jobs. In this context, EU enlargement has
and will continue to provide automotive firms in
high wage countries with new opportunities to
profit from low labour costs by via restructuring and
relocating significant parts of their value chain. This
will help the EU-15 automotive industry to stay
competitive albeit jobs prospects are less promising
than in the past.
Relatively high labour costs and their negative
impact on price competitiveness are a special threat
in light of structural overcapacity in the global auto-
motive industry. Seen in a global context, capacity
utilisation rates are still high in the EU and there
have been some signs of recovery in recent months.
However, despite overcapacity in global automotive
production, new capacity will enter the market soon
from emerging countries like China but also from
the new Member States. This will inevitably fuel
price competition globally especially in the mass
market segments of the automotive industry.
Based on performance on the global automotive
market one can conclude that the European auto-
motive industry is competitive. However, success in
the future is clearly not guaranteed. Japanese manu-
facturers are equally strong in investing in automo-
tive innovations and US producers are taking advan-
tage not only the large home market but have also
pursued internationalisation strategies for years.
There are major technological challenges ahead,
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most prominently the development of new tech-
nology/fuel combinations, including fuel cells.
Competition and innovation will continue to be
central determinants of the viability and strength of
Europe’s automobile industry.
World-wide demands to make vehicles safer and more
environment-friendly will continue. These demands
will drive research and innovation; it is of crucial
importance to identify and implement innovative
technical solutions that will become global, thus
giving European industry a first mover advantage.
The competitiveness of the automotive industry,
and of the European economy, depends on a
coherent and cost-effective regulatory framework.
This drove the Commission to use increasingly the
tools of ‘Better Regulation’, such as Impact Assess-
ment techniques. Nevertheless, there is still progress
to be made as concerns reducing regulatory
complexity and designing regulations so as to meet
their goals while taking into account possible
conflicts between regulations, their cumulative
impact and their external aspects.
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Table A.4.1: Ranking of suppliers in the automotive industry by turnover in 2001
Company Country Turnover. ￿ 2001bn
1 Delphi USA 28.7
2 Bosch D 23.2
3 Visteon USA 19.6
4 Denso J 17.9
5 Lear USA 15.0
6 Johnson Controls USA 15.0
7 Magna Int. CDA 11.6
8 Continental D 11.2
9 TRW USA 11.1
10 Faurecia F 9.6
11 Aisins Seiki J 9.3
12 Dana USA 8.5
13 Valeo F 8.1
14 ZF Friedrichshafen D 7.8
15 Yazaki J 6.8
16 Arvin Meritor USA 6.4
17 Thyssen Krupp Automotive D 6.2
18 DuPont USA 5.7
19 Siemens VDO Automotive D 5.7
20 Michelin F 5.1
Source: AP.
Appendix
Table A.4.2: M&A transactions 2002 – manufacturer
Daewoo Motor Co - 
Certain Assets KOR General Motors (& affiliates)/Daewoo Creditors INT 2,627 100
Renault SA FRA Nissan Motor Co Ltd JPN 1,959 15
Nissan Motor Co Ltd JPN Renault SA FRA 1,620 7.6
Ferrari SpA IT Mediobanca (net 24 %)/Commerzbank (net 10 %) IT/D 760 34
Dmax - diesel engines USA General Motors Corp USA 422 20
Maruti Udyog Ltd IND Suzuki Motor Corporation JPN 285 4.2
Tianjin Automotive Xiali Co Ltd CHN First Automotive Works CHN 171 51
Aixam FRA Norbert Dentressangle SA FRA 129 100
Yantai Bodyshop Corp CHN General Motors/Shanghai Auto US/CHN 109 100
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
Target Target 
Nation
Buyer Buyer’s 
Nation
Deal value
($m)
% 
Acquired
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Germany 20.7 21.6 14.8 20.8 12.9 47.0 17.1
France 8.5 8.0 5.8 8.9 11.9 5.4 8.8
UK 5.0 4.3 2.5 1.9 8.0 6.3 7.1
Italy 4.6 3.5 6.0 4.6 6.1 5.9 7.2
Belgium/
Luxembourg 6.1 8.1 4.7 13.4 2.7 2.1 4.9
Netherlands 1.7 0.9 3.0 14.5 1.4 2.9 5.0
Denmark 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4
Ireland 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Spain 4.4 5.8 2.2 2.0 3.6 0.6 2.3
Portugal 0.3 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.7
Sweden 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.4 3.0 0.6 2.2
Finland 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.3 1.0
Austria 0.8 0.3 2.2 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.8
Switzerland 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.6
Norway 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.7
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Turkey 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.5
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
Hungary
Canada 8.8 8.7 17.8 7.5 7.7 0.3 4.3
USA 10.7 6.8 11.5 8.1 21.5 5.8 15.5
Mexico 1.4 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7
Japan 23.6 27.0 24.2 13.5 17.1 19.8 13.6
South Korea
Australia 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.9
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
EU-15 excluding 
intra EU-15 trade 22.9 22.3 16.3 38.0 20.6 45.1 34.7
World market share: Share of national exports on total OECD exports.
1) OECD without Poland, Czech Republic, Slovac Republic, Hungary and Korea.
Source: OECD: ITCS - International Trade By Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 2001, 2002. - NIW calculation.
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Table A.4.3: M&A transactions 2002 – supplier
TRW Inc USA Northrop Grumman Corp USA 11.7 100
Edscha AG D Carlyle Management Group/Edscha Management USA 605 98
Teksid SpA IT Questor/JP Morgan PE/PE Partners/AIG USA 453 100
Donnelly Corp USA Magna International Inc CAN 389 100
Varta AG (Auto Batteries Div) D Johnson Controls Inc USA 308 100
FTE Automotive GmbH D Hg Capital Ltd UK 198 100
Conti Temic 
Microelectronic GmbH D Continental AG D 188 40
Unisia Jecs Corp JPN Hitachi Ltd JPN 184 83.3
Cie Financiere Michelin CHN Michelin SA FRA 175 6.3
Aetna Industries & Zenith Inc. USA Questor Management Co USA 145 100
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers.
Target Target
Nation
Buyer Buyer’s
Nation
Deal value
($m)
% 
Acquired
Country 78
Automotive
products
781
Motor cars
782
Trucks
783
Buses,
road tractors
784
Parts and
accessories
Other road
vehicles
Total 
merchandise
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Table A.4.5: World shares in vehicles automotive of OECD-countries in 2001
Germany 20.1 22.4 14.3 23.6 13.5 34.7 13.9
France 7.4 7.2 6.2 7.9 9.1 4.0 7.3
UK 3.8 3.9 2.4 1.6 4.7 2.9 6.4
Italy 3.7 2.3 5.7 0.6 5.6 7.9 6.1
Belgium/
Luxembourg 5.4 6.7 4.8 9.2 2.8 3.2 4.6
Netherlands 1.7 1.2 2.4 13.2 1.1 3.7 4.1
Denmark 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1
Ireland 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.9
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Spain 5.1 5.6 5.2 2.3 4.7 2.4 2.7
Portugal 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.6
Sweden 1.6 1.4 0.7 3.4 2.4 0.8 1.8
Finland 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.1
Austria 1.3 0.9 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.7 1.6
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 2.0
Norway 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5
Iceland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Turkey 0.4 0.3 0.7 2.4 0.4 0.2 0.7
Poland 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Czech Republic 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.7 0.8
Slovak Republic 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3
Hungary 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
Canada 10.1 10.6 17.2 11.0 7.8 1.3 5.2
USA 10.8 6.1 11.6 7.1 22.7 7.7 16.9
Mexico 5.3 5.1 12.3 1.4 4.3 1.3 3.6
Japan 15.5 17.6 10.1 6.9 12.2 22.2 9.8
South Korea 2.9 4.0 1.3 3.7 1.5 0.8 3.8
Australia 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.8
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
EU-15 excluding 
intra EU-15 trade 25.3 26.5 17.9 36.8 21.4 41.0 31.5
World market share: Share of national exports on total OECD exports
Source: OECD: ITCS - International Trade By Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 2001, 2002. - NIW calculation
Country 78
Automotive
products
781
Motor cars
782
Trucks
783
Buses,
road tractors
784
Parts and
accessories
Other road
vehicles
Total 
merchandise
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Table A.4.6: Joint ventures in China
Foreign Company Chinese Ventures
GM 1. GM: Shanghai GM, Jinbei GM, SAIC-GM Wuling, Shanghai-GM Dongyue
2. Suzuki: Chang’an Suzuki, Changhe Suzuki
3. Isuzu: Qingling Motor (Isuzu), Jiangling (Isuzu), Guangzhou Isuzu Bus
4. Fiat: Nanjing Fiat
5. Fujiheavy: Guiyang Yunque
Ford 1. Ford: Chang’an Ford, Jiangling (Ford) Motors Group
2. Mazada: Hainan Mazada, FAW Car (technology cooperation)
Toyota 1. Toyota: Tianjin FAW Toyota, Sichuan Toyota, FAW Xiali (technology cooperation), Brillance Auto
(technology cooperation, FAW Toyota Sales)
2. Daihatsu: FAW Xiali (technology cooperation), FAW Huali (technology cooperation)
3. Hino: Shenfei Hino
Volkswagen 1. VW: FAW-VW, Shanghai-VW, SAIC-VW Sales
2. Audi: FAW-VW (10 %)
Daimler-Chrysler 1. Daimler-Chrysler: Beijing Jeep, Yaxing Benz, Beijing Benz Truck (under negotiation), South East
Motor Benz (under negotiation)
2. Mitsubishi: Hunan Changfeng, Beijing Jeep (technology cooperation), South East Auto (tech-
nology cooperation), Harbin Hafei Motor (technology cooperation)
3. Hyundai: Beijing Hyundai, Dongfeng Yueda-Kia, Jianghuai Auto (technology cooperation),
Rongcheng Huatai (technology cooperation)
Renault-Nissan 1. Renault: Sanjiang Renault
2. Nissan: Zhengzhou Nissan, Dongfeng Motor Co. Ltd.
3. Nissan: Fengshen Motor (Nissan Motor).
PSA 1. Peugeot – Citroen: DPCA – Dongfeng Peugeot Citroen Co. Ltd.
Honda 1. Honda: Guangzhou Honda, Honda China Co. Ltd. (Guangzhou), Dongfeng Honda Wuhan) Co.
Ltd.
BMW 1. Brillance - BMW
FIAT 1. Fiat Auto: Nianjing Fiat
2. Iveco: Naveco (Iveco-Yuejin Group)
3. Iveco: Haveco (Iveco-Yuejin Group-Hanghzou Group)
4. Iveco: Iveco-Changzhou Bus Company (CBC)
Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center.
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Table A.4.7: Assembly plants in Central and Eastern Europe
Manufacturer Country Plant Site/Name Products
(country of mother 
company)
Andoria-Mot Sp. z.o.o. Poland Andrychów Honker Suv, Lublin
Audi Hungaria Motor Kft. Hungary (VW Germany) Györ Audi TTCoupé/Roadster
Automobile Dacia S.A. Romania (Renault France) Pitesti Dacia Berlina/Break, pick up,
Supernova
Daewoo Automobile Romania, S.A. Romania (Rep. Korea) Craiova Daewoo Cielo, Matiz, Nubiera,
Lanos, Takuma (CKD)
Daewoo Avia Czech Republic (Rep. Korea) Prague Avia small trucks
Daewoo-FSO Motor Poland (Rep. Korea) Warsaw Daewoo Matiz, Nubria, Lanos
Fiat Czech Republic (Italy) Vysoké Myto Karosa buses
Fiat Auto Poland (Italy) Tychy Fiat Palio Weekend, Seicento, 
Nuova Panda
Magyar Suzuki Hungary (Japan) Esztergom Suzuki: Wagon R+, Ignis
MAN Poland (DaimlerChrysler  Starachowice STAR trucks, NEOPLAN
Germany) Tarnowo
NABI Hungary Kaposvar Compobus vehs.
OpelPolska Sp.z.o.o. Poland (GM USA) Gliwice Opel Agila
Revoz Slovenia (Renault France) Novo Mesto Renault Clio
Scania Poland (Sweden) Slupsk Scania buses
Skoda Auto a.s. Czech Republic  Kvasiny Mlada
(VW Germany) Boleslav Vrchlabi Superb
Fabia, Octavia
Octavia
Volkswagen Poznan Sp.z.o.o. Poland (Germany) Poznañ Skoda, Fabia, VW: T5
Volkswagen Slovakia Slovakia (Germany) Bratislava VW: Bora, Polo A04, 
Golf R32, Golf A4, Touareg, 
Porsche Cayenne bodies, 
SEAT Ibiza
Volvo Trucks Poland (Sweden, Scania?) Wroclaw Volvo trucks
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2003, p. 18 f.
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Table A.4.8: CO2 Emissions and Fuel Consumption, 1995-2002
ACEA 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 (3) 2002 (3) Change 95/02 [%] (4)
CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2
(g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km)
Petrol-fuelled vehicles 188 182 180 177 172 172/171 -8.5/9.0 % (6)
Diesel-fuelled vehicles 176 167 161 157 153 155/152 -11.9/13.6 % (6)
All fuels (1) 185 178 174 169 165 165/163 -10.8/12.1 % (6)
(5)
JAMA (2) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 (3) 2002 (3) Change 95/02 [%] (4)
CO2 CO2  CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2
(g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km)
Petrol-fuelled vehicles 191 184 181 177 174 172 -9.9 %
Diesel-fuelled vehicles 239 221 221 213 198 180 -24.7 %
All fuels (1) 196 189 187 183 178 174 -11.2 %
KAMA (2) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 (3) 2002 (3) Change 95/02 [%] (4)
CO2 CO2  CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2
(g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km)
Petrol-fuelled vehicles 195 198 189 185 179 178 -8.7 %
Diesel-fuelled vehicles 309 248 253 245 234 203 -34.3 %
All fuels (1) 197 202 194 191 187 183 -7.1 %
EU-15 (2) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 (3) 2002 (3) Change 95/02 [%] (4)
CO2 CO2  CO2 CO2 CO2 CO2
(g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km) (g/km)
Petrol-fuelled vehicles 189 182 180 178 173 172 -9.0 %
Diesel-fuelled vehicles 179 171 165 163 156 157 -12.3 %
All fuels (1) 186 180 176 172 167 166 -10.8 %
(1) Petrol and diesel-fuelled vehicles only, other fuels and statistically not identified vehicles are not expected to affect these averages significantly.
(2) Data from Member States are taken for 2002. For the ‘change 95/02’, 95 data are taken from the associations and 2002 data originate from the
Member States. New passenger cars put on the EU market by manufacturers not covered by the Commitments would not influence the EU
average significantly.
(3) The figures for 2001 and 2002 are corrected by 0.7 % for the change in the driving cycle.
(4) Percentages are calculated from unrounded CO2 figures; for 2002 data is taken from Member States.
(5) The first figure is based one data from Member States; the second figure is based on data from ACEA.
(6) The first figure is based on 2002 data from Member States and 1995 data from ACEA; the second figure is based solely on data from ACEA.
Source: European Commission (2004).
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In the course of the last quarter century China has
become a major presence in the international
economy and today seems to be on a trajectory
towards even greater prominence. The market-
oriented transformations initiated in the late seven-
ties have created conditions supportive of economic
growth and for China’s progressive integration in
the international economy. The gradual establish-
ment of market-based conditions has opened up
possibilities for economic actors to exploit compar-
ative advantages resulting in a more rational divi-
sion of labour that previously.
Economic relations between China and Europe are
entering a new era.188 Two major events have
contributed to this. First, China’s accession to the
WTO in December 2001 and the subsequent imple-
mentation of the accession protocol is changing its
position in the global economy. Secondly, enlarge-
ment and the integration of ten new Member
States in May 2004 will alter economic structures in
Europe. As a consequence, a large number of insti-
tutional barriers to trade and investment are being
dismantled and, as a result, new trade and invest-
ment possibilities are emerging. It is likely that these
changes will lead to new patterns in the interna-
tional division of labour and significant pressure for
structural change will be exerted on virtually all EU
economies.
Whereas a rising Chinese economy offers great
trading potential and investment opportunities for
European business, this Chapter mainly considers
235
the challenges it will pose to the EU and especially
to the new Member States and the candidate coun-
tries.189 The economic structures and factor endow-
ments of the new Member States, and even more
so of the candidate countries, would appear to
make them more susceptible to China’s competitive
pressure than the more industrialized EU-15
economies.190 The chapter is divided into three
parts, followed by some concluding remarks.
Section 5.2 discusses China’s economy and the
forces that are determining China’s recent advance
in the global economy; Section 5.3 discusses
China’s role in the global division of labour and the
China-EU economic relations in particular, including
trade patterns and foreign direct investment flows;
Section 5.4 addresses the impact a rising Chinese
economy might have on various industries in the EU
and especially in the new Member States; finally,
Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Growth factors and risks in
China’s economic
development
China’s economic transformation during the last 25
years has been spectacular. GDP has been growing
at an annual average of 9.0 % between 1979 and
2002 and parts of the economy have become hig-
hly integrated in the global production system.191
In the process, China has narrowed significantly the
large developmental gap separating it from the
industrialized economies only two decades ago.
Chapter 5:
The Challenge to the EU 
of a Rising Chinese Economy
189 Unless otherwise indicated, candidate countries are Bulgaria, Romania, and
Turkey.
190 See the Competitiveness Report 2003 for a detailed analysis of the competi-
tiveness of manufacturing in the accession and candidate countries.
191 The validity of China’s statistics has been often questioned (see e.g. Rawski
2001, 2002). It would be mistaken, however, to deny the extraordinary growth
performance of the Chinese economy during the last quarter century and
dismiss it as a statistical mirage. Alternative, independent, efforts to measure
economic activity in China indicate that at least in recent years the growth
performance of China’s economy might be understated by the official data (see
especially the Goldman Sachs China Activity Index and Goldman Sachs, 2003).
188 Throughout the Report ‘China’ refers to ‘People’s Republic of China’, ‘Hong
Kong’ to ‘People’s Republic of China – Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region’, and ‘Taiwan’ to ‘Taiwan Province of China’. All statistical data
presented are based on customs territories. Data for China are therefore
constrained to ‘Mainland China’. Statistical data for Hong Kong and Taiwan
are provided separately.
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Nevertheless, large segments of China’s economy
are still underdeveloped and, especially in the
Western provinces, notably poor. There remains a
long way to go and it is anything but certain that
China will be able to uphold the dynamics of its
recent development process.
5.2.1 Determinants of Economic
Development in China
China has traditionally been endowed with favourable
conditions for economic development and growth.
Abundant natural resources, a very high savings rate, a
huge supply of low-cost labour, a (potentially) large
domestic market as well as a sophisticated administra-
tive system bode well for economic development. But,
as China’s experiences during three decades of central
planning have shown, the existence of these ingredi-
ents alone is not enough.
The abandonment of the economically inefficient
ideological foundations and institutional arrange-
ments of the Maoist era in the late 1970s has laid the
foundations for a higher growth path.192 Ideological
changes adopted by the ruling elite have facilitated a
reorganisation of industry and the creation of a new
set of institutions and performance enhancing prop-
erty rights structures. These ideological break-
throughs together with the establishment of an
increasingly performance oriented institutional set-
up have created the foundation of China’s contem-
porary economic successes through increasing incen-
tives to respect market signals about scarcity and
profits. But although the Chinese economic system
has been gradually transformed, it is still far from
being a full market economy and further progress is
needed concerning, for example, the widespread
Box 5.1: China’s Low Labour Cost Advantage
The Chinese economy is endowed with a huge and growing labour force (see Graph B.1). Today close to 900 million
people are in the age group 15-64 but this will rise to 1 billion in the year 2015. The majority of these people have been
brought up in the countryside with little or no knowledge of industrial production. However, bereft of sufficient job
opportunities in the rural areas a large and growing number is migrating to the industrial centres in the coastal belt area.
This army of unskilled labour, approximately 150 to 200 million strong, has been the backbone of China’s ‘economic
miracle’ of the past two decades. The perpetual inflow of new labourers has been keeping wages low, although produc-
tion facilities had been expanding rapidly.
Graph B.1: Intertemporal Development of China’s Labour Force Population aged 15-64, in million (forecasts)
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Source: Graph based on United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database.
192 Two watershed-events may be distinguished (Bell 1993, Qian 2000): 1. At
the third plenary session of the Central Committee in 1978 the main contra-
diction in Chinese society is defined to be the insufficient performance of the
economic system with respect to the material needs of the population. 2. In
1992 Deng Xiaoping proclaims the ‘socialist market economy’ as China’s
new economic system of order. It is declared that the market mechanism is
nothing but a means to achieve economic development and growth.
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influence of the state and the lagging implementa-
tion of private property rights.193
Opening up to the outside world has allowed a
highly productive combination of China’s most
abundant factor of production, unskilled labour (see
Box 5.1), with the capital as well as the technolog-
ical and organisational knowledge of the world
economy.
Foreign trade has been the lever to adjust prices in
the Chinese economy and indicate relative scarcities
of goods and factors of production. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) has also been a catalyst to bring
China to the global economy. It was foreign
investors, initially overseas Chinese from Hong Kong
and South East Asia, that provided the knowledge
of what products China could manufacture for the
global market and how to penetrate the markets of
the industrialized world. In later stages China has
been successfully trading domestic market shares
for technological and organizational know how
introduced to the economy by foreign investors
from the industrialised world.
China’s economic policy makers, however, are not
content with China being the global centre for
labour intensive manufacturing. While industries
establishing labour intensive production capacities
in China will be promoted in order to create jobs for
China’s growing population, the real focus of
China’s industrial policy lies on the promotion and
establishment of higher value added, technology
intensive industries. From the beginning, foreign
investors have been courted to transfer technology
intensive production facilities to China.194 Foreign
investors introducing new technologies or estab-
lishing R&D facilities in China have been able to
receive the greatest benefits in form of tax exemp-
tions, special import/exports rights, access to the
domestic market, etc.
China’s industrial policy does not stop with the
selective promotion of FDI projects. Rather, the
domestic enterprise sector is the most important
target of these policies. Enterprises thought to
posses the potential to become global players have
been promoted by a number of preferential poli-
cies. These ‘national champions’ have enjoyed a
wide range of special policies and direct support
measures (Nolan, 2001, Nolan and Zhang, 2002).
From this heavy handed industrial policy approach,
China has upgraded its industrial capacities much
faster than if market forces alone would have been
at play. Any positive short-term effects of this policy,
however, are endangered by long-term repercus-
sions resulting from such ‘growth engineering’.
5.2.2 Downside Risks to China’s Economic
Development
How sound are the foundations of China’s remark-
able growth process? Four areas of concern stand
out.
(a) The Dismal Banking Sector – State Owned
Enterprise Sector Nexus
The greatest risk to the development process is
probably the poor performance of the banking
sector and its dismal relationship with the state
owned enterprise sector. The banking sector is
highly successful in attracting savings but the allo-
cation of these savings to investment projects
undertaken by state-owned enterprises is not always
the more efficient one.195 The banks are still pushed
to finance projects that are deemed socially neces-
sary but yield no commercial rates of return. As
long as such projects are financed by the banking
sector the problem of soft budget constraints
persists – enterprises are not concerned with the
profitability of their business activities and banks
have no incentive to diligently monitor and restrict
their credit outlays. As a result, a large share of
credit allocated by the banking sector has turned
into non-performing loans and is not recoverable.
Estimates of the costs of bailing out the Chinese
banking sector range from 30-58 % of China’s 2000
GDP (OECD, 2002) to 41 % of the 2003 GDP
(Goldman Sachs, 2003).196
Bailing out the banking sector and establishing a
firewall separating policy loans from commercial
banking activities can be only one, albeit inefficient,
measure to solve this problem. Further efforts
addressing the reform of the banking system
include the need for banks to run on a commercial
basis, meet prudential requirements, establish risk
control procedures, etc. It is also necessary to trans-
form the state-owned enterprises – which are not
only the main recipients of bank credit but also the
main source of non-performing-loans – into
commercial entities. These enterprises must be
195 In the last two decades China’s savings rate has been in the range of 35-
43 % of GDP.
196 Although substantial progress has been made in recent years many chal-
lenges remain. No real breakthrough can be expected while the nexus
between the banking sector and a not really accountable state-owned enter-
prise sector remains in existence.
193 According to a recent European Commission report (European Commission,
2004) some of the areas of concern include: state interference, corporate
governance, property rights and bankruptcy regime, and the financial sector.
194 Li (1988), and Hiemenz and Li (1988) show that relative factor prices have
been manipulated in favour of capital, resulting in a higher capital intensity
of foreign invested enterprises production than would comply with local
factor endowments.
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confronted with a threat of dissolution if they
become insolvent. Such a threat, however, cannot
be credible if these enterprises are not freed from
the implementation of tasks that belong to the
domain of government.
(b) An Irreconcilable Gap between Labour Sup-
ply and Demand
China’s abundant (unskilled) labour supply is the
key to its successful transformation into the world’s
manufacturing power. At the same time it consti-
tutes a threat to sustainable socio-economic devel-
opment for as long as the supply of labour exceeds
the demand for low-cost labour by such a wide
margin as today. At the moment, China is barely
able to contain the excess supply of unskilled labour
at a level acceptable to society.
According to some estimations the rural sector
could be sheltering a high unemployment number
(around 150 million people).197 The state-owned
enterprise sector could also be harbouring a large
reservoir of hidden unemployment. To raise enter-
prise competitiveness, these employees must enter
the open labour market. Due to the restructuring
process speeded up by China’s accession to WTO
up to 5 million people may be shed by China’s
state-owned enterprise sector annually over the
near term while the demand for labour in the agri-
cultural sector is falling dramatically.198 China is
also facing a demographic shock which will lead to
an increase of its population aged 15-64 years at
least until the year 2015 (see Box 5.1). This shock
alone amounts to a net enlargement of the
Chinese labour market by three times the equiva-
lent of the total German labour market during the
next 10 years.
The political task to create an environment in which
such an enormous number of new jobs can be
created year by year is momentous. The promotion
of private initiative (domestic as well as foreign) will
be of decisive importance if the phenomenon of
open unemployment is kept in dimensions that are
still socially accepted. The recent ideological
upgrading of private property as well as the
continued encouragement of FDI indicates the
political will to strengthen such private initiatives.
The concept of a heavy handed discretionary indus-
trial policy and the idea to create ‘national cham-
pions’, however, raises doubts in how far the funda-
mental elements of competition-driven economic
development are in place.
A pertinent question concerns the market where the
products manufactured by the Chinese workforce
will be made available. Domestic demand is the
main destination and with growing affluence of the
population it will expand in coming years. An
export to GDP ratio of 31 % in the year 2003,
however, indicates that the world economy is also a
very important net indirect employer of Chinese
labour. Without the enormous international
demand for Chinese goods the economic miracle
could give way to severe unemployment and
poverty. Given the insufficient state of China’s social
security net serious social unrest could become a
likely scenario.
(c) Regional Disparity: How much is too much?
The policy of regional differentiation has been an
important factor in economic developments in China.
It has freed entrepreneurial acumen, concentrated
scarce resources in those regions able to put them to
best use and established a new form of inter-regional
competition. After 25 years of economic transforma-
tion and policies of openness, however, it becomes
obvious that these positive effects have been
purchased at a high price. There is no significant
intra-China pattern according to which booming
coastal provinces would transfer industries and value
chain segments no longer profitable in their locations
to the less developed hinterland. Instead the develop-
ment gap is widening and the distribution of income
is becoming increasingly more inequitable. The Gini
coefficient has been estimated at 0.45 for 2002, up
from 0.4 in 1998. In 2002 the level of per-capita
income in the richest province was more than ten
times that in the poorest one (Prasad, 2004).
The key to these developments relates to self-
enforcing effects that have improved further the
location advantages of those regions first to enter
the present growth path. Net-capital flows have
been moving from the West to the East, where the
rate of return is higher (Zweig, 2002); the Western
regions suffer a substantial brain drain as the most
skilled and entrepreneurial youth migrate to the
East Coast, lured by higher salaries and better living
conditions; and an enormous flow of unqualified
labour from the poor Westerns regions has been
migrating towards the coastal belt too.199 The
199 While per capita income seems to be converging within each region, the two
regions show a diverging development pattern (see Aziz and Duenwald, 2001).
Besides income disparities, the delivery of public services also favours the richest
provinces. Local governments –particularly in the poor provinces- experience diffi-
culties in financing basic services thus contributing to perpetuating regional dispar-
ities. This situation is partly a reflection of the system of intergovernmental fiscal
relations introduced in 1994. The transfer system, designed to compensate local
governments for revenue lost to the center and promote equalization across
provinces, clearly is in need of reform (see Prasad, 2004).
197 Prasad (2004).
198 See the background paper ‘The Challenge to the EU by a Rising Chinese
Economy,’ prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness
Report.
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‘Great Western Development Strategy’ launched in
2001 is one of the policy initiatives designed to
address the problem of regional disparity.
(d) State Capitalism and Corruption: Learning
from the Asian Crisis?
China’s policy of creating ‘national champions’ by
means of selective support measures and an accom-
modating regulatory policy as well as institution
building recalls memories of unsustainable industrial
policies in Korea and South East Asia, which eventu-
ally led to the dramatic events of the ‘Asian crisis’ in
1997-1998. China’s ‘national champions’ policy
coexists with a highly underdeveloped competitive
system. The allocation of resources and the resulting
industrial structures are to a considerable extent not
the outcome of market processes but rather of polit-
ical fiat. This has inevitably led to corruption.
During the transformation process numerous func-
tions in the administrative apparatus have become
superfluous and the structures of personal influence
and power have been altered considerably. Many of
those having lost discretionary power and influence
now occupy management positions in the corporate
sector, thus becoming a new bridge between the
corporate sector and the government. This interface
threatens the long-term performance of China’s
economic system in so far as it becomes a gateway
for corruption and strengthens the political leverage
on the corporate sector. In recent years reports of
corrupt behaviour have become a regular feature of
the Chinese media, revealing the omnipresence of
corruption which has already been permeating all
areas of social and economic life in China.
Besides the imbalances discussed above, there are
other important risks affecting the Chinese economy.
In particular, the rapid economic development of the
last decades has come at a steep cost to China’s envi-
ronment. And with economic development, popula-
tion growth and higher living standards, the amount
of primary energy consumed will increase in the
future (despite technological improvements and
reductions in energy intensity). The authorities are
beginning to take seriously the need of environ-
mental regulation. But the efforts are being partly
countered by weak law enforcement and by the low
levels of central government funding for environ-
mental protection (well under the level that Chinese
experts claim is necessary to prevent further deterio-
ration).
5.2.3 Development Prospects
Prospects for continued robust economic growth in
China appear to be very favourable. The key deter-
minants of growth will continue to be in place over
the foreseeable future and the institutional setting is
characterized by increasing incentives for perform-
ance and entrepreneurial initiative.
Cheap unskilled labour will remain the foremost
asset. The steady influx of unskilled labour from the
rural areas of Western China will allow China to
uphold its competitive advantage in the field of
labour-intensive manufacturing. However, skilled
labour (in the fields of engineering as well as
management) continues to be a scarce resource.
Skilled labour already commands prices similar to
those in the industrialized world. Skilled workers’
bottlenecks could hamper China’s economic expan-
sion in coming years even as domestic demand
takes the leading role in the growth process.
Although significant, it is likely that the risks to
China’s economic future will be at least in the short
term contained. A stronger and better structured
economy will eventually contribute to correcting
distortions accumulated during years of sectorally
and regionally unbalanced development. But even
though high economic growth would make pos-
sible the reduction of various imbalances (non-
performing-loans, arrears in the financing of the
social security system), structural reforms in the
banking sector and in the pension system, among
others, need to be addressed in order to secure the
way towards sustainable economic growth.
Though short-term risks appear to be manageable,
there is a danger of setting up structures that might
impede longer term economic performance. The
lack of a workable competitive system combined
with a heavy-handed industrial policy and wide-
spread corruption bode ill for the creation of indus-
trial structures that are to guide China’s economic
prospects in the coming decades. The danger of a
new substantial misallocation of capital is high.
Foreign investors may exercise influence but in view
of distorted incentive structures FDI will also
contribute to a sub-optimal allocation capital.
5.3 China in the global division
of labour and China’s economic
relations with the EU
The ascendancy of China in the global economy
amounts to a formidable challenge to established
patterns of specialisation and division of labour.
China has increasingly become a destination for
foreign direct investment in the developing world
and has turned into a manufacturing centre for a
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wide range of products. As a consequence, China is
absorbing large quantities of intermediate products
that are inputs for its export production. As China
will likely upgrade its industrial structures in the
foreseeable future it will inevitably further
strengthen its position in global trade.
Economic links between China and Europe have
intensified in recent years, in part to take advantage
of China’s favourable production facilities and
growing domestic markets.200 However, China’s
broadening competence in industrial manufacturing
is exerting significant competitive pressures on EU
industrial economies and especially on those of the
new Member States and candidate countries.
In the EU during a quarter century since the begin-
ning of China’s transformation process key events
bringing about a significant reorganization of the
European economies’ structure have been (i) the
single European market and (ii) the transformation
of the Central and Eastern European economies into
market economies. Both have provided business
opportunities for European enterprises allowing
them to take advantage of cost differentials and
easy access to markets. This has contributed to
rationalization and concentration of business activi-
ties across a wider Europe. Nevertheless, European
enterprises have also expanded their activities in
China and China-EU economic links have intensi-
fied. This has led to China becoming the most
important non-European trading partner of the EU
second only to the US and the most important one
in Asia in 2002.201
5.3.1 China’s Position in Global Trade
General Features of China’s Foreign Trade202
At the onset of China’s reform era its foreign trade
was determined by the amount of goods available
for export; i.e. exports basically constituted the
residual item between domestic production and
consumption. Since then China has converted its
export structure into one determined by a price
system based on relative scarcities.203 China’
exports integration in international trade has
increased significantly in recent years, gaining
market shares in most of the broad product groups
and enjoying the highest growth rates in IT prod-
ucts (Table 5.1). Exports have soared, making China
globally the fourth largest exporter (see Table 5.2)
and third in terms of merchandise imports. Strong
demand from China has contributed to raising
prices for commodities and raw materials and has
stimulated global growth.204
China’s high share of exports in GDP of 31 % in
2003, remarkable in itself for a large country, is
partly a reflection of China’s extensive export
processing activities which correspond to about half
of China’s foreign trade. China is importing unfin-
ished products which are then processed in labour-
intensive processes and subsequently exported as
finished or further processed products, thus gener-
ating high import and export volumes. The contri-
bution of these processing activities to GDP is,
however, comparatively low.
European Trade Relations with China
Trade between China and the EU has expanded at
great speed since China’s re-orientation of policy in
mid 1970s (see Graph 5.1). China’s importance for
Western Europe is primarily as a market to source
imports more than as an export market. While the
share of China in extra-EU15 imports was 7.4% in
2001 up from 2.6% in 1990, the share in extra-
EU15 exports was 3% in 2001 up from 1.5% in
1990. This unbalanced trade structure has led to
the emergence of deficits in the China-EU trade.
While exports from the EU to China have grown
annually at 9 % over the period 1995-2002, West
European imports from China have grown faster, at
an annual rate of 14.4 %.
More detailed data by product groups suggest that the
trade balance of EU-15 with China worsened between
1996 and 2002 in nearly all of the broad product
groups. The only exception to this among the biggest
industries is trade in chemicals where improvement
was caused primarily by the soaring Chinese demand
for intermediary goods - see Table 5.3.
There are several reasons for the import surge and
the worsening of the EU-China trade balance:
1. China is implementing a vigorous export-
oriented strategy and, in terms of trade balance
movements, this has contributed to offsetting
imports from the EU with its own exports.
204 China accounts for around 24% of world growth during the period 2001-
2003 (Prasad, 2004).
200 Detailed accounts of the developments in Chinese-European economic rela-
tions can be found in Taube (2002), and van den Bulcke et al. (2003).
201 According to Eurostat, the Chinese dominance is based on the large EU
import volume from China. In terms of exports Japan is still the most impor-
tant European partner in Asia.
202 Different trade statistical sources are used knowing that they are often not
directly comparable (for example, regarding trade volume Chinese Customs
Statistics measure direct trade only, while Eurostat includes the flow of goods
via third countries as well). The additional information gained by accessing
different sources justifies such a procedure.
203 China abstained from foreign borrowing during the Maoist era and was
virtually (foreign) debt free in the early 1980s. See Kamm (1989) for an
account of China’s foreign trade reform in this period.
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Table 5.2: Share in World Merchandise Trade by Region, 2003
Export Import
Rank US$ billion % Rank US$ billion %
Germany 1 748.4 10.0 United States 1 1305.6 16.8
United States 2 724.0 9.7 Germany 2 601.7 7.7
Japan 3 471.9 6.3 China 3 412.8 5.3
China 4 438.4 5.9 France 4 388.4 5.0
France 5 384.7 5.1 United Kingdom 5 388.3 5.0
UK 6 303.9 4.1 Japan 6 383.0 4.9
Netherlands 7 293.4 3.9 Italy 7 289.0 3.7
Italy 8 290.2 3.9 Netherlands 8 261.1 3.4
Canada 9 272.1 3.6 Canada 9 245.6 3.2
Belgium 10 254.6 3.4 Hong Kong 10 232.6 3.0
Source: WTO; own calculations.
Table 5.1: China’s Share in World Merchandise Trade by Product Groups 2001
Total trade 3,806.17 297.2 9.2 4.1 10.2
Of which:
Food products, beverages and tobacco 195.42 14.6 8.8 1.3 3.0
Textiles and textile products 199.86 60.6 35.7 3.0 5.8
Leather and leather products 46.85 17.1 43.0 4.8 7.3
Wood and wood products 39.38 2.6 7.7 1.6 8.6
Pulp, paper and paper products; 
publishing and printing 72.88 1.6 2.6 -1.2 7.5
Coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel 118.48 8.4 8.4 6.3 7.3
Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 337.86 14.9 5.2 5.4 6.3
Rubber and plastic products 111.06 3.0 3.2 4.0 10.2
Other non-metallic mineral products 76.76 5.4 8.3 4.3 6.0
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 226.89 18.1 9.4 1.0 5.1
Machinery and equipment 503.91 14.9 3.5 2.5 15.8
Office machinery and computers 138.49 26.3 22.4 5.1 30.4
Electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c. 264.59 28.2 12.5 5.0 19.0
Radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus 109.65 26.5 28.5 7.8 18.9
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 118.64 7.6 7.5 5.8 9.0
Transport equipment 433.48 10.1 2.7 5.2 15.6
*Exports include OECD plus China and Hong Kong exports and exclude intra-EU exports.
Source: UN World Trade Database; WIFO; own calculations.
2001
OECD 
exports*
China's exports 1996 - 2001 in %
￿ billion ￿ billion Share of OECD trade in
%
OECD China
Annual average 
growth of exports
Product groups (NACE)
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2. Growth of European investment projects in
China. As more and more enterprise ventures
entered into production in the 1990s, they not
only became important suppliers for European
imports but also increasingly substituted Euro-
pean exports as firms gradually entered the local
market. At the same time, foreign enterprises in
China are also major buyers of European capital
goods, and this makes it nearly impossible to
ascertain the net effects on the bilateral trade
balances of economies like the UK and Germany.
3. The rise of export processing business in China
has led to a redirection of European import
flows in China’s favour as production facilities
have moved from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
South East Asia to China. Imports which until
then had been classified as originating from
those countries now originate in China.
4. The surge of imports from China to the EU has to a
considerable extent been boosted by EU assis-
tance measures. China was included in the EC’s
System of Generalized Tariff Preferences (GSP) in
1980 and has since become one of its greatest
beneficiaries.205 The value of imports to EU
member countries from China that fell under the
GSP in 1995 amounted to 53.6 % of total EU
imports from China. Since then the EU has been
phasing out GSP preferences towards China.
According to recent data China is still the main
beneficiary with a share of more than 30 % of all
EU imports eligible for GSP preferential rates. In
addition, export subsidies and a distorted price
structure, at least until the middle of the 1990s,
had enhanced the price competitiveness of some
Chinese exporters in a way that seemed to warrant
the label ‘dumping’ and made China the target of
numerous anti-dumping measures by the EU.206
5. China has a long tradition of protecting
domestic industries thought to be unfit for inter-
national competition (Fukasaku and Lecomte
1998, Shirk 1994). These measures have
constrained European sales to China and have
adversely affected bilateral trade balances.
However, under its WTO commitments China
has been reducing the level and dispersion of its
average tariff and its non-tariff barriers. Satisfac-
tory compliance will minimize the impact of
protected domestic industries on EU exports to
China.
206 For a detailed discussion of the role of anti-dumping measures in the Sino-Euro-
pean trade relations see Strange (1998), Carzaniga (1997), Fu Donghui (1997).
205 The GSP scheme has been designed in order to strengthen the export activities of
developing countries in the markets of the developed industrialized countries.
Graph 5.1: Development of EU-China Trade, 1980-2002
EU-15 Trade with China
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
E
u
r
o
s
Exports Imports
Source: UN World Trade Database; WIFO; own calculations.
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Regarding China’s relations with the former
COMECON countries and Turkey, the absolute
volumes of bilateral trade are markedly smaller than
those with Western Europe. Furthermore, devel-
oping a trading relation with these countries met
obstacles in the form of structural rigidities, political
dependencies and ideological principles in the
COMECON group. Only a decade after the dissolu-
tion of the eastern block was it possible for these
nations to embrace a systematic development of
economic relations with China. On the export side,
the intensity of interaction with China is even
smaller than on the import side.
5.3.2 The Role of FDI Inflows in China’s
Economic Development
FDI is one of the most important mechanisms for
transferring technology and knowledge internation-
ally. Such inflows have been playing a central role in
China’s economic development during the last two
decades. Foreign invested enterprises (FIE) have
been the driving force in the modernization of
China’s industry, providing it with new technolog-
ical and organizational know how as well as access
to new markets.207
China has been extremely successful in attracting
FDI, becoming since the early 1990s the prime
destination in the developing world (See Graph
5.2).208 China has been absorbing 20-25 % of all
FDI directed towards developing countries and a
multiple of the FDI the whole African continent has
been able to attract. In comparison to the East
European economies China has also been attracting
by far more FDI - see Graphs 5.3 and 5.4.
207 For earlier discussion on this topic see Lemoine (2000) and Development
Bank of Japan (2003).
208 It should be noted that this upswing of FDI inflows to China coincides with a
general increase in global FDI flows to developing countries. According to
UNCTAD data average annual flows directed towards developing countries in
1990-1993 were double those of 1987-1989.
Table 5.3: EU-15 Trade with China by Broad Product Groups
Exports Imports Trade balances
Total manufactured products 37,016 8.9 47,389 14.5 -10,373 1,992 -12,366
Of which:
Food products, beverages and tobacco 546 -2.8 1,097 2.2 -551 -277 -274
Textiles and textile products 696 10.0 6,810 8.6 -6,114 -3,455 -2,658
Leather and leather products 452 13.7 2,537 9.0 -2,085 -1,201 -884
Wood and wood products 251 38.8 587 4.5 -336 -405 69
Pulp, paper and paper products; 
publishing and printing 1,101 20.3 248 17.7 853 223 630
Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 59 25.6 338 3.4 -279 -256 -24
Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 4,867 15.9 2,955 5.5 1,912 -297 2,209
Rubber and plastic products 513 23.0 1,517 14.7 -1,005 -460 -545
Other non-metallic mineral products 358 6.1 755 9.8 -397 -155 -242
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 2,938 12.4 3,019 8.4 -81 -426 345
Machinery and equipment 11,450 4.1 4,379 21.7 7,072 7,542 -471
Office machinery and computers 942 33.6 6,556 31.3 -5,614 -1,313 -4,301
Electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c. 2,961 13.0 2,826 22.0 135 382 -246
Radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 3,088 4.8 5,988 23.4 -2,900 289 -3,190
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 2,236 17.5 1,293 14.6 943 34 909
Transport equipment 4,308 8.8 1,938 30.9 2,369 2,092 277
a) Average annual growth rate.
Source: UN World Trade Database; WIFO; own calculations.
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Box 5.2: The Institutional Foundations of the Chinese – European Economic Relations
The institutional foundations of modern Chinese-European economic relations have already been laid in 1975 when the
EC and China established diplomatic relations and recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only government of
China. Since then relations have improved and the institutional framework has been continuously evolving and
improving.
Source: European Commission.
Two thousand has been an important year in the history of bilateral economic relations with the establishment of the
European Chamber of Commerce in China and the conclusion of the bilateral negotiations on China’s accession to the
World Trade Organisation. Since then, bilateral institution building has gathered speed. Following an evaluation of the
1998 policy paper, the EU published in 2001 a Communication in which the EU’s China-strategy was discussed. The Euro-
pean concept of a ‘constructive engagement’ of China was further strengthened in a policy paper published in 2003. In
direct response to this paper China published its first policy paper on its relation with the EU.
The economic dimension of bilateral relations is central to political developments and lays the foundation for improve-
ments in bilateral relations in other policy fields. At the same time the political process has provided a very strong insti-
tutional basis for economic exchange in all areas and at the beginning of the 21st century has consolidated the respec-
tive importance of China and the EU as key partners (Algieri, 2002).
China’s success in the attraction of FDI is mirrored
by the important role Foreign Invested Enterprises
(FIE) are commanding in terms of industrial produc-
tion. The share of FIE in China’s industrial output
has risen dramatically in recent years and today
they produce about one third of China’s gross
industrial value. The distribution of China’s FDI
inflows to various sectors, however, does not follow
market parameters alone, but has been and still is
rather heavily regulated by the Chinese govern-
ment. The ‘Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance
Catalogue’ outlines in which industries foreign
investors are welcome, restricted or not permitted.
FIE have an especially strong impact on the produc-
tion of electronic and telecommunication equip-
ment (73 % share of industrial output), office
machinery (62 % share), leather and sports goods
(both over 53 % share of industrial output), furni-
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ture (47 % share), as well as garments and plastic
products (both with a share over 42 %).
European FDI in China and Europe’s trade with
FIE in China
The bulk of China’s FDI inflows has been undertaken
by the overseas Chinese community. Hong Kong,
Taiwan and South-East Asia have been the most
important investors in China. The Triad economies of
the EU, Japan and the USA each have accounted for
only about 10 % of all China-bound FDI.
During the five year period 1998-2002 only about
1 % of Europe’s FDI flows have been directed
towards China.209 Even if potential distortions in the
data related to investments executed by affiliates of
European companies registered in Hong Kong,
Singapore, etc., are taken into consideration, Euro-
pean FDI in China is very moderate especially in
view of the total size of European economies.
The comparatively weak presence of the European
economies in China can, to a large extent, be
explained by historical developments in Europe
itself. European integration, German re-unification
and emerging possibilities to access the East Euro-
pean markets, has absorbed substantial amounts of
capital and management capacities that otherwise
might have been allocated to ventures in China.
Nevertheless, the absolute volumes of China-bound
FDI flows have multiplied in recent years. For
example, British enterprises’ FDI in China amounted
to only US$ 71.6 million in 1985 but rose to US$
895.8 million in 2002. In the same period German
FDI flows rose from US$ 24.1 to US$ 928.0 million,
while French enterprises committed US$ 32.5
million in 1985 but US$ 575.6 million in 2002 to
activities in China – see Table 5.4.
The growth of European investment in China
mirrors the path of China’s market transformation
and its opening to the world economy. The 1980s,
characterized by a wait-and-see attitude, reflected
institutional obstacles in China’s FDI regulations
(Taube, 1997). A change occurred towards 1992,
when it was clear that the party leadership was
strongly committed to China’s integration in world
markets, and global and European FDI flows to
China increased markedly. Since then the institu-
tional environment has continued to improve
while China’s entry to the WTO has, generally,
provided further stimulus to European FDI. Ho-
wever, a reduction in European FDI flows occurred
in 2002, reflecting various economic factors but
also a preoccupation with the prospective enlarge-
ment.
209 European investment projects, however, are on average more technology
intensive than those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and South East Asia in general.
As such they are making a larger contribution to China’s industrial upgrading
than the latter. A detailed discussion of European FDI in China can be found
in van den Bulcke et al. (2003).
Graph 5.2: FDI Inflows to China 1978-2003 (US$ billion)
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Graph 5.3: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction by Selected Economies, (FDI Inflows 2002, US$ million)
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Graph 5.4: Foreign Direct Investment Attraction (FDI Stock to GDP, 2002)
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Early European FDI to China has been motivated
primarily by low costs and less by the size and
potential of China’s market. Consequently, a consid-
erable share of FIE production has been exported.
However, more liberal FDI regulations resulting in
better access to the Chinese market (especially in
the service sector), and rising incomes are gradually
changing the character of European FDI as new
investment opportunities are exploited. Market
seeking FDI is becoming more important and is
expected to gain a further impetus following the
WTO accession.
Reflecting the resource-oriented character of many
investment projects, a considerable share of the EU
trade with China is conducted with FIE located in
China amounting to around 50 % of the EU-15
trade with China – see Tables 5.5 and 5.6. For the
FIE sector, however, the EU represents no more than
about one seventh of total FIE trade. The share of
FIE exports to the EU in total Chinese exports to EU
has continuously risen and from 1998 on FIE
exports have become larger than imports – see
Graph 5.5. Today, exports by Chinese FIE to the EU
surpass FIE imports from the EU by a wide margin,
reflecting growth rates differentials in FIE absorption
of European capital goods and machinery and in EU
imports of light industrial products from China.
EU exports to China are largely dominated by
capital goods, especially machinery imported by
local enterprises to establish or upgrade produc-
tion facilities. While such exports have been
directed to customers in China irrespective of
their ownership structures (state, collective,
domestic private or foreign) and therefore have
been able to evolve in an early stage, most EU
imports from Chinese FIE are founded in
complex, long-term business relationships. A
considerable share of these imports concerns
intra-firm trade, according to which EU enter-
prises are sourcing inputs or final products from
their Chinese affiliates. Another part concerns
(European or third-country) Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) which have relocated their
manufacturing plants from a third country (e.g.
South East Asia or Eastern Europe) to China in
order to benefit from lower production costs and
continue to supply their European customers
from this new production base. Accordingly, the
marked increase in FIE exports to the EU mirrors
the establishment of large production capacities
by resource seeking FIE beginning in 1992 and
likely to continue further following the 2001
accession to WTO.
Table 5.4: European FDI Flows to China, 1994-2002, (US$ million)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 10.10 18.65 16.75 74.61 21.13 23.17 22.59 57.78 67.27
Belgium 31.83 54.07 45.49 33.26 28.04 83.22 56.16 20.02 124.28
Denmark 1.65 35.35 28.85 16.81 62.66 84.91 49.46 56.38 71.09
Finland 1.18 4.86 7.10 4.95 39.30 67.65 59.83 73.71 64.65
France 192.04 287.02 423.75 474.65 714.89 884.29 853.16 532.46 575.60
Germany 258.99 386.35 518.31 992.63 736.73 1,373.26 1,041.49 1,212.92 927.96
Greece 0.05 1.02 - - 0.30 0.03 12.89 7.31 6.17
Ireland - 0.90 10.03 0.30 - 3.05 0.76 1.29 13.22
Italy 206.16 263.31 166.94 215.04 274.57 187.44 209.51 219.98 176.74
Luxembourg 1.44 10.29 10.26 1.00 11.51 4.22 23.44 28.78 13.53
Netherlands 111.05 114.11 125.11 413.80 718.82 541.68 789.48 776.11 571.75
Portugal 1.36 6.32 4.89 8.67 8.31 3.40 26.02 9.76
Spain 10.18 26.32 20.73 38.81 53.83 17.54 34.00 33.89 92.24
Sweden 24.18 13.56 56.69 42.81 133.42 155.80 159.24 84.39 99.80
United Kingdom 688.84 914.14 1,300.73 1,857.56 1,174.86 1,044.49 1,164.05 1,051.66 895.76
EU-12 1,415.28
EU-15 2,131.31 2,737.06 4,171.15 3,978.73 4,506.51 4,479.46 4,182.70 3,709.82
Czech Rep. 3.32 7.29 10.42 4.98 5.07 14.07 9.75 4.87 15.69
Hungary 3.71 3.06 3.93 5.67 10.73 12.04 10.65 21.53 20.73
Poland 1.86 1.57 3.38 0.94 0.94 3.54 4.64 3.67 3.67
Norway 2.31 1.53 26.79 6.46 25.92 18.59 24.10 6.22 28.99
Switzerland 70.54 63.53 187.61 215.67 228.82 247.09 194.03 205.44 199.80
World 33,766.5 37,520.5 41,725.5 45,257.0 45,462.7 40,318.7 40,714.8 46,877.6 52,742.9
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Commerce.
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5.3.3 Assessing China’s Competitiveness
The Competitive Edge of China’s Export Industry
China’s reform process and rapid economic develop-
ment have gone in parallel with a notable shift in
China’s revealed comparative advantages (RCA).210
While resource-intensive, low-tech and labour-inten-
sive products were core exports during the 1980s, by
1995 China’s export structure had already changed
significantly, notwithstanding strong and even
growing competitiveness in traditional Chinese prod-
ucts such as textiles, clothing and leather.
Foreign trade developments indicate that China’s
competitiveness has improved more widely since
the mid-1990s. RCA indices for selected industries
suggest that positive RCA values are not restricted
Table 5.5: Imports by FIE from the EU to China, 1991-2003
1991 2,347 16,908 13.88 8,402 27.93
1992 3,229 26,387 12.24 9,802 32.94
1993 6,399 41,833 15.30 14,108 45.36
1994 7,875 52,934 14.88 16,939 46.49
1995 14,913 62,943 23.69 21,254 70.17
1996 11,381 75,604 15.05 19,868 57.28
1997 10,615 77,720 13.66 19,192 55.31
1998 11,220 76,717 14.63 20,715 54.16
1999 12,496 85,884 14.55 25,465 49.07
2000 16,623 117,273 14.17 30,845 53.89
2001 18,577 125,863 14.80 35,723 52.00
2002 18,943 160,272 11.82 38,543 49.15
2003 26,041 231,914 11.23 53,062 49.08
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Chinese Customs Statistics.
FIE imports 
from the EU,
US$ million
Total FIE 
imports,
US$ million
FIE imports from 
EU in % of total FIE
imports
Total Chinese
imports from 
EU,
US$ million
FIE imports 
from EU in % 
of total Chinese
imports from EU
Table 5.6: Exports by FIE from China to the EU, 1991-2003
1991 457 12,047 3.79 6,739 6.78
1992 713 17,360 4.11 7,601 9.38
1993 2,894 25,237 11.47 11,692 24.75
1994 3,714 34,713 10.70 14,580 25.47
1995 4,821 46,876 10.28 19,090 25.25
1996 7,030 61,506 11.43 19,831 35.45
1997 9,136 74,900 12.20 23,811 38.37
1998 11,523 80,962 14.23 28,148 40.94
1999 12,660 88,628 14.28 30,211 41.91
2000 17,300 119,441 14.48 38,193 45.30
2001 19,277 133,235 14.50 40,904 47.13
2002 23,946 169,936 14.09 48,210 49.67
2003 39,514 240,338 16.44 72,155 54.76
Source: Ministry of Commerce, Chinese Customs Statistics.
FIE exports to
EU,
US$ million
Total FIE 
exports,
US$ million
FIE exports to 
EU in % of total FIE
exports
Total Chinese
exports to 
EU,
US$ million
FIE exports
to EU in % 
of total Chinese
exports to EU
210 In this section, the RCA index is used as a proxy of a country’s unobserved
comparative advantage and thus as a proxy of a country’s international
competitiveness. To the extent that the index is sensitive to government
strategies and policy actions it might not be a good proxy for competitive-
ness. Still, it is a widely used index and that justifies its use here.
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to agricultural and labour-intensive products only
but also apply to some medium-tech and more
capital intensive products. Also, there have been
RCA (competitiveness) improvements in industries
supplying more complex products, such as informa-
tion and communication technologies (See Graph
5.6, upper panel). Even in machinery and equip-
ment products where China has been strongly
dependent on foreign technology negative RCA
values are improving.211
Some of the sectors showing a strong trade perform-
ance are sectors where output from FIE represents a
high share of the total sector’s production (e.g.
telecommunication equipment 73%, office
machinery 62%). As mentioned, European FDI flows
to China have traditionally been resource oriented,
and presumably some of these flows respond to
multinationals’ strategy of splitting up production
processes and reallocating them across countries in
order to benefit from international labor arbitrage.212
It is thus probable that China’s RCA evolution in
modern sectors is partly driven by vertical FDI; i.e. by
multinationals-linked plants specializing in those parts
of the production processes intensives in low-medium
skill labor. In order to adequately illustrate this fact a
more disaggregated data analysis would be needed.
Box 5.3: Revealed Comparative Advantage
The Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index meas-
ures the relative export performance by country and
industry. It is defined as the share of a country’s exports of
a certain product in the total exports of this country
divided by the share of the exports of this product by the
world in the world’s total exports. The result is trans-
formed in a natural logarithm and multiplied by 100. The
index takes a positive (negative) value if the first ratio is
higher (smaller) than the second. A positive value indi-
cates a revealed comparative advantage, i.e. relative
strong export performance, of a country in the said good.
The RCA index takes the form:
RCA = 100* In 
with:
χi,j denoting exports of product i by country j
χi,w denoting exports of product i by world
Xi denoting total exports of country i
Ww denoting total exports world
Graph 5.5: EU trade with FIE Located in China, 1991-2003
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Raw materials and intermediary goods are among
the product groups characterized by declines in
RCA values (Graph 5.6, lower chart). The negative
RCA values for pulp and paper, coke and refinery
products appear to reflect primarily the increased
internal demand which has contributed to diverting
production away from exports. It is also a reflection
211 In transport equipment the improvement is driven by efficiency seeking
subcontractors to the major brands of the automotive industry.
212 Therefore contributing to improve EU firms’ competitiveness.
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Graph 5.6: Dynamic Development of China’s RCA (NACE 2-digit level)
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Graph 5.7: Dynamic Development of EU-15’s RCA (NACE 2-digit level)
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Graph 5.8: Dynamic Development of the new Member States’ RCA (NACE 2-digit level)
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of growing downstream capacities which provide
an opportunity to processing intermediary products
thus gaining a higher proportion of the overall
value added of final products.
There is a degree of complementarity between devel-
opments in China’s and the EU-15’s RCAs - compare
Graphs 5.6 and 5.7. In most areas where China shows
decreasing trade competitiveness the EU-15 shows
gaining revealed advantages. One of the few excep-
tions is textile and clothing products. The improved
situation for European producers in this market reflects
the strength of high-end products and luxury brands.
However, the data reveal weakness in areas in which
Europe possesses an outstanding position in interna-
tional markets, such as in the manufacture of transport
equipment and machinery (see Graph 5.7, lower
chart). This reflects to an extent growing imports of low
value added intermediate goods but also the impact of
the integration of the new Member States into the EU-
15 manufacturing networks.
Since the mid-1990s the new Member States have
improved their trade performance in machinery and
transport equipment (see Graph 5.8). Among those
sectors with declining RCAs are textile, clothing and
leather products, branches in which the new
Member States had performed strongly in earlier
times but currently are unable to compete against
low-wage countries in Asia.
The Competitive Challenge to the 
new Member States
The challenge posed by Chinese industrialization is of
particular importance for the new Member States.
The similarity of trade structures could be a good
indicator of the market competition they are facing
(see Box 5.4 for the definition of the similarity index).
The underlying assumption is that the EU-15 is the
most important market for exports of the Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Turkey and they face
competition from China in this market.
The structures of trade to the EU-15 of the three largest
new Member States are quite homogenous. At the 3-
digit level the similarity of trade indices range between
55 and 59 and at the 2-digit level the range is some-
what higher between 62 and 67 - see Table 5.7. In
contrast, EU trade with China greatly differs from EU
trade with any of the new Member States. Exports from
Hungary and China to the EU show the greatest simi-
larity while Turkey’s export pattern to the EU differs the
most from that of China’s.
Hungary’s exposure to China’s challenge is partly a
reflection of its success in attracting FDI in the
manufacture of IT equipment, investment which led
to large exports of these products. While initially IT
was not important in Hungary’s exports, these
products accounted to 13 % of its exports to the EU
by 2001. This is the highest IT share among exports
from the new Member States and compares well
with the share of 15 % of IT equipment in China’s
exports to the EU in 2001.
A comparison of trade shares for the period 1996-
2001 shows that product groups which gained in
Chinese exports also gained shares in exports from the
new Member States, in particular, of the Czech
Republic and Hungary - see Table 5.8. This might be a
typical pattern in industrialization and market growth,
but it also indicates that there is a growing competi-
tion in markets for more sophisticated products.
For Poland and Turkey the opposite has occurred,
with both experiencing declines in the share of
competing products. In the case of Poland this has
been caused by strongly growing exports of
internal combustion engines which do not play an
important role in Chinese exports. Moreover
Poland is a leading exporter of furniture, a peculi-
arity among new Member States that has increased
over time. The low similarity index in the case of
Turkey is to a large extent caused by a poor regula-
tory environment which inhibits foreign direct
investment, especially efficiency seeking FDI. This
suggests that Turkey’s declining exposure to
Chinese competition is primarily a reflection of a
lagging industrialization process.
Box 5.4: Similarity Index
The Similarity Index takes the form:
S = ∑ min (Si
ad, Si
bd) 100
with i denotes products group i
a, b, d, country a, b, d,
Si
sd percentage share of product 
i in exports of country a to d
The Similarity Index measures the similarity of country a’s
exports to country d with that of country b’s exports to
country d. Here, ‘country d’ is the EU-15. The index may
take values running from 0 to 100. A complete identity
of export structures would be equivalent to an index
value of 100. The index values are dependent on the
level of aggregation, usually recording smaller values the
more disaggregated the sectors or products are.
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Factor endowment and trade patterns
Mature industrialized countries face a challenge
from emerging economies which have especially a
labour cost advantage. Therefore technological
progress and investment in human capital are key
strategies for industrialized countries.
Graph 5.9 shows exports to the EU by quality of
labour inputs for 1995 and 2002.213 Across the
three sub-regions (new Member States, candidate
countries and China) there is a notable improve-
ment in the quality of labour input between the
two dates. For China, the share of products which
require high-skill labour has grown by around 70 %
between 1995 and 2002 to a share of 20 % of
exports in 2002 while the share of products of low-
skill industries fell by ten percent-points to less than
30 %. These developments point at growing
competitive pressure for human-capital intensive
industries which used to be less exposed to compe-
tition from low-wage countries. One example of
growing import penetration in the EU-15 by China
concerns IT products.
Exports of the new Member States and candidate
countries to the EU-15 are considerably different
from those of China. Although the share of high-
skill industries in total exports has grown during this
period it has still remained much lower compared
to China’s. In 2002, for example, such exports from
the more advanced new Member States reached
12 %, which is about half of that of China. Instead,
industries employing medium-skilled blue-collar
workers advanced reaching more than 30 % of total
exports from new Member States to the EU. This
reflects in part FDI in the new Member States espe-
cially in the automotive sector. The share of quali-
fied blue-collar skill exports from China grew only
proportional to their overall exports to the EU.
The share of low skill-labour industries shrank in all
exports. And while the share of low-skill products in
China’s exports is comparable to that of the new
Member States, in the case of the candidate coun-
tries this share is in excess of 60 %. Exports of
textiles and apparel are of major importance in this
skill category and most originate in Turkey.
Graph 5.10 presents another classification of
exports of the same countries based on industry
characteristics. Products are grouped according to
(i) technology with high R&D content (ii) capital
intensity (iii) labour intensity and (iv) marketing-
213 For clustering industries by labour quality and by endowments factor inputs
the WIFO categorization has been applied, see 2003 Competitiveness Report.
Table 5.7: Similarity of Trade Structures of Selected Economies (Exports to EU-15 in 2001: 
SITC 2-digit and SITC 3-digit Level)
2-digit 3-digit China Czech Republic Hungary Poland Turkey
China x 41.69 49.96 38.65 30.37
Czech Republic 57.62 x 58.00 58.97 36.13
Hungary 60.51 62.71 x 55.37 34.10
Poland 54.70 67.29 62.39 x 43.71
Turkey 44.77 44.05 40.22 50.05 x
Table 5.8: Selected Economies’ Direct Competition with Chinese Exports into EU-15 in the Ten Most
Important Product Groups
Share in 1996* Share in 2001* 2001-1996 change
in percentage points
Czech Republic 1.92 9.04 +7.12
Hungary 16.17 21.05 +4.88
Poland 10.13 4.36 -5.77
Turkey 29.42 11.77 -17.65
* Percentage share of competing product groups in percent of respective economies’ total exports to EU-15.
Source: OECD; own calculations.
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.
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driven, mostly consumer goods. A fifth residual
group comprises all other industries.
The data show a remarkable growth of exports in
technology sectors. This group comprises computers
and telecommunication equipment as well as life
science products, measurement equipment and
transport equipment (the latter category being
accountable for much of the new Member States’
technology driven exports). Furthermore, new
Member States and candidate countries exports of
computers and telecommunication equipment show
strong growth but for the time being these shares are
still small compared to China’s.
Marketing driven exports from the three regions
have generally lost some of their importance over
the period under consideration, reflecting to some
extent a flat consumer demand growth over much
of the past decade. China’s strength here reflects
marketing-driven exports of articles such as games,
toys, sports goods and the like.
Capital intensive industries are predominantly
process industries which mostly manufacture inter-
mediary goods. Pulp and paper production, man-
made fibres, most of the chemical products, the
manufacture of construction material and basic
metals are within this category. Exports of these
goods have generally lost some of their importance,
reflecting flat demand in the EU and in part reloca-
tion of production of, for example, textiles fibres
overseas.
As shown in Graph 5.10, the share of exports from
labour intensive industries varies between one third
and one fifth of total exports to the EU, being more
important for candidate countries than for new
Member States and China. The most important
product group here is wearing apparel but also
handicraft products and labour intensive assembled
machinery and transport equipment.
Finally, the residual category groups most of the
engineering industries and products of different
Graph 5.9: Exports to the EU by Labour Quality Indicators (% of manufacturing exports to the EU-15)
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materials. These mainstream industries make up
nearly half of the candidate countries’ exports to
the EU but the shares of the new Member States
and of China have shrank to around 20 % in 2002.
China is therefore not only a supplier of industrial
goods manufactured with inexpensive and poorly
skilled labour but also of so-called technology-based
high-tech products. Hence, China’s competitive
position in global market relates not only to its
labour abundance but also to the modernization of
its industrial structures. Thus, China’s challenge has
become increasingly more complex in recent years
and its exports could adversely affect a broad range
of industries in the EU.
5.4 China’s challenge:
opportunities and risks 
for European industries
The competitive impact and business opportunities
associated with the rise of China in the international
economy will differ greatly across industries. Sector-
specific differences in protection of EU and China’s
markets against foreign competitors are only part of
the explanation. Equally important are industries-
specific characteristics as well as the degree to
which the production process (the value chain) can
be (is) divided across national boundaries; the latter
being one indicator of how much local industry
Graph 5.10: Exports to the EU by Input Endowment Indicators (% of manufacturing exports 
to the EU-15)
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may be affected by developments in other regions
of the world.214
China has entered the global markets with increasingly
sophisticated products that require a certain level of
labour qualifications and production technology.
Beyond the textile and apparel industry, which has
been at the forefront of China’s success in exports
markets, the present section reviews trends and devel-
opments in the area of high tech products, such as
telecommunication equipment and computers; of
electrical and non-electrical machinery such as the
engineering industry;215 and in the chemical industry,
one of the most important in the EU and one that has
seen an improvement of its trade balance with China
during the latter half of the 1990s.
5.4.1 Information & Telecommunication
Industry
This industry comprises a wide range of products
which as a common denominator are based on an
application of electricity.216 Specifically, it includes:
1) office machinery and computers; 2) electronic
parts and components necessary for the manufac-
ture of the whole product range of information and
telecommunication equipment, and products for
the final demand;217 and, 3) precision, medical, and
optical instruments, measurement, testing and
industrial process control equipment, watches and
clocks.218 With the exception of some product
groups within the third category, the industry
supplies information and telecommunication (IT)
equipment.
The IT industry has been dominated by global
competition in technology where a certain special-
ization among regions has occurred. The US has
emerged as the predominant actor in computers
and the Internet and it is leading in IT software
development (not included in industrial output as
defined above). Its industrial policy has been
successful to ensure the US a lead in the manufac-
turing technology for the total value added chain in
electronics. Europe is ahead in telecommunication
technology, in digital fixed networks as well as in
mobile networks. Japan took over the lead in
consumer electronics from Europe during the early
1970s. This was a success based on technological
progress and the availability of cheap labour in the
early years of Japan’s industrial development.
During the 1980s relocation of assembling opera-
tions of consumer electronics began and South-East
Asia became a centre for this labour-intensive
production.
The IT industry is still dominated by the industrial-
ized economies. Technological leadership as well as
the largest share of value added to the global
industry’ output is generated here. Only about one
sixth of manufacturing value was created in the
developing world in 2001. But it is this industry that
is leading in the international division of labour.
Most of the assembly of consumer goods including
handsets has been carried out in low-wage coun-
tries. The area of gravity was in South-East Asia but
during the latter half of the 1990s China has
become increasingly important.
In the future, not only the assembly but also the
upstream production of high-tech components is
expected to expand at significantly higher rates in
the developing than the industrialized world – with
China playing a particularly important role.
According to a recent World Bank study (IFC, BAH,
2003) China had a share of 8.1 % (51.7 %) of
global (developing economies’) IT production in
2001. Its share in newly added production value
until 2005, however, is expected to amount to
33 % of the global total and 77 % of that of the
developing world. Nearly half of all high-volume
assembly is expected to be done in China in the
year 2005. China is becoming the hub of elec-
tronics manufacturing in the developing world and
is a key step in the value chain of many electronic
products.
Development Trends in China
China’s electronic industry as well as the domestic
market for electronic goods has developed spectacu-
larly in all segments since the 1990s. The build up of
production facilities, however, has shown quite
different patterns with productivity levels increasing
much faster in mobile handsets and PCs and periph-
erals than in the field of consumer electronics.219 The
219 The Chinese mobile phone market has become the largest worldwide,
commanding a share of about one quarter of total global sales in 2003. FIE,
which in the late 1990s were dominating the market to nearly 100 % are
being squeezed out by domestic companies who are profiting from heavy
handed government support. According to Chinese sources, the share of
Chinese companies in the market for mobile handsets has raised from 5 % in
1998 to 43 % in 2002 and Chinese government plans this share shall rise up
to 80 % in 2005. European companies who are key players in this market are
most affected.
214 Taking the trade/sales ratio as a proxy for this phenomenon it may, for
example, be argued that the automotive sector with a trade/sales ratio of 42
has much less global leverage than for example the consumer electronics
industry with a ratio of 118 (McKinsey, 2003).
215 Chapter 4 of this report analyzes the Chinese challenge for EU car industry.
216 The sector includes products in NACE 30, 32 and 33.
217 Such as valves, tubes, semiconductors, integrated circuits in the first group,
and equipment for the investment in telecommunication networks needed
by operators and the whole range of consumer electronics in the second
group.
218 Electrical engineering products (NACE 31) are mentioned below as part of
the sector engineering industries since many of the products are closely
related to mechanical engineering (NACE 29). Household appliances are also
mentioned in the engineering section.
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reason for this is the relative importance of FDI for the
respective industries. Resource-seeking FDI designed
to produce in China for the global markets have been
highly welcome and have benefited from tax and
other incentives. In contrast, market-seeking FDI,
meant to produce for the domestic market have been
largely discouraged. This pattern also relates with the
strength of domestic industry at the beginning of
China’s opening. While there existed virtually no IT
industry before the entry of foreign investors, China
had its own (stated-owned) producers of brown and
white goods.
Since government bodies and entrepreneurs are not
content with a high dependence on foreign knowl-
edge and marketing strategies, they have started to
develop their own new systemic technologies220
that provide, at the same time, an indirect means to
protect domestic enterprises from foreign competi-
tion in the home market. The government’s indus-
trial policy has had a crucial impact on the develop-
ment of the IT industry, an industrial policy aimed
at supporting domestic chip manufacturing and
offering tax and other incentives as well as pressing
forward to introduce Chinese standards in key areas
effectively increasing market access barriers to
foreigners. Furthermore, global suppliers in the IT
market have been required to reveal the source
code of their software and submit their intellectual
property to Chinese experts. Despite concerns by
foreign firms, it is unlikely that the government will
abandon its objective to create a strong national
electronics industry with broad access to leading
technology.221
Thus, China intends to reduce the strong depend-
ence on foreign technology of this industry whose
share is more than 18 % of all of the Chinese manu-
facturing industries in 2002 – see Table 5.9. The
share of employment of the electronics industry in
China’s total manufacturing is comparable to that in
the EU-15. As the share of electronics in China’s
manufacturing output is high this suggests that this
industry is very efficient in comparison with other
manufacturing industries. In fact, labour produc-
tivity is 50 % higher than the average Chinese
manufacturing productivity.
Impact on Europe
Today, China’s electronics production is already
more than four times the size of that of Eastern
Europe and these volume advantages occur in all
segments of the value chain. The advantage is lesser
in production equipment and semiconductors, two
segments that are also less important in terms of
production value for both regions. Production
equipment and the related process technology are
key technologies to gain technological leadership in
semiconductors and their manufacture. This know-
how is dominated by US enterprises and it is only in
peripheral areas that there are significant suppliers
from other countries.222
The manufacture of Dynamic Random Access
Memories (DRAMs) is a capital-intensive process
which usually is not the first step for an emerging
country to engage in but it will follow after down-
stream production has developed. The construction
of high capacities for the assembly of electronic
components in an industrializing region will attract
investment in upstream component manufacturing
which means that the construction of plants for the
production of memory chips will take place if a
certain threshold is met. Currently, China has
surpassed this level by far and attracts – supported
also by political means – the production of semi-
conductors.223
It is likely that China will cease to be dependent on
upstream deliveries for the assembly of electronics
since the whole value added chain will be estab-
lished in China, including the capital-intensive
manufacture, to meet at least domestic demand
(see EIU, 2003). China will remain dependent on
foreign deliveries of production equipment for the
manufacture of semiconductors. This suggests that
there are only few opportunities for European
exports to China. Most promising are those areas in
which European companies are technological
leaders and a demand for systems and engineering
exists. This concerns primarily the installation and
upgrading of infrastructure for telecommunication
operators.
Already today Europe has a high trade deficit with
China. EU-15 imports grew by an average annual
rate of more than 25 % over the past seven years,
dominated by three subgroups of the electronics
industry: computer, telecommunication and
consumer electronics – see Graph 5.11. In standard-
ized volume products China has the advantage of
222 Europe has a strong position in production technologies for small-batch
manufacture and is on the leading edge in some other processes.
223 According to the EU services information, some EU Enterprises (STMicroelec-
tronic, Infineon and Philips, respectively the 6th, 7th and 10th largest world
largest semiconductor manufacturers), have established 7 development
centres and manufacturing plants that supply the Chinese market. These are
fully owned or are joint-ventures or other technology licensing partnerships.
220 For example, the mobile phone protocol TD-SCDMA and the EDS system as
a DVD standard.
221 Yet there are cases of successful political initiatives in this area. After concerns
raised by the EU and the US both bilaterally and in the WTO, China
announced the indefinite delayed of the implementation of authentication
national standard regulations in the area of wireless local area networks,
which were supposed to enter into force on June 2004.
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an enormous labour force which will enable China
to steadily expand the capacities in this kind of
production without major difficulties. This will likely
attract further relocation of large-batch production
from Europe. The European electronics industry
could shift towards a more knowledge-oriented
industry exploiting advantages in system engi-
neering and hence stay in the technology lead.
In the recent years, EU production in electronics, espe-
cially consumer goods, has become more involved in
the final customisation of products and smoothing the
impact of volatility in demand on output. This suggests
a division in labour between Chinese and European
plants along the value chain according to logistic needs.
Imports of preassembled components will grow and
product specification and final assembly will take place
within Europe - close to final customer markets.
The extraordinary growth of Chinese electronics
exports to the new Member States, at an annual
average rate of more than 50 % between 1996 and
2002, indicates that adjustments to a new form of inter-
national division are taking place. In countries such as
Hungary and Estonia, which have a stronghold in the
manufacture of electronics, structural changes would
follow very likely.
However, IT exports from new Member States to the
EU-15, at growth rates of more than 25 %, suggest
that the production sites in these countries continue
to sustain their importance. The high exposure of the
new Member States to low-wage competition in this
industry is indicated by the similarity index for
exports to EU-15. Compared to China’s deliveries to
EU-15 the similarity index for total IT goods climbed
to 81.5 (Table 5.10), indicating that there are oppor-
tunities for substitution of a considerable range of
products from the new Member States by China’s
products. The new Member States and candidate
countries will inevitably be obliged to develop alter-
native advantages in their competition with produc-
tion locations in China to justify higher wages espe-
cially as convergence in real incomes towards EU-15
levels proceeds.
5.4.2 Textiles and Clothing
The textile and clothing sector has traditionally
been one of the least liberalised and most highly
protected industries in the international
economy.224 Treated as a special case, this sector
was exempt from most trans-industry regulations
developed under the auspices of the GATT/WTO. A
final breakthrough was eventually reached in the
Table 5.9: Key Data for the Electronics Industry
Indicator Units EU-15 New  Member Candidate China
2001 Statesa) countriesb) 2002
2001 2000
Value added
Value Millions ￿ 178,854 7,779 458 34,309
Share of GDP in % 3.0 2.2 0.6 2.2
Share of manufacturing industries in % 12.0 11.7 4.1 18.4
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 4.9 16.9 -6.2 10.9
Employment
Numbers 1000 3,274 624 121 3,390
Share of total in % 2.8 2.3 1.0 0.5
Share of manufacturing industries in % 11.6 10.4 5.2 12.0
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 6.8 3.9 -8.6 -5.5
Labour productivity d)
Indicator ￿ per employee 54,632 12,476 3,791 10,120
Average of manufacturing 
industries = 100 in % 102.8 107.0 78.7 153.2
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 12.5 2.6 17.3
Unit-labour costs
Indicator ￿ per ￿ 0.58 0.47 0.76 0.21
Average of manufacturing 
industries = 100 in % 116.0 98.3 144.0 29.9
a) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; - b) Bulgaria, Romania; - c) 1997-2000 for candidate countries.
d) Value added per capita.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Ifo Institut.
224 The industry is defined as including the NACE categories 17.1-17.7 and 18.
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Table 5.10: Comparison of Electronics and Electrical Products Exports to EU-15
2002 1996 - 2002 Similarity Indexa)
in ￿ million Share Average 1995 2002
of total annual growth
exports rate in percent
China
Total IT goods 13837 28.7 25.3
Computers, IT consumer goods 11927 24.7 26.9
New Member States
Total IT goods 15268 14.8 25.7 45.2 81.5
Computers, IT consumer goods 12449 12.1 42.9
Candidate countries
Total IT goods 1669 6.2 32.5 52.7 46.1
Computers, IT consumer goods 1549 5.8 34.3
a) In this table the similarity index is calculated between exports of China and the new Member States to the EU-15 as well as between exports of
China and the candidate countries to the EU15; see Box 5.4.
Source: UNIDO, WIFO, Ifo Institut.
Graph 5.11: Chinese exports of electronics and electrical products to Europe
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Uruguay Round, when the elimination of the Multi-
fiber Agreement and other quotas on textiles for
WTO member countries was concluded.225 This
process started in 1995 and will be completed by
January 1st, 2005, when 49 % of the quota volumes
existing in 1990 are to be eliminated - see Table
5.11. It is also in the last liberalisation phase that
the most sensitive products will finally be subjected
to WTO principles (Spinanger, 1999). Although the
market will be fully liberalized by the end of 2004,
WTO members will still have a transitional option to
impose quantitative restrictions on China as a result
of the safeguard clauses that have been included in
the protocol of accession of China to the WTO -
until 2008 for the textile specific-clause and until
2013 for the general safeguard clause.
China became a member of the WTO in December of
2001. With the quota reductions under the Agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) applying to WTO
members only, China was not able to profit from these
liberalization measures directly until the third phase in
January 2002. At this moment however the liberaliza-
tion effect for China had been substantial.
Development Trends in China
China’s textile and clothing industry is one of the
largest in the world. In recent years the industry has
gone through drastic reorganisation designed to
increase the productivity of the industry, improve
quality standards and increase its global competi-
tiveness. As a result, the number of enterprises as
well as total employment declined dramatically
while overall output increased substantially.
In recent years a multitude of studies have investi-
gated the effects of China’s accession to WTO on its
economy,226 and nearly all suggest that, at least in
the short term, the main positive impact of China’s
WTO accession will result from the textile and
clothing industry. Indeed, there is no other industry
in which the difference between the level of protec-
tion against China’s products before and after WTO
accession is larger, and no industry in which China’s
factor endowments can create greater leverage
effects in the global division of labour, than textiles
and clothing. China does not only possess an abun-
dant labour force, but has a competitive edge in the
availability of basic materials for the textile industry.
China is the world’s largest cotton producer with a
one quarter of global production and it accounts for
70 % of the world output of mulberry cocoons and
silk materials, and 99 % of the global ramie fibre
production (Bhalla and Qiu, 2004).
Impact on Europe
The textile and clothing industry has remained an
important segment of EU-15 manufacturing. The
industry represents about 7% of employment in manu-
facturing and its share in total EU manufacturing value
added is about 4 % but decreasing - see Table 5.12.
With the recent enlargement the European textile and
clothing industry is experiencing a shock that will
induce a substantial reshuffle of industrial and regional
specialization. The impact on the European labour
market may be large, with a net addition of about one
third of the already employed 1,800,000 people in the
textile and clothing industry of the EU-15.227 The
greatest challenge however will result from the elimina-
226 OECD (2002) provides an overview of major studies that use computable
general equilibrium models.
227 According to data from the Viena based WIIW. In recent years, however,
substantial relocations of production facilities from the EU-15 to the new
Member States have already anticipated a good deal of the structural adap-
tations that become necessary with the enlargement. The enlargement may
strengthen the textile and clothing industry of the EU-15 countries as well as
in the new Member States as the business formalities between EU-15 enter-
prises and their affiliates, subcontractors etc. in the new Member States will
become less burdened with transaction costs.
225 The Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) is a trade agreement adopted in 1973 by
industrialized countries that set quotas for the amount of textiles and apparel
that other countries could export to these countries.
Table 5.11: The MFA Phase-out
1993, December ‘Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’ (ATC) agreed upon in the Uruguay Round final draft act.
All MFA and other quotas on textiles shall be phased out in a 10 year period, starting 1995
1995, January 1 1st ATC tranche liberalised by importing countries – 16 % of the 1990 import volume
1998, January 1 2nd ATC tranche liberalised by importing countries – further 17 % of the 1990 import volume
2002, January 1 3rd ATC tranche liberalised by importing countries – further 18 % of the 1990 import volume
2005, January 1 4th ATC tranche to be liberalised by importing countries – final 49 % of the 1990 import volume
Note: Quotas not lifted in the first three stages are to be increased on a yearly basis.
Source: Spinanger (1999).
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tion of import quotas on January 1, 2005 – and thus the
competitive pressure arising from the expected greatest
beneficiary of this liberalization, China.
The textile and clothing industries in the new Member
States has yet to become adequately efficient.
Although labour productivity has grown since the mid-
1990s by nearly 5 % per annum, it still remains low
compared to other manufacturing industries of the
regions. Even though this industry laid off 4.5 % of
their labour force per year labour productivity is only
36 % of the manufacturing industries and thus even
lower than for the Chinese textile industry which is
close to 40 %. For the candidate countries the situation
appears to be even worse (there are no output and
employment data for Turkey however).
After three ATC liberalisation rounds, imports from
China to the EU are still subject to strict quota
limits. In 2003 out of 42 product groups subject to
import quotas 26 have utilized more than 90 % of
the quota. This high utilization level indicates that
quotas are actually binding and they are
suppressing imports from China. Obviously, with
the elimination of all import quotas it is certain that
European imports from China will increase.
An increase in imports from China will probably not
be accompanied by an equal increase in total textile
and clothing imports in the EU. At least in the EU-
15 markets for textiles and clothing seem to be
saturated. In Germany, for example, overall imports
of textiles are stagnant, while clothing imports are
declining. Therefore, it is likely that imports from
China will crowd out other textile producers and
exporters with China taking over market shares
from them. This process will probably accelerate by
an increasing price competitiveness of Chinese
exporters which will not only be able to make full
use of labour abundance but, from January 1, 2005
onwards, will also save on costs that currently relate
to the purchase of export licenses.228
228 With these costs amounting to up to 20 % (Jungbauer, 2004) there exist
scope for considerable price cuts.
Table 5.12: Key Data for the Textile Industry
Indicator Units EU-15 New  Member  Candidate    China
2001 Statesa) countriesb) 2002
2001 2000
Value added
Value ￿ million 59,333 2,764 761 10,799
Share of GDP in % 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.7
Share of manufacturing industries in % 4.0 4.1 6.8 5.8
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 1.8 0.0 -0.7 -4.8
Employment
Numbers 1000 1,881 663 532 4,100
Share of total in % 1.6 2.5 4.6 0.6
Share of manufacturing industries in % 6.7 12.0 23.1 14.5
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % -3.4 -4.5 -1.0 -9.9
Labour productivity d)
Indicator ￿ per employee 31,537 4,168 1,432 2634
Average of manufacturing 
industries = 100 in % 59.3 35.7 29.7 39.9
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 4.8 0.3 5.6
Unit-labour costs
Indicator ￿ per ￿ 0.50 0.86 1.21 0.46
Average of manufacturing 
industries = 100 in % 101.0 181.3 231.2 63.9
a) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; - b) Bulgaria, Romania; - c) 1997-2000 for candidate countries.
d) Value added per capita.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Ifo Institut.
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A first glimpse of what might happen in 2005 was
provided in 2002 when in the wake of its WTO
accession and the 3rd ATC round China was able to
increase its exports and expand its market share
substantially. At the same time, very significant unit
price reductions came into effect. For all product
categories liberalised for China under the third ATC
stage EU imports increased by 46 % in value and
192 % in volume while prices fell by 50 % on
average.229 Thus besides forcing (always painful)
restructuring, the impact on Europe will also trans-
late into lower prices for consumers and a more
efficient, less-distorted global division of labour.
The impact of integration of China’s textile and
clothing industry on the new Member States is
likely to be very significant. In 2002 more than
50 % of the total exports of the new Member States
were accounted for by textile and clothing –about
90 % was exported to the EU. In 2003, in all but
two of the sector’s products exported by new
Member States China’s import quotas were utilized
to or in excess of 90 %. The economy facing the
greatest challenge could be Turkey notwithstanding
its textile industry having a broad basis and good
upstream link. Turkey’s most important export
goods to the EU (‘articles of apparel, of textile
fabrics, n.e.c.’) are also part of China’s top ten
exports to the EU-15.
China’s exports of textile and clothing goods to EU-
15 have grown moderately compared to other
industries but imports by the new Member States
have been growing strongly while exports to candi-
date countries have grown at annual rates of less
than 5 % - see Graph 5.12. Two sub-groups within
textiles and clothing exports – fabrics, knitted and
crocheted articles representing around 15 % of EU-
15 textile and clothing imports from China – grew
markedly stronger than the average.
The three regions (new Member States, candidate
countries and China) share a high similarity in trade
structure. Already in 1995 the similarity index was
above 80 and it further grew to a value above
90 indicating the potential for substitution and
price competition between the three regions – see
Table 5.13.
There is a possibility to contain the restructuring effect
of the integration of China’s textile and clothing
industry on the EU based on specific safeguards 229 See European Commission, 2003.
Graph 5.12: Chinese exports of textile and clothing products to Europe
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providing for limiting imports if an increase causes or
threatens to cause domestic market disruptions or result
in ‘significant trade distortions’. Such safeguard provi-
sions, which may take the form of customs duties or
quantitative restrictions, are included in China’s WTO
accession protocol and were enshrined in Community
law by the EU in early 2003. WTO-sanctioned safe-
guards designed especially for the textiles and clothing
industry may be applied until the end of 2008. A further
product-specific protection mechanism may be applied
until the end of 2013.
China is not only a threat to the European textile and
clothing industry but also an opportunity. As EU
home markets are at least partly saturated, China is a
potential target market for European manufacturers
of high-quality products. In acceding to WTO China
made substantial concessions about access to its
domestic market. In 2005 average customs duties on
textiles and clothing will be reduced to 13 %, while
quantitative restrictions on the import of particular
textile pre-products will be lifted. Growing affluence
especially of China’s young urban population can be
expected to raise demand for high quality clothing
and fashion items made in Europe.230
It may, however, be the knowledge as well as
capital intensive area of technical textiles that will
prove to be most interesting for European actors.231
European enterprises with their superior knowledge
in the production of technical textiles may profit
from a booming Chinese economy and its growing
demand for technical textiles used in infrastructure
and construction projects. Among others, a
booming automotive sector can be expected to add
further momentum.232
FDI must also play an important role to promote
European interests in China’s market. As such, Euro-
pean FDI in China’s textile and clothing industry
should not be confined to resource-seeking
ventures that seek to exploit China’s cheap labour
resources. In particular, in the area of technical
textiles, where innovation is driven by new tech-
nologies, opportunities exist to supply China with
textiles important for a broad range of industrial
applications and above all for infrastructure projects
and construction.
5.4.3 Capital Goods and Engineering
Industry
Engineering industries carry out the manufacture of
capital goods. They comprise the manufacture of
electrical engineering (NACE 31) and of mechanical
engineering goods (NACE 29.1-5). These do not
only manufacture capital goods for final demand
but also intermediary goods, parts and components
which are necessary for the assembly of capital
232 It is exactly the three product groups mentioned here (high quality products,
fashion items, technical textiles) for which a study commissioned by the
European Commission (IFM, 2004) suggests Europe as having particular
competitive strength.
230 However, in order to make full use of this market potential both non tariff
barriers and intellectual property rights protection issues will have to be thor-
oughly addressed.
231 This segment includes textiles for the health industries, textiles for chemical
applications (barriers against viral infections, news materials such as carbon
fibre fabrics, etc). One of the most important areas by volume is textiles for
the automotive industry.
Table 5.13: Comparison of Textile and Clothing Exports to the EU-15
2002 1996 - 2002 Similarity Indexa)
in ￿ million Share Average 1995 2002
of total annual growth
exports rate in percent
China
Textiles and clothing 6810 14.1 8.6
Fabrics and knitted apparel 1012 2.1 13.2
New Member States
Textiles and clothing 7768 7.5 2.0 82.4 93.0
Fabrics and knitted apparel 1343 1.3 2.2
Candidate countries
Textiles and clothing 10927 40.7 6.9 80.2 80.9
Fabrics and knitted apparel 1967 7.3 4.9
a) In this table the similarity index is calculated between exports of China and the new Member States to the EU-15, as well as between exports
of China and the candidate countries to EU-15; see Box 5.4.
Source: UNIDO, WIFO, Ifo Institut.
Origin of products/industry
& subgroups
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goods. Most of these intermediary goods, whose
share is more than 50 % of the total production
volume, are complex and sophisticated products.
Mechanical engineering industries are characterised
by a large number of small and medium-sized
companies, a size structure that reflects production
requirements. Only in some sub-branches are
mechanical engineering products suitable for large-
scale production (such as roller bearings, earth
moving machinery and tractors) and, hence, there
are few opportunities for production in which
economies of scale could be achieved and large
players can gain advantage against smaller
competitors.
The structure of the electrical engineering industry
differs somewhat. Here, large industrial groups are
more important. Some sub-branches have a
predominant output of serial products, e.g.
controls, primary cells, electric motors etc. Another
area where large industrial groups are active in is
plant engineering. In these markets large industrial
groups do not exploit advantages in economies of
scale but are in a better position to raise funds for
financing large projects with high contract volumes
compared to SMEs.
The engineering industries are part of the metal
industry and highly dependent on upstream link-
ages and the supply of high quality and technolog-
ically advanced intermediary products to manufac-
ture high performance products, plants and
customized systems. Thus, close industrial linkages
provide strategic advantages and support the evolu-
tion of regional clusters that enjoy comparative
advantages through direct contact between the
supplying and procuring plants. This relation even
holds in the era of the Internet and e-business
because of specific market conditions and product
characteristics. Small-scale production requires high
logistic efforts which cannot be distributed on a
high volume output. The relatively high transport
costs hamper long distance deliveries. Therefore,
the trade-sales ratio for engineering industries of
30 % (EU-15, US and Japan) is low.
In 2002, two thirds of total EU-15 engineering
output was mechanical engineering goods such as
machine tools, steel works, precision tools, robotics,
etc. (statistics of the German Mechanical Engi-
neering Association). An analysis of major non-EU
competitors reveals that the EU is globally in the
lead with an output surpassing that of the US and
also Japan. The EU is in an outstanding position in
the global technology competition. Although some
industrial revival has taken place in the US, it
remains well behind European suppliers’ state-of-
technology in most areas. Competitors from Japan
have caught up in many areas and are eager to
apply advanced technologies, for instance, new
materials and components of IT industries. This area
of activity has been identified as the most chal-
lenging task for European manufacturers.233
Development Trends in China234
The industries in question are of outstanding impor-
tance for emerging countries because they provide
the necessary capital goods. The Chinese govern-
ment has always had an interest in being, at least
partly, self-sufficient and this, even after accession to
WTO, has continued to be a factor in the design of
industrial policies. Liberalization has led to some
restructuring and reform resulting in the abolition
of direct control but the agency in charge, the State
Administration of Machine Building Industry
(SAMB), developed other more complex instru-
ments for the administrative guidance of the
companies under its responsibility.
The objective of developing a national machinery
industry and upgrading the state of technology has
led to a set of regulations guiding the integration of
foreign companies in joint-ventures and the execu-
tion of major industrial projects. These rules are
stringent for large projects. In the case of power
plants, foreign deliveries are not allowed for units
below a certain threshold. Even beyond that
threshold, government approval and a joint venture
are necessary prerequisites before a contract will be
signed. Further, there exist requirements for the
share of local content (Nolan, 2001). Although such
an explicit regulation is no longer adequate after
the accession to the WTO, implicitly major projects
will be handled in line with these or similar require-
ments. These restrictions will not pose major diffi-
culties for most of the projects which are of interest
to global enterprises in the power generating
market given the usual size for a plant. The govern-
ment’s plan for the establishment of power plants
until the end of the decade will provide many
opportunities for foreign companies because China
is lagging behind in this technology.
The engineering industries are highly diversified
and plant engineering is only one area which has
been dominated by specialized companies which
pursue a global approach in sales. These compa-
233 See, among others, Kriegbaum et al. (1997), and Vieweg et al. (2002).
234 See the background study ‘The Challenge to the EU by a Rising Chinese
Economy’ prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness
Report for further details.
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nies are strongly involved in China but many sub-
branches of the engineering industries are domi-
nated by medium-sized enterprises which are
specializing in market niches often on a single
machining process, such as spinning or weaving,
printing or metal cutting. For them it is more diffi-
cult to tap into the Chinese market. Although
there are success stories of SMEs gaining export
contracts for the delivery of manufacturing tech-
nology, only few of these companies have
ventured on to start their own subsidiary or to
become a partner in a joint-venture. In this area,
joint-ventures and other associations have not yet
become as important as in plant engineering, and
domestic engineering industries are lagging
behind overall economic trends in China.
Chinese authorities are enacting regulations that
require mandatory compliance with national stan-
dards and a burdensome and costly conformity
assessment procedure. Given the extensive informa-
tion needed by Chinese laboratories for product
testing purposes, concerns have been raised about
the protection of intellectual property right of
foreign firms. Compliance with the system places a
particularly heavy burden on SMEs.235
China’s mechanical engineering industry has not
gained the importance necessary for an emerging
economy with soaring investment activities in new
production capacities. Its share on total manufac-
turing value added is 6.5 %, around 5 percentage
points lower than in EU-15 and more similar to the
share in new Member States and candidate coun-
tries. On the basis of labour productivity, China’s
engineering industry is highly inefficient even in
comparison with other manufacturing industries.
Labour productivity in engineering amounts to
only 56 % of the average labour productivity in
manufacturing which is lower than the correspon-
ding estimated for the new Member States – see
Table 5.14.
235 The European Commission has intensified co-operation with the competent
Chinese authorities in the field of product certification with a view of
obtaining a simplification of the system.
Table 5.14: Key Data for the Engineering Industry
Indicator Units EU-15 New  Member  Candidate  China 
2001 Statesa)  countriesb)  2002
2001 2000
Value added
Value ￿ million 182,485 4,126 552 11,933
Share of GDP in % 2.9 1.2 0.8 0.8
Share of manufacturing industries in % 11.3 6.2 5.0 6.4
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 2.8 2.6 -8.6 -2.0
Employment
Numbers 1000 3,411 554 245 3,230
Share of total in % 2.8 2.1 2.1 0.4
Share of manufacturing industries in % 11.2 9.9 10.6 11.5
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 0.1 -4.7 -13.1 -10.6
Labour productivity d)
Indicator ￿ per employee 53,499 7,448 2254 3,694
Average of manufacturing industries 
= 100 in % 101.2 63.9 46.9 55.9
Average annual growth rate 1996 - 2002 c) in % 7.7 5.2 9.7
Unit-labour costs
Indicator ￿ per ￿ 0.74 0.78 1.25 0.48
Average of manufacturing industries = 100 in % 142.0 163.1 238.5 67.2
a) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; - b) Bulgaria, Romania; - c) 1997-2000 for candidate countries.
d) Value added per capita.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Ifo Institut.
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Impact on Europe
During the recent slowdown of global economic
growth China has continued to be the only major
market for engineering products, and has become
one of the largest destinations for capital goods
originated in EU-15. Most large European engi-
neering companies are now involved in China. In
2002 the value of exports of engineering products
reached ￿ 14.4 billion and the trade surplus with
China came to ￿ 7.2 billion.
In some sub-branches of the industry characterized
by a high intra-industry trade (machine tools, agri-
cultural machinery, electric motors, insulated wires
and cables),236 intermediary products are procured
from China for the manufacture of capital goods in
Europe. Although close regional linkages and short-
distance transport are an advantage for an industry
with predominance of one-piece and small-batch
production, there are clearly areas open to overseas
procurement for intermediary parts.237
The engineering industries as defined by the NACE
nomenclature also contain some sub-branches,
such as equipment for the distribution of electricity
and accumulators, batteries etc. and domestic
appliances. Most of these products are manufac-
tured in large-batch and are not to be understood
as capital goods. In these subgroups, the EU-15
trade with China shows high deficits, suggesting
that the potential challenges for these European
industries are above all in the production of serial,
large-batch, products.
China’s engineering exports have grown strongly
since the mid-1990s but exports to the new
Member States and candidate countries have
grown even faster than to EU-15, in part reflecting
the impact of the opening up of these economies to
the international trade system – see Graph 5.13.
Exports from the new Member States and candidate
countries to the EU-15 have grown somewhat
slower than those of China since the mid-1990s.
Trade structures across the three regions show
significant similarities suggesting that there are
opportunities for substitution – see the estimates of
the similarity index in Table 5.15. This means that
price competition is likely to be strong especially in
those segments dominated by serial products
manufactured in large batches, such as domestic
236 The Grubel-Lloyd index values are higher than 0.9.
237 While the intra-industrial trade between China and the EU-15 is high only in
some sub-branches, the intra-industrial linkages between the EU-15 and the
new Member States are strong in most sub-branches. For a decade, an
intense division of labour for the exploitation of the regional comparative
advantages has emerged between EU-15 and new Member States compa-
nies. A new cluster in the engineering industries has come into view.
Graph 5.13: Chinese exports of engineering products to Europe
1996-2002
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Candidate Countries New Member States EU-15
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
%
Domestic appliances Mechanical eng. Electrical eng. Total exports
 
Source: UNIDO, WIFO, Ifo Institut.
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:19  Pagina 267European competitiveness report 2004
268
appliances etc. The core of parts and components
produced by engineering industries will be less
contested.
Undoubtedly, it will be necessary to modernize the
outdated and obsolete structures of China’s engi-
neering industry and this will inevitably require high
investment growth. However, given the govern-
ment’s objective to raise the competitiveness of its
domestic companies it will be necessary to depend
and to import international technology and know-
how. If not, domestic industries compelled to invest
in indigenous technology would have to use poor
quality and outdated machinery that would under-
mine their efficiency. This prospect provides inter-
esting opportunities for European engineering firms
both in the short- but even in the long-term.
The core of engineering industries is highly
dependent on strong inter- and intra-sectoral link-
ages with companies on the leading edge of tech-
nology that can provide high-quality parts and
components. These features and the predominant
single-unit and small-batch production makes
manufacturing production facilities less suited for
relocation and thus provide opportunities to build
on the advantages of the engineering cluster in the
EU. The EU is technologically in the lead in these
industries. These considerations suggest that Euro-
pean engineering industries can be attractive part-
ners active in the industrialization of China. To
further strengthen the already good position,
continuous efforts in R&D and more involvement
from medium-sized firms should be encouraged.
5.4.4 Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Industry238
Most of this industry’s products are intermediary
goods delivered to a broad range of downstream
industries and only in some sub-branches, such as
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, products are dedi-
cated to the final demand. Standardization is very
important - nearly all of the industry’s output
consists of serial products - and many products are
commodities sold in international markets. Only in
some segments, in particular in life sciences, there
are opportunities to gain a unique market position
on the basis of product innovation.
Basic chemicals, above all petrochemicals, count for
around one third of the total industry output. Life
science chemicals, dominated by pharmaceuticals
and cosmetics, provide another quarter of the
industry’s output. This segment is driven by research
and development and global technological competi-
tion. In particular, genetic engineering has become a
driver for product innovation since the early 1990s.
More than 70 % of the chemical industries turnover
is supplied by large industrial groups, although
more than 90 % of the companies are SMEs. Even
in the life science segment global enterprises play a
central role.239 Global competition has induced
structural changes in the industry and, in particular,
Table 5.15: Comparison of engineering exports to the EU-15
2002 1996 - 2002 Similarity Indexa)
￿ million Share Average 1995 2002
in total annual growth
exports rate in percent a)
China
Engineering industries 7204 14.9 21.8
Domestic appliances 1785 3.7 22.8
New Member States
Engineering industries 17329 16.8 14.7 87.2 83.7
Domestic appliances 1474 1.4 22.8
Candidate countries
Engineering industries 2526 9.4 15.1 88.6 94.1
Domestic appliances 628 2.3 18.9
a) The similarity index is calculated between exports of China and the new Member States to the EU-15, as well as between exports of China and the
candidate countries to EU-15; see Box 5.4.
Source: UNIDO, WIFO, Ifo Institut.
Origin of products/industry
& subgroups
238 The analysis and data refers to products under NACE 24. Other analysis also
includes NACE 25 -Manufacture of rubber and plastic products- under the
industry.
239 Most of the small companies in genetic engineering are affiliated with the
large groups.
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the large European groups are increasingly focusing
on fewer market segments where they can maintain
or gain a leading position.
Most of the global chemical production has been
carried out in mature industrialized countries. The
Triad economies constitute two thirds of the global
supply, with the EU-15 and the USA producing
around one quarter each. While the US has gained
a strong position in genetic engineering, the Euro-
pean industry is characterized by its broad involve-
ment in all areas.240
The trade-sales ratio of the chemical industry is only
35 % indicating that regional clusters are of impor-
tance and long-distance trade is hampered by a
high weight-price ratio, particularly as it concerns
basic commodities.
Development Trends in China241
China’s chemicals industry is dominated by state-
held groups, conglomerates that in spite of all
efforts have been unable to adjust in order to
exploit economies-of-scale and scope similar to the
large international producers. They command an
unaccountably high number of small out-of-date
plants. The government has announced plans to
shut down these unproductive and environmentally
hazardous operations, most of which are run by
local authorities.
As a consequence, on average, the chemical
industry has remained inefficient in spite of the
establishment of efficient new capacities over a
period of more than a decade. Data in Table 5.16
show that labour productivity in China’s chemicals
industry is only a fraction of that of the EU. This
suggests that there are opportunities not only for
growth but also for broad restructuring of the
industry to improve the allocation of resources and
ultimately to safeguard the environment.
China is strongly dependent on the imports of raw
materials for the chemical industry. It has become a
net importer of oil during the 1990s and analysts
expect continued high growth until the end of the
decade.242 To sustain high rates of economic
growth rates heavy investment in the chemical
industry, among others, will be necessary. In partic-
242 ATKEARNEY (2003), and SRI (2003).
240 The Japanese chemical industry is on the leading edge of technology in the
development of man-made fibres, a small segment as measured by its
volume, but with strong downstream linkages to the Asian textile industry.
241 See the background study ‘The Challenge to the EU by a Rising Chinese
Economy’ prepared for the 2004 edition of the European Competitiveness
Report for further details.
Table 5.16: Key Data for the Chemical Industry
Indicator Units EU-15 New Member  Candidate China
2001 Statesa) countriesb) 2002
2001 2000
Value added
Value Millions ￿ 160,379 4,729 996.9 22,191
Share of GDP in % 2.7 0.4 1.4 1.4
Share of manufacturing industries in % 10.7 7.1 8.9 11.9
Average annual growth rate 1996-2002 c) in % 11.7 2.6 -4.1 3.7
Employment
Numbers 1000 1,685 250 115 3,250
Share of total in % 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.4
Share of manufacturing industries in % 6.0 4.5 5.0 11.5
Average annual growth rate 1996-2002 c) in % -0.6 -4.6 -11.0 -7.5
Labour productivity d)
Indicator ￿ per employee 95,194 18,927 8,687 6,828
Average of manufacturing industries = 100 in % 179.1 162.3 180.7 103.5
Average annual growth rate 1996-2002 c) in % 7.6 7.8 12.1
Unit-labour costs
Indicator ￿ per ￿ 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.27
Average of manufacturing industries = 100 in % 80.8 89.0 83.6 37.5
a) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia; - b) Bulgaria, Romania; - c) 1997-2000 for candidate countries.
d) Value added per capita.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Ifo Institute.
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ular, production capacity in basic chemicals can
emerge as a bottleneck for many manufacturing
industries. Consequently, government plans include
the establishment of new capacities and new proj-
ects are being developed favouring the growth of
the chemical industry.243
Most of the newly established capacities are charac-
terized by high capacity per manufacturing unit as
compared to Europe or the US. This will enable the
exploitation of economies of scale and will
strengthen China’s position as a location for the
manufacture of chemicals. This suggests that the new
capacities are not only established for the domestic
market but to supply chemical products to other
Asian countries (although this may not ultimately be
as important in the basic chemicals industry that
faces a strong demand from downstream industries).
Foreign owned companies have been involved in the
set up of new plants by funding investment or partic-
ipating in joint ventures.
In pharmaceuticals, the Chinese market is character-
ized by certain peculiarities. There exists a broad
market for traditional Chinese medicines but
Western pharmaceuticals have taken over 80 % of
the market. In volume terms, however, it is esti-
mated that both segments command half of the
total market. The traditional market is dominated
by Chinese enterprises and about 1,000 of the total
3,300 Chinese pharmaceutical companies produce
Chinese medicines.
The liberalization of the pharmaceutical industry has
been lagging behind other industries. For the old-
state-planned plants, run under control of the
public administration, the situation changed only at
the end of the 1990s. In contrast, the government
has permitted multinational investment in the
Chinese pharmaceuticals industry from early on in
the reform process. By the mid-1990s, investment
had increased to significant levels and all of the top
companies had set up joint ventures by that time.
Additional stimulus to the restructuring of the phar-
maceutical industry was given by the liberalization
of enterprise funding.
The Chinese pharmaceuticals market is one of the
largest in the world, although expenditure per
capita is on the low side. Demand has been domi-
nated by health organizations under public admin-
istration subject to an outdated regulatory system.
The state-controlled hospitals are run inefficiently
and utilization is below 50 %. The government has
planned to bring in professional management and
shut down many of these facilities. Even more
important for the pharmaceutical industry are initia-
tives to scrap the current distribution system
directed by the central government, regional, and
local authorities.
Impact on Europe
Most of Europe’s international firms have invested in
China and are well positioned to benefit from strong
growth in that country. The size of the market and
China’s policy objective not to leave the industry to
foreign companies necessitates the establishment of
sales subsidiaries and of joint ventures with leading
Chinese groups and indigenous production capacities.
In the area of basic chemicals it will be essential to
run plants in China where the size of the market
provides opportunities to benefit from economies-
of-scale. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, production
capacity in China can be used to supply other Asian
countries. It is likely that an industrial cluster will
ultimately emerge that will permit the exploitation
of intra-industrial division of labour, with close link-
ages between plants along the value chain.
Europe has a surplus in its trade with China in these
products which in 2002 was ￿ 1.9 billion. Exports to
China, which account for around 12 % of total Euro-
pean exports, grew at a double-digit rate between
1995 and 2002 in most sub-branches. Basic chemi-
cals with a share of around 40 % were the dominant
products, followed by pharmaceuticals. Exports of
basic chemicals, induced by soaring Chinese demand
and high economic growth, could weaken if new
capacities in China start production. In pharmaceuti-
cals the situation is somewhat different since these
are not bulk export commodities but in many cases
niche products which are not suited to be produced
at different locations simultaneously.
In 2002, the value of China’s exports was ￿ 3 billion
representing 6 % of total exports. Three small
groups are registering high growth, each of them
representing 1-2 % of chemical exports: paints and
varnishes, soaps and detergents, and man-made
fibres. Average growth of the deliveries to EU-15 for
the period 1995-2002 was between 28 % and 35 %
per annum - see Graph 5.14. Chinese exports to
new Member States and candidate countries grew
even faster.
Growth in the first group is mainly determined by
exports of ink for PC printers; in the second group
by intermediary chemicals necessary for life science
243 The gradual loosening up of the financing restrictions, in particular overseas
listing has provided opportunities for financing major projects, but it also
provides opportunities for foreign players to tap into the Chinese market.
02_2004_0531_testo_EN  12-01-2005  14:19  Pagina 270Chapter 5 — The Challenge to the EU of a Rising Chinese Economy
271
products; and in the third group by basic chemicals
necessary for the manufacture of textiles. The three
groups encompass above all intermediary goods
delivered for further processing. With the exception
of ink, these products are mass commodities and
growing exports to the EU-15 might be a reflection
of excess capacity in China and sales at marginal
costs to European chemicals companies.
The chemicals industry in the new Member States
and candidate countries represents a smaller share
of GDP and employment than in the EU-15 – see
Table 5.16. Countries in both regions are strongly
dependent on chemicals imports and are recording
high deficits in their chemicals trade with the EU-
15. There is a trade deficit even for basic chemicals
even though new Member States and candidate
countries have important production capacities in
this area, but the technology is outdated and
plants, despite cheaper labour costs, can still not be
competitive.
Thus, the chemicals industry in both the new
Member States and in candidate countries is
encountering difficulties. The industry is neither
competitive in comparison with EU-15 production
sites nor in comparison with China’s plants which,
at least as part of joint-ventures or due to FDI,
incorporate latest technologies. Table 5.17 presents
some basic data. The new Member States’ and
candidate countries’ exports of two of the sub-
branches characterized by the highest export
growth from China to the EU-15 have shares of 9 %
and 26 % in total chemicals exports to the EU-15.
Although Chinese exports in these sub-branches are
still small, a continuation of past growth trends will
imply further pressure to new Member States’ and
candidate countries’ industries.
Most of the opportunities for the European chemi-
cals industry from the integration of China in the
world trade system and the access to the WTO will
arise from direct involvement via FDI and own
production facilities in the domestic market. Exports
are less suited to obtain a strong and sustainable
position in this market especially if its size has
surpassed a certain threshold.
Despite problems related in particular to respecting
of intellectual property rights all the big European
chemical producers are already present in China’s
market. Investment projections suggest plans to
benefit from the growth prospects of the economy.
However, it will be necessary to strengthen R&D in
order to stay on the leading edge of technology.
Without state-of-the art technology and products
China’s bureaucracy will not see the need to invite
foreign companies in the domestic market. This will
be crucial especially in pharmaceuticals where
Europe has a strong position, although the US is
gaining the lead in technology with enormous
efforts in R&D. In technical textiles European
suppliers are on the leading edge and can benefit
from China’s growth, in particular the necessity to
invest in infrastructure.
Finally, note that Europe’s trade with Asia could
slowdown or even decline if China’s growth decel-
erates and new capacities come into operation.
These new Chinese plants will be run at lower
Graph 5.14: Chinese exports of chemical products to Europe
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marginal costs than older facilities in Europe, in
particular in new Member States and candidate
countries, making it possible for chemicals, espe-
cially intermediary chemicals, from Asia to be
exported to Europe. The impact on the price level
for chemicals on the international market of a slow-
down in Chinese imports is potentially one of the
biggest threats for the global chemical industry in
the coming years.
5.5 Concluding remarks
Competition from low-wage locations is nothing new
for the EU-15 industries which have adapted to ever
changing environments, thereby learning that ‘soft
factors’ such as time, customisation, reliability, etc.
can make up for labour costs disadvantages. But
emerging China has brought a new quality in global
competition with mature industrialized economies.
The analysis of China’s exports to Europe shows that
beyond cheap labour there is already competitive
pressure originating from China in technological-
driven and knowledge-based products.
The emergence of the China’s economy in interna-
tional trade is linked to a clear industrial policy to
transfer knowledge into economic success for
domestic companies. China has shown an outspoken
interest to attract foreign companies to accelerate the
catch-up process. However, it has also put in place
instruments to prevent domestic companies from
takeovers by foreigners by setting upper limits for
foreign equity shares and stimulating joint ventures.
For the time being, the main challenge relates to
China’s advantageous factor, in particular labour,
endowments. This was originally exploited by
Chinese companies that played the role of original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for the world’s
leading brands and retail labels. The growth of
Chinese brand name producers exploiting these
advantages will become a major challenge to estab-
lished multinationals and brand owners affecting to
a large extent well positioned EU-15 companies.
Driven by the desire to tap the high profit pools of
branded products in the industrialized world and
being pushed by an ambitious Chinese govern-
ment, China’s OEMs are devising strategies to sell
their products under their own brand names.
Faced with China’s competition, the new Member
States and candidate countries have so far been able
to offer more attractive near-shore centres. But
further improvements in the performance of knowl-
edge economies in the new Member States as well as
a better synchronization of traditional EU-15 and new
Member States structures are crucial to cope with
China’s challenge. The more imminent challenge
new Member States are facing, compared to the EU-
15, is reflected by China’s exports to Europe: the
growth rates have been much higher for the deliv-
eries to new Member States than to the EU-15 not
only for all industries under review in this chapter, but
total exports to new Member States have also grown
at higher rates. This reveals that their integration into
the global division of labour has made much progress
since the mid-1990s, although industrial structures
have not yet fully adjusted. Jobs reallocation to China
has led to some employment losses, for instance in
the Hungarian electronics industry. This indicates
that even the manufacture of high-tech products is
being challenged by low-cost locations for produc-
tion of serial products.
Table 5.17: Comparison of Chemical Exports to the EU-15
2002 1996 - 2002 Similarity Index a)
in ￿ Share of Average 1995 2002
million of total annual
exports growth rate
China
Chemicals 2955 6.1 5.5
Paints & man-made fibres 85 0.2 32.5
New Member States
Chemicals 4292 4.2 2.4 71.8 78.6
Paints & man-made fibres 379 0.4 3.2
Candidate countries
Chemicals 609 2.3 -2.7 72.6 74.8
Paints & man-made fibres 163 0.6 0.0
a) In this table the similarity index is calculated between exports of China and the new Member States to the EU-15, as well as between exports
of China and the candidate countries to the EU-15; see Box 5.4.
Source: UNIDO, WIFO, Ifo Institut.
Origin of products/industry 
& subgroups
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Value migration, i.e. the shift of the principal source
of value added from one stage to another in a given
commercial activity, may guarantee European actors
the most profitable segments in the value-added
chain if they can maintain the leading edge in R&D
to stimulate innovation and exploit comparative
advantages in organization, coordination,
marketing, logistics etc. Value migration effects on
the labour market, however, cannot be a priori
determined. As jobs will be lost in traditional
production activities, new jobs will have to be
created in activities more decisive to meet the chal-
lenges from the newly industrializing countries.
Such change has been taken place already during
the 1990s and has led to an employment structure
with a stronger focus in high-skill labour. The final
outcome will very much depend on the institutional
set up in the economies and their flexibility and
capacity to accommodate structural changes.
Recent jobs losses in the manufacturing industries is
clearly not a promising development in spite of the
creation of new jobs with higher qualification
requirements in the service sectors. Employment
has shrunk in both EU-15 industries and in those in
the new Member States.
The opening up of China is not only a challenge; it
also provides great opportunities for European
companies. Many of the market access barriers have
been dismantled during the process of market
reforms and with China’s access to the WTO the
situation has further improved. EU businesses are
already benefiting from the size of the Chinese
market and its increasing appetite for imports (e.g.
capital goods). Also, as European firms have been
relocating activities to China in order to profit from
its cost advantage (e.g. through vertical FDI carried
out by multinationals) they have been improving
their overall competitiveness vis-à-vis international
competitors. And to the extent that FDI flows are
now increasingly turning into market-seeking rather
than resource-seeking flows, fears of job losses to a
low wage destination as China should be minimized
across Europe. Indeed, given China’s large market
potential, the long-term utilization of the opportu-
nities ought to be exploited above all by indigenous
production. Thus, it is not only in the interest of the
Chinese administration but also of European
companies to substitute part of their exports to
China by FDI. The success in this market does not
only generate growth but economies of scale which
are even more important for large enterprises to
protect their strategic position against their
competitors in these markets.
Currently, institutional conditions favouring innova-
tions are better in the EU-15 as well as in the new
Member States than in China. But the vast, inex-
pensive, work force, combined with the develop-
ment of a knowledge economy provides an excel-
lent basis for offshore centres for the manufacture
of a broad range of products and services. The
competitiveness of Europe, its capacity to cope with
the challenges as well as its ability to make use of
the opportunities brought forward by a rising
Chinese economy will, to a great extent, be deter-
mined by its innovation performance.
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